

# **Race and Local Governance: Theoretical Reflections and Examination of Two Case Studies in the United Kingdom and South Africa**

**or**

*"Who said we weren't interested in justice, equality, democracy and freedom?".*      Emancipation in the ushering dusk of Black politics as white boys try to switch off the Enlightenment.

**Research submission by Neville John Adams in fulfilment for a Ph.D. to City University, Department of Sociology in May 2002**

# CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Section I	16
<i>Theoretical Reflections on Race, Racism, and Local Governance</i>	
Chapter 1	17
<i>De- and Reconstructing Race, Racism and Black Anti-Racist Politics</i>	
Chapter 2	77
<i>Framing the Examination of Local Governance Theories</i>	
Chapter 3	88
<i>Version 1 – Post-Fordism</i>	
Chapter 4	106
<i>Version 2 - Localism</i>	
Chapter 5	124
<i>Version 3 – The Critical Theory of Habermas and its Implications for Local Governance</i>	
Chapter 6	184
<i>The Critique of Habermas</i>	
Chapter 7	277
<i>Positively Racialised Local Governance – Controlling the Enlightenment’s Hidden Dimmer Switch</i>	
Section II	317
<i>Bridging Theory and Empirical Research</i>	
Chapter 8	318
<i>Prelude to Empirical details – On Methodology</i>	
Section III	355
<i>Race and Local Governance – Two Case Studies</i>	
Chapter 9	356
<i>Context to UK Race and Local Governance Details</i>	



<b>Chapter 10</b> <i>Overview to UK Race and Local Governance</i>	<b>367</b>
<b>Chapter 11</b> <i>Race and Local Governance – the case of the ‘Target Borough’</i>	<b>416</b>
<b>Chapter 12</b> <i>Race and Local Governance – The Case of Cape Town in South Africa</i>	<b>587</b>
<b>Chapter 13</b> <i>Conclusion</i>	<b>657</b>
<b>Appendix 1</b> <i>Response by Race Equality Advisers to First Attempts by Members to Review Equality Structures</i>	<b>664</b>
<b>Appendix 2</b> <i>Key Memoranda from Equality Advisers to Labour Members on Equal Opportunities Working Party</i>	<b>676</b>
<b>Appendix 3</b> <i>Response from Target Borough’s NALGO Black Workers Group to Council’s ‘Excellence’ Initiative</i>	<b>679</b>
<b>Appendix 4</b> <i>Responses from Equality Advisers to Labour Members’ Attempts to Curtail the Equality Initiative</i>	<b>684</b>
<b>Appendix 5</b> <i>Race Equality Unit’s Briefing Paper to Members on the Incompatibilities between the Race Equality Service Initiatives and those Promoted by the Council under the PSO Initiative</i>	<b>689</b>
<b>Appendix 6</b> <i>Hierarchy of Employees in Target Borough in 1985</i>	<b>694</b>
<b>Appendix 7</b> <i>Interviews Conducted</i>	<b>695</b>
<b>Appendix 8</b> <i>Key to Main Abbreviations Used</i>	<b>696</b>
<b>Notes</b>	<b>698</b>

## **Declaration.**

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# Introduction

As the sub-title suggests, and, as I start to write, this might not turn out to be an ordinary thesis. And who ever said that contingent agency was the sole preserve of the "posties"<sup>1</sup>. This introduction is intended to be a digressive statement of annoyance/anger, condensation of the research's core theoretical themes, continuation of a theoretical project started in the '70s, an indication of areas that require further work, and thus, as that solidary prosaism would have it, "work-in-progress."

## The Route

This is a resuscitation of theoretical themes developed for my first university based research in the mid seventies based on the work of Jurgen Habermas. It has been kept alive and critically tested in the intervening period, primarily within the sphere of local governance, through the practice, experiencing and empirical validation of race, politics and work, areas contextualised by an increasing neo-conservative invasion of the public sector, community, family, person, and, a concomitant growth in *différance* pursuing pseudo-radical theorising. The problem tackled by that original research<sup>2</sup> was, using Tanzania as the "laboratory", why the progressive change based theories of the relationship between the "first" and "third" worlds proffered solutions that would see the third world turned into a work camp. The seemingly schizoid world of these theorists, not just as expressed through the canonical texts, but through the beavering acolytes in various academic sites, would see the hurrahing and championing of engendered civil rights (but not at that stage deracialised ones) in the UK, but their condemnation by silence in the third world through support for so-called progressive regimes. Vast areas of "African" human experience were homogenised under "peasantization", and therein encoded to backwardness. Progress and freedom were to be sought in the nascent African working class. Introduction into the debates of commentary such as, " questions about social institutions, family structure, subjugation of women etc. cannot be left to the post-revolutionary period....(nor can).....the question of the puritanical authoritarianism of socialist Third World countries, which in European socialist countries is condemned by Western Marxists. That is white liberal condescension with a vengeance."<sup>3</sup> - provoked either a "whose-side-are-you-on?" or a stronger "technical progress before we live" response. This was especially so within the strong theoretical Althusserian paradigm that then existed. The collapse of that anally retentive theoretical cul-de-sac with its anti-humanist and agency overtones and the absorption of its now apostate disciples into paralleling post-modernist genres was not



symptomatic of better solutions found, but merely the move from one form of meta-physics to negative metaphysics. The problem still remained which, at its simplest, is how to establish a complementarily equivalent and mutually respectful commonality between the claims to differing forms of social life, especially where those differentiations are unjustly structured<sup>4</sup>. The empirical vindication of the that key question, and the theoretical approach of that first research, can be seen, some twenty five plus years later, in the identification of, and struggles for, substantive democratisation in many parts of Africa.

One of the more fecund theoretical but contrasting endeavours was, and is, therefore, the project undertaken by the heirs to the Frankfurt School critical theorists, in particular Jurgen Habermas with his critique of Marxism that whilst the universals of human development cannot be reduced to social labour, this requires not a rejection of universalism, but a move to another level of abstraction.. In other words the "Enlightenment" is not yet dead. However, the espousal of the "death of the Enlightenment" was, and is however, the basis for a similar set of theoretical projects originating in France and which I'll categorise under the catch-all of post modernism. For the purposes of this introduction, this can be defined as, "that variant of modernism which has given up hope of freeing itself from the ravages of modernity or of mastering the forces unleashed by modernity."<sup>5</sup> In the seventies and eighties, as Black<sup>6</sup> people in the UK and South Africa fought to fulfill the promise of the Enlightenment, a sigh of "that-is-so-passé" resignation could be heard from 'once-were' radicals in the West, including my erstwhile modernity journeying professor, Bauman, in the face of what appeared to be the omnipotence of modern capitalism. Whilst I am aware of the differences between post-Marxism, -structuralism and -colonialism, they are not so important as the common characteristic that they critique and reject the foundations of modernism. The similarity of the two projects - one a critique and extension of modernism, the other a critique and rejection - entailed a critical excursus via the canons of the major post-modernist thinkers, including their acolytes who have used their works to analyse race. Here I include post-colonialists such as Spivak, Bhabha, and Said, and those who have concentrated on race in the metropolitan countries, such as Gates, Goldberg and Stoller.

That core question about the conditions for complementarity between claims to differing forms of social life remains the key interrogative leit motiv to the main motivation to this piece of research. This concerns the reasons for the development of an explicit commitment to race equality in the early eighties in many UK urban local authorities, and its subsequent jettisoning by the early nineties. There are three key contextualising areas, and thus questions. The first is that of local governance, which is simply about how people at the local level can govern themselves. The second is about 'race', where race,

and the differences between 'races' is not endowed with any biological grounding, but is seen as a social construct. The third, given that race is a social construct, is how such forms of local governance can work through the problems of race, notably that of the unjust differentiation of racism, so that 'race' is not a debilitating factor for some in the establishment of complementarity. It is about de-racialising race without incorporating it. Such an approach implies a dimension of active agency. It is to be differentiated from the social constructivism of post structuralism in which, whilst denying the biologism of race, surreptitiously licence another level of ontology by ceding too much determinist power to 'discourses', i.e. the over determination of "knowledge' as a socially constituted category through which power is manifested and deployed".<sup>7</sup> However, just as it appeared that local authorities in the UK were abandoning the substantive resolution to these questions in the early nineties, so another opportunity to examine them anew was presenting itself in the rapidly changing political environment of South Africa where the possibility for a racially inclusive, radical de- and reconstruction of local government, more so than in the UK, existed.

This was opportune for two reasons. Firstly the experience of race and racism of the primary researcher and the need to make sense of that socially and politically, is a key motivation in this piece of research. This was forged in both South Africa and the United Kingdom. Secondly in framing the interpretation of this through critical theory, but in particular Jurgen Habermas, brings into focus the subliminal unease, experienced as one of the 'Other', with certain aspects of his theory, especially as it pertained to its relevance, or not, in the concrete experience of the struggles for race equality in local governance. Not only does this bring into the argument the criticisms of the Enlightenment raised by post modernists, it also, in a real sense, tests the universalistic claims of Habermas, by asking whether or not a theory derived from the 'provincialism' of German thought, has any relevance for a situation some six thousand miles away.

Staying with the work of Habermas, whilst it acknowledges a long developed and well thought out project, the fundamental aims of which I support, it does not entail, however, endorsing it warts and all. There are problem areas, particularly with regard to the 'inclusion of the Other', but which do not of themselves pose problems of such substantive principle that they entail abandoning the project, particularly as this relates to the reconstructive agency of emancipation and what that means. A brief outline of this, compared to that offered by post modernism, is given below as an overview theoretical lead into the main body of the research.

More practically, in terms of the structure of the research and thesis, there is a debate, argumentation and critical interrogation, primarily of Habermas,



which is conducted at three levels: the meta-level, looking at the philosophical implications for Habermas' theory if a proper accounting of race is to be had; the meso- or macro-level, examining the political, social and local governance institutional implications arising out of a critical theoretic approach; and the micro-level, which dissects the detail of the UK and South African case studies of race equality and local governance.

## **Why Habermas?**

In sum because Habermas still attempts to develop a theory of emancipation and reconstructive agency whose universalism, I contend, is of direct relevance to Black people and to the fight against racism.

I want to outline Habermas's idea of emancipation around three principal themes in an evolving spiral fashion so that these will be fleshed out in enlarging cycles "doner" style. This reflects nothing more than the difficulty of attempting to condense into a few pages a plethora of sources. The three themes I want to concentrate on are:

- ◆ universalism
- ◆ rationality
- ◆ unity

As a preface to these considerations, it has to be noted that Habermas's project is essentially a political one aimed at providing the means to address key issues: "respect for each other, the moral autonomy of the individual, economic and social justice, equality, democratic participation, civil and political liberties comparable with principles of justice, solidaristic human associations."<sup>8</sup> In other words "socialism which used to mean making an attempt which was as fallibist as possible and as open to self correction as possible, to at least reduce identifiable injustice, avoidable repressions, in other words, to resolve through collective efforts, and from a specific perspective problems which have to be dealt with and resolved as one goes along the way.....can be (now) characterised in abstract terms: namely, to arrest the destruction of solidaristic collective life - in other words, life-forms with possibilities for expression, with space for moral practical orientations, life forms which offer a context within which one's own identity and that of others can be unfolded less problematically and in a less damaged way."<sup>9</sup> The importance of this project is that it provides a non-privileging means to link the individual level with the collective level.

Let me at this stage introduce an ontogenetic core around which the spiral will develop. This model set out by Benhabib<sup>10</sup> is as follows:

Pace Kant, this subject of reason is a human infant whose body can only be kept alive, whose needs satisfied and whose self can only develop within the human community into which it is born. This infant becomes self through its speech and interaction in the human community. The self becomes an individual by becoming a social being capable of language, interaction and cognition. The self's identity is constituted by a narrative unity which integrates what "I" can do, have done and will accomplish with what you expect of "me", interpret my acts and intentions to mean, wish for me in the future etc. For Habermas Western modernization has given rise to a skewed lop-sided development and utilization of the potentials for rationality within modernity. The possibilities that therefore still exist for domination free rationality mean that he is not prepared to do a deluded Jericho gig - endlessly circling the walls of reason blowing his (own) trumpet.

"What constitutes the idea of socialism for me is the possibility of overcoming the capitalistic simplification of the process of rationalisation. Simplification that is, in the sense of the rise to dominance of cognitive-instrumental aspects, through which everything else is driven into the apparent realm of irrationality."<sup>11</sup>

In a development from an earlier distinction between "labour" and "interaction", Habermas distinguishes between communicative rationality and instrumental/strategic rationality that turns on the theorisation that linguistic interaction has built into it a rationality that cannot be reduced to contextual or instrumental dimensions. For him the speech acts of competent actors conform to rules which help establish the criteria for communicative rationality. Such rules set the competence a speaker has for using sentences aimed at reaching an understanding. When an actor is so inclined, he/she is engaging in communicative action. In terms of speech acts, Habermas argues that every utterance has a propositional component that predicts something of an object. The utterance's meaning is dependent upon the force with which it is put forth i.e., its force which is given by its illocutionary component - I wish, I promise, etc. Such utterances make three validity claims: a truth claim which relates to the objective world of states of affairs; a rightness claim that relates to the social world of normatively regulated interpersonal relations; and a sincerity claim relating the subjective world of experiences to which the speaker has privileged access. Habermas's claim is that these are universally true, implicitly or explicitly for every speech act. In other words the three claims to validity transcend the particular context or linguistic community in which the utterance is made. There are three world correlates to the speaker - objective, social and subjective. Truth validation occurs not by comparing the statement with what is in the world, but by looking at the reasons given



in support. These reasons are evaluated in terms of inter-subjective acceptability. Arguments are accepted because they are better, and not because of the power one speaker has over another. Before we go into the deontological basis to what has just been described i.e the "ideal speech" situation, it would help to digress by way of explaining Habermas's notion of the "lifeworld".

Situational based processes of coming to an understanding takes place against and within a background of lifeworlds. The lifeworld is the repository interpretive work of preceding generations. It acts therefore "as a conservative counter weight to the risk of disagreement that arises with every actual process of reaching understanding."<sup>12</sup> Such problems of disagreement are temporary dislocations in an otherwise shared horizon which helps define what should be done and how "authentic expressions" are to be assessed. The "rationalised lifeworld" on the other hand, comes about as follows:

"To the degree that the institutionalised production of knowledge that is specialised according to cognitive, normative and aesthetic validity claims, penetrates to the level of everyday communication and replaces traditional knowledge in its interaction guiding functions, there is rationalisation of everyday practices that is accessible only from the perspective of action oriented to reaching understanding.....the need for achieving understanding (thus) is met less and less by a reservoir of traditionally certified interpretations immune from criticism....."<sup>13</sup>

For Habermas the rationalised lifeworld can reproduce only to the extent that communicative action functions as the medium. Social action is guided less by normative prescriptions arising from non-traceable sources of authority and more by attempts to secure inter subjective consensus. Implicit in what I have described so far, but explicit in Habermas's work is an evolutionary model of developmental universalism in which there are pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional modes of culture. It is the overlap between the modern world and the post-conventional mode that the rationalised lifeworld can be realised. What Habermas is clear about is that the developmental scheme is not premised upon a stages of history telos that sees an endpoint of world history and culture somewhere in the vicinity of modern day Frankfurt! As I shall argue later such levels are not natural sequential progressions, but can be short-circuited because in many instances they exist side by side.

Returning, therefore, to the "ideal speech" situation, this assumes a state of symmetry between competent speakers whenever they enter into understanding-interaction. Ideal is used to denote that which has a regulative function and which cannot be hypostasised.



"The ideal of universal agreement that is projected by every validity claim, and the correlative ideals of world-totalities corresponding to all true statements, to all correct norms and to all truthful expressions, function in communication as critical reference points."<sup>14</sup>

Implicit in the above, but explicitly stated elsewhere in Habermas's work - and which I will not go into now - is a deontological moral theory in which the emphasis is on justice and rights (as I see it the regulative framework), and not on the "good life". However, the notion of the "ideal" speaks of forces which inhibit the attainment of such. It is here that we need to introduce his ideas on the "colonization of the lifeworld".

To do this we need first to paint a backdrop in which Habermas sees capitalism as having generated an uncoupling of systemically integrated spheres of action, i.e. those of the economic and administrative systems, and those integrated by communicative action. Colonisation of the rationalised lifeworld in modernity occurs when the expansion of systemic integration begins to undermine functions essential to the reproduction of the rationalised lifeworld. That is when the systemic media of money and power begin to displace the performative attitude actors might have towards other interactees and validity claims. Action which is co-ordinated by money and power require an objectivating attitude and, variations on the "Yowser! Yowser! Let's go kick some arse." It is this process of colonisation which generates the pathologies of advanced capitalism, as well as opposition in the form of new social movements. By this Habermas is referring to movements such as the environmental, womens, race etc. These movements are therefore, under this schema, not relegated to the marginal but are central to the understanding of the potentials for change in advanced capitalism. There are key moral, ethical and political questions which are linked directly to the participants in such phenomena. In an advance on Weber's idea of disenchantment in modernity because of increased differentiation, Habermas proposes that "it is not the differentiation and development of cultural value spheres according to their own logic which leads to cultural impoverishment of everyday life, but the elitist splitting off of expert cultures from the contexts of everyday practice."<sup>15</sup> This theory provides a means for looking at the emancipatory potentials of individuals and groups by concentrating on the resources the lifeworld has for preventing functionalisation of domination, promoting rebellion, and, determining the hidden capacities for self determination.

Let me tease out some more of Habermas's ideas on emancipation by looking at one of the key post-modernist criticisms voiced against him; that of being insensitive to difference and the "other". His universalism, they hold, suppresses the claim of the individual over and against the universal. Habermas points to two strands of current thinking on the unity/plural theme

that has been present within metaphysics since its inception. The one evoked by the radical contextualist thinking of people like Lyotard who summon up pluralities of histories and life forms in opposition to a singular world history, "attributes responsibility for the present crises of the present to the metaphysical legacy left by unitary thinking within the philosophy of the subject and philosophy of history. The other, in an attempt to go back to metaphysics, or even a further regression, want to protect "the powers of tradition which are no longer rationally defensible..."<sup>16</sup> Both I claim, even though Habermas has not on this occasion said so, give succour to the neo-conservative forces.

Habermas, on the other hand is clear that he is not privileging the universal above the individual, the "other" or difference, but, rather is attempting to ensure that the individual is not entombed in extreme relativistic and/or racist/culturo-centric particularisms. Metaphysics on the other hand does suppress the individual at the expense of the universal since the individual totality is made dependent upon an absolute totality. Habermas contends that it is possible to conceptualise the individual in a way that fleshes out the dimensions of autonomy and the capacity to be oneself, and allows for a distinction to be made between social differentiation and progressive individuation.

"The metaphysical priority of unity above plurality and the contextualistic priority of plurality above unity are secret accomplices. My reflections point towards the thesis that the unity of reason only remains perceptible in the plurality of its voices - as the possibility in principle of passing from one language to another - a passage that, no matter how occasional, is still comprehensible. This possibility of mutual understanding, which is now guaranteed only procedurally and is realised only transitorily, forms the background for the existing diversity of those who encounter one another - even when they fail to understand each other."<sup>17</sup>

The argument contained in that passage has two critical moments. The first builds on the realisation contained in the paradigmatic move from the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of language, that it is through language that the historical and cultural substantiations of the human mind can be accessed. Eschewing objectivistic and relativistic strands in the philosophy of language model, and in particular with the relativistic one that "there are no standards of rationality that point beyond the local commitments of the various universes of discourse", Habermas proposes that in the process of reaching understanding all participants acknowledge, implicitly or explicitly, the potential that exists for consensus, even if these potentials originate in different contexts.

"Concepts like truth, rationality, or justification play the same grammatical role in every linguistic community.....all languages offer the possibility of distinguishing between what is true and what we hold to be true"<sup>18</sup>



The explicit acknowledgement of a post-conventional self not tied to a "civilised" telos provides the basis for the second critical moment whereby Habermas distinguishes between two dimensions in which the post-conventional self appeals to a universal community. In the first, the moral, an individual through discourse seeks consensus with a larger community about the rightness of binding norms. In the other, the ethical, the individual lays claim to a unique identity which is implicitly or explicitly in contradistinction to the imposition of a social type. In this agreement with the larger community is not so much sought as the recognition of that individual as the one he/she wishes to be. Here the self is not conflated with "I-wannabee", but launches a claim to radical authenticity through engaging in the non-distorted process of recognition by others. The post-conventional self, and the possibility for such, which requires the taking up of a critical attitude towards the given norms in a particular society, means that individuation cannot be equated with social differentiation. Let me pursue this line of thought in Habermas, because, as I shall propose and adumbrate in the body of the thesis, it provides for new thinking on the issue of race and the potential for change, both collectively and individually. Habermas does, however, believe that social differentiation results in flooding the conventional individual's carbuettor with conflicting demands which can result in the break-up of that conventional identity. .. But this is an ambiguous process in which the individual can proceed ambivalently, able to realise the emancipatory potential only if he/she can "transitionise" to post-conventional identity structures. This requires not isolation, but the projected re-integration into a larger community. Thus the supposition of a projected of a universal community relies upon, not the subsumption of the individual, but the existence of a complementary relationship.

"Repulsion towards the One and veneration of the...Other....obscure the transitory unity that is generated in the porous and refracted intersubjectivity of a linguistically mediated consensus (which) not only supports but furthers the pluralisation of forms of life and the individualisation of lifestyles. More discourse means more contradiction and difference. The more abstract the agreements become, the more diverse the disagreements with which we can nonviolently live."<sup>19</sup>

A summation of this brief outline up to now, will serve too as a prefatory introduction to Habermas' key disagreements with the main post-modernist theorists, which in turn will further flesh out his ideas.

Habermas believes that increasingly with the decrease in "traditional means of will unification", that the contents of political action has the capacity to be co-ordinated by acts of collective mutual understanding. Only political institutions which can guarantee such processes will ensure the respect of their citizens. His model of developmental logic, which is neither ontological or teleological, but used as a heuristic device, aims at securing the

autonomous individual as the site for locating the moral capacity for individuals to be able to critique and revise social conventions in the light of their own principles. His analysis integrates both domination and emancipation with the emphasis on the "way the life world co-ordinates contexts of action."<sup>20</sup> His notion of "critical theory", not a term I have used to date because of the baggage of its earlier proponents, is always connected to the views of participants in real social struggles. Or as Habermas himself has said, "a theory of society with practical intent."

"We can .....distinguish theories according to whether or not they are structurally related to possible emancipation."<sup>21</sup>

By focussing on the moral and institutional barriers that prevent domination he posits an interest, that can be historically analysed, in the possibilities of resisting total domination. Never again the "Musselman"<sup>22</sup> which lurks as the only real alternative in postie's like Foucault. Above all the theory eschews the philosophy of consciousness pitfalls with its implicit metaphors of overhead tramlines of essential reality waiting for the collective/individual conductor rods. Social reality is not premissed upon historical, political certainties. In the "process of enlightenment there can only be participants" means that there cannot be "true" or "false" statements, only more or less justified ones. Contingent empirical fallibility, sans therefore, the idealism of empiricism, is the key because the logic of communicative reason is such that even the bases for its emergence as a medium is contingent.

Because in the rationalised lifeworld communicative action does not make equal use of its potential, normatively secured consensus, as opposed to a discursively achieved consensus, does occur. e.g. women's roles in a traditional family background which are beyond normative scrutiny. Domination therefore is not a mugging from behind which removes concrete persons from their experiences, but is an articulation of blockages which both prevent individuals from engaging in performative acts that have a reflexive transforming effect on what is being criticised, and institutions and cultures from engaging properly "in public processes in which a society thematises itself."<sup>23</sup> There is in this the basis for an analytical link between domination and emancipation which allows for a better look at forms of domination, such as racism and sexism, and is not reliant on "weak notions of counter-resistance"<sup>24</sup>. It also, in terms of anti-racism, provides better grounds for assessing the legitimacy or illegitimacy of different social and political movements - e.g. those "radicalised" Others who are nothing more than nouveau closet 'etniks', a term which is explained further on.

Finally unlike the enlightenment thinkers such as Hobbes, Descartes, Rousseau, Locke, and Kant, who believe reason to be a natural condition of



the human mind, and unlike Nietzsche's total critique of modern values, or Montequieu's relativistic half-way house conservatism, Habermas advances a theory of discursive justification and validation of truth claims in which no moment is privileged - a communicative concept of rationality in other words.

**As Against Post-Modernism – or, The Postie always knocks, and knocks without being able to open the door.**

I want to deal briefly with the fundamental differences between the theories of those I have loosely labelled "post-modernist", and those of theorists such as Habermas. Whilst acknowledging the similarity of their projects' areas, and therefore the possible complementarity of their approaches, thus signalling the potential for a loosening of boundaries, I want to push these differences to the outer margins because the posties' critique of liberal enlightenment in fact is aimed at the foundations of normative democratic politics.

"If there is one commitment which unites post-modernists from Foucault to Derrida to Lyotard it is the critique of Western rationality as seen from the perspectives from the margins..."<sup>25</sup>

I will concentrate on outlining a general immanent critique of Foucault which uses his work to reflect similar concerns about the whole post-modernist genre, not only because he has been the most influential, but also because there are similarities in his and Habermas' project and yet too "différance".<sup>26</sup>

There are for me, three key areas of similarity. Others have attempted to establish more.<sup>27</sup> But I regard the differences in approach within these additional areas to move them out of the purviews of "similarity". The first is that both call for a fundamental restructuring of the notion of "pure reason" through a non-foundational attempt to reconstruct those supra-individual rules and structures which are socio-cultural in origin. Secondly both reject the type of autonomous subject that lies at the heart of the domineering, discriminating and exploitative Western rationalism. And finally both critique the human sciences, in particular the instrumentalising impetuses and the disempowering role played by "experts".

Foucault's genealogical endeavours seek on the basis of his pithy "every-society-has-its-regime-of-truth" to examine how, in pursuing "truth", people govern themselves and others. Within the human sciences, which he targets for particular attention, he unravels the ways in which power relations both conditions and effects the production of truth about human beings. Human sciences, according to Foucault, arose in hierarchically structured

institutions, have continued to be developed in such settings, and form the framework in which coercion by violence has been replaced by subtler means of control through "experts" The pursuit of truth has always been contaminated by that processes' interconnections with changing power arrangements. This is the tragedy of the Enlightenment. Its pursuit of truth through reason has produced a totalised disciplin-ary/ing regime hell bent on eliminating, marginalising, controlling the Other. In this respect there is much that overlaps with the pessimistic auguries of the later Horkheimer and Adorno, especially in the "Dialectic of Enlightenment". Both regard the humanist project, including Marxist humanism, as a project of domination in which the individual is merely one of the prime effects of power. The genealogical analysis, whilst seeking to account for the individual within a historical framework, deliberately excludes from these considerations the individual's beliefs, actions or intentions - the Zombification of action. To be fair the later Foucault, probably as a result of having finally read Habermas and other Frankfurt School theorists, gestures away from the one dimensional ontology towards a multi-dimensional approach which almost mirrors Habermas'. i.e the individual relating to the objective world, social world, and her/himself. The problem, however, is that even in this changed ontology, power still becomes a determining factor, not simply as domination, but now too, as determining continuing strategic games marked by perpetual asymmetries of power in which people try to determine the conduct of others. In fact what Foucault does is to conflate, in Habermasian terms, the distinct areas of social interaction with strategic interaction. If autonomy in the earlier Foucault was a fiction, in the later one it emerges blinking in the relationship one has with one self -rapport à soi.

Let me now bracket Foucault with Derrida and Lyotard to outline an immanent critique which can be broad brush stroked over their approaches generally without necessarily applying to very detail of their "theories"☒. Briefly for Derrida, the Other is always there and is irreducible. It is not simply a name for that which is excluded, e.g. race, gender etc., but exists in a logic of binary opposition which is ineliminable. Thus the Orient is there to enable the Occident etc. The act of differing is *différance*. For Lyotard the grand narratives of Western modernisation always exclude the small narratives, e.g. women, Black people. They all share the vision that behind the grand edifice of Reason can be seen the flickering phosphorescent spectres of excluded others. Unfortunately they share too some common fault lines.

Despite the deliberate attempt to ditch social systems and society for micro/fragmentary analyses, and despite that "essentialist" characterisation in secondary commentaries, post modernist theorists are just as universalistic as those they criticise. Foucault and Lyotard both have produced totalising,



on tologically reductive, empirically challenged theories of historically complex situations which are over-generalised and simplified. The underlying premise that the history of the human species is characterised by increasing power of instrumental reason is just as metaphysical as those who presuppose an evolving progress, a situation described by Habermas as "negative metaphysics". Or, perhaps a case of META-meta-physicians heal thyselfes. More importantly "posties" have no theories of capitalism, the state, agency, both social and individual, and, because of their "cynicalisation" of bourgeois consciousness, fictionalise any kind of normative framework from within which immanent critiques can be launched.

There is a performative self contradiction which posties share with the earlier Frankfurt School theorists which is that if self enlightenment is fated to be impossible because of the domination of reason, what guarantee is there then that their own work is not subject to the same distortions? If there is this process of total domination and/or perpetual asymmetrical power relationships, then posties can only make that claim from the advantageous context of some temporary sanctuary "out there". If there is no subject, then the posties' moral identification with the victims, say of racism, can only come from outside, and not from within. What makes them so special? Such elitism, with its potential for the politics of paternalism, smacks of the emperor-like vanguard party and/or the enlightened liberal in new clothes. By cutting off access to inter-subjective otherness there is no basis for any possible collective action against the dominant discourses of modernity. One of the undesirable spin-offs, as advanced by Foucault is that there is no necessity for there to be any causal relationship between an author's theoretical position and his or her political practice.<sup>28</sup>. In the face therefore of, say racism, post-modernist discourse appears to offer no more than consolation to acidulated intellectuals who have given up hope of any kind of social change. In other words, good for white boys, if I might borrow a Foucauldian metaphor, writing their careers on racism whilst advocating to Black people that equality, freedom and justice are the creations of the brothers Grimm.

This leads on to the second major performative self contradiction of post-modernism, a variation on the "heads-I-win-tails-you-lose" syndrome. This is that posties presuppose a liberal pluralism more open to the right of difference and otherness. They depend upon the legal and moral achievements of modernity so that the outcome of the rapport à soi, even if it is a fractured self, has the right to pursue his/her sense of the good. In the end the inability to theorise collective and individual agency, and therefore, causation, leads posties to merely replicate liberal pluralism. The question is why posties so easily write off the normatively informed autonomous subject and rationalised democratic procedures upon which they so evidently

rely. "Perhaps," as one critic puts it, "because as the sons of the French revolution they have enjoyed the privileges of modernity to the point of growing blasé vis-a-vis them."<sup>29</sup>

Finally I agree with Habermas that it is no coincidence that the growth in neo-konservativism, which accepts a highly technicised modernism, but a regressive culturalism, since the 70's has seen a growth too in the nouveau conservatism of post modernism. Conservative, not only because of the liberal pluralist assumptions of their theorising, but because their opacity of agency has the potential for irrationalist conclusions which the celebration of the "Other" cannot performatively judge or condemn. In the end they have no way of distinguishing between Louis and the "Farrakhanites" and the Southall Black Sisters<sup>30</sup> as outcomes.

This results in what I term the 'Sowetoisation of Race'. This celebration of the coming out of the "Other" as that which the Enlightenment has suppressed rests on the posties having been sold and then bought the dummy of accepting that the "Other" was beyond "History". Hegel's exemplary removal of Africa from the spirit of world history was one of many co-existent theories not only Aryanising but also white maling the eighteenth century. In their acceptance, apolitically and ahistorically, that this particular form of universalism excludes the "other", Universalism is excluded from the "other"'s development so that "other" becomes *the* "Other" in a process in which their reality (e)merges with/to Reality. This form of theorising has legitimated the emergence of the new ethnicisation of race, as opposed to the "Dark Strangers" variant, in which, for example, the apartheid of an American university campus is celebrated co-voce with Mandela's ending of Apartheid.<sup>31</sup> Aziz's seminal dismantling of the myth of an Islamic culture echoes this concern.

"What we have is a culturalist differentialism...(in which)..supposed differences of "culture" within a discourse...can be either heterophilic or heterophobic.....In the course of the past two decades...race became ethnicity, then culture, and normative hierarchy and inequality gave way to representation in terms of difference. Thus we find fused in racist and anti-racist discourse alike the concept of non-transmissible life styles...."<sup>32</sup>

Thus, in a heuristic echo of the attempt to create a false Coloured ethnicity in South Africa, still resonating in the "ag, siestog" type reporting of that group, let me, post coventionally, differentiate the new ethnicisation from the old by calling it "etnikfication", in which the word "etnik" has phonetic communicative links with other Black constituencies. This 'etnik' differentiation, with its trailing baggage of conscious or sub-conscious post modernist justification, can be seen in the displacement of race equality in the circles of governance by 'diversity'. The neo-conservative effects are demonstrated in the limits to race equality change in which the goals of anti-



racist and Black struggles are to be contained within a WYSIWYG present reality. The corollary of this would be tantamount to saying that collective action against racism can be conflated with joining the Labour Party.

There is, therefore, a need, as I argue in the thesis, to advance the argument against racism within a universalistic context, but one that avoids the social labour incorporatist pitfalls of Marxism. Symbiotically co-joined with this new argument is a linked need to re-fantasise the outlines of a substantive racially inclusive form of governance. Both of these are attempted through a reconstruction of the normative potential of Habermas' theory from a race perspective.

## **Structure of the Thesis**

The rest of the thesis is therefore constructed as follows:

*Chapter 1* attempts a de- and reconstruction of race and racism within a communicative paradigm.

*Chapters 2, 3, and 4* critically examine current local governance theoretical orthodoxies of 'progressive' change within a perspective which asks what it would mean for these to be properly racially inclusive.

*Chapters 5 and 6* derives a Habermassian based version of local governance and submits this, as well, to a critical interrogation through the prism of race.

*Chapter 7* tries to outline the fantasy of a racially inclusive form of local governance, based on the insights gleaned from the earlier chapters.

*Chapter 8*, in anticipation of the examination of the empirical details, derives a relevant critical theoretic methodology.

*Chapter 9, 10 and 11* examines the rise and fall of a race equality programme in a London borough, the borough of 'X', in the eighties, referencing key developments with what went on in other local authorities, but also using this overall experience to help validate the theoretical developments derived from chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, particularly that of a racially inclusive critical theory.

*Chapter 12* attempts a similar exercise with a South African local authority, focussing on post 1990 and post-apartheid developments.

*Chapter 13* draws together the relevant key issues and major conclusions.

## **A Brief Note On Terminology**

As is evident in this 'introduction', I have, when the occasion requires it, neologised to help explain and clarify certain issues. Further, throughout this thesis the main local authority used as the research source for the UK part of the research, is anonymised, and referred to as the Lonodon Borough of "X". I have also called it "The Target Borough", as an alternative label.

**SECTION I**

**Theoretical Reflections on Race, Racism and Local Governance**

# Chapter 1

## De- and Reconstructing Race, Racism, and Black Anti-Racist Politics

### 1.0 Introduction

"....we are asked to believe that human beings are now so speciated by gender and race - though we are silent about class - that there can be no universal knowledge, politics or morality. These ideas have not grown up among the masses defeated by the empty hopes of our kind. It is not the masses who have sickened of the injustice and exploitation that grinds their lives, weakens their families, starves their children, murders and terrorises them each hour of the day and night in every corner of the world. No, it is not these people who have abandoned idealism, universalism, truth and justice. It is those who already enjoy these things who have denounced them on behalf of the others."<sup>33</sup>

I want to outline roughly a number of theoretical projects which form the basic frameworks to further research. In so doing I make no claims to "first order never been done before theoretical projects" since all we ever do in such endeavours is build modestly on what has gone before. This "modesty", which circumscribes the theoretical boundaries derives from the acknowledgement that no moment is ever privileged, and that therefore, a fallibilism in which even the empirical methods are contingent, underpins the theoretical construction. These theoretical constructions are built on an abstracted theory of capitalism which does not empower a notion of social labour derived human development as being deterministic in the last instance, but provides the analytical framework for the development of fallibilistic micro-theories. These, whilst focussing on the emancipation/domination continuum, allow for reflexive learning. i.e. have a critical idealism where the distance is maintained between that which is held to be true here and now and a conception that is true. This allows for policy and practice interventions which, whilst not WYSIWYG types, do not postpone such actions by privileging "class struggle." Furthermore the "truth" claims are determined by us as participants - not out there - in the struggles to achieve that symmetrical relationship between "us" and "them" so that the settlement of validity claims are consensually arrived at. It is within this inclusive reconstructive framework that I want to tease out the implications for race theorising and politics; those which speak of the politics of radical democracy, and within that accountability. Counter pointedly I want to move away from the perpetual contextualising "it's a Black thing you wouldn't understand" type of theorising with its "Ag! Siestog"<sup>34</sup> tendencies to "victim" Black people through entrapping them in



the language of "racial disadvantage" because unlike those who pursue the culturalist differentiating line, like Bhabha and co., I do not want to indulge in new forms of ethno-theorising that attempt to create cultural traditions devoid of controversy, discard the moral and ethical bases upon which such cultures are "equalised", and give licence to what can be described as "the cognescenti of the niggerati"<sup>35</sup>. Part of that means, as Black people, being able to distinguish and discard some of the detritus passing itself off as radical authenticity and which is protected by the "Othering" of reason.

## 1.1 Proposal

The proposed reconstruction adumbrates a number of theoretical concerns surrounding race, racism and anti-racism within the modernist ~ post-modernist spectrum, and are themselves part of and signifiers of the need for, further research. This is a research made more urgent by the experiential common sense evidence - that sixth sense validation process which the everyday racist assault upon our lifeworlds evokes and which so eludes the capture of orthodox research<sup>36</sup> - that the situation is worsening for Black people here, in Europe and world wide. The project to decompose and recompose "race" is structured within a "keep-in-the-forefront" framework oriented towards the following ideal-type goals:

- ◆ that the analysis should seek to show the distinctive nature of rac(e)ism, as against other "ideological representations". (And here I 'quotationalise', a term explained later.)
- ◆ that the analysis is not particularistic
- ◆ that it is not teleological
- ◆ that it is reflexive
- ◆ that it provides the means for policy and practice interventions which can be radically distinguished from the WYSIWYG genre because they are linked to substantive issues of democratic will formation
- ◆ that it provides the basis for pursuing the deracialising of race

These ideal type objectives are the markers against which the progress of the theoretical project and its process of validation, can be measured. Whilst the framing of these goals might, at first reading strike a chord with the overt depoliticised, private sector based neo-managerialism currently informing decision making in the local and national polities, I am in fact talking about deneutralising the techno-managerial claims of strategic planning through a communicative discourse framework, and, by so doing, periodizing "utopia". The objectives speak therefore of an explicit immanence, as opposed to the implicit immanence of post-modernist policy WYSIWYG mirroring attempts in which the underlying attempted "deracination of radical critique", because it is incapable of putting anything in its place, ends up merely inferring neo-liberal pluralist politics.<sup>37</sup> To talk about gradualising "utopia" is not to

give succour to the suprabundance of vision statements and the like with which institutions, democratic, quangos and others, parade their new found pro-active mode. It is, however, oxymoron "stylee", about practical critical idealism which rejects the new realist, absolutist implying, perjorativising of utopia. I have introduced "utopia" because it permits discussion to take place, without inhibitors, about action oriented towards change for a better future; and in raising therefore the issue of racism and its doing away, i.e. anti-racism, utopian considerations are implicit, even where there is an explicit theoretical/political rejection of these

## 1.2 Utopia

Whilst the traditional view of the idea of utopia bifurcates into the censorious, perjorative condemnation of being unreasonable, at one end, and as a proclamatory image of an alternative world at the other, the reality is that the two are the visible outer signposts of a spectrum of positions, all oriented towards changing the world. Let us therefore take on "tick/spec" Bloch's view that the desire to create a better world is an anthropological constant.<sup>38</sup> Utopian considerations can then, in my view, be heuristically better categorised threefoldedly by time and change parameters as traditionalist/neo conservative ones, accommodationist ones, and transformative ones. Traditionalist/neo-conservative utopias hark back to some "golden age" and attempt to put a time drag on the present. The accomodationists, in rejecting teleological immnance, which is not what I am advocating, have sought also to banish utopia as part of the collateral damage, and have therefore allowed themselves to get caught up with those who, in absolutising the present, absolutise the dominant status quo. Attempting to then bridge the contradiction that there are utopian tendencies latent in their policy proposals for change with their theory that rejects utopia, results in ad hoc short term pragmatism. Transformative uotpias, on the other hand are future oriented towards qualitatively better changes aimed at greater equality, freedom and justice. They catalyse critical thinking because:

Utopias relativise the present. One cannot be critical about something that is believed to be an absolute. By exposing the partiality of current reality, by scanning the field of the possible in which the real occupies a tiny plot, utopias pave the way for a critical attitude and a critical activity which alone can transform the present predicament of man. The presence of utopia, the ability to think of alternative solutions to festering problems of the present, may be seen therefore as a necessary condition of historical change.<sup>39</sup>

As part of this introductory foregrounding to the reconstruction of racism and anti-racism, I want to briefly explore utopia, Black experiences and racism via a brief linking exposition on emancipatory politics. Generally, and this is very generally, Black life experiences are touched in one way or



another by racism where racism, as a crude, at this stage, definition, can be said to be the disruption of life chances because of biological or attributed biological differences. There is enough historical and contemporary evidence to support this statement whilst acknowledging that there is no necessary synchrony between individual Black experiences and that general observation. Nor does this assume some metaphysical existence of racism, anymore so than claiming that the capitalist system gives rise to unfair inequalities is metaphysical. Allied to this we can look briefly at the notion of emancipatory politics within, at this stage, a critical skimming of a schemata put forward by Giddens<sup>40</sup>, not because I accept fully his characterisation of such, but because, for the purposes of this introduction, it is a useful shorthand heuristic device and I do not have time to re-invent the sjambok.

Giddens's threefold acknowledged over-simplified characterisation of emancipatory politics as being radical, liberal or conservative in which liberal denotes progressive emancipation of the individual in conjunction with the liberal state, and conservative denotes a rejection of the other two, echoes my distinctions of "utopias". Whilst it is implied I would add explicit time parameters so that radical, liberal and conservative are, respectively, future, indeterminately present and past oriented. I would accept for the moment his definition of emancipatory politics "as a generic outlook concerned above all with liberating groups and individuals from constraints which adversely affect their life chances ....i.e.... the objective of emancipatory politics is either to release under privileged groups from their unhappy condition, or to eliminate the relative differences between them."<sup>41</sup> The characterisation of such politics as having two main elements, relinquishing the past to permit a transformative attitude towards the future, and overcoming the illegitimate domination of some by others, I agree with at one level. The problem is, as my research into race and local government will show, is that very often the two are conflated to the extent that a transformative attitude towards the future partially relinquishes a racialised past, but projects forwards a backwards facing vision premised upon false socially constructed ethno-histories.. I would prefer the more general, simple strategic characterisation of defining the problem i.e. racism, and working at the solutions, two very different, though linked, processes. At one level this accords with Pieterse's definition of emancipation which is that it "is a matter of critique and reconstruction of which resistance represents the first step and transformation, in the sense of structural change, the second."<sup>42</sup> As I shall argue later, I prefer the terms, emancipating the first from the bosom of the post-structuralists, 'de'- and 're-construction. In Habermas' version of emancipation, as Pieterse rightly observes, the "future is past" because it is prefigured in the project of enlightenment, unlike Foucault who can see no future.<sup>43</sup> What matters then is, in terms of the race dimension, is how inclusively the past is defined. Emancipatory politics

works not just with a notion of power that is hierarchicalised, pace Giddens, but a more refined notion of a hierarchy that is unjustly applied. It is only on that basis that Giddens can derive the key directing aims of such politics as that of wanting to reduce or eliminate exploitation, inequality and oppression. I would go further and put these three under the general rubric of "injustice". Exploitation then is not the illegitimate denial of resources to one group, but is the unjust use of power to coerce one group to produce goods for which they are then either not rewarded, or under rewarded. Inequality, in an emancipatory context, then derives from those situations in which there is unjust denial of, or limitation of access to, resources and/or material rewards. Giddens definition of oppression as "a matter of differential power applied to limit the life chances of another", is the flabby response from those who have to peer out at the world from the hermitically sealed vacuum of Oxbridge. Oppression is the unjust domination of one group or individual of another group, or individual to the extent that life chances are limited, ground down, or terminated with extreme prejudice. Obviously these are not closed categories of unjust power applications, but often elide with each other, or give rise to one or the other, or co-exist.

Motivationally Giddens gives primacy to justice, equality and participation, as the imperatives of emancipatory politics. I think this short circuits the basic imperatives which I take instead to be equality and freedom, both of which are underpinned by politico-moral issues of justice in which participation is but one of the possible outcomes of attempting to realise the "freedom" imperative. Finally, in finishing with the Giddens schema, he correctly defines the main orientation of such politics as being "away from", as opposed to "towards" - a variation on my defining the problem and working at the solutions differentiation. This reluctance to "think in utopian terms" is a charge that has been levelled at Marx, the "later one" that is, as well as Habermas with the common theme that both do not believe that the future social order must be left to those who usher in that new dawn.<sup>44</sup> Habermas, for example, whilst claiming that the imputation that "because the theory of communicative action focuses attention on the social facticity of recognised validity claims, it proposes, or at least suggests a rationalistic utopian society" is wrong, maintains that "the only utopian perspectives in social theory which we can straightforwardly maintain are of a procedural nature...(because)...the utopian lineaments of any future emancipated society can be no more than the necessary conditions for it."<sup>45</sup> This I agree with insofar as it sets the framework for working at solutions that are justice based. I won't at this stage elaborate on the particular emancipatory politics espoused by Habermas in terms of communication, but do want to pursue the utopian moment. As one commentator put it, "who, after all, would man the barricades for a utopia of procedures?"<sup>46</sup> Just as his male engendered language undermines the piquancy of his sarcasm, so too anyone who has had to endure the racism of an equality procedureless work



environment would willingly erect and staff the barricades. There is a sense then in which anti-racism can flesh out the pursuit of justice as an underpinning to the utopian moment. Let's run with Bloch's notion that "unresolved problems as well as unfulfilled hopes can carry over from one phase of history into another,"<sup>47</sup> with the form, content and use changing with the prevailing socio-economic and political structures of that period. This obviously has implications for phenomena such as racism where we can postulate that the utopian drive to the need for the reconciliation of such contradictions will gather momentum to the extent that the working out of modernity's promise cannot be conceived without the explicit, but integrated solution to those, up to now, epochal excrescences. We can now refine more the radical utopian moment to which we previously assigned a temporal character. Thus for someone like David Harvey, radical oppositional politics have been much better at conducting place based battles, and that the dimension of spatial power has been overlooked.<sup>48</sup> For him capitalism has managed to compress and control the space-time continuum. However, if utopia relativises the present, in anticipation of better future, that rumble of the foundations affects both place, that area lived in, and time. For Black people there is a further dimension because racism relativises the presence. That "go-back-to-where-you-came-from" relativises the present, the place and the space. This is where racism and its solutions have the potential to push back further the boundaries of modernism because in the utopian moment there is the potential to realise, as Massey believes a global sense of place so that there really is "no place like home!"<sup>49</sup> Swept up, thus in this linkage of utopia and racism, are, as I argue later, those necessary reconstructed practices, labelled elsewhere as "the politics of recognition"<sup>50</sup> and which I thematically contend that we cannot assume identities other than by entering into communicative discourse aimed at mutual understanding.

If the utopian vision we should aspire to is the transformative, forward looking one, the question then is, "What are we supposed to be changing?" The answer isn't simply racism, but racism situated within a specific historical, socio-political and economic context, increasingly global in reach, i.e. capitalism. In proposing that analyses of racism and anti-racism have to take cognizance of capitalism, and therefore have some theorization of that process, means that orthodox Marxist analyses of race cannot so easily be dismissed without showing why and how they are inadequate. This I intend to do via a summary of Habermas' critique of Marx, as a means of engaging with an orthodox Marxist analysis of racism which focuses on South Africa. There is a reflexive sub-objective built into this enterprise which is contained above in the non-marginalising bench mark of modernity's success or not, and against which, therefore, Habermas' own project can be scrutinised.



### 1.3 Habermas and Marx

For Habermas, the unique, crucial aspect of Marx's theory lies in his analysis of the double nature of the commodity form which allows him both to outline the character of capitalist development objectively, and to infer the subjective perspective of those involved. The objective is distinguished as a "crisis-ridden process of the self realisation of capital", whilst the subjective pans out as a "conflict-ridden interaction between social classes."<sup>51</sup> The uniqueness of the analysis refers to the idea that the conflict inherent in all class based societies has fundamentally changed under capitalist class societies by becoming "objectivistically concealed" and objectivated through the medium of exchange. In Habermasian terms, labour power operates through concrete actions and cooperative relationships, but is absorbed as an abstract process. This sets up the relationship between those who produce labour and those who buy labour as a "site of an encounter between the imperatives of system integration and those of social integration: as an action it belongs to the lifeworld of the producers, as a performance to the functional nexus of the capitalist enterprise and the economic system as a whole."<sup>52</sup> This abstraction, real abstraction, takes place when actions are no longer norm or understanding co-ordinated, but, co-ordinated via the medium of exchange value. The participants therefore, adopt an objectivating attitude towards each other thereby instrumentalising such relations. On the basis of this identification of Marx's kernel, Habermas flags up some pluses and minuses. Briefly on the plus side, Habermas sees Marx's scheme as pinpointing the rules for the essential relationship between the economic system and the lifeworld via the process of valorization. Thus "problems of system integration - that is to say the crisis ridden pattern of accumulation - can be reflected at the level of social integration and connected with the dynamics of class conflict."<sup>53</sup> But this bilingual nature of Marx's theory, because it uses the theory of value to travel from/to the lifeworld and the economic system, contains the seed of its fundamental weaknesses as well.

What are these weaknesses? The first major one is that Marx remains tied to an Hegelian concept of totality in which the difference between system and lifeworld is maintained only at the level of a semantic distinction which harbours therefore the assumption, in logic, that the transformation of the lifeworld is dependent upon the development of the system. In other words, Marx "does not see that the differentiation of the state apparatus and the economy also represents a higher level of system differentiation which simultaneously opens up new steering possibilities and forces a reorganisation of the old, feudal class relationships."<sup>54</sup> The second linked weakness relates to the theory of societal change. Marx's future state of affairs envisages a world in which the objectivating power of capital will

have disappeared, via the revolt of the industrial classes led by a theoretically advanced avant garde, thereby re-empowering the spontaneity of the proletariat. In Habermasian terms the systematically autonomous process of economic growth will be brought back into the fold of the lifeworld.

The error therefore lies in the fact that Marx did not "allow for a sufficiently sharp separation between the level of system differentiation attained in the modern period and the class specific forms in which it was institutionalised."

<sup>55</sup> The third faultline appears in Marx's theory of alienation where he has no criteria to distinguish between the destruction of traditional forms of life and the reification of post-traditional forms of life. Under the theory of value, a worker's life chances are reduced because of the violation of justice contained in the exchange of equivalents, but "life" remains, in Marx, unspecified, and therefore ambiguous. Because he bases his theory of alienation on the process of the proletarianization of craftsmen etc. his theory of value cannot distinguish between reification, where it does occur, and individuation that results from the separation of culture, society and personality in the modern world. The two processes cannot be conflated. The final identified weakness relates to the inflated case made for subsuming the lifeworld under the system. Reification occurs not just in the sphere of social labour, but too in the domain of the private through both media of money and power. Thus whilst Marx identifies only one route, the theory of value, which "explains" the monetarization of labour power and thus allocates alienation to the public sphere of occupation, Habermas identifies a number. "Reification effects can result in like manner from the bureaucratization and monetarization of public and private areas of life."<sup>56</sup> It is on the basis of those identified weaknesses that a summary of Habermas' critique can be said to be that he finds the concept of social labour not abstract enough to encompass the universals of human development. His observation, on the back of his critique, that there are many aspects of modern capitalism which present themselves in class unspecific ways is true. His identification of the welfare state as one phenomenon the orthodox Marxists have difficulty reconciling with their theoretical parameters, is too obvious. There are trans-epochal unresolved processes of unjust social differentiation, such as sexism and racism, which have more salience as key cornerstone puzzles the solution to which are the benchmark tests of a theory's validity. Having identified, then the class unspecific nature of modern capitalism, the question is whether or not Habermas' theory can deal with the phenomenon of racism. In attempting to answer that, I want to go on a slight excursion via an orthodox Marxist theorisation of racism, using that as an incandescent light around which are attracted the moths of variegated Marxist theories of race.



## **1.4 Marx, Race and Habermas**

Hillel Ticktin's text, entitled "The Politics of Race: Discrimination in South Africa", combines a purist orthodox Marxist approach to the issue of race in South Africa, which is equally applicable, if the explicit theoretical assumptions are to be enacted, in other geographical contexts of political economy where the laws of such are refracted through the category of racial discrimination.<sup>57</sup> He identifies an ambiguous relationship between the capitalist class and different sections of the working class through an examination of the concept of abstract labour. The fundamental problem then in South Africa is that "abstract labour has necessarily to be fractured to maintain the system."<sup>58</sup> This results both in a conflict between the economic and political interests of the capitalist class, and in the development of "impure" community based, as opposed to class based, struggles of Black workers. The drag on the rise of class based struggles in South Africa, as it is no doubt in other racialised political economies, is down to the fracturing of abstract labour. This fracturing occurs because "a capitalism which can foresee its own overthrow needs to limit and contain accumulation in a way that it maximises its own life even at the expense of the law of value....(so).....in South Africa the expansion of value, and so surplus value, has been partially diverted by cessation to white workers of a limited degree of control over the process of extraction of surplus value from Black workers."<sup>59</sup> The ideology of white superiority derives not from previous history, but from the capitalist class seizing on colour as a visible means to divide the working class. What this does, i.e. the fracturing of abstract labour, is to politicise workers since commodity fetishism based control has been partially done away with. The political outcome of this is the creation of a community and racial conflict rather than a class conflict. Black workers, therefore, do not see their boss as a capitalist, but as a white oppressor. The essential outcome for Ticktin is a form of supra-exploitation of Black workers who are differentiated out as the less privileged section of the working class. The logic of change that flows from this sort of analysis would either have the historical laws of capitalism naturally running to its conclusion, or, have the intervention of a party led by the theoretically enlightened. Both, however, would need to premise a twofold change in the consciousness of the proletariat which sees first the shedding of the false consciousness of racial difference and the assumption of colour blind class solidarity, and then the exposition in their consciousness of the true nature of capitalism. Likewise the capitalist class is involved uni-epochly in a conscious conspiracy to use race in a way that assumes they know better. Now, whilst the issue of race and modern capitalism, and in particular the recent changes in South Africa, are not synchronous with this sort of analysis, that does not legitimate damning it completely. The analysis obviously holds modern capitalism explicit.

It still talks about exploitation, inequality and oppression. In dealing with the acknowledged class unspecific nature of race, it recognises the politicisation of areas that might otherwise in terms of the logic of his argument have been purely valorized. The question is whether or not these class unspecific phenomena betoken a capitalism inadequately theorised or a reality that defies theory.

Let's therefore relook at Ticktin's argument in Habermassian terms as an opener into other Marxist theories of race, and into a wider examination and application of Habermas' theory to race. In so doing, as the previous chapter argues, this entails a rejection of the post-modernist argument that the multiplicity of phenomena are unique and can only ever be categorised through a recognition of a particular trans-epochal discourse, say racism, in which disparities can only share ever a generalised denominator, say exclusion. In its projected pure form, Ticktin's theory of capitalism would translate into seeing the commodity form as those rules which govern the interchange between the worker's lifeworld and the economic system. In other words problems of system integration can be linked with those of social integration. The impure version, in which the impurity stems from the conscious appropriation by the capitalist class of an epochally unique phenomena of race, the interchange between the worker's lifeworld and the economic system is corrupted by racism. Thus the workers' lifeworlds bifurcates around Black/white notions of race in which the white worker occupies a hierarchical position a step or two up the valorization scale. From this we can infer that economic crises are likely to see an increase in the exploitation of the Black worker which is experienced as direct oppression by the white worker. The pure/impure distinction of abstract labour in Ticktin's analysis expresses the weakness identified above in which the desire to re-secure the totality is expressed by wanting to wish away the issue of race as a conscious conspiracy of the capitalist class. There is an inherent contradiction in this sort of analysis whereby if there is a pure form of alienation which is commodity fetishist tied, then an impure form represented by race must increase the likelihood of revolt, not just amongst Black workers, but white as well. And yet what emerges is an argument that's tantamount to saying that first we have to get rid of this political reification of race before the pure form of alienation allows for the oppressional framework within which true class consciousness can develop. In other words this highlights the other aspect of the critique outlined above qua Marx's theory, and which is that the theory of alienation has difficulty distinguishing between reification, which may be economically or politically induced, and the structural differentiation of the lifeworld, which might very well give rise to community forms of protest.

Other Marxist theories of race and racism, which whilst they might differ in their analysis of the content of racism, and Ticktin does not say what the



content of South African racism is, although we know it has a biological/religious pre-ordained character, agree on the fundamental characteristic of racism. Hall, for example, in his analysis of racism within the UK, whilst he warns "against extrapolating a common and universal structure to racism which remains essentially the same outside of its specific historical location", then goes on to define racism and its root cause in a way that echoes Ticktin.<sup>60</sup> Hence racism is, "one of the dominant means of ideological representation through which white fractions of the working class come to live their relations to other fractions, and through them to capital itself."<sup>61</sup> Whilst in specific social formations, Hall sees racism as being reworked and ideologically reconstituted by the dominant class, it still boils down to a fracturing of abstract labour and partial valorization of capital, not to mention the machinations of the ruling class. Thus too for the CCCS posse in the early eighties, there is a concentration on the changing content of British racism, especially as this comes to be expressed through the thinking and actions of the Conservative Party, but which has to be seen in the context of the development of an organic crisis of British capitalism. Racism can, under this analysis, "mistakenly make sense of the world and thereby provide a strategy for political action for sections of different classes, .....(and that therefore because).....racism is an attempt to understand a specific combination of economic and political relations.....strategies for eliminating racism should concentrate less on trying exclusively to persuade those who articulate racism that they are "wrong" and more on changing those particular economic and political relations."<sup>62</sup> In terms therefore of the two track strategy for change identified in the latter, the priority given to the systemic element, i.e. economic, means that there is the assumption that the lifeworld of workers is subsumed under the system. In all three orthodox Marxist analyses briefly discussed there is the unspecified articulation that racism exerts a drag on the "natural" connection that can be made between the development of the system and the structural transformation of the lifeworld. The utopian vision that can be inferred is a backward/forward looking one in which the lifeworld reclaims the economic system totalistically, but only providing that the Black worker downscale her/his interests to those of the white worker. To that extent they are similar to the crude anti-racist emancipatory projects with their partial relinquishment of a racialised past, but forward projection of an etnik utopia. Both are still held in thrall to "a form of totalising conceptions of order.." which seek inter lifeworld integration through a group/individual enlightening growth of political consciousness adduced through struggle. This holds true, as well, for the Manichean RAT derived homogenising "Black perspectives" theorising which aims at sustaining an anti-racist movement within social work in the UK. The key question then is if not the orthodox marxist/pseudo-radical anti-racist theorising, and if not, as I argue later, the post-modernist ones, what then?

## 1.5 De- and Reconstructing Racism

### 1.6 De-

Whilst what I am proposing is based upon accepting that validity claims are raised here in the present within specific contexts and with outcomes that affect social interaction, my explicit racialising of the process in order that race may not play a part in the acceptance or rejection of such claims means that the assumption that we were always here, as opposed to out there, has to have a history. In reconstructing race via the history of "white over Black", I am building on, but not necessarily accepting all of, Habermas' gutting and refurbishing of historical materialism in which the "concept of mode of production is not abstract enough to capture the universals of societal development." In short I want to use the issue of "race" as the axis around which to subject Habermas' "reconstruction" to immanent critique, for as he says:

"reconstruction entails taking a theory apart and putting it back together again in a new form in order to attain more fully the goal it has set itself."<sup>63</sup>

In brief this is a social evolutionary theory which is non-unilinear in conception, non-teleological, and without assumptions of necessary continuity or reversibility. It tracks back to "anthropological deep-seated general structures which were formed in the phase of hominization and which lay down the initial state of social evolution; these structures presumably arose to the extent that the cognitive and motivational potential of anthropoid apes was transformed and reorganised under conditions of linguistic communication."<sup>64</sup> This history therefore gives greater primacy to reconstructing the shapes of development of normative structures in cultural traditions and institutions as a means of unravelling the learning capacities of such societies when faced with social evolutionary challenges. Categorization of these patterns I'll leave for another paper, suffice at this stage to roughly sketch out the implications for "race". What I want to propose is that prior to, and during the initial stages in, the development of dominant capitalism in Europe, that not only were the learning boundaries between Europe and the "Black" world surrounding it more fluid and open than the Aryanising of history would have us believe, but that there were too similarity of learning problems as well. The emergence of "race" as a white/Black issue I want to examine as Miles has sketched out, in relation to the white-Black colour differentiation in Western Judaeo-Christian culture as the substrate around which normative legitimations of racial domination crystallised on the basis that the move from one developmental epoch to another, as I believe Western imperialism entails, prerequisites the societal learning processes of the preceding epoch to have begun the articulation of the problem.<sup>65</sup> In other words, as I outline in more detail below, part of



the development of the normative based learning processes of capitalism was that which facilitated racial domination. Within a few months of occupying the Cape in 1652, the Dutch leader of the expedition was referring to the Khoikhoi as "dull, stupid and odorous", and as "black, stinking dogs". The observation then by Beck gains greater saliency when analysing race.

"...the lifeworld norms, value orientations and lifestyles that characterise people in developing industrial capitalism are, in terms of their genealogy, not so much the products of the formation of industrial classes, but are often the relics of precapitalistic and pre-industrial traditions."<sup>66</sup>

There is agreement, therefore, at a general level with Miles' outlining and evocation of the representation of the other, and in Kovel's psychoanalytic history of racism. Both, unlike the Marxist approaches, locate the origins of racism in the stirrings of White-Black domination that began occurring pre-capitalism. What I propose therefore, is to provide a brief historical description framed through key categories, which can then be refracted through a theoretical reconstruction of Habermas' re-examination of historical materialism.

At the outset of this description let's follow Miles in his use of Moscovici's notion of representations of the Other as images and beliefs which categorise people in terms of real or attributed differences when compared with self as the oscillating kernel around which we can categorise key phases. Unlike Marxist analyses of race discourse, this "historicity of representations" does not apply a synchronous clamp between base and superstructure so that race and racism begin at the onset of early capitalist expansions into the Americas and Africa. As part of validating the unique logic of the development of normative structures postulate, this history tracks back into earlier European times. Thus the Graeco-Roman empires did have a "conception of human diversity, spatially dispersed, but bound together by the possession of characteristics that distinguished human beings from gods and animals..."<sup>67</sup> Pace Miles, however, the Graeco-Roman representations of the barbarian Other beyond the boundaries of the empire were not, despite their cultural deficiencies, recognised as human beings. It was the reality of conquest, conversion and acceptance of the politico-religious order that promoted those aliens from non-human to human. Contact between the empire and Africa was quite extensive. There was a certain ambivalence in the response to Africans. Africans were distinguished anthropometrically phenotypically by skin, nose and hair type, though these differences were attributed to environmental factors. On the other hand there was not only a hierarchical colour cultural symbolisation which associated white with beauty and Black with death and the underworld, but also, the "identification" of extra-boundaried population groups characterised by spatial and phenotypical traits. Parts of Africa - those beyond direct

experience - and India were supposedly peopled by those not only pigmentally different, but also, inhumanly deformed, e.g. dog headed, flesh eaters etc. In the Graeco-Roman world natural events were taken as indicators of the deities' intentions towards humans, and were defined as monstra. This carried over into medieval times where "Christianity became the prism through which all knowledge about the world was refracted" increasingly via the use of the bible as a literal explication of the material world.<sup>68</sup> Deviations from the norm, like these "monstra", were attributed to God's divine wrath which resulted in the disfigurement of these people and their banishment to the peripheries. There are, within that, obvious emerging patterns which matured through the later Calvinistic strand of the Reformation and which centuries later still resonated in the theocratic apologia overlap between the Dutch Reformed Church and the apartheid establishment. What is key, however, is the increasing ossifying of the ancient world ambivalence towards representations of the Other into a growing hierarchicalisation of the symbolic "white-Black" difference as signed in the phenotypical, and in particular, pigmental human characteristics of those beyond Europe's boundaries. These were being "realised, not through imaginary spatial, phenotypical projections, but through increasingly violent interaction with Islam. Through early to late medieval times continuing political conflict between the Christian European world and the Islamic Arab world over dominance of geographical areas sought legitimation through issues of theological validity. Within this context the representation of the Islamic Other came to be "portrayed as barbaric, degenerate, and tyrannical....characteristics which were rooted in the character of Islam as a supposedly false and heretic theology. The object of much of the attack was the prophet Muhammed who was represented as an imposter by claims that his life exemplified violence and sexuality...(resulting from the fact)..that the theology that Muhammed created for his own ends embodied violence and sexuality, with the consequence that believers of the theology inevitably behaved in similar ways."<sup>69</sup> Before dealing with the subsequent period of European expansion, colonialism and imperialism, it is suffice to say that many Marxist and other radical analyses of race and racism claim a genetic starting point for these phenomena with that of the period indicated i.e.with the advent of systematic capitalist growth. I am not therefore going to outline the key facets of the white-Black dialectic because this has been done in countless other works, other than point to the crucial characteristics. The major summary features of these characteristics are twofold. These are:

- ◆ a growing, and maintenance of, a power hierarchicalisation of white over Black through throughout the social integrative and systemic areas of life
- ◆ and, the fact that this power related hierarchicalisation originated long before the start of systematic capitalist development



The characteristics of the period from the 15<sup>th</sup> onwards were, and are, a development of pre-capitalist patterns of white over Black in which to exclude entails consciously, or unwittingly, creating the criteria for inclusion i.e. I can call you "savage" because I have and meet the criteria for being civilised. These saw the patterns changing over time according to circumstance, but without violating the fundamental power relationship; a discourse develop framed within epochal dominant paradigms of religion, science and culture.

In seeking to locate the descriptive analysis within its political and economic context, theorists like Miles, whilst critical of the Marxist works which tie expansion and colonialism too closely with the origins of racism, nevertheless still clings to modes of production historicism in which racism is an ideology that is multi-dimensional and historically specific. The trans mode epochal character of racism arises because of the development of capitalist, in continuous articulation with non-capitalist, modes of production. Thus "ideological reproduction is therefore a consequence of a transaction between historical legacy and individual and collective attempts to make sense of the world."<sup>70</sup> For Miles the nature of this ideology of racism presumes a process of racialisation i.e. differentiating social collectivities on the basis of real or ascribed natural characteristics, but has a dialectical process of representation in which the other is negatively evaluated in relation to Self. Part of the problem with Miles' analyses is the fact that the retention of the modes of production thesis, gives rise to a contradiction between the class unspecific nature of racism, and which his analysis hints at, and the class specific basis of change which the "modes of production" logic dictates. More importantly because of the philosophy of consciousness baggage that goes with such types of analyses, there is no way to look at either why and how racism is structured, or why and how those who experience racism react to such experiences. But then the reason for taking this detour via Miles is because his emphasis on signification inches towards a perspective I think is crucial to a reconstruction of racism. "Consequently my interest is in the production and reproduction of meanings, a focus that leads to a particular emphasis upon systems of communication in order to understand the reproduction of racism."<sup>71</sup>

## 1.7 Re-

Lets begin the reconstruction proper then by looking at Habermas' reconstruction of historical materialism whose parameters of investigation are framed "in the question whether the concept of social labour adequately characterises the form of the reproduction of human life."<sup>72</sup> On the basis of this and anthropological evidence, Habermas goes on to propose that social labour is adequate as an explanatory key for distinguishing the hominization

stage of human evolution i.e. the development from primate to humans, but does not "capture the specifically human reproduction of life."<sup>73</sup> The crucial reproductive features were only begun to be established when the economy of the hunt was supplemented by a family structure, a process in which the status system became mediated by language derived social norms. We are then talking about the evolution of social role systems based on the "intersubjective recognition of normed behaviour".<sup>74</sup> The orthodox version of historical materialism proposes six modes of production which signify universal stages in social evolution and which, according to the ultra-orthodox, "set down a unilinear, necessary, uninterrupted and progressive development of a macrosubject." The foundations of Habermas' reconstruction are thus:

- ◆ it is not a species subject that undergoes evolution, but societies and the actors integrated therein so that social evolution is marked by the replacement of rationally constructed structures by more comprehensive rational structures
- ◆ the need to separate the logic from the dynamics of development so that history does not become bounded by the teleological parameters of unilinearity, necessity, continuity or irreversibility
- ◆ the postulation therefore that the development of more comprehensive social structures are contingently bounded and can only be investigated empirically
- ◆ the conclusion that many paths can lead to the same level of development, a process with no guarantee of uninterrupted. (There are therefore retrogressions that can occur)
- ◆ evolution does not presuppose a cumulative based direction, but, like Marx, progress can be judged, not measured, by criteria which look at the development of productive forces and the maturity of forms of social intercourse. In Habermasian terms "progress in these two dimensions is measured against the two universal validity claims we also use to measure the progress of empirical knowledge and of moral-practical insight, namely the truth of propositions and the rightness of norms."<sup>75</sup>

In my view the last characteristic flags up an ambivalence in Habermas' theory which can be interpreted as giving some licence to that which he is attempting to avoid, viz. the objectivism of the philosophy of history. I prefer, therefore, to use the term "judge" so that the differentiation in the spheres of productive forces and social intercourse dis-aggregates progress into numerous decisions that need to be taken, and thus a continuing process of the "jury being out." In sum Habermas concludes that the "concept of a mode of production is not abstract enough to capture the universals of societal development" What is required are more abstract principles of social organization where such principles are understood as "innovations



that become possible through developmental logically reconstructible stages of learning, and which institutionalise new levels of societal learning."<sup>76</sup> This he attempts to do by classifying, according to evolutionary features, the forms of social integration determined by the principles of social organisation. On the basis that the evolutionary learning process of societies is dependent upon the competencies of the individuals that belong to them, three stages of interactive competence are identified which parallel Piaget's developmental stages of moral consciousness.

- ◆ the preconventional stage signified by a single plane of action, motive and acting subjects
- ◆ the conventional stage where motives can be assessed independently of concrete action consequences
- ◆ the postconventional stage where norms require justification from universalistic points of view

A heuristic categorisation of four ideal type societies is arrived at in which social integration is characterised threefoldedly according to general structures of action, structures of world views and structures of institutionalised law and binding moral representations. In each respective category can be summarised a level of interactive competence. Thus societal forms are never all preconventional, conventional or post conventional, but an admixture. A diagrammatic summary is given in figure 1.

<b>\Social \Intergration \Level <i>Society Type</i></b>	<b>Structures of Action</b>	<b>World View Structures</b>	<b>Law and Moral Structures</b>
<i>Neolithic</i>	Conventional	mythological still enmeshed with action system	legal regulation of conflicts from preconventional point of view
<i>Early Civilizations</i>	coventional structure	mythological view set off from action system	conflict regulation on basis of conventional morality tied to justice administering figure
<i>Developed Civilizations</i>	conventional structure	development of non- mythological rationalized world view	conflict regulation on conventional basis detached from ruler or justice figure
<i>Modern Age</i>	Postconventional action structures - differentiation of universalistically regulated domain of strategic action. Political will formation based on principles	universalistic developed doctrines of legitimation	conflict regulation through strict separation of legality and morality - principled general, formal and rationalised law, private morality guided by principles

It is clear that Habermas' analyses is not meant to provide the dynamic blueprint for a history of the species, but seeks instead to set out the key analytic tools, at a more abstracted level, with which a society's development may be examined. What it does not do is provide, in the first instance, the means to look at the processes of domination, exploitation and oppression although Habermas does use these analytical tools i.e. the development of relevant learning processes and competencies as the necessary precursor to the expansion of the productive forces, to sketch out the evolutionary path of class societies. What can be inferred, therefore, from this type of analysis, is that there might be multi-variate forms of any one kind of ideal type society. I am therefore, going to use this to try and arrive at a variant of modern society which seeks to show that the development and domination of Western capitalism imposed a set of different learning problems on the Black world, not a better set, whose evolutionary impetus and logic, whilst located in Europe, still had to be dealt with. And further, that a fundamental part of this learning process, a dialectical one in the sense that the logic of the process infers an unspoken "unlogic" so to speak, was and is that which relates to the learning parameters of domination via the medium of race i.e. domination mediatised through race. The origins of this I see as having begun temporally long before the advent of the capitalist system and as lying, instead, in the intensifying relationship of subjugation between the white and Black worlds. My reading of Habermas is that there is an ambiguity contained in his notion of the learning processes insofar as he does not



appear to differentiate between learning which furthers the rationalisation of society, and learning which furthers the necessary dominating aspects of that society.<sup>77</sup> I want to run critically, therefore, with his brief excursus on progress and exploitation in which he claims it is no longer possible to apply those characteristics in a blanket fashion to describe the character of a society. Rather one has to differentiate the use of these concepts so that there will be features of, say neolithic society which are progressive when compared with, say the level of progress in some areas of modern society. Likewise, exploitation and oppression can be disaggregated into "bodily harm, personal degradation and spiritual desparation" and to which correspond respective hopes. My contention is that when it comes to race, that progress in one area is tied to exploitation and oppression in another in a way that makes the differentiation of these phenomena time lagged so that oppression and exploitation still belatedly maintain the contours of their differentiated form. This locks into race in terms of the Blochian notion of "unresolved problems and unfulfilled hopes", as the trans epochal leitmotiv, the finale of which is one of the key benchmarks against which we can test whether or not modernity can/or has run its course. The contours of this societal form I'll leave for later because the journey there entails an excursus via a reconstructive look at the development of normative structures: a reconstruction that seeks to unmask the racialised nature of Western normative structures despite their liberal democratic based ostensible claims to deracialised status.

### **1.8 (Norm)alising Domination**

Habermas regards the necessity of reconstructing societal normative structures as having arisen out of the lack of clarity surrounding those foundations of Marxian theory, a theory which, he quite rightly, views as making claims to being "critical", as opposed to being affirmative, of bourgeois social theory and institutions. The basis for the Marxian critique could be the immanence of bourgeois normative content. But when, as Habermas puts it, "the bourgeois ideals have gone into apparent retirement,..(so that)...there are no norms and values to which an immanent critique might appeal..<sup>78</sup>", then the only path open to a philosophical ethics is that which allows for the justification of norms and values through communication. In other words, as outlined earlier, a critical idealism in that arise out of action orientated towards reaching understanding and in which are always implicit universal validity claims. Learning processes are therefore not only located in the realm of technical knowledge, that upon which the productive forces depend, but also in the dimension of "moral insight, practical knowledge, communicative action and consensual regulation of action conflicts"<sup>79</sup>. These latter learning processes reveal normative structural patterns in which can be discerned a development logic which is inherent in cultural traditions and institutional change. To talk of

"logic" is not to talk about the means of this development, but only to flag up the range of cultural value, normative etc variations at any level of societal organisation. For Habermas " the change of normative structures remains dependent on evolutionary challenges posed by unresolved economically conditioned system problems and on learning processes that are a response to them."<sup>80</sup> For me this ambiguity - an ambiguity which is eschewed in his later works, the reconstruction of historical materialism having been done in the mid-seventies - allows too much of the Althusserian last instance determination by the economic. As a preface, therefore, to the detail of the normativisation of racialised group identities I want to propose the following which whilst relating directly to the history of white over Black, also highlights the core unresolved problem of modernity:

- ◆ that, following Bloch, there are also unresolved problems in the normative based learning processes which can carry over from one epoch into another
- ◆ that these problems relate to the relations of domination which are trans-epochal and which can eventually allow one society to meet the evolutionary challenges posed by systemic problems of their economy by imposing new relations of domination on another.
- ◆ that, therefore immanence is not totally exhausted so that, for example, the immanence of bourgeois law, retains some relevance when reconsidered in the light of the notion of racial (in)justice, to the extent that the time-laggedness of this issue apropos the developmental dynamics allows for time warping examination of modernity's unfulfilled hopes once Black people are brought explicitly into the frame.<sup>81</sup>

The basis of Habermas' thinking on normative structure development is the contention that there are homologies between ego structures and world views in which both exhibit "growing decentration of interpretive systems and to an ever clearer categorical demarcation of the subjectivity of internal nature from the objectivity of external nature, as well as from the normativity of social reality and the intersubjectivity of linguistic reality."<sup>82</sup> A similar point is made by Kovel in his attempt to delineate a psycho-history of racism.<sup>83</sup> This is the ground for developing the supplementary contention that there are homologies between ego and group identity structures thus: the epistemic ego is characterised by those abilities (cognitive, linguistic and action) held in common with other egos whilst the practical ego "lives" as an individual in performing its actions. It, in other words, " maintains the continuity of life history and the symbolic boundaries of the personality system through repeatedly actualises self identifications"<sup>84</sup>, so that the identity of the person is the sum of the achievements of that person. Identities, according to Habermas, can be twofold - propositional and those that people claim for themselves and maintain in communicative action. A



propositional stance requires that we make a statement about things, or people. Persons are very often identified propositionally by reference to some somatic feature, like skin colour. These can never be sufficient, and there is the further requirement that the person or persons are asked to clarify their own identity. Thus, if the propositionally ascribed identity is denied, "we cannot be certain whether he/she is simply disavowing his identity or is not in a position to sustain his/her identity, or whether he/she is not the person we suspect on the basis of external characteristics."<sup>85</sup> To resolve this requires a performative attitude in which the person concerned is asked to identify him/herself. Ego self identification cannot be accomplished in a propositional attitude, but only in the performance of communicative action where the participants must suppose that self contra-distinction is recognised by those others. On this basis Habermas can claim that asserting one's own identity can only be done through intersubjectively recognised self identification. This thesis can be pursued through examining the possible identity permutations arising out of personal pronouns. "I" and "you" and "we" and "you(pl.)" are performative i.e. they have "primarily the meaning of personal self representation on the basis of intersubjective recognition of reciprocal self representations." "We" also proposes a complementary relation to that individual's group. On the other hand, "he", "she", "it" and "they" denotes more of a propositional attitude. For Habermas, "I-you-we" relations are the foundations upon which collective identities are created in which such identities are those that are not freely chosen by members, are ascribed to members, and, therefore extend beyond the life histories of members. These identities do regulate the inclusive/exclusive boundaries of societal membership through the "taken-for-granted, consensual, basic values and institutions that enjoy a kind of fundamental validity in the group."<sup>86</sup>

I want to re-examine critically the above notions as refracted through systems of hierarchicalised power, especially as revealed in systems of racial domination by, at this stage, looking at a number of contentions. The first is that hierarchies of power which whilst they have inbuilt the tendency for propositional attitudes, especially from those in power about those disempowered, they do allow for the formation of collective identities. The second contention relates specifically to the one outlined above in terms of the earlier proposition that there is a growing hierarchicalisation of power between black and white which has pre-capitalist roots, and this is that at the core of this hierarchicalisation is the dynamic which maintains and renews a propositional attitude of white towards Black thereby retarding or preventing the attainment of common white and Black collective identities. The use of the term "common" does not give succour to the misread and misinformed carping of people like Goldberg that Habermas's notion of communicative action is incorporatist<sup>87</sup>. Rather it speaks of the conditions which will ensure that inter-subjective based discourse does not allow the parameters of

"common" to be so circumscriptive that white subsumes Black identities. This second contention is key because its genesis marks it out from issues of gender and class based hierarchies insofar as pigment based phenotypical features catalyse an "othering" atavism in white societies which maintain in the socially constructed arena of white/Black race, the propositional spatio-temporal attitudes. In other words white women and the working class can still share a collective identity which can be national or trans national e.g. the European, but which is denied in practice to Black people. The corporeal identification of Black people always has implicit spatio-temporal characteristics, i.e. newly arrived from out there, and has, therefore, common overlaps with the identification of "things". Just as a green stone in the garden has no need of a performative based identity, so too it would appear with Black people. The denial of a propositionally ascribed identity, has not in the past, and very seldom in the present, been followed by a performative attitude by white society in which there is an invitation, communicatively framed, to self identify. But therein too is contained one of the fundamental arcana of modernity's unfulfilled promise, especially in this era of increasing globalisation, and which goes to the heart of the white psyche. This is that the assertion of white identity is not complete until there is intersubjectively recognised self identification which is inclusive of Black people. In other words until we can truly become part of the "I-you-we", on the basis of communicatively based reciprocity, and in so doing shatter the "he-she-it-they" glass prison, marginalisation will continue. To advance the argument further, we need to look at Habermas' attempt to reconstruct the thinking on collective identities. His contention that with the transition to the modern world that "there proceeded a strong structural compulsion for the development of personality structures that replaced conventional role identity with ego identity", is true in one respect.<sup>88</sup> However conventional identification i.e. the expectation of certain roles, continued in the areas of gender, class, but, qualitatively more so in the area of race. Pace Habermas therefore, the new empires - and it is here that Habermas' theorisation appears deficient insofar as he does not take sufficient account of the growing symbiotic relationship that arose between the white and Black worlds - did attempt to represent itself as a universal unity, but not through a conventional role shattering i.e. post-conventional identification process, emancipation of citizens who could know themselves as being free and equal subjects of civil law, morally free subjects or politically free subjects, but rather through an "appeal" to Black people to be a part of but not a participant, in an entity. The white working class and, increasingly, white women became participants in the creation and maintenance of nation and Empire, whilst Black people only became part of Empire. The tenuousness of only "being part of" i.e. a "you", as opposed to being a "participant in", i.e. a "we", is a leitmotiv that recurs through the history of Black experience. Conventionalisation of Black people is not only the Bhabhian attempt to range the spectrum between the Fanonian



"Look! A negro" and his evocation of the less obvious distancing that can be "caught in a gaze" or heard "in the solecism of a silence".<sup>89</sup> This would still put the rolling on a par with that of Simmel or Goffman. The identified bookends are still too closely spaced to be able to include the full meaning of the maintenance of race based communicative distorted communication.. Catachrestically, the enrolment of a Black person is also the maintenance of those spatio-temporal parameters so that, transitively and neologically, it can be said to a Black person, "I conventionalise you". This speaks not only of doing to, as opposed to doing with, but also is premised upon the ability of the doer to so do. It speaks, in other words, of unjust hierarchy. The continual nurture of a racialised propositional attitude is thus far more than just exclusion for it is too entrapment, enslavement, imprisonment, ensnarement of Black people in a dynamic which renews atavistically the normative structures underpinning those taken-for-granted values of racism. This is not to give succour to the Foucauldian argument about continual asymmetrical positions of power. It is, on the other hand as I shall detail later, to say that the galvanising of the conventional-post-conventional interface is far greater for white people in areas of gender and class, say, than in the area of race. If exclusion dimensionally has implicit spatially a horizontal, almost neutered, visualisation, conventionalisation projects a three dimensional hologram that has vertical and horizontal parameters as well as an oscillation temporally with the past and future. My interest then is not in the defensive, past oriented part of the oscillation wave within which not only is, for example, the Bhabhian range located, but also the fertile ground for the "Ag siestog" redemption songs about manifest visible injustices. Rather my focus is on the future oriented part which I locate as the sharp cutting edge to anti-racist initiatives; here at the interface between conventional and post-conventional identifications that are racialised or non-race based. It is here, for example, that the locus of the failure of equal opportunity initiatives to stem the enrolment of Black people resides. It is here where the PC white subconsciously ratchets back the Black person's starting position despite all his/her training and belief in equality. That back of the mind barely conscious half formed query about competency which is not enacted with white colleagues, is of greater relevance than the "Look! A negro". Particularly as far as race is concerned, I agree with Habermas that "normative structures do not simply follow the path of the development of productive processes and do not simply respond to the pattern of system problems, but that they instead have an internal history."<sup>90</sup> The key characteristic of this internal history in relation to the white-Black dynamic is that Black people are "thinged" thereby maintaining not only a vertical hierarchical relationship of power, but an unjust relationship of power insofar as the opportunity for a performative attitude is denied to Black people. If thus bureaucracies encompass the instrumentalisation of action, then one can see the continuities between the achievement of primal ends by modern means, which the Holocaust has been described as, and the

persistence of institutional racism within overtly "equality oriented" organisations. Does this capture the essence of the irrationality/irrationalization of modernity's racism to date if, as Habermas does, we accept rationalization to mean "extirpating those relations of force that are inconspicuously set in the very structures of communication and prevent conscious settlement of conflicts, and consensual regulation of conflicts, by means of intrapsychic as well as interpersonal communicative barriers"?<sup>91</sup> Racism can then be descriptively described as the maintenance of racialised dominance, such as exploitation, exclusion, oppression and creation of inequality, which gives rise to the unjust disruption of life chances. *Substantively, however, racism can be defined as the maintenance of relations of force in the structures of communication, through conventionalisation of biological differences or ascribed biological differences.*

## 1.9 Forming Racial Domination

Miles' criticism that contemporary theories of racism are still too tied to notions of colonialism is true only to the extent that such theories retain the historicity of orthodox historical materialism, and therefore their ideologies of racism-productive forces linkage. On the other hand post modernist attempts to denarrativise racism by engaging with "discrete racisms" characterised, if at all, only by a core effect, such as exclusion, proves itself incapable of dealing with the reality of a world wide growing white-Black divide in which the sources of the inter and intra-national connections of power and economic disparities are transparent. At this stage I want to put forward a number of proposals which are the bases for an outline, as promised earlier, of a variant of modern global society built on racial domination. These are that:

- ◆ race has to be placed within a global framework of economy and power
- ◆ this framework has a history
- ◆ there is no assumption of an a priori relationship between economy/power and the contours of racial domination

These are already contextualised in earlier delineated arguments summarised thus:

- ◆ that the origins of racism are pre-capitalist, whilst acknowledging the significant pump-priming action capitalism had on its subsequent development
- ◆ that early mythological based views of the "anthropophagi" become transformed along the path to the modern age into conventionalised



- background norms normalising white domination over Black, including those which attempt to 'culturalise' differences
- ◆ that maintaining these relations of dominance mediated by race are an integral part of the learning processes of the West and thus an unresolved problem the solution to which is the touchstone to the fulfillment of the modern age

Just as Habermas attempted to use his schemata to outline the rise of class societies, so too I want to reconstruct his theory to sketch out the rise of racialised societies using the the phenomenon of white over Black relations. In employing his meta-distinction between system and social integrations, I do not regard these separations as ontic, but as heuristic devices to aid analyses. To this end racism's origins are not tied to the advent of capitalism, rather the advent of what Habermas describes as the "modern age" is taken as the beginnings of a world system in which racialised relations of domination are transposed globally. One can talk therefore about core/metropolitan and peripheral states systemically, the way Wallerstein does, which does not make any assumptions about the synchronisation of social integrative processes with the development of those systemic processes. Rather one can talk about the logic of the development of learning processes which enables new forms of crisis avoiding system integration to be implemented where this implementation is tied to new institutional arrangements. Thus, more concretely, if we are talking about current learning processes including that of racial domination to enable a global system of racial disadvantage, then, concomitantly we are talking about increasing the cognitive potential of anti-racist knowledge to both release inclusive institutional arrangements, and revised systemic arrangements, which might not be in the direction of increased forces of production. Hence:

"By principles of organisation I understand innovations that become possible through developmental-logically reconstructed stages of learning, and which institutionalise new levels of societal learning."<sup>92</sup>

Furtado's attempt to capture the quintessential quality of the genesis of the relationship between the first and third worlds by describing it as a capitalist wedge driven into those societies is in part true echoing as it does my earlier description of the imposition of a new set of learning problems.<sup>93</sup> However it still places too heavy an emphasis on the leading evolutionary role of new productive forces. Likewise Ray's welcome, but belated attempt, to use the Habermasian analysis outside of the West, places too heavy an emphasis on the global systemic crisis and its influence on the legitimation strategies that arise in so called peripheral states. Whilst paying heed, therefore, to the areas of system problems, I want to concentrate more on the social

integration aspects of the relationship and its history, and in particular the white-Black nexus.

Europe's contact with Black populations at its periphery transmogrified into a full blown conquest with near global geographical parameters via a cognitive potential already structured through a cultural nascent normatively framed hierarchicalisation of white over Black. The transformation of early mercantile capitalist penetration of Black societies into formal structures of politico-economic domination I see as providing the institutional framework for the further development and implementation of racialised learning processes of domination. Unlike orthodox Marxists, neo-Marxists, like Furtado, critical theorists, like Ray, and even post-modernist commentators, like Said, whose emphases lean towards either system or culture, I see this process as that of a wedge, if I might borrow again that metaphor, of new systemic and social integrative actions in which there is a sharper bifurcation between white and Black at the socio-integrative level. Systemically new structures of economic and administrative power were imposed on these societies which ruptured and realigned some of the traditional systems according to priorities determined by a dynamic located elsewhere. Social integrative institutions and processes were disrupted as well not just by the penetration of new forms of systemic action, but by the imposition of social integrative action that consensualised norms hierarchicalising white over Black, which were instrumentally applied, and therefore experienced as direct domination. Economies and polities were re-oriented via a permission sanctioned overtly by forcible control, as exercised through the military, police and imposed judicial systems, and via a justification normatively secured for white society by the "de-anthropophaging"/induction into "humanity" trope as exercised on Black people through Christo-redemptive institutional practices of the church, school, and public health agencies. There is enough evidence to show the outward resource draining orientation the new economic systemic arrangements occasioned, and which continue today. I am not going to concentrate so much on that, other than to lock economic crises in peripheral states into system integrative responses to crises of the world economy, and the impact the economic system, and particularly crises, have on the social integrative systems in such societies/states. Instead I want to focus on the hybridity effects the imposition of white social integrative actions and institutions had on Black societies by looking categorically at the two collectivities in a way that seeks to draw out principled characteristics without assuming any reductive homogeneities. White societies in the peripheral subject "states" were crucial access conduits to Black subjects, especially where the lack of any kind democratic polity made the gap between white civilian life and the administering state even narrower. The administered "state" with its non-challenged, affirmative polity provided a more fertile ground upon which phenotypical based propositional statements



about subjects out there could be made. Those who ranged from beasts of burden to not quite yet adults, were not and could not be party to the norming through the growing repository of conventional(ised) wisdom about the naturalness of Black people being subjected. The growing boundaries of Western knowledge, and within that the enlarging boundaried differentiation of "subject" areas, reflected within each as an integral moment, knowledge about Black people, very often negotiated through those white settler societies in the form of the colonising power's phantasms of progressive empire. These societies' social institutional core were very much linked to the relevant metropolitan/colonial country. The spatio-temporal parameters were in a state of very slow flux in which "home" was frozen in the memories transported with them and kept on ice by the slow rate of white societal change on the periphery. Systemic crises, other than revolutionary upheaval in the colonial states, were those that occurred in metropolitan countries. In a sense then the distance the white settlers had to travel to truly see Black people still detoured via the colonising society - a greater distance than the actual mileage separating the two societies. This time and distance lagged stagnation simply increased the conventionalisation of Black people. It jump started those othering tendencies into the creation of essentialised exaggerated white national identities. This is not to argue that such white societies were an undifferentiated group, but it is to argue that despite differences of class, gender, status etc within such societies there was still a commonality of conventional knowledge about and conventionalising attitude towards their Black subjects. The assumption of new nationhood which marked the passage into post colonialism offered no resolution. These were epochal problems about white over Black which carried over unresolved into another era in which the institutional framework for new levels of learning, i.e. one that substantively deracialises white and Black, becomes displaced on to a world scene. The question then is what are the key characteristics of this displacement. To answer this means tracking back to delineate the main features of white subjugation, and, more importantly, Black societies' responses. There were two main features. Firstly a systemic disruption and re-alignment due to the imposition of new economic and political systems of power that had its impetus tied to the systemic manouverings of the metropolitan country manifested in an objective of selected resource drainage, not radical societal transformation. The nascent cognitive potential that sanctioned, and in the process developed, the civilised-uncivilised, human-beast, clean-dirty hierarchicalisation justified a range of systemic interventions - slavery, indentured labour, plantationising, mineral appropriation, poll taxes etc. However, subjugation disrupted as well a range of social integrative institutions, and not just kinship systems as the "mode of production" theorists would have. In so doing it imposed a different set of societal learning problems the solution to which involved/involves the inclusive participation of white societies - but more of that later. Habermas has

attempted at his abstract level of analysis to characterise the formation of class societies by postulating that these arose when the material production process was uncoupled from the kinship system and re-organised via relations of political domination. Using that as a crude analogy it can be said that white subjugation not so much uncoupled material production as selectively re-orientated it via relations of racialised domination. The systemic effect on Black life worlds cannot be considered without looking too at the attempts to institutionalise new forms of social integration. Political integration was sought through the introduction of colonial subjects, not citizens, who could owe allegiance to white regent based parental figures in metropolitan Xanadus. Limited introduction of extra life world socialising institutions - limited in the sense that the introduction of these institutions were tied to the instrumentalised micro-systemic needs of individual subjugated areas e.g the production of clerks for minor functionary jobs in the administrative set-up, and not, as in metropolitan societies, tied to systemic legitimation strategies - through educational, public health, social policy and religious interventions were refracted through a core concern to naturalise white-Black hierarchicalisation. In other words the "I" of white society and "you" of Black society could only ever become a "we" under limited circumstances of sharing a common political ruler, monarchically symbolised in some colonising powers and/or through normative subjugation via "Black skin, white masks" assimilation processes, but effected through a universal franchise in colonising countries, and an enforced universalisation in the colonised ones. Thematically compulsory socialisation of ersatz cultures, as one of the facets of the epoch straddling unresolved white-Black problem, is burped once again from the belly of the imperial beast in the form of the knowledge restrictive to conventionalise "who belongs" in the redefined UK educational processes governing the formation of the national curriculum. The second main feature then relates to the disruption of the social integrative institutional core by the imposition of new systemic and social integrative processes, and thus on the evolutionary learning, i.e. the cognitive potential, of those societies, and the responses this evoked. In so doing I am but attempting to delineate at a generalised level the categorical range of probable responses, and its invitation to empirical validation within specific contexts, both as a reaction away from the empirically narrow implications of the "mode of production" teleology, and the inference of infinite multi-cultural entities contained within the textualised post-modernist theorising. Re-alignment of the social integrative mechanisms occurred through a process of life-world colonisation. Now Habermas identifies life-world colonisation in the West as that process of systemic intervention of economy and power that results in the displacement of consensual norms and has, therefore, as one of its outcomes post-conventionalisation, manifested in the formation of modernity questioning new social movements. These new social movements, as against the orthodox Marxist notion of class conflict, are



indicators of the modernity questioning twilight zones of change. My claim, however, is that this process manifested itself, as one of the responses to colonial racial subjugation, time-warpedly, long before their visible appearance in the West. Touissant L'Ouverture's stakeholder in humanity claims for Black ex-slaves in the very heart of the political centre and practice of the Enlightenment is one, as is, relatedly and more importantly, the subsequent creation by France and the States, between those insticities of change, of the "Doc"toring of Haitian history. I have identified categories of responses. These are not made with any claim to all embracing inclusivity, other than to flag up that they do attempt to resolve one of the principal objections of the newly emerging school of post-coloniality which postulates that radical Western theories of, and about, the Third World prevent the "subaltern" from speaking because their parameters of change are too circumscriptive and thus have an inbuilt imputation of nativism/traditionalism for those phenomena that do not fit. I am not going to differentiate between system and social integrative imposition, but will run them together as an en bloc subjugation giving rise to similar responses. Categorically we can talk about the following:

- ◆ Systemic and/or system-social integrative overload in which systems penetration disrupts the social integrative core so much that it disintegrates. The impact of slavery on some of the smaller societies in West Africa is an example; or under other categories the description of individuals totally pathologised by the process
- ◆ Partial systemic and/or system-social integrative imposition in which organic (preferred term to describe those social integrative institutions that existed before colonial subjugation) social integrative core remains largely untouched, i.e. it can still renew the belief values of that society. This can describe as well those situations of encouraged ethnicity, i.e the subjugating powers allow/encourage/facilitate the nativism of the "natives". This can be the basis of an offensive oriented action to restore what was; or a defensive oriented attempt to "pickle" in frozen time and place an ethnicity. An example of this would be the Zulu so called nation which historically has exhibited both offensive and defensive attitudes.
- ◆ Organic social integrative displacement in which life world colonisation through imposed social integrative processes and sytemic penetration displace the organic core. Displacement is the operative word because it allows for the qualification of degrees of displacement. Total, or near total displacement, will depend on the extent to which systemic impositions coincide with the inherent legitimations of the substitute social integrative core. One of the key factors affecting the level of coincidence would be the extent of de-to anti-racialisation of the replacement socio-integrative core

The imbalance towards the colonial administration system as a bureaucratic steering vehicle for new inspirations is a better way of relooking at someone like Alavi's notion of the overdeveloped colonial/post-colonial state.<sup>94</sup> The development of organic economic systems with a dynamic sufficient to withstand external pressure might offer a way of looking at latterday Singapore. To get back to the main concern, the inherent conventionalisation which seeks to legitimate white over Black alongside promises of incorporation into civilised humanity within the imposed socio integrative core, means that there are a number of responses that can be idealised within this type of category. The first is represented by the "coconut/choc-ice/chocolate teacake/speelwit" syndrome in which the disengendered "white man"-as-best is accepted wholly either by a total displacement, or partial adaptation of organic systems. There is the rejection of the white-Black hierarchicalisation which can take a number of forms: defensive actions cast within the organic socio-integrative core which can reject the imposed systemic and socio-integrative institutions and pose idealised alternatives; rejection of the imposed socio-integrative core, partially or wholly, but acceptance of the systemic interventions on condition they are under "Black" control i.e this includes the varieties of nationalist decolonising movements; or interrogation of both sets of systemic and socio-integrative process which pose questions about the conditions for white acceptance of Black and vice versa i.e this includes the range of Marxist oriented movements, post-modernist theorising, and, the conceptualisation of post-conventionalisation in "Third world" contexts. The abstracted framework outlined above is a better one within which specific contexts can be analysed and held up to the scrutiny of localised empirical studies without having to jettison a global interconnectedness or, concomitantly, postulate an infinite number of unconnected specificities. In the latter type of analyses, allowing the subaltern to speak is premised upon a base line that goes no further than providing a configuration within which better understanding can be non-judgementally achieved, thereby providing the Goldbergs of this world the specificity bound comprehension to understand the phenomenon of necklacing without condemning it.<sup>95</sup> I, however, want to go further by prefacing the analytical framework with the critically interrogative question of what constitutes the way of seeing things which can provide the means to examine the basis for non-distorted communicative discourse both here and over there. In other words not only can one acknowledge and understand the variety of responses to white-Black hierarchicalisation as possible outcomes, which the philosophy of consciousness school does not allow, but one has a basis for engaging in practice, with that overall objective in mind, to resolve the multitudinous claims made. Imperialism can be reconstructed in terms that move beyond the productivist logic normally entailed therein to allow, for example, analyses which lock post-colonial state legitimation into the narrow band of congruence between systems of



economic and administrative power and social integration that exists, sometimes transiently, for those countries' urbanised elites; analyses which allow for acknowledgement of religio-cultural ethnicities, authoritarianism, populist democratic movements etc. as authentic exit signs of a systemically provoked legitimation crisis. It allows for a reconstruction that permits the construction of solutions to the charge of racism made about the West by post-colonial national leaders, the moral and ethical content of which applies equally to the action of those leaders within their own countries. One can now view migration of Black people, post-colonially, to white countries as part of those exiting phenomena associated with legitimation crises in post-colonial societies, whether this be for economic or political reasons, or belief in the "streets-paved-with-gold" phantasm. People thus migrate for a number of reasons with manifold value systems. With the UK there was, and is, the promise of full participatory rights, that is of synchronicity of space and temporal parameters which comes with journeying to "home", that original harbinger of universal rights. But hierarchicalisation of the white-Black nexus, which in metropolitan countries expresses itself through an even greater systemic colonisation of Black life-worlds, finds the legitimation crisis exit signs being displayed at a greater rate from the Black communities, and, in relation to white society, temporally advanced.

Conventional racism from the colonial epoch, itself a development of pre-colonial hierarchicalisation of white over Black, becomes part of the repository of knowledge about Black people which is inclusive of the learning strategies that arise out of maintaining relations of force in communicative discourse, an example of which is the divide and rule tactic of promoting frozen ethnicities in metropolitan countries as a means of dispersing claims of racial justice. In fact it can be said that the whole of the colonial period can be characterised as an exercise in the propositional identification of Black people "out there" in which the propositional process is inclusive of subjugation that prevents the self identification of "these Others", other than in representational form through the activities of the colonisers and the burgoening nationalist elites who come to speak "for the people". Post-colonially this becomes displaced on to the world scene underpinning the inter-relationships between white and Black countries, whilst intra Western countries, these phantasms of imperial days past are re-engaged and reformed with the growth of Black populations internally as a result of migration. This displacement and re-engagement are not the only symptoms of epochally unresolved problems of racism. Within ex-colonial societies, legitimation problems soon arise because the promise of systemic rewards inherent in the independence movements, cannot be met. Issues of white-Black racialisation begin to recede and are displaced by those of "Wa'benzi".<sup>96</sup> But these are not new; they are, instead, a re-ignition of the process of questioning of certain aspects of the hybrid socio-integrative core which post-colonial societies become after formal independence, and a

questioning of the systemic arrangements. Thus issues of gender, democracy, exaggerated ethnicities, etc., which are masked by the independence promise of universalism, come to the fore, as they are increasingly in so-called Third World countries, and in a way in which the orthodox Marxist domination of "imperialism" has been, and is incapable of predicting or adequately analysing..

### 1.10 Racism in the Metropole

Let me preface the outline of a reconstructed idea of racism that is globally envisaged by mentioning now a phenomenon I want to examine in more detail later. This is, is this pattern of racialised force in colonial relations of communication so dissimilar from what is going on now in white countries with large Black populations? The cognitive potential of learning to dominate, increased through the colonial and post-colonial period, is, if I might only speculate at this stage because of the need for further research, a better way of accounting, perhaps, for the pattern emerging now. By way of analogy Arendt's perceptive characterisation of the forming Afrikaaner domination of South Africa captures the selectivity I am trying to describe. Hence:

"Imperialism was willing to abandon the so-called laws of capitalist production and their egalitarian tendencies so long as profits from specific investments were safe (to the extent that) whenever rational labour and production policies came into conflict with race considerations, the latter won."<sup>97</sup>

Thus there is today in Western countries with Black populations a de-universalisation of the claims of the systemic processes, i.e the synchronicity of socio-integrative institutions and systemic interventions self evidently applies to only a narrow band of elites, large sections of the society are subalternised i.e placed in positions of greater communicative force, with the Black communities being the pathfinder ones at the cutting edge; a selective, sometimes forced, e.g. workfare, systemic engagement with these communities e.g. permanent unemployment, withdrawal of the welfare state; an imposed socio-integrative core based upon idealised past standards that have their philosophical bases in a communitarian impulse ranging from "left" to "right", as a result of panics about so called organic socio-integrative institutions, like the family, but which are coded ways of talking about those aliens in our midst, i.e. Black people.<sup>98</sup> Perhaps we should disinter and critically re-construct theories like Blauner's notion of internal colonialism.

Let's start, though with the phenomenon of migration of Black people to colonising countries, like the UK, not out of a belief that racism started there in time, but to emphasise the point made earlier about the re-ignition of long



standing, imperially enhanced, knowledge, lurking in all socio-cultural processes, which maintains white-Black hierarchicalisation. The distinction attempted by Habermas in his belated, but welcome attempt to deal with the resurgence of overt neo-nazi racism in Germany, between those European countries with a "tradition" of migration, and here he means Black migration, to them, and those without, such as Germany, appears to give sustenance to the argument that it is an issue of culture clash.<sup>99</sup> My contention is that the learning processes of racial domination occurred long before the phenomenon of Black migration. Thus, for example, Germany's imperial forays into Black countries and the reservoir this provided for the emergence of anti Afro-German racism post- Second World War is testament to these tendencies.<sup>100</sup> Black people arrived, certainly in the case of the UK, from the many corners of the Black world with a range of localised and nascent world views, and from a range of backgrounds. There was a criss-crossing at the terminus, of socio-economic, gender, and socio-cultural backgrounds. What is certain is that these were not hermetically sealed ethnic entities that arrived. It was not the transportation of ethnic continuities, as implied by the ethnic, and latterly, etnik, minority specialists, nor the centuries old Caribbean excursus via slavery, of a cultural lineage, covering for biologically based authenticity, as implied by the Afrikaanists, nor the migration of historically unchanging religio-cultural social formations. If there is any common denominator it is that which not only characterises the reasons for migration, but also testifies to the primacy of the "here-and now" nature of identity formation and motivations. That is to say that migration from nascent Third world countries and transitional colonial states in the '50s and '60s is one of the visible signs of a legitimisation crisis amongst some of their populations. Migration expresses at a general level, and for a multitude of individual reasons, at the micro-level, a rejection of that country. These reasons could range across the spectrum of "systemic" interventions, or absence of these, e.g. political refugees or those who migrate for economic betterment, or the spectrum of socio-cultural displacement, e.g the belief in "God, Queen and mother country", or the hope of a fully compensatory claim to those "universal ideals". One of the few areas of synchronicity between white and Black was in that coalescence around the identification of "white" as a general description for Europeans, but exhibiting as well a normative bifurcation between the two collectivities expressed through the social missionary "white man's burden" on the one hand, and the "white as subjugators" on the other. Black people arrived with their localised identities, not self identifying as Black, except in those few instances where colonial propositional practices had "niggered" the colonised descriptions. It is worth mentioning briefly the belated attempt by some to reconstruct the Black experience in terms of space and time considerations, usually, unfortunately, by those who because their post-modernist theoretical proclivities have knocked away the structural linkages between metropole and periphery, contrary to experience and evidence,

now see this as a way of re-instating that necessary link. I have attempted to sketch out an analysis which gives primacy to the universalisation of a specific form of dominance i.e. racialised, with different space and time parameters one of whose specific effects was to delegitimise local place in favour of a metropole made more favourable by the promise of universalised "fruits" at the end of the journey between the two locales. However, arrival in the metropole initiated an accelerated re-colonisation process, which I'll detail later, and, which in effect was a racialised blitzkrieg on every aspect of their being. Those racialised relations of force, which are trans-epochally unresolved problems of the hierarchicalisation of white over Black, and which have entered into the learning processes of the modern age as a means of securing the short term solutions to systemic crises, structures, overtly and covertly, the decision making processes relating to Black people's lives. The brief, temporary, transitory glimpse of systemic and socio-integrative isochronism which first foot on the soil evokes, and later because of increasing racist immigration practices, which the actual journey offers, is wiped aside as racism re-asserts those dominative space and time parameters which destabilise place. Racism focuses the Black immigrant's experience back on to the margins. "Go back to where you came from" which re-asserts the parameters of global space in a racialised dominative mode, has, too, a retro time element, that encapsulates the backward temporal displacement of the continual not being accepted as "we". Racism then soon shatters that brief convergence of time, space and place and differentiates hierarchically once again the respective time and space coordinates of white and Black. In re-averring racial domination, racism, if I might run with a mathematical allegory, vectors white space and time parameters, and pseudo-vectors Black ones, so that the white vector field determines the space and time of Black people to the extent that physical place become the axes for their pseudo-vectors of space and time. Here the experience of place is the space of the ghetto, and of time that extra weight that slows down the pendulum of opportunities for self determination out of those circumstances. It also, as one of the outcomes, freeze dries those sedimented ethno-memories as an etnik blueprint, which are then evoked and reconstructed in the here and now by the rapaciousness of racism in the metropole whilst claiming an organic pedigree of time lineage, which in reality is empirically challengeable. This racialised irrationalisation in the sense of the maintenance of relations of force in communicative discourse, means that in reality despite the physical proximity of field vectored Black communities to, for example, local Town halls, the communicative distance that has to be travelled is still via the colonies. Yet all of this is contained within the dialectic in which that experience of relativising of the presence allows "us", as one of the delegitimising exiting routes, to time warp to the future to pose substantive questions about society well ahead of the rest. That questioning of "home", that belated realisation that "jobs are not for life", that wakening up to global inter-connectedness



which are issues now, can as a recent trans-national Pepsi advertisement would have it, be reconstrued as; pace white experiences, "Been there. Done that....."

Thus the universalisation of a specific form of domination, which, whilst imposing different spatial and temporal parameters, was only intermittently active, as evinced by the stagnation of colonial structures and as picked up by Arendt, and thus never able to achieve the same degree of colonisation of the lifeworld, which I'll detail below, as in the Western centre. It is within this "caesura" that we can explore and distinguish notions of the "lost undifferentiated community" yearning forms of resistance, and immanently "time warping" ones of Black people appropriating the dangled fruits of equality, freedom etc. and thus pushing back the boundaries of modernism. In so doing I want too to run with the notion of this forced bi-temporal/spatial multi-linguism as one of the emancipatory means by which the colonial/post-colonial/Black person not so much catchresises, as neologises in pursuit of validity claims about racial justice. This also, I believe, provides a better framework for looking at hybridisation.

I want to explore therefore the detail of the why and how of racism and the use of "Black" by looking at Habermas' notion of the colonisation of the lifeworld. This exploration bifurcates into an examination of the non psycho-analytic but normative anchoring of white racism, and into an examination of the experience and effects of racism vis-a-vis the lifeworld of Black people; the latter as a basis for developing the notion of an accelerated autonomous post-conventional identity as one of the outcomes. alongside others such as newly reconstructed conventional ones, and pathological ones, all of these characterising the non-predictable outcomes of such colonisation.

Let me re-journey briefly over Habermas' theory of colonisation of the lifeworld via both his own and other commentators' work as a foregrounding to a reconstruction through testing its universalist claims in the domain of race and racism. The idea of the lifeworld arises out of Habermas' categorical distinction between action theory and systems theory; a distinction someone like Chatterjee in his analysis of colonial India echoes.

<sup>101</sup> That is "one must distinguish mechanisms for co-ordinating action that harmonise the action orientations of participants from mechanisms that stabilise non-intended interconnections of actions by way of functionally intermeshing action consequences (whereby the in the former) integration of an action system is established by a normatively secured or communicatively achieved consensus (and in the latter) by non-normative regulation of individual decisions that extends beyond the actors' consciousness." In this distinction between system and lifeworld, the latter is defined by Habermas as "a culturally transmitted and linguistically organised stock of interpretive patterns".<sup>102</sup> Categorically the lifeworld can be broken down, as

Outhwaite, points out, in terms of "cultural reproduction[continuity of tradition, coherence and rationality of knowledge], social integration[stabilisation of group identities, solidarity] and socialisation[transmission of generalised competencies for action, harmonization of individual biographies with collective forms of life]"<sup>103</sup>. Habermas' theory has it that under the modern age, increased differentiation means that the lifeworld and system become detached from each other, and there is an increasing pattern in which the exchange, ie. between system and lifeworld, media of economy and power, become sub-systems themselves. They become "detached from normative contexts" and thus "challenge the assimilative power of the lifeworld," to the extent that, "the social system made up of these subsystems escapes from the intuitive knowledge of everyday communicative practice, and is henceforth only accessible to the counter-intuitive knowledge of the social sciences..." Habermas sees this delinguistified medium, such as money, as providing the basis for the transformation of normative grounded actions into success oriented actions. By inference, too, one can say that there is a displacement of normative based actions by power medium grounded actions, such as status and control. Outhwaite therefore discerns that the system and social integration distinction is underpinned by two further micro-distinctions: "between action oriented to success and action oriented to mutual understanding and between mechanisms of action co-ordination which develop and formalise mutual understanding.... and mechanisms which replace it, such as money and power."<sup>104</sup> To this, in advance of the reconstruction of the colonisation of the lifeworld thesis I see as necessary, I would add that some of the counter actions to mutual understanding that need to be flagged up are those oriented to actions such as status and control. Habermas uses these distinctions to argue that in the dominant societal formations of the modern age i.e. advanced capitalist and bureaucratic socialist, as then was, its members become "organisation dependent", as employees and clients, to the extent that communicative action processes are peripheral to those processes of conventionalisation within the organisation. Displacement becomes at the same time colonisation. Habermas pinpoints, in the modern age, the nuclear family's prioritisation of socialisation and consumption and the differentiation out of the cultural processes as the lynchpin to the colonisation process. I don't want to go into, at this stage the feminist criticisms about the location of the family as the life world core, suffice to mark it up as one of the crucial areas surrounding a race based reconstruction.<sup>105</sup> It is thus that "the adaption of individuals to organisational imperatives" gives rise to the "elimination of moral-practical reasoning". But colonisation is only one of the possible outcomes of increasing systemic and social differentiation. Within the resultant ambivalent indeterminacy there is, as well, the possibility of increasing rationality in the Habermasian sense in which "the further the structural components of the lifeworld and the processes that contribute to maintaining



them get differentiated, the more interaction contexts come under control of rationally motivated mutual understanding, that is of consensus formation that rests in the end on the authority of the better argument"<sup>106</sup>. Or as Outhwaite, in an echo of White puts it, "towards a hypothetical end state in which cultural traditions are constantly criticised and renewed, political forms are dependent on formal procedures of justification, and personalities are increasingly autonomous."<sup>107</sup> In a crude nutshell, if that is Habermas's theory of life world colonisation, then its validity claims to universality, especially since it was constructed within the purviews of Western society and its Enlightenment, have to be tested against the, as then, unacknowledged presence of Black lifeworlds in the metropole.

To that extent I want to colour Habermas' use of the term "colonise" both as an inclusive acknowledgement of Black presence here, and to reclaim the dominative energetic use the term has come to symbolise through the history of white over Black. Thus I agree with Kunneman that Habermas's work reads as if colonisation is no more than the replacement of one principle of sociation with another.<sup>108</sup> It is more than that, especially where formal semantic definitions of colonialism include that of being "the policy of a power in extending control over weaker peoples or areas."<sup>109</sup> This brings in too Honneth's query about the motivational source for inter-subjective communicative discourse.<sup>110</sup> But, then again, given his all white treatment of the subject, this is not that surprising for there is an inherent problem in moving from the *prima facie* motivational collectivities of class to the autonomous individual based new social movements in the emerging constellations of change in white society which does throw up questions about the role of collective identities as the source for actor based social change. It is thus within this Habermassian notion of linguistic based social interaction with its primacy given to the role of actors in societal processes that I want to locate the earlier mentioned bifurcation of the impact of racism on Black and white life-world in terms of "experiencers" and "perpetrators". These, like the use of the terms, "Black" and "white", are categorical heuristic differentiations and not hypostatisations.

Earlier I defined racism as "the maintenance of relations of force in the structures of communication through conventionalisation of biological differences and/or ascribed biological differences", where "conventionalisation" is taken to mean the perpetuation of a propositional identification of, and thus concomitant denial of a performative attitude from, Black people. Racialised conventionalisation within the white socio-integrative processes allows the structuration of actions so that the outcomes for Black people see them over represented in the formal indices of exploitation, oppression exclusion, and inequality. Apropos those who argue a common denominator of exclusion to the phenomenon of racism, it must be pointed out that the general outcome for Black people is in fact their

over inclusion in the social constructions of the criminalised, mentally pathologised, the unemployed, etc. In the process of racism, Black people are done to. Their experiences are not the "Oops!" like after effect of a societal belch. This restatement and amplification of the earlier definition I want to use as the preface for the general characterisation of the Black lifeworld in the metropole as that of being over colonised. In support of that let's start the detailed considerations by re-examining Habermas contention that success oriented actions transform normative grounded ones. Now this might do for the bourgeois Yuppie, but its logic would be irrelevant to the experience of the dispossessed. That it is not, however to dismiss this particular notion. Rather it is to argue that the lack of success is equally, if not more forceful, in transforming normative grounded actions, especially where that lack of success is mediated by racialisation. Lack of success makes visible increasingly, the wider context to that orientation towards success, with every failed attempt at inclusion. Where this is mediatized by racialised hierarchicalisation of white over Black, there is in fact a spectrum of visible economic force of success to the invisible "dark" side of lack of success in which Black people's attempts at full inclusion are nearly always ratcheted back. Perhaps we should use the term negative economic systemic intrusion to describe this specific colonisation of the Black life world. Now, it might be argued that this occurs to the White unemployed as well. That much is true. The qualitative difference, however, is that conventionalisation ensures that this process is that much greater and intrusive in the Black life world thereby differentiating the white from the Black dispossessed. I'll come to its likely effects later. First let's look at the tandem of political/administrative force contained in Habermas's theory in which the welfare state transforms the unsuccessful into organisation dependent clients. One of the routes to that stage is via what Habermas refers to as "juridification". This, as Outhwaite rightly summaries, "is part of a broad process of extension and deepening of the sphere of law in which it comes to cover more and more areas of life in greater and greater detail."<sup>111</sup> Juridification, however, embraces both dependency, and in some cases greater freedom.

"The point is to protect areas of life that are functionally dependent on social integration through values, norms and consensus formation, to preserve them from falling prey to the systemic imperatives of economic and administrative subsystems growing with dynamics of their own, and to defend them from becoming converted through the steering medium of law to a principle of sociation that is, for them, dysfunctional."<sup>112</sup>

It is certainly true, as my research into Black children in care shows<sup>113</sup>, that laws positivistically framed. i.e. not on the basis of substantive communicative discourse, have inherent the potential for dysfunctional applications. The difference when it comes to Black people is that laws, particularly welfare laws, are applied within a discretionary context that



allows for welfare actors' actions to be structured within conventionalised knowledge about Black people. Conventionalisation includes both the pejorative assessment of Black people, e.g. my research which showed that white social workers in their court reports were referring to Black parents who were illiterate as "unintelligent", and the new forms of "progressive" essentialist etnikfying of Black experiences, e.g. the one local authority Black Worker's Group who, in their defence of a Black member accused of threatening a child in care, claimed that authoritarian parenting was a part of Afro-Caribbean culture, or, those agencies who do not bother to provide certain services to Black Asian people because the "family takes care of those problems." Habermas' notion of juridification then does not adequately capture the true extent of what happens to Black people within the welfare service context. His underlying contention that these sort of processes underscore the move from one principle of sociation to another, because it does not articulate the power relationship involved, implies a painless transition. It is much more painful than that for Black communities in the metropole. I prefer, therefore, the idea of forced sociation, i.e. of the pressurised attempt to change through control strategies Black socio-integrative processes because of racism as defined. To that extent there is congruence with Kunneman's claims about the re-emergence of asymmetrical power relationships even in therapeutic so-called equivalence based services. There is an overlap, then with his idea of "pseudo-communication", and my one of racialised conventionalisation in which the latter allows for discretionary based re-assertion of the Black-white hierarchicalisation even in so-called "equal opportunity" environments. Having pushed criticisms of Foucault to the limits in the previous chapter, there is then an acknowledgement of the need for a slight rapprochement with his work, but with the proviso, as Outhwaite, correctly points out, that "Foucault's undifferentiated concept of disciplinary power must be refined in terms of distinctions implicit in Habermas's work"<sup>114</sup>. One of the overriding distinctions is that this particular power relationship has to be constructed in terms of specific blockages which "prevent individuals from engaging in performative acts that have a reflexive transforming effect on what is being criticised", i.e. articulating the racialised relations of force in communicative structures. The universalist claims of the law are thus undercut either by the over administration of such processes, or the lack of administration, i.e. services are inappropriate or discriminately refused. In fact the transformation of the notion of universality in welfare into explicit selectivity by the new right means that compensatory welfare interventions can be targeted on the grounds of efficiency etc. away from Black people without recourse to new laws but simply by ministerial fiat. This can be justified by an appeal to fictive cultural values which existed in the past, or, in extremis, by a resurrection of the contention that certain racial groups are less intelligent and therefore resources which are affirmative action targeted are wasted. This is a variation on the increasing past oriented, but rooted in

today phenomenon of the deliberate social construction of nostalgia exemplified by the cultural media trend of buying in time locked white settler television programmes so that the past and present can be "Neighbour"(ed). This points to my argument, detailed later, about the new technical racism in which high technicism and its selective white control allows for the recreation of racialised communicative distance and power asymmetry by trading in cultural conservatism/irrationalism. There is a sense then in which we can talk as well about negative politico-administrative systemic intrusions into Black life worlds. This goes to my earlier notion that Habermas's idea of the learning processes which support evolutionary stages and are the prefiguring bases for the move from one to another has, certainly in the move to, and during the modern age, to highlight its shadow because those learning processes are inclusive of a curriculum for maintaining racial domination. However, unlike post-modernists, I do not see these as irreconcilable, but rather the carry over of trans-epochal to date unresolved resolvable problems built around atavisms which lurk in the white normative anchored sub-conscious, structuring modern age "Fortress Europe", as the fear of the Black evil forces victory in the imagined Ragnarök. Thus in the material nexus that develops between white and Black success orientation because of conventionalisation, grows racialised exploitation and inequality; in the gap that develops between lack of success administrative inspired interventions in white and Black life worlds, grows racial oppression. It's like the imagined response a Black welfare recipient would give to a white welfare recipient where the latter had complained about his benefits that "All this amounts to is shit!"; which was; "Hell, I get shit asking for shit, then I don't even get the shit I'm entitled to." In sum, racialised conventionalisation by maintaining relations of force in the structures of communication, contributes to the key characteristic of its impact on the Black lifeworld, which is that that lifeworld is over colonised. The structures of communication I interpret to mean as those arrangements of institutions, processes, procedures and practices which facilitate non-distorted communication, and which speak of the political and ethical potential language has. Thus the inherent problem the post-modernist turn towards prioritising culture has is in its inability to use this as a basis for launching a political counter-offensive; a problem shared even by those modernist culture based theorists of race like Gilroy. The over colonisation of the Black life world gives rise to a number of outcomes which can be outlined at an abstract level categorically. This abstraction, like the earlier qualification on the Manichean use of white and Black, delineates building block principles that allow for regional and localised levels of analyses guided by empirical reflexive realities in which the "intuitive social sciences", one of the avenues now open to understanding the excluded experiences as a result of systemic colonisation, are "competent and capable" enough to encompass Black lifeworld experiences.



Over colonisation results in a range of phenomena far greater than that occurring to white lifeworlds, which make explicit time, space and place parameters to the extent that some of these phenomena represent the cutting edge to the fulfilment or not of modernity's promise of "progress".

Whereas Habermas speaks of the displacement of a new form of sociation with another which results in, amongst other outcomes, "progressive" new social movements based on post-conventional norm formation, i.e as the result of reflexive communicative discourse amongst individuals, I want to outline an interim stage which the Black lifeworld exhibits, and which maintains a group/collective character, itself a basis for motivation. I want to retain Habermas's distinction between "defensive" and "offensive" outcomes, but refine them by contextualising them within the previously raised issues surrounding past, present and future oriented utopias. The best way to arrive at this intended abstracted map of the effects on the Black lifeworld is to cross-tabulate those six columns of past, present and future oriented defensive and offensive leaning outcomes by considerations of identity, sub-divided categorically into individual, group and collective identities. One of the reasons for this is so that we can short circuitedly bring into the fold, and at the same time deal with, those standard bearer questions about hybridity and differences with which postie race theorists have assailed the excluding grand narrative discourses. The other reason is because, as I shall argue, over colonisation as an outcome of racialised conventionalisation brings to the fore at a sharper rate simultaneously for Black people questions about individual, group and collective identities which are not unique to them, as is implied in the postie celebration of difference, but harbingers of wider societal issues; the same sorts of issues which have given rise to the new right and resurgent neo-fascistic romanticism of a "golden white past".

We can describe racialised conventionalisation as that of a process of forced social differentiation in which the racial hierarchicalisation inherent gives rise to a relativisation of the Black conventional identity. Forced sociation, over systemic intervention, the maintenance of propositional identification, together with the space, place and time vectoring of these, give rise to the Black individual asking more quickly and regularly than his/her white counterpart questions about who he/she is, where they fit in, and how they fit in. Let's deal with the most obvious outcome which is the over whelming of the individual resulting in pathologisation as evidenced by the health profiles of Black communities in the metropole. However, maintaining the communicative distance and hierarchy because of racialised conventionalisation means that the relativisation of the Black person's conventional identity can result in the re-affirmation of that convention in contradistinction to the propositional identity foisted on him/her. For the Black person metropolitan wogging crystallises those values brought with and with which he/she confirms and maintains his/her identity. For those

first immigrants this might still be rooted in the geographical location of origin. "You are not wanted here" quickly re-introduces that travelled space between Black and white, imagined Empire and metropole. These values, sometimes underpinned by religious considerations might manifest itself in an overtly declared group identity, which in the absence of mechanisms for radical communicative discourse, ends up as being representational; open to appropriation and representation as propositional essentialised ethnic identity. At this stage such claims to group identity, as a counter to wogged identification, might entail a questioning of social institutions, but not a rejection of political ones, which structure the wider collective normative sinews of "nation". Substantive group identities, insofar as they depend on the reflexive identification of individuals therein, are not static; especially if, as is the case with over colonisation, the pressures on those normative underpinnings to individual identities are always under attack. Before we go on to the hybridisation of group identities, those sub-propositional ethnic identities, as opposed to the overt conventionalised wogged identities, i.e. the non-differentiating "they're all niggers" etc., might come to be accepted and even touted by Black individuals as oppositional representation e.g. the variations on the "we West Indians" theme. One thing is certain, such identities, as with white settler ones in third world countries, become themselves conventionalised exaggerated ethnic traps. There are two main fault lines that quickly appear in so-called group identities. The first is generational in which those born and socialised in the metropole are not burdened by considerations of physically being from out there. Wogging is far more likely to raise questions about the racist nature and acceptability of white society, and at the same time a questioning of their own allocated group/family norms which they might see as too accepting of unpalatable treatment. The use of the auxiliary verb "might" is indicative of the ambiguity and ambivalence of the process. Generational sub-group identities might revolve around cultural processes and manifest themselves in dramaturgical and poetical idiom, as in music or fashion. The extent to which these are substantive identities, i.e. they at least inform the normative structuring of the next generation, and not simply the manifestation of the need for the self to find its acceptance in a group expression (what makes me secure, feel good etc.) is open to question. However given that there is little to no control over the media of its expression, these manifold identities have a short decay time, only to re-emerge in different form once the old one has been appropriated by white expertisation. On the other hand these generational sub-identities might find their overt socially constructed normative expression in fashion whilst still boundaried by religio-grounded cultural values, as Aziz shows in his description of "Yummies".<sup>115</sup> These new ethnicities are marked by their origins in an overt questioning by their Black participants, not only of the racism of conventionalisation, but also, the normative structure of their lifeworlds, probably as expressed through



their familial socialisation. This results, not in the move towards a post-conventional self-identification, as outlined by Habermas, but in the explicit social construction of etnikfied identities, as evidenced, for example, by the acceptance of one form of Islamic values by young Muslim women born and brought up in the metropole. These formations and reformations of individual and group identities are marked by the implicit and explicit claims made against their exclusion from the collective identity of the nation, and thus by the potential for a sub-collective identity which is characterised by the common experience of wogging, and which sometimes manifests itself in terms of the overt sub-collective identification as "Black". Over colonisation also renders those normative structures which consensualise gender hierarchies open to increasing question by women. However, it is not guaranteed that this will result in a rejection of those structures. Racialised conventionalisation, in its disengendered form, might, and does in some cases, result in women "preferring" the sanctuary of those structures, or reconstructing normative structures which whilst they might empower the male, are prioritised against white racism, as evidenced, for example, by the manouverings around the etnik construction of the "disempowered" Black Afro-Caribbean male and the "strong" in work woman/mother who understands the bases to the formers' now etnikfiedly explained, but not necessarily accepted, "philandering ways". It might, and in some cases does, on the other hand, pitch the identification around a restructuring of the family, pace those white feminists who maintain the permanence of patriarchy in the family structure, in ways that orient its processes towards radical communicative based gender equivalence, but also maintains an anti-racist normative input. In other words identities, as the Black experience in the metropole shows, are increasingly formed in the here and now, a point I made in the earlier paper. It might thus give rise to an individual based post-conventional self identification in which the individual maintains a critical reflexive performative attitude towards issues not only of gender and race, but also the wider contexts of, say capitalism and modernity. There is therefore, the potential for two sub-collectivities, "Black" and "women", both of which in their appropriation by Black people/women, and their permutations therein, point to ways in which it is possible "to arrest the destruction of solidaristic collective life - in other words, life forms with possibilities for expression, with space for moral practical orientations which offer a context within which one's own identity and that of others can be unfolded less problematically and in a less damaged way."<sup>116</sup>

Habermas differentiates these symptoms of modernity two-foldedly in terms of defensive and offensive phenomena. Whilst he does this explicitly in relation to what he describes as new social movements, I take this distinction to apply too to the manifold manifestations of identity formation. I think this distinction, in the light of racialised conventionalisation, needs refining. Someone like Ray does as well. However, his critique that Habermas'

distinction is too broad to pick up on the complexities of these movements, e.g. they are structured by complex layers of sectional interest and attachments to the past, misses the point that this distinction is abstract and thus necessarily general enough to encompass the intricacies I have illustrated above. I prefer the distinction, particularly in categorising Black social movements, of "inclusive" and "exclusive", where the process of including means as well practices aimed at removing the structures of force in communication, means therefore, practices which are not dominating, exploiting or promoting of inequality, means not being "etnik", means, finally, not conventionalising on the grounds of race. Utopianly it means being future oriented. It means being reflexively oriented so that problems experienced are new lessons learnt, and thus a new and better politics offered. Let me illustrate this by looking at what I regard as an exclusive Black new social phenomenon as expressed in the identification of Black with those of African and/or Asian descent, and in particular the frequent privileging collapse of African into Black. The use of Black thus as a positive political re-signing process by those who, because of perceived pigmentation differences, are homogenised under racist "wogging", unintentionally masks a naturalling and etnikfying tendency in the "descent" suffix. Thus, for example, "of African descent" frequently speaks of a uni-linear bio- and ethno-historicising of cultural tradition which seeks to draw a distinction at a geo-historical terminus between the "Arabisation" of North Africa and the rest of "genuine" Africa. We are then left with an exclusivist anthropometric notion of "African" which is not that dissimilar to the Apartheid "Bantuisation" of "African", or for that matter the BNPs racist shadow caricaturing of so-called Black African features in their literature. I reject this essentialist Golliwogging of Africa with its unspoken invitation to witness and question those other non-negroised unAfricans in Africa and its licencing of an anthropometric template against which some latter day African diasporic "descendents" are permitted to privilege their claim to Africa over other inhabitants because certain phenotypical characteristics of their mirror image offer a closer symmetry. I insist however that within the time/space/language framework of migration and hybridisation that "of descent" is virtually meaningless and that the here and now of Black people's existence is far more important to the process of identity formation than the construction of suspect secondary source ethno-memories. Thus even Gilroy's, as presented in his "Black trans-Atlantic"<sup>117</sup>, and for that matter Gate's "Colored People"<sup>118</sup>, attempts at rapping between the Scylla of a skewed imposed universalism and the Charybdis of multiple absolutist ethnicities, goes off key because of the trailing privileging baggage associated with his use of terms such as "African" and "diaspora". There is a strong sense in which Gilroy views Black as African as, therefore, a phenotypical construction. Of course the enslavement of some Black people from Africa is not epiphenomenal to modernism, but then neither is the enslavement of other Black people's from other parts of the world, or the



forced labourisation of others, or the genocide of still others. At another level of analysis, as outlined earlier, it can be said that over-colonisation has led to a questioning not only of the normative basis to Black Afro-Caribbean and Black Afro-American group identity, but as well to the wider conventionalised normative content of white society. The result is an archeological tracking back in time to uncover and recreate via a historiography that is a mirror image of the white "great names in history" school, the authentic Afrikan heritage which will serve as the underpinning to a reconstructed Black/Afrikan identity. This past recreated utopia is incapable of dealing with the present. Afrikaanisation therefore presents not only an exclusivist, but also in some cases dominating, defensive, backward looking posture towards the problem of racism.<sup>119</sup> Thus for example, one Black Workers Group in a particular local authority, started out as inclusive i.e. open to all workers who regarded themselves as Black, and, and in a non-hierarchical participative way. In the authority it was perceived by both councillors and unions as a threat that was unpredictable, i.e. in this case not open to strategic manipulation. Over the years, however, it "evolved" into a hierarchical organisation i.e. officers mirroring the wider union and an executive group that took decisions outside of the wider forum. It also came to assume an Afrikan identity through the Farrakhanising of key figures on the executive group to the extent that its logo changed to include a shadow representation of an ancient Egyptian with, for want of a better description, "negroid" features. Two features of its political functioning went hand in hand. The first was the extent to which its officers became embroiled in orthodox union politics i.e. alliances and chasing union official positions to the detriment of the Black Workers Group's constituency's interests; and also courting the approval of councillors to the extent that for a while the group saw its interests and the ruling Labour party's as co-terminus. The other feature was the de facto exclusion of other Black workers, such as Black Asian workers, many of whom felt aggrieved, and the hot pursuit of this tactic through the inclusion of Black Asian workers in allegations of racism against Black "Afrikans". The similarity of these phenomena, and say that of Farrakhan's movement with its Afrikan Islamisist overtones, authoritarian organisational processes, and scapegoating of other groups, needs to be mentioned because both exhibit the hallmarks of an exclusivist movement which relies on fighting racism through a counter assertion that is based at the end of the day, on including criteria which, like those forces that exclude them, are "naturedly" falsely constructed. There is a sense then in which this eruption of multi-identity formations, which can be expressed in the overt formation of constructed "groups", and which analysts like Eade in his work with the Bengali community would celebrate as evidence of the post-modern turn, is in fact a very visible symptom of a modernity, that far from being exhausted, has still to run its full course. Thus someone like Bauman's<sup>120</sup> theorising on the Holocaust, as the written watershed in his disenchantment with

modernism and thus subsequent fall into post-modernism, can be reconstructed if the Nazi experience could be seen as the terrible consequences of the first mass post-modern political movement i.e. a highly conservative racist authoritarian etnik construction of Aryan history and culture coupled with high technicism. Little wonder then, that the intellectual and political architects of Apartheid were, in their, younger days, interned during the Second World war for being overt Nazi sympathisers because the logic of that doctrine prefigured the multi-kultural claims made by latter day post-modernist theorists. The similarities are apparent - the social construction of bio-cultural hierarchies in which those at the lower end of the scale are propositionally interned in conventionalised racist categories, thus legitimating the subsequent enactment against them of operations through modernised bureaucracies which, together with their thing like status, exacerbated the indifference associated with large asymmetries of force in structures of communication. This finds a modern day echo in the post unified Germany where there is the conscious attempt by some to rewrite history through resurrecting the idea of a naturalised German ethnic identity which defines the collective "we" sans those "life not worthy of life" foreigners. The reclamation of Nietzsche and Heidegger by the new German right as the philosophical underpinnings for such endeavours exposes the Janus face of so-called radical "leftwing" epistemologically similarly radixed post modernist theorists whose deconstruction of the problem is powerless to prevent, as one of the outcomes, the etnikfication of the solution.

Before we get to the begged question of "what then is the solution?", we should retrace to the bifurcation of the effects of racism on Black and white in order to flesh out white participation in the construction of racism. It is clear that I am arguing that one of the principal facets of racism for white people is the trans-epochal carry over into conventional based normative systems of anthropophagied notions of Black people. Unlike the effect of racism on Black lifeworlds, the colonisation of white lifeworlds very rarely touches those conventional racialised norms. If anything, one of the key effects, as evinced by the growth of Christo-religious fundamentalism in the States and the allied re-emergence of explicit bio-cultural hierarchicalisation, is the added crystallisation of these racialised norms. Access to processes which might facilitate "solidaristic collective life" in which "one's own identity and that of others can be unfolded less problematically", are often double blocked, not only by existing relations of force in communicative structures, but also, the racialised conventionalisation of these, leaving isolated pockets both of "intellectuals" based inter university public spheres, and trans- and co-racial friendship, love and collective action as the "ticking over" carriers of communicative discourse which can pose validity questions about taken for granted racist norms. This provides a framework as well for looking at the continuing debate between Black and white feminisms and



the former's charge that the latter, when talking about feminism, has failed to incorporate the dimension of race and racism, perhaps because the route to the post-conventionalisation of the white feminist's life-world does not include as well the questioning of racialised norms. Thus for example, van Dijk's<sup>121</sup> work on discourse and the maintenance of racism provides a partial insight into the way one to one communication between Black and white can become malstructured to maintain the hierarchical distancing of white over Black because of taken for granted racialised norming. It reinforces Harvey's<sup>122</sup> point that despite the modern-era of global interconnectedness, the forces of distantiation between Black and white are even greater. With slight representational licence it can be said for many Black people that the exchange between white and Black of-

"Where are you from?

"Tooting"

"No. I mean originally."

-re-occurs in many forms. Thus, as a more concrete example, even at the height and heart of race 'equalitating', a local authority Directorate's Chief Officer could counter at a council's senior management meeting to the Principal Race equality Adviser's recommendation that in race related disciplinary cases the burden of proof should lie with the employer, with the response that, "The Principal Race Equality Advisor should realise that *in this country* (my emphasis) a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty."<sup>123</sup> Those who in the light of the collapse of a productivist analysis of racism have likewise moved away from meso- and macro-theorising about racism into the realms of decentring the causes of racism, with the concomitant "there are many forms of racism" descriptions, and/or, being only prepared to specify the effects of racism, miss the point that the racialised normative bases to the cultural context in which racism is enacted, is composed atavistically of leitmotifs trans-epochally carried over, even if they are re-arranged continuously to present as new. These racialised conventions, which are not yet accessible to post conventionalisation processes, capture and re-present Black people, and by so doing, relativise (s)p(l)ace and presen(t)ce. The certainty of white racism has, as one of its counters for Black people, a reformulation of the Uncertainty Principle, in which because Black people's time and space are refused synchronicity, these can, in many instances, never be simultaneously captured. In these cavities, can grow counter resistances, such as Bhabha's "catachresis"<sup>124</sup>, or as I prefer neologisms, and even neo-metaphoricalness; except, in the latter two, I use these as a premonitory device within the wider context of "quotationalising". To "quotationalise" is not only, counter resistance style, contingent action to avoid representational ensnarement, but is, above all, to flag up those areas which still require communicative action based discourse aimed at consensus between Black and white. It re-writes the meaning of "signify" which then becomes more than the Derridean bracketing, as a deconstructive precursor, more than a signing of non-

essentialised difference, because it has in built a reconstructive dimension, which unlike the Foucauldian/Derridean, as an example, stating of the problematic with its limit at solutions residing in individual action, has implications for meso- and macro-type collective action.

### **1.11 Towards a new anti-racist politics**

I want to outline the basis for this "third way" in anti-racist politics; or should I say 'transformative way', given new right labour's Giddens inspired misappropriation of that term. In this I am joined as well by some post-modernist theorists on race, like Goldberg<sup>125</sup>, who have belatedly come to realise that statements of difference do not guarantee equal and mutual acceptance of that difference. The fundamental point of departure is that I claim greater organic coherence between the approach I have adopted to move between the micro-, meso- and macro-levels of analysis and action, and the short term pragmatic based actions that flow from what Habermas has described as the philosophical opportunism of the latter. Let's deal first with the stock misinformed criticism leveled at Habermassian type analysis and which is that they are too idealistic with limited politico-practical effect other than that of critique. My reading of the texts, however, tells me that proper comprehension will arise only if distinctions are made between discourses, for example those of philosophy, politics, sociology etc., and that, therefore to hypostasize a concept like undistorted communicative action, with the counter about individual manipulation and/or the hierarchical realities of social inequality, is to indulge in the speciousness of eliding philosophical, political and psychological discourses. Undistorted communication does not assume an everyday extant symmetry between speakers, but instead, expresses the ideal that has to be aimed for. It therefore openly begs the questions about what kind of, say, politics would realise that goal, or what kind of "psychologising" would deal with the intra-psychic forces that prevent its attainment. Coupled with its concept of inter-subjective communicative discourse aimed at consensus, it throws into sharp relief those issues of the moral, ethical, normative and juridical frameworks that not only will enable this process, but reflexively as well, how "we" agree the constituents of those frameworks.

Lets start the outline proper by returning to the two constituencies contained in my bifurcation of the effects of racism on Black and white people by looking first at the conditions for Black anti-racist politics. In so doing I shall make reference to the work on Social Movements as refracted through a key text by Eder<sup>126</sup> who, within a communicative action context, reworks notions of the collective actor and of collective action. Prefatorily then I use "Black" not in any absolutist Manichean, or conflationary, or essentialist sense, but as a signifier of potential collective action, yet to be agreed by and



from those who, because of phenotypical, or ascribed phenotypical, differences, experience racism.

### 1.12 Proposition 1

The first proposition is contained within the outline of what I regard as the Black cathexis, which in political discussion amongst Black people might be underscored in semi-serious/humorous aside as "the Black person's burden". It is at one and the same time the flip-side that exposes the racist arrogance of Dr. Livingstone's civilisingly cathected African sojourn as the mythologised embodiment of the "white man's burden", just as much as it expresses the experience of Black people, within which is contained their universal utopian hope for better change. Thus Eder makes a similar point to mine which is that derationalization is also an effect of modernisation, in other words the learning processes that allow for domination etc. Thus rationalization cannot be defined via a postulated norm, but through the procedural norms necessary for that rationalisation. To go further using some of Eder's terminology to express again ideas similar to mine, there is a reciprocity between collectivities in conflict, e.g. exploited and exploiter etc. which at the same time contains contradictions that can initiate and/or continue communication. These Eder, maintains, are not only crucial to the generation of social change, but also to the development of collective learning processes, and thus to the development of modernisation because those at the one end of the reciprocal scale, those that are done to unjustly etc., contain within their "unofficial" vision, the re-enchantment of modernism. Blockage of communication, which Eder acknowledges as more often happening than not, causes regression. It is within this reciprocity of contradictions, if I might simplify, that I want to return to cathected change in order to chisel out some more features. These are that such changes must contribute to the development of collective learning processes reflexively within the "collectivity" of Black, and also in the redefining of "we". In other words Black anti-racist politics has to be better than that which maintains racialised force in the structures of communication. This sharpening of the contours of the desire for change, makes possible the emergence of the beginning of an ethical framework as an entry point into moral questions to support procedural norms of action at different levels. Here I embrace the distinction between ethical and moral made by Habermas<sup>127</sup> which is that whilst "ethical" relates to conceptions of the good life, the "moral" relates to questions about whether something is good for everyone. Thus, for example, at the micro-level, Todorov<sup>128</sup> expresses the problem simply and lucidly, when he describes his dismay at finding that his new companions in Western Europe lacked an ethical framework to their political convictions. Whilst not expecting sainthood, he was not prepared to accept "the fact that their professed convictions had no perceptible influence on their behaviour," (or), "the discontinuity between

the way people lived and the way they talked" (lead on to representational politics versus signifying politics etc.). The notion of the Black cathexis contains more than the defensively oriented counter resistance to racism which intentionally and unintentionally ends up being unable to do more than celebrate, as evidence of the non-essentialised Black self, the hybridised individuation of action, because it includes as well in its focus the ethicizing bases for coagulating Black responses into a forward oriented collective action.

### 1.13 Proposition 2

The second proposition concerns the need for Black politics to move from that of being representational to that of being signifiable/significationable through reconstructed cognitive practices. What then is representational politics? Representational politics as refracted through Black people's experiences is engaging in political action which, whilst, in overall intent are aimed at removing the relations of force, end up reproducing them by being captured by those self same scleroses of communication. It is, if you like, a cross over of Foucault's notion of 'discourse' with Said's one of 'representation'. Representation, then, is the Black councillor at a local borough's Race Relations Committee meeting defending noisy parties on the basis that when Black people get together they like music with a beat.<sup>129</sup> It's the demand by another Black councillor, newly elected, that the Town Hall catering section should serve "ethnic" biscuits with the coffee.<sup>130</sup> It's the excuse made in all seriousness by one white manager because it was told to him by a Black person, that the reason there were no Black Afro-Caribbean gardening apprentices in that council's parks section was because Black Afro-Caribbean people had an aversion to such activities due to their long ago slavery experiences on the plantation.<sup>131</sup> It is the homogenised "Black dimension" and its pursuit through self appointed Black institutional gatekeepers whose role it is to refuse entry to other Black "trouble makers" with which Black professionals in social work have slit their own throats. It is Modood's substitution of his representational "Black", with the equally representation of class cleavaged rich East African Asians. It is the numerous unaccountable claims made on behalf and for group constituencies which, in so doing, legitimate the conventionalisation of ethnicising and etnikfying processes through a mirror image reconstruction of operations to produce the good ethnic group identity as opposed to the bad white derived one. Time and space vectoring which is being attempted to be denied, is then simply re-introduced so that those marginalised are not included by a radical redefining of the borders, but are left there, only this time shouting louder and more garishly adorned. Institutionally it is the mimicry of the "chairman, secretary, treasurer" organisational syndrome, often in the name of good constitutional practice - a "see-we-know-how-to-do-it" - that re-enforces the hierarchicalisation processes which give rise to "leaders"



making unaccountable group claims. The separation between life world and system is maintained to the extent, for example, that Black male self proclaimed "leaders" can pursue radical societal goals through radically goaled institutions with claims to representing Black constituencies, political, intellectual etc., whilst carrying on malgendered private lives. Group identities are thus captured and hostaged against others "racist" misunderstandings, e.g. the "that is disrespectful to us Muslims, Rastafarians etc." They do not arise out of new forms of collective learning as the underpinning to new forms of collective action, not even "strategic learning processes that use and instrumentalise moral arguments in rational-choice situations in a co-operative game"<sup>132</sup>; a quote which is used to pre-empt the criticism that I am simply advocating mass participation as the antidote.

The politics of signification, on the other hand, does not trade in the certainties of conventionalisation, either racist, or the misconceived representational re-equipping of the slave ships with which some Black people "bodily" make the symbolic trip "home". To signify is to symbolise that which has to be explored further through reconstructed cognitive practices; or to mint a phrase "signifying cognitive practices (SCP for short)". At the micro level then, the Black signifier indicates openness to communicative discourse about the claims he/she is making, whilst for the signified, the signs made are not an invitation to lapse into the imprisonment of that claim in iron-clad imaginings. Thus, for example, claiming the identity "Black", does not brook any mis-assumptions about an essentialised collapse into "of African, or Afro-Caribbean, or African Caribbean, or even Not-Asian descent". It can only define, instead an inclusive boundary of those "not being white", subject to the consensual participation of those within, that includes those who because of phenotypical or ascribed phenotypical characteristics, experience racism as defined earlier. It is at one and the same time, a statement, at a general level, about the commonality of the experience of racism, the individual problem analysis of which is open to discursive argumentation, a recognition that the general rationalisation process of that society legitimates an unequal Black/white split and therefore at the societal level an excluding "we", as well as an explicit or implicit desire for change, the details of which cannot be assumed from the problem definition, but have to be worked out amongst those individual and groups claiming Blackness. We have thus emerging the "third way" in anti-racist politics, which can be inclusive of the aesthetic dimension without the Gilroyian assumption of refugee status there in as the only option for change. In other words it speaks of new cognitive practices within the Black collectivity SCP is the bases then for a reconstructed Black Social Movement which includes, as I outline later, the emergence of a reflexively oriented collective actor making and made by collective action. I have introduced the notion of "social movement", made popular by theorists such as Touraine, though my use of the concept owes more to theorists like

Habermas and Arato and Cohen<sup>133</sup>, because I believe that the higher level of eruptions between the lifeworld/system seam, which over colonisation produces in the Black experience, has to be garnered if the increasing pace of racist conventionalisation is to be arrested. Such a movement's overall characteristics are adequately summed up by the following quote from Arato and Cohen:

"What we have in mind, above all, is a self understanding that abandons revolutionary dreams in favour of radical reform that is not necessarily and primarily oriented to the state. We shall label as 'self limiting radicalism' projects for the defence and democratisation of civil society that accept structural differentiation and acknowledge the integrity of political and economic systems. We do not believe that it is possible to justify this claim about what is new in movements on the basis of a philosophy of history that links the 'true essence' of what the movements 'really are' (however heterogeneous their practices and forms of consciousness) to an allegedly new stage of history. Nor does the theme 'society against the state' which is shared by all contemporary movements (including some on the right), in itself imply something new in the sense of a radical break with the past. On the contrary it implies continuity with what is worth preserving in the institutions, norms, and political cultures of contemporary civil societies."<sup>134</sup>

It is, in other words, not an apocalyptic "seven times around the walls of Jericho, a blast of the trumpet, and wham!" movement, any more than it is a short termist "baby out with the bath water" WYSIWYG movement. Those eruptions mentioned earlier thus encompass the fragmented, fractured Black self made evident through the multi-faceted hybrid identity claims, many of them ephemeral, not only in terms of substance, but life-span as well, like fireflies slamming against the windscreen of a car on a motorway. "Otherness", used as a term to denote the continual othering process I have no problem with because I am part of that "other". However, amongst Black people, whilst what I have said before means that identity claims can only be radically authenticated by engaging in non-distorted communication, this acknowledgement cannot be conflated with any normative baggage that is in tow with that identity claim. Thus if, for example, someone lays claim to being a "Pakistani Muslim", that signification cannot at face value be pseudo-inflated through the signified's conventionalised representation of "pak"-(istan), and/or an unconscious symbolic rerun of the crusades.<sup>135</sup> On the other hand if the signifier makes further claim to the commonality of the general "other", e.g. the demand made by some for the banning of Rushdie's book and the MP Bernie Grant's support for this. In the first instance, this cannot be accepted simply as part of the "multi-cultural" fabric, but, because the invitation is built into the claim, has to be subject to discourse scrutiny. Likewise should the signifier focus the "otherness" by prefixing "Black" to the Pakistani Muslim category, this cannot be denied by some "others", e.g. the MP.....etc, because of a normative belief in Black which is as biologically fixated as those "anthropophagied" notions of "nigger". Both instances, within the sub-collectivity of "Black" attest to the "problem" of "how to



establish a complementarily equivalent and mutually respectful commonality.." The concept that "more discourse means more contradiction and difference", is taken up by Eder in his notion that "contradictions are mechanisms that initiate or continue communication". The task of a Black politics of SCP is to (re)construct that social movement with internal frameworks, mechanisms and processes which can facilitate such forms of communication. Thus for example one Black Workers Group in a local authority defined its constituency on the widest possible rationalised basis, had open participatory meetings, a flattened hierarchy with only one recognised co-ordinator post, developed, on the basis of recognising that racism cuts across "white" socially constructed formal and informal boundaries, horizontal cross institutional networked relationships with local Black communities over issues of dispute with the council, and used this experience to get such initiatives accepted as practice by the wider branch. I have retained the sub-collectivity "Black" because it bears witness to the trans epochal contradiction which white over Black racism is, and which requires further communication between the collectivities of white and Black. Thus the Black cathexis is the motivational force for Black SCP catalyses, that which allows the boundaries of modernism to expand by generating new collective learning processes, i.e. a non-conventionalised "we", and thus to deracialise, but not dedifferentiate "Black". What we do not want is a continuation of the representational Black in which, because we do not have the political wherewithal to engage with those forces in communicative structures which nurture racism, we permit the opportunists, charlatans, intellectual mountebanks and crooks, à la Marion Berry, in our communities to assume leadership, or have it foisted, but never born with it, because we fear that open criticism, since it is beyond our control, will be captured and misused by those racist distorted communicative forces.

I am trying to arrive at the position, through SCP, where we can talk about the "other" in terms of the collective actor, collective action and collective identity which cannot be conflated wholly with that collective actor's individual identity, or declared "ethnic/etnik" identity. Like Eder I agree that class as the rallying framework for "collective" is no longer applicable in modern Western society and that there is no historical "subject". However, I do think that whilst for the collectivity "white" some actors act in a space structurally defined by class, for the collectivity "Black", more often than not actors act in a space structured by race which overrides other vectors of class and/or gender, though these do exert an influence, e.g. the position of Black professionals in Social Services, many of them women. In fact, as I have argued earlier, it is a cavity in which for race, space and time are vectored so that place and presence become relativised; far more so than would happen if a Black actor sought recourse to the collectivities of class or gender, though

these might be claimed. Thus the degree of solidaristic action with the white working class or sisterhood within their fixity of "home" can oscillate when, at the drop of a careless remark, the Black actor can be zapped into another time, another place. In developing the notion of the Black collective actor, I want to run with Eder's ideas on the constitution of the collective actor, though, as I pointed out earlier, reserving the right to change later whilst I reconstruct it. Hence I concur with the idea that it is not the collective actor that is the repository for collective action, but that it is the construction of collective action that allows for the emergence of the collective actor; and that what is paramount in this process is how consensus is mobilised. We are not talking here about the mass psychology type theorising in which social movements are explained by reference to people sharing "ideological and strategic visions of the world..." One of the key characteristics in the development of the collective actor is the process of defining boundaries between the collective actor and his/her environment. Racism does that to the extent that Black people can identify the problem. The other feature however, is the reproduction of that collective identity through cognitive practice processes. This is part of the new political terrain that Black people have to map out because the identities Black people claim for themselves, very often as an anchoring to normative expectations, are still locked into the ethnicised/etnikfied and/or the visible ephemerality of aesthetic taste. Thus, let's say for example, that the social movement would be boundaried both by an aim for racial justice and equality and by the general political characteristics as outlined earlier. It is clear that it would be impracticable to talk about blow by blow, or even individual consensus without recourse to the traditional "vanguardist" tactics. It is however, possible to talk about the procedural norms of action which will facilitate the pursuance of consensus. In this Eder identifies two crucial principles that flow from a core universalisation procedure, which my experience shows to work. The two principles are equality and discursive handling of conflicts which are inherent in the procedure of impartial consideration by all concerned. Eder goes on to identify equality of communicative relationships best structure for impartial judgements. His definition of this, which is "the unequal distribution of chances to claim the universality of wants and interests within a process of collective discussion", I find deficient<sup>136</sup>. I prefer my own which adds to his the rider "which has in built the conditions to nullify those unjust forces in the structures of communication". This is a point picked up by Offe<sup>137</sup> in his re-appraisal of the experience of participatory democracy based initiatives and the communicative force structures that emerge from the practice of "those who shout the loudest are heard". A good example of practice based on my definition were the procedural norms collectively agreed by one Black organisation which attempted to ensure both that women participants were, at the minimum, allowed the same right to speak freely and openly without any form of male arrogation of speaking space and that issues of



group/ethnic background did not enter unjustly into discussions or decisions. It is these sort of SCP which inform new collective learning processes and provide the context for reflexive i.e. the actors learn from the experience, reproduction of collective identities. This is the way in which "Black" should be used; not as the exclusive biologically colour graded property of a conventionalised group, but as an open signifier of "otherness", only ever fleetingly able to be represented collectively by phenotypical or ascribed phenotypical features, because "collective actors strive to create a group identity within a general social identity whose interpretation they contest". Collective learning processes are those then that thematize and change the normative context of co-operation, both strategically formed and collectively based ones. Moreover, for the Black collectivity these processes should be the reflexive context from within which demands to resolve the trans-epochal contradiction between Black and white, which is racism, are launched. Eder identifies three levels of collective action - micro, meso and macro. The micro defines that level at which individual activists' actions constitute the collective actor. The meso level that in which the collective action becomes formalised through organisations; and the macro level that in which collective action enters the public sphere through public communication channels. I think, however, that the micro and meso levels, for the Black collectivity, would be more of a continuum which, according to the logic of SCP would have organisational repercussions for those forms that facilitate and those that hinder reducing communicative force structures. Furthermore the public sphere on race equality and justice, in the absence of SCP constituted Black social movement is fragmented, dependent upon patronage based access to communicative media and very often limited to elitist coteries of "intellectuals" formally and informally clustering around various race related institutions at universities. Part of the process of developing a Black SCP based social movement would be the creation of a genuine public sphere that blurs the distinctions and enhances the communicative networks between universities, other organisations, media and the Black communities; and, in the clearing house debates in and amongst Black people about ethnicities etc, is reflexively resistant to any divide and rule instrumental action such debates might provoke from the white collectivity. This reflexive resistance is not, as I have argued earlier, tied to any notion of representationalised laagered mentality, but to reconstructed or newly constructed cognitive practices that engage with the wider contradiction. We should not seek therefore, to stabilise that oscillation of time, space and place by claiming respect for past oriented traditions, or the "recognised" limits of pragmatic practices, but should run with the forward oriented wave length of that oscillation to ensure that such practices are the incisive cutting edge not only to unravelling the social and institutional implications posed by the problem contained in the following quotations, but informs substantively as well the wider SCP.

"Can there be a politics of recognition that respects a multitude of multicultural identities and does not script too tightly any one life?"

and,

".....it is hard to find a democratic or democratising society these days that is not the sight of some significant controversy over whether and how its public institutions should better recognise the identities of cultural and disadvantaged minorities. What does it mean for citizens with different cultural identities, often based on ethnicity, race, gender or religion, to recognise ourselves as equals in the way we are treated in politics?"<sup>138</sup>

### 1.14 Proposition 3

Part of the answer to this conundrum with trans epochal roots, lies in my third proposition which attempts to set the scene for the engagement the Black social movement has with the wider white collectivity through the institutional constructions, just as much as it attempts to delineate the bases for white anti-racists involvement in the fight for equality and justice. Apropos the latter, this is not a rehash of the white guilt trip politics. It is, however, an expression that the politics of anti-racism, if they are defined against the communicative forces of racialised conventionalisation, has to enable the Black experience to be heard equally. The third proposition therefore is that the Black social movement through SCP, should seek the goal of impartial judgement of the claims made by the Black collectivity. The rough con tours, thus, of a reconstructed constitutionality, one that begins to answer the questions posed, are contained in the third proposition. The details of this I'll leave for Chapters 6 and 7 which touch on the principled bases to this constitution. Built into this, as I have argued earlier, are the conditions which would realise equality of communicative relationships. This locks directly into questions about the structure of institutions and how the claims of Black participants there in are realised sans racist conventionalisation. They raise questions about how "participants clarify the way they want to understand themselves as citizens of a specific republic, as inhabitants of a specific region, as heirs to a specific culture, which traditions they want to perpetuate and which they want to discontinue, how they want to deal with their history, with one another, with nature and so on."<sup>139</sup> The importance is the "how", because as that last quote from Habermas' recent work on multi-culturalism shows, whilst it suffices to paint the general tones of the question, it underestimates the effect of racism in suppressing the means to make such claims. Habermas in a dialogue and critique with and of Taylor's communitarian based attempt to answer the questions posed above, contends that democracies with a constitution and legal framework that focuses on individual rights is not incompatible with the collective claims made by groups. Against the communitarian contention that such frameworks have to guarantee the



"equal value" of that culture, Habermas, correctly, points out that "The right to equal respect which everyone can demand in the life contexts in which his or her identity is formed as well as elsewhere, has nothing to do with the presumed excellence of his or her culture of origin, that is, with general valued accomplishments."<sup>140</sup>—Thus the Black Social Movement will not seek constitutionally, á la Taylor and the new etnik protectors, the pickled in aspic cultural outcomes of constitutionally "maintaining and cherishing distinctness, not just now but forever"<sup>141</sup>. What it will seek is the constitutional principle that derives from the Black experiential realisation that 'wogging' occurs not on the basis of one's religion, Caribbean island of origin, or 'sari'-ed statements people make, but because our signifying differences are, through racialised conventionalisation, conflationarily homogenised into wog, nigger, Paki, or, as an example the liberal, "needs more training before.." put down to Black career aspirations. Vis-a-vis race the impartiality principle focuses on racism as that which threatens the integrity of the individual legal person because racism attacks "the intersubjectively shared experiences and life contexts in which the person has been socialised and has formed his or her identity"<sup>142</sup>. It allows for collective claims to be launched that will not allow the recourse to the "Ag. Siestog, we are the endangered cultural species with special needs" stockade. Habermas distinguishes - correctly as I have argued elsewhere and as my experience á la the Labour Party's racist re-attachment to broad equal opportunities shows - between "feminism, multiculturalism, nationalism, and the struggle against the Eurocentric heritage of colonialism"<sup>143</sup> on the basis that whilst they are related, they are not the same. Thus, "they are related in that women, ethnic and cultural minorities and nations and cultures defend themselves against oppression, marginalisation and disrespect and thereby struggle for the recognition of collective identities...."<sup>144</sup>. However, for example, according to Habermas, whilst feminism's struggles have the potential, if successful, to change the relationship between the sexes and the collective identity of women, for "oppressed ethnic and cultural minorities", the struggle for collective identities does not necessarily alter the role of the "majority" in the same way. That much I agree with, as I have shown earlier. But my argument, unlike Habermas', is that those Eurocentric colonial traditions do not merely manifest themselves at the world level of national disagreements, but are the conventionalised normative embedded bases to structural forces in communication which prevent the alteration of the role of the majority i.e. they permit moral questions to be posed and answered by the white collectivity about the Black actor and without his/her equal participation. So that the question is not so much whether or not such "minorities" raise claims for equal respect rather than equalization of conditions, but instead that such "minorities" raise claims about the forces which prevent their claims for respect and equality being heard and explicitly equitably dealt with. It is in this sense that my notion of the Black collective actor comes into play for the claims raised then are not so much

those of a non-uniform phenomenon dependent on the minority status, i.e., new or old immigration, or on whether or not countries have or do not have a history of immigration, but are focussed on the conditions which permit these claims to be considered reflexively. In meeting these conditions, and the how is the focus of the Black social movement, i.e. the wider society, this contributes to new collective learning processes both within the Black collectivity, and the white. Thus rather than talk about the multi-culturalist bases to society in the West, as Habermas does and which explains his impression of an uneven phenomenon, I want to sharpen that "relation of oppression, marginalization and disrespect" into the signifying Black experience of phenotypical or ascribed phenotypical based oppression etc which has anthropophagied trans -epochal roots and which structures distorted communicative forces. The Black social movement will then at the same time that it reflexively, within its constituencies, provide the political ethical framework for Black people to develop the space to stand back from over-colonisation so that they can confront their culture "and to perpetuate it in its conventional form or transform it, as well as (take) the opportunity to turn away from its commands with indifference or break with it self-critically and then live spurred on by having made a conscious break with tradition, or even with a divided identity"<sup>145</sup>, will also reflect on to the white collectivity the demands for such an ethical political framework so that the Black collective claims are equally part of the processes that transform white racialised conventionalisation that allows the white collective actor to turn away from these distorted commands self-critically and live on in the divided identity which is the substantive multi-racial "we". Therefore, as an example, we can tease out more concretely within the here and now the political focus such a movement should/might have via Cohen and Arato's argument that new social movements articulate collective political action along three inter-related lines: a politics of inclusion focussing on ensuring that political institutions recognise "new political actors as members of a political society" thereby benefiting those whom they "represent"; a politics of influence "aimed at altering the universe of political discourse to accommodate new need interpretations, new identities and new norms (so that) the administrative and economic colonization of civil society, which tends to create new dependencies can be restricted and controlled"; and a politics of reform which seeks further democratization of political and economic institutions.<sup>146</sup> This is fine as a general over-arching definition of political action. My experience and research into the issue of race equality in local government suggests that on the issue of racism the above needs to be tightened, a move which fits with my thesis of over-colonization of Black people. My restructuring does not presume that it would apply equally to feminism, but rather that the contours of collective political action might probably fit in with the general outline above. Thus it can be said that the realities of the politics of inclusion and influence vis-a-vis race in the local government context to date has seen a fleeting improvement which has



"reified" in the face of the whitelash to the extent that in many cases the "overgeneralised classifications of disadvantageous situations and disadvantaged groups.....lead to 'normalising' interventions into the way people lead their lives, with the result that the intended compensations turn into new forms of discrimination and instead of liberties being guaranteed people are deprived of freedom".<sup>147</sup> Harken to a Liberal Democratic councillor defending the decision to shut a Social Services Directorate's Equality Unit on the basis that; "Forty percent of Lambeth Council's senior management, including two Assistant Directors are Black, and they are sensitive and aware of race issues...".<sup>148</sup> On the test of critical fallibility therefore, I would give priority to the politics of increased democratisation and create two broad fronts by conflating it with the politics of inclusion and influence so that influence and inclusion move out of "representationalness" into that of SCP based democratisation. Such collective action does not assume a position of de-bureaucratisation, though the current organisational trends, misleadingly described as post-modernist elsewhere, of flatter hierarchies in smaller units, is useful. Instead it presumes an aim of communicative action based control which might lead to deconstructing bureaucracies or might, as is most likely in the medium term, give rise to ensuring communicatively based control over formally organised units of strategic action, i.e. bureaucracies. Nor does it presume an aim of unfettered participative democracy with the attendant risk that the more organised or communicatively competent will come to dominate, but rather that its emphasis on the procedural norms for impartial consideration of issues will ensure that such communicative forces are attenuated. Likewise the scope of such collective political action, in confronting the "irrationalisation" of communicative force structures, does not rule out forms of action such as boycotts, civil disobedience, or even, under certain circumstances violence.

## **1.15 Conclusion**

Let me therefore briefly summarise the intent of this chapter which is to reconstruct racism and anti-racism in a way that does not duck the old core concerns of objectivism and subjectivism, or for that matter discard reason simply because one particular instance has let "us" down. It proposes however that race and racism as a linked subject, in the manner that Arthur Miller could say that if it weren't for anti-semitism he would not have thought of himself as Jewish, has to be and can be a thematized major text within a universalist based theory which does not result in the subjugating of the resolution of the problems contained within the former to the supposed shortcomings of the latter where those shortcomings derive from an inadequately thematised universalism.. It goes further to say that a Black politics has to be explicitly normatively and post-conventionally based both internally and mediationally. Finally it sketches out, at this stage, a

political and research programme, which in the case of the latter is neither nomothetic or idiographic but methodologically eclectic with, given the normative underpinnings of the theory, the promise of getting to grips reflexively with fundamental questions about issues of power in researching, and in the case of the former, a forward orienting politics that seeks encounters with social and systemic integration through the mediating practices geared towards tackling the racialised conventional forces in the structures of communication.



## Chapter 2

### Framing the Examination of Local Governance Theories

#### 2.1 Introduction

Local governance studies have tended to languish in epistemologically boundaried discourses of public policy and/or politics only ever succumbing to partial trans-discourse analyses where these have been accompanied by their framing within an explicit theoretical approach which defies capture by these demarcations, such as Marxism. Notwithstanding that both, i.e. Marxist and non-Marxist, have exhibited, however, a form of naive realism either because there is the belief in the independent reality of empirical facts or, as in the case of Marxist type analyses, the objective "last instance" determination of independent realities. The inference of critical realism contained within the latter does not extend as such to meta-theoretical concerns, but more to a shift in the identification of the final locus of determining responsibility. This then might be the "economic", and/or the "state". Post-modernist analyses, if they do exist, where the post refers to a rejection of grand narrative theorising because of perceived irreconcilable inconsistencies within the narrative structure, are most likely to be social category, such as gender or race, inspired critiques of orthodoxies since the struggle against the exclusion of race and gender as prime considerations has been at the heart of questioning modernity's (in)difference. Now whilst the claimed anti-foundationalist bases to these have moved the debate into the arena of meta-theoretical concerns, their, sometimes unintended, analytical character has seen the re-introduction of an ontological naive realism which sanctions a WYSIWYG<sup>149</sup> approach to research issues. Thus despite their avowed anti-positivist approach to theorisation, their empirical outcome has seen an unintended vindication of forms of empiricism. The reason for structuring the introduction to local governance like this is because I want to focus on the emancipative change potentials within such a sphere of study. These potentials are not the empirically observable accretions of change which one can discern in local government in the UK today and which has spawned interventionist based academic theorising i.e. the authors have in one capacity or another been contracted by relevant public agencies, though these do obviously enter into the argument at some level.<sup>150</sup> Rather they are the potentials for change which, in the case of race, point to the capacity for emancipatory practice in local government overall. The analyses of race within a modernist meta-theoretical approach, has been done in the previous section in which the argument has been based upon a reconstruction of Habermasian arguments that renarrativises the analyses of social

phenomena by recourse to greater abstraction. Such an approach, whilst it radicalises the vision of change, does not postpone the consideration of day to day concerns within this locale of study, and, therefore, will seek also to address the principal stake holder constituencies, i.e. elected representatives, employees, and communities without sacrificing the need for the explicit contextualisation of the change potentials. To achieve this therefore requires a meta-theoretical perspective not only to the review of studies to date, but as well, to the critical realist reconstruction of what "ought" from what "is."

But first a look at the issue of meta-theory. The espousal of the need for a meta theory approach is, at one and the same time, not only inherent in the critical theory based methodology informing the study, but as well the recognition that this will provide the necessary "stand back" space to deal with the reality of the multiplicity of changes occurring to local government in the UK - evidenced by the fact that local government theorists have thus far only managed to analyse such changes by reference to crude heuristic categories. This will then provide a more abstract level framework within which it will be possible to address substantively issues, such as race and gender, within a core concern context of local governance that provides easily identifiable reference points to overlapping concerns, e.g. modernity, and post-modernity, as well as the change strategies, policies and practices that flow from this. Thus substantiating race within meta-theoretical concerns means treating it not as incidental, to conceptual structuring, but as an explicit categorical element internally related to other considerations. It is clear by the throwaway one-liners on equal opportunities and/or ethnic minorities that the majority of local government theorising in the UK still marginalises the issue, despite the existence in one form or another of explicit equality programmes in most large urban councils, and the existence of large Black populations in the UK.<sup>151</sup> That, on the basis of my definition, is a form of racism. As an exemplar, therefore, of what I am attempting, such marginalisation speaks of a form of universalism which subordinates the experience and needs of Black people to that of a larger constituency, e.g. citizens, local community, customers etc., by defining the parameters of such constituencies without explicit reference to Black people

## **2.2 Meta-Theory**

Meta-theory as the Greek etymology of the prefix indicates, is the theory about theories. It looks at the presuppositions underlying theories. More formally, as Morrow does in borrowing from Ritzer, it is "the language of presuppositions through which a research orientation is grounded."<sup>152</sup> It does not therefore seek to interrogate social reality through trying to explain specific social phenomena via a substantive theory. Instead it provides a core elements framework within which interrogative categories can be



generated thereby enabling travel trans- and intra-theories and discourses. An example will be the working out of a critical discourse on local governance with explicit categorisation of and internal linkage to, race/racism from a meta-theoretical based deconstruction of "orthodox" local government studies, coupled with that already done on racism in the previous chapter. To that extent I can prefatorily confirm that, as with my paper on racism, I am still engaged in reconstructing some of Habermas' key concepts. I do not therefore intend to decipher and critique existing theories of local governance/government one by one, which would occur if I were attempting an analytical based exercise. Rather, through a consideration of meta-theorising I want to generate key and core reconstructive categories within which such studies, where relevant, can be deconstructed, selectively reconstructively appropriated, or simply referenced. To begin with, therefore, meta-theory deals explicitly with those philosophical rationales with which we, very often unconsciously, ground our actions. Morrow identifies six philosophical sub-domains to notions of meta-theory: metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, logic, aesthetics and ethics.<sup>153</sup> For the purposes of de- and reconstructing local governance, especially reconstructing with the specific categorical imperative of transactivising race within these concerns, I am going to concentrate on three: ontology, epistemology and ethics. Theories of local governance, and my heuristic categorisation of them, I'll deal with in the next section. At this stage I want to invoke examples of social realities and their practice contexts to illustrate the limitations of the analytical theories implicitly or overtly used. Nearly all theories of local governance make ontological assumptions about the real-politik fixity of local government parameters. That is say, there are limits to what can be changed to the extent that probing these will provoke a bare bones type X-ray of an unwritten constitution, which, as I will show later, is white maled. For example, attempting to write a situation of race equality in a specific local authority within the historical context of a "white" hundred year plus evolved institution, and the then immediate context of the recent temporality of race equality in such situations, provoked responses which tried to show that such initiatives had done enough and that there was little that needed to be substantively achieved.<sup>154</sup> Very often this was a prelude to running down the race equality infra-structure in the local authority. One can rewrite this as the ontological assumption about the permanency of the white presence vis -a-vis the impermanency of the Black presence, or the permanency of the marginalisation of the Black presence. Theories of local governance have implicit epistemological assumptions not only about what constitutes valid knowledge, but as well, inter-relatedly, about how, i.e., the correct way, such knowledge should be constituted. The epistemological battles that raged around notions of racism and its validation in local government, together with the marginalisation of such issues in local government studies, thereby further reinforcing and fuelling the erasure of this from local governance

texts, attests to this. The dominant mode of knowledge constitution is positivistically framed empirico-analytical methods. That is to say the reliance upon descriptive and analytical reasoning which is honed upon an emphasis privileging "scientific" factual based knowledge constitution. A hypothetico-deductive model of causality which relies on a quantifiable base predominates.. A good example concerns a study into Black children in care in a London borough.<sup>155</sup> This was empiricistly framed and reinforced through the use of mathematical sampling and computer based social surveys. Attempts to resituate the results within a paradigm that theoretically contextualised them, and revalidated them hermeneutically via Black communities' spoken experiences, resulted in the final report being banned by the local authority on the grounds that it read as if it were written by someone totally alienated from that authority.<sup>156</sup> In other words a contestation about what and how racism is epistemologically constituted. Finally theories of local governance make ethical claims, that is they impart values to their positions. Most agree that local government is a good thing. Their vision of the good, however, varies so that for each theory there can be generated a series of sub-values. In fact it leads on to questions about the normative knowledges informing theories of local governance. Normative theories concern themselves with what ought to be. There is a direct link here with issues of utopia, a subject introduced in the paper on racism. The normativisation of local governance in the UK has developed immensely over the past twenty years, whether as exemplified in the explicit long term vision of local government of liberal market right wing theorists á la Ridley, or the temporally stunted mission and core value statements of individual local authorities.<sup>157</sup> The contradiction between an organisational culture giving primacy to empirical based knowledge, and the assumption of an explicit value framework which, according to the logic of the former cannot be subject to rational or empirical validation, gives rise to imposed authoritarian based systems, as I shall argue extensively later. Thus, for example, many of the local authorities which have explicitly normativised "equal opportunities" through their version of the "core value" programme, have, because of the circumscriptions to the ontological groundings and to the forming of the epistemological constitution of that value, dedefined racism and sexism in a way that allows, despite that normative overt expression, such dominating practices to continue. (Or, as one Black Workers Group put it - "Cor! Wot a load of porkies.")<sup>158</sup> The question provoked then is how normative values can be empirically and rationally interrogated, and, more importantly, what this process infers about the nature of political change and its ramifications through social and political institutions.

To begin to answer that latter question, I want to go back to the earlier promise to develop a critical realist approach. Such an approach eschews the pitfalls of a empirico-positivistic juggling of statistical variables and the



tribulations of a purely subjectivist experientalist method, though in the practice of local governance the latter are only afforded any degree of primacy in areas like social work, but attempts a third way that allows questions of normativity, whether implicit or explicit, to be scrutinised. Thus a method like this, because of its recourse to meta-theory, seeks a critical path that not only makes bare relations of power, but more importantly, given the claims made for local government vis-à-vis serving local communities ipso facto Black communities as well, as I outline later, also critiques at the same time that it attempts a reconstruction of unjust relations of power.<sup>159</sup> I want to attempt a preliminary "working hypothesis" type definition through, first, a prefatory brief summary of Habermas' theory.

### **2.3 Meta-theory and Habermas**

Part of the reasons for Habermas' reconstructive rejection of the orthodox Marx was because he detects within the body of Marx's theory a latent positivism. Habermas therefore proposes a categorical distinction between work and interaction with the latter being privileged as the medium through which symbolic and communicative practices are constituted in social life. On the basis of this Habermas develops an epistemological based theory of cognitive interests in which these interests are seen to underpin all cognitive practices in humans, whether conscious or unconscious.<sup>160</sup> Knowledge is therefore seen to be constituted by one or more of three interests: empirical-analytical, hermeneutical-historical and critical-emancipatory. Under this scheme Habermas sees empirical-analytical interest as rooted in the desire for technical control over external nature or social life. Hermeneutic-historical interest guides those cognitive interests which see human life processes as only being amenable to interpretation of meanings. Because Habermas views both the above as being unable to comprehend properly the issue of domination, he postulates a third interest, that of critical-emancipatory. In particular, given the primacy afforded to interaction, he sees values and norms are socially linked to the production and reproduction of social relations that are inherently unjust. To that extent Morrow can say that the "...fundamental assumption of critical theory is that every form of social order entails some forms of domination and that the critical-emancipatory interest underlies the struggles to change those relations of domination-subordination."<sup>161</sup> There are obvious problems of foundationalism which inhere in Habermas' assumption of Kantian derived anthropologically constant knowledge interests in humans. These transcendental structures of cognition are not open to empirical verification, but are assumed to be part of the deep structures of the human mind. Habermas himself acknowledges this. Hence his later move theoretically via a "linguistic turn" towards identifying and reconstructing "universal conditions of possible understanding"; or, as he terms it, universal pragmatics.<sup>162</sup> This theory of "communicative action is held to be

universal in the sense of constituting part of the deep structure of any possible form of society" to the extent that "even though processes of communication and interpretation may appear to be completely open and relative they are in fact grounded and made possible by the four implicit validity claims of comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness and rightness."<sup>163</sup> We have then the bases to reconstruct a theory of society and internal institutions in which the implied idealised possibilities that flow from universal pragmatics .i.e. that of non-distorted communication, can be held up as that against which societies that fail to realise or nurture such potentials can be "measured". In other words we can hold to scrutiny those societies, their inter, extra and intra-institutional frameworks and processes that prevent the attainment of inter-subjective communication. As Morrow correctly identifies, "such an ethic is communicative because it is grounded in an analysis of the normative imperatives built into the most fundamental features of human communication and linguistic understanding."<sup>164</sup> His further observation that this allows as well for connecting social analyses with ethical drives is correct.. On tologically therefore, Habermas assumes a critical realist approach which, based on his work-interaction categorical dichotomy, permits analyses of systemic and social processes in which truth does not correspond to reality, as is the case with empirico-analytical based analyses, but is tied to the "identification of deeper causal mechanisms (based upon) a view of reality outside discourse even if it can only be known fallibly through it." <sup>165</sup> Epistemologically Habermas grants nominalism and subjectivism partial validity, but ties its truth claims, in a unique third way, to a theory of argumentation. i.e. it is not factual verification etc. which grounds knowledge, but the recognition "that the unsettled ground of rationally motivated agreement amongst participants in argumentation is our only foundation..." <sup>166</sup> In the struggle amongst secondary commentators to describe such an epistemology, terms such as pragmatism and constructivism have surfaced. None of these, I think, do this justice. I prefer the term radical reconstructed cognitive practices. This not only captures the here and now of participants making unprivileged moments of history, but, as well, disabuses those realists who attempt to impute to a theory like this, the stock cliched criticisms they normally reserve for Marxist type theorising. Such an epistemology, therefore, is grounded in practices which are interventionist in reality. That is to say, because teleologically based historical subjects do not figure, practice is neither theoretically privileged against the uselessness of practical intervention, nor, aimed at the consciousness raising of such subjects as a necessary prelude to prioritised revolution, nor, if I can indulge in syntactical stretching, grants to areas asynchronous with the underlying substantive analytical theory, autonomy as a means of getting to grips with the problems of everyday reality still with the proviso of the "last instance determining economic." This puts a different slant on Habermas' earlier attempts to construct a quasi-transcendental theory of knowledge interests in so far as no



form of knowledge in his later writings is anthropologically privileged. Despite that I want to adhere to his knowledge-interest distinctions as a heuristic device, particularly as a de- and reconstructive tool in the meta-theoretical scrutiny of local governance theories and their intentional and unintentional palimpsestic writing out of race.

## **2.4 Race and Meta-theory**

By way of further contextualisation, I argued in the previous section that issues of race and racism, far from being marginal, a position to which it has normally been assigned within so-called "mainstream" considerations, is an inherent, intrinsic and ineluctable part of modernity to the extent that its irresolution has given rise to trans epochal unresolved problems the solution to which is one of the elemental keys to extending and pushing back the emancipatory boundaries of modernity. To that extend the fact of multi-racial/multi-racist Britain/world order, should be the added impetus, though the absence of Black people should not absolve the analyst from the consideration of race, for a more substantive, explicit internal theoretical categorisation and treatment of race and racism within theories of local governance. Its absence denotes in all theories of local governance an empirico-analytical dominance of the knowledge interest which perjurativises changes that go beyond certain boundaries.

In an earlier discussion of "utopia" I distinguished between backward looking, present day and forward looking utopias, locating the critical-emancipatory interest in the latter. We can in fact extend that argument about utopia by running alongside my threefold temporal categorisation, Habermas' knowledge interest categories to realise a further elucidation which can postulate that where the hermeneutical-historical interest dominates, "golden age" backward looking utopian visions are likely to emerge, where the empirico-analytical dominates, a control of the present utopia emerges, and where the critical-emancipatory dominates, a forward looking utopia is likely. I want to deal first with that paradoxical notion of the present day utopia. The oxymoronic "present day utopia" is the performative contradiction based riposte to those who critique utopia on the basis that it is unrealisable by saying that even those who absolutise what is infer a vision of the technocratic industrial society as best. The critique of forward oriented utopia is not so much that of a questioning of utopia per se, but a particular form of utopia. This derives from a conventionalisation, that is to say, a representation that over a period has not been the outcome of discourse communication, about the so-called evils of socialism. Alongside this, as Apel has shown, is a trailing baggage of the socialist utopia being that of the "utopia of totalitarian planning and organisation".<sup>167</sup> It is a critique that forward plays a vision of utopia as a politically homogenising process that squeezes everyone into one ideological model, and whose

realisation is likely only ever to be obtained through terroristic means.<sup>168</sup> As to the converse, i.e. that which is desirable, this is a neo-conservative position which is "a status quo notion held by so-called pragmatists which absolutises a norm of progress that is dictated to us by the so-called 'factual constraints' of what is technically and economically feasible." The current range of local governance theories, as a comment in itself on the inherent positivistic tendencies within them, and I include those neo-Marxist ones, e.g. post-Fordist based ones, have, in their response to systemically impelled changes to local government, occupied a spectrum of accommodation to the TINA<sup>169</sup> syndrome, as opposed to developing a radical alternative. As an example of instrumentalised distorted communicative practices within local government responses to systemic crises, but which is reflected within theories of local governance, one local government political leader from the ruling so-called socialist party, attempted to channel the organisational response to national government restructuring by introducing private sector based neo-managerialist techniques. To this end a book extolling such virtues was held up as capturing the quintessential new managerial approach. In contrast, a rather thin booklet on co-operative/collective management bad practices in the voluntary sector was put forward as not the way to do it.<sup>170</sup> The "dented shield" approach, i.e. an overt acceptance of private sector values in a democratic public sector institution, curtailed the range of options immanent in the ostensible party political values by accepting the present and perjurativising viable alternative visions. This provided the normative framework in which commitments to race equality could be technocratically transmogrified into those of local political legitimation as expressed through the unrealistic expectations of the "loony left" and thus into political representationalised questions about "justifiable costs".

I raise the issue of the present day "utopia" in the above form because it provides the dominant meta-theoretical change sounding board against which to measure the extent to which theories of local governance can reconcile the claims made by Black people. It can be said at a general level, that, because of previous and continuing colonialism, imperialism and racism that Black people primarily make claims of justice, that underpin additional claims of equality and freedom which might also be made. These claims are made individually, institutionally, and, more importantly, under certain circumstances, collectively. These critical-emancipatory claims are made communicatively with the desire for agreement. They are claims about the truth of racial domination of Black people, about the rightness therefore of racial justice, and about the truthfulness of her/his experience as a Black person. These claims are made at the interface between the Black person's lifeworld and economic and political systemic intervention. These claims can be constituted at the interfaces of the polity, both formal and informal, the economic, and welfare, in the broadest sense of the word. Now whilst these claims arise because of a particular



form of racial conventionalisation that is unique to Black people which means that such justice based claims are made more frequently than white people, though racial conventionalisation generally can apply to other situations, such as anti-semitism, and thus the conditions for their resolution apply equally to the other communities. In other words the force of Black claims, and within the context of local governance they are forceful, could and should be met with similar urgency not as a special need, but as the bases for pathfinder solutions to claims made by the wider communities. By this is meant treating race as an interlinked categorical imperative within theorising so that such theorising becomes race explicit without recourse necessarily to the marginalising process that sees it becoming a race specific discourse. But then this is but expressing the framework for the metatheoretical endeavours which seeks to acknowledge properly the realities of multi-racial/-racist societies and in so doing does not absorb race into the generalities of the exploitation contained within the valorisation of labour, say, or posts it on the boundaries via a cursory one-liner on equal opportunities.

## **2.5 Categorising the ‘Meta’**

Upon these considerations I want to generate sets of scrutinising categories, which as a means of summary, can be cross-tabulated, but which primarily provide the means to interrogate meta-theoretically theories of local governance. Because such categories will be substantively racialised, that is to say they will explicitly deal with the race dimension without deriving race specific categories, they will provide the means to critique such theories where critique means deconstructing those theories to enable at a later stage the reconstruction of a race explicit theory of local governance. The key interrogative categories are derived from a consideration and reconstruction of Morrow's analysis of social science models.<sup>171</sup> These are:

- ◆ meta-theoretical concerns refracted through sub-categories of epistemological, ontological and normative groundings

and

- ◆ implied, inferred and explicit agency

The heuristic analytical categories of local governance theories will be outlined in the next section. However, each of these will be constituted through their consideration of democratic will formation in the local polity, the political and bureaucratic organisation of governance, and the organisation of welfare. Thus included in considerations of democratic will formation are both the formal and informal political processes, where

informal is inclusive of communities' relationships, whilst welfare is used as a generic catch-all to include all those services and benefits organised for and on behalf of such communities. We can therefore sum up for each category of local governance with a grid that looks like this:

	Democratic will formation	Organisation of governance	Organisation of welfare
Meta-theoretical considerations			
Agency			

## 2.6 Context

Within the UK local government over the past fifteen years has undergone and is undergoing an accelerated rate of change politically and organisationally; changes which are reflected in the reaction from and development by theorists of local governance of theories which take it beyond the sterile knowledge of public administration in which it had been entombed. "Reaction" is one of the key operational words for it expresses the backward looking "why" inherent in theories only partially capable of explaining events, and not the "how" of forward looking quasi-predictive delineating theories which have greater explanatory and incorporating potential. Thus, the extent to which such theories and their substantive subject i.e. the changes, can be described as "radical", or "revolutionary", as the Audit Commission does, or even "trans-epochal", are open to question. More to the point their partialisation, as I have indicated earlier, and which is reflected in the miserable failure of local government to reconcile justly the claims of Black people and women to substantive participation within the practice and processes of actual local governance, is and has resulted in an inadequate theorisation - in fact an almost total lack of theorisation, of that fundamental issue. I have therefore identified two broad categories of local governance theories which are those of the left and those of the right, and from which are derived a number of linked variants. I want to concentrate on the left because whilst they speak of an implicit forward utopia, their whitened theorisation of the issue, effectively cheats on the changes possible and consigns it to the limitations of the present. As I shall argue later, the



glaring contradictions between their realisation of the class unspecific empirical realities of local government and the productivist theorisation with which they underpin their analyses, gives rise to a variant of the new realism school in which radical future alternatives are increasingly boundaried by acceptance of the present. That is to say, as I have indicated in the chapter on racism, we begin to look substantively at why self designated so-called positively oriented equality local government organisations, still consign Black people to the margins. Part of the reason for that lies in the theories which inform and frame actions as key elements of the dialectics of change in local government. More concretely, two of the theories, post Fordism and Localism, have been highly influential considerations in the debates deciding the changes being made to local governance by the Labour party.

# Chapter 3

## Version 1 - Post-Fordism

### 3.1 Background

I want to start with the Fordist/Post-Fordist theorisation of local governance which, whilst I would situate it on the left of the spectrum, does not, as other left theorists do, refuse or postpone engagement with the everyday practice realities, but attempts to derive from a substantive theoretical materialist based analysis the concrete change options within the political and organisational spheres of local government.<sup>172</sup> This version of local governance builds on the work done by the French Regulation School<sup>173</sup> which in turn is a Marxist economic theory that attempts to provide a post Keynesian analysis of the crisis of over accumulation and the uneven development of capital. So what is the Keynesian analysis? Basically it is the proposition that expanding fiscal and monetary spheres will absorb the products of surplus capital. However its discrediting occurred in the 60s to 70s transitional period "in which expansionary policies stimulated escalating inflation alongside a squeeze on profits, the collapse of investment, and rising unemployment."<sup>174</sup> The New Right had a simple answer: price stability, restrictive monetary policy, and the removal of barriers to competition in labour, product and financial markets as the means by which the market could rectify such structural imbalances. Equally for left theorists there was a rethinking amongst some, like Aglietta, who thought that the Keynesian reliance on the market too simplistic. Instead sustained accumulation was seen to depend "on the development of institutional forms which could maintain the proportionality of the macrostructure of production and the distribution of total income,"<sup>175</sup> i.e. a mode of regulation. For Aglietta therefore the development of capitalism this century has been marked by the development of epochal based regimes of accumulation. Thus pre 1929 and the "great crash" designates one regime of accumulation. Post 1929 to the early seventies periodises another. It is the latter with its emphasis on large scale Taylorist framed production methods which is designated "Fordist". Or, as one commentator puts it, from a period extensive accumulation pre-1929 to one of intensive accumulation post-1929. The crisis thus of the Fordist regime can only be overcome by the development of a new accumulation regime: the neo- or post-Fordist accumulation regime. Hence "the crisis can only be overcome, and accumulation sustained, if capital can find ways of increasing the production of relative surplus value to reconcile the requirements for the production and realisation of surplus value, particularly through the development of neo-Fordist production methods in the public sector, or, as others have suggested, such panaceas as flexible specialisation, the



Japanisation of industrial relations, the micro-electronics revolution, or the segmentation of the working class and the globalisation of production."<sup>176</sup> There is, however, some doubt as to whether or not Aglietta saw the possibility of a neo-Fordist regime of accumulation. Leaving that aside however, what is of importance is the way in which the state is theorised in Aglietta inspired analyses.

Such theorisations of the state draw on what has been described elsewhere as Marx's second position and which is that "the state and bureaucratic machinery are class instruments which emerge to co-ordinate a divided society in the interests of the ruling class."<sup>177</sup> Whilst that summation might appear crude, it does contain the core seed of the approach in which the state is derived from the nature of capital. Criticisms of this approach from alternative Marxist theorists, rightly, within the logic of such a materialist based analysis, are that it encourages a structural functionalist reasoning in which class struggle is suppressed thereby giving rise to voluntarism<sup>178</sup>. More importantly, as one of the critics, points out, and as I have echoed earlier, but from a different standpoint, because "it seems that the objective laws of capitalist development have crushed the subjective struggles of the working class, it seems that the only option open to Marxists is to choose between lamenting the growth of capitalist violence and repression or to argue for accommodation to the new realities.....The world is closed, the future is determined." <sup>179</sup> I introduce this because the criticism is partially true insofar as the utopian edge to such analyses is foreclosed, and foreclosed in a way that, whilst pointing to both the inadequacy of the post-Fordist type thinking and the more general capital based logic underpinning it and its critics, also forecloses the substantive theorisation of racism, and therefore marginalises Black people. In terms of local governance, local governmental arrangements are read as extensions of the national state. To that extent, the term "local state" can be used. Here post-Fordist based theorists of local governance find themselves in a cleft stick because whilst their analyses brings forth an indeterminacy of the future, and thus allows for a detailed examination of the various spheres that constitute local governance, the more they delve, the more the class unspecific nature of local governance becomes clear to the extent that it imperils the capital logic of their argument. Hence it is no surprise that, for example, one theorist of post-Fordist local governance, "ahems" and "ha's" through a number of introductory circumscriptions and conditions in one of his pieces in order to put a temporal distance between the developmental motorhouse of his argument, i.e. capital, and the socio-political changes it induces so that the charge of "economic reductionist" can be avoided. Thus "whilst economic restructuring begins in the economic sphere, narrowly defined, to be successful it must also extend to the socio-institutional sphere (i.e those institutions concerned with international finance, trade, redistribution, the nation state, the welfare state, the family

etc.)", there is "no inexorable logic" to these developments, but rather there are sets of choices, a market rationalised debureaucratized welfare state being just one of them.<sup>180</sup> Leaving aside therefore the nuances of the debate amongst orthodox Marxist theorists, about whether or not one can talk about post-Fordism, the adherents of this position claim that there is a congruence between the period of industrial Fordism, i.e. large scale production processes, and the post-Second World War growth in local government functions and organisational arrangements. The post-Fordist development thus of local government sees the deconstruction of these large bureaucratized Fordist arrangements of production and allocation of services, as one of the theorists defines local government activities, to the extent that four inter-related characteristics can be identified:<sup>181</sup>

- ◆ marketisation and labour flexibility on the economic side
- ◆ a purchaser and provider organisational split on the service side
- ◆ down sizing of the extent of elected political control over functions
- ◆ private sector based neo-managerialism.

I want to resituate these four characteristics within the three heuristic categories I outlined earlier as a better analytical framework to release the information on the post-Fordist local state in order that they can then be subjected to critically racialised interrogative categories in the full matrix.

### **3.2 Post Fordist Democratic Will Formation**

Within the substantive context of "democratic will formation" with its explanatory preface, located elsewhere in Habermas' texts, there is a clearer, more abstract framework to encompass the post-Fordist theorists critiques of democratic developments. Thus they are correct to identify the erosion of local democratic control of local government that has resulted out of the new right implementation of marketised pF strategies. For pF theorists there are two interlocked elements to this. The first is the centralisation of decisions and accountability of key local government responsibilities previously the provenance of the Fordist local government. A good example of this is the determination of local government finances which are now directi(ve)ly controlled through national government formulae coupled with local revenue raising responsibilities which includes an enlarging element of revenue obtained through charging for more and more services. The second is what can be described as the increasing quangoisation of local government covered euphemistically by such "nu-speak" terms such as "the enabling council", or "multi-agency" working. Quangoisation therefore covers all those processes in which increasingly responsibilities which previously were under control of a representatively elected body are apportioned to bodies where there is no form of local elected democratic



accountability. Included in this are those processes whereby responsibilities are shifted to institutions traditionally thought of as quangoes, e.g. the London Residuary Body, and processes which give rise to the contracting out of services to private companies and/or voluntary organisations. The pF analysis, as I shall detail and argue later, does not go far enough in outlining the extent of such forced de-politicisation of local government nor does it appear to realise that the contradiction between the claims made by the new right that such arrangements provide consumers with more control and the actual reality that the journey now made by such consumers from service interface to those identified as being democratically accountable is actually more tortuously longer, goes to the very heart of its capital logic based argument. Thus there is a third element of de-democratisation which pF theorists have difficulty reconciling and which is located in the attempt to construct explicit past oriented normative based cultural and political value orientations as the expected and accepted belief framework to behaviour in the sphere of local governance. Such neo-conservatism is not the sole preserve of the traditional new right, and the Labour Party's dangerous espousal of communitarianism and its actual implementation in some "new model" Labour authorities is evidence of the extent to which inadequate theorisations of the crisis, and pFordism has intervened and is intervening in local governance through undemocratic channels of consultancies, unwittingly energises the neo-conservatist new realism. It is little wonder then that such analyses never ever seem to address explicitly issues of race and/or gender, other than by brief reference to equal opportunities. Issues of race have to be inferred, and here it is as a continuation and worsening of traditional patterns of discrimination already evidenced in equality audits of Fordist arrangements, i.e. contracting out affects Black people and women the worst in terms of employment especially, quangoes have an almost total absence of Black members etc. But then, this is but part of the growth of an underclass, "less racialised" than in the States, but "beset by processes of implosion and fragmentation" to the extent that "the common good is lost altogether amidst the uproar of defended groups, particular interests and incommensurable identities."<sup>182</sup> However much the pF author of the previous sentiments contained in the quotation marks would probably deny the intention, it does reflect the inherent nostalgia in such productivist based analyses whereby the "common good" is code for the "good old white working class"; nostalgia which is being worked through with a vengeance in some Labour run authorities. Thus whilst solutions are sought by such pF theorists in the greater democratisation of local government - and here it is not clear whether or not greater democratisation is a particular response to the attempt at forced depoliticisation of local government, or whether or not it is in fact the emancipatory normative response to capitalism, it is a democratisation based upon collectivities which are ultimately class based derivatives of the capital-labour contradiction, and not new collectivities which, as I outline in

the chapter on race, are substantively inclusive of Black people. Their rejection of the consumerist/customer/client model of local democracy is right, as is their espousal of a civil society based democracy where political action is not confined to the issue of securing control of the local state through the party system. Where we part company is, as I outline later, on the organic impetus linkage between capitalism as an economic system and a thus derivative polity, because inherent in this sort of analysis is an exclusion of the full and proper reconciliation of the racist social construction of race, and therefore an exclusion of Black people.

### **3.3 Post Fordist Organisation of Local Governance**

Within pF theory the organisation of local governance can be read as a functional derivative of the changing form of the regulation of capital accumulation mediated temporally as a "catch-up" mimicry of changes that have occurred in the private sector. It is thus, and in fact can only be, retrospective in its analytical direction. Whilst this apparent "quantum leap" between theorisation of capital accumulation and local governance is done sans any kind of "middle order" theory, this has not stopped pF theorists from attempting to engage with the details of the changes at the local level. But because this level of their engagement is referenced via a touchstone reflection of changes occurring elsewhere in the regulation of capital, these reflections end up mirroring the new right specification for local government. That is to say that, for example, a Ridley type model of local government is confirmed by pF theorists with the only difference being in the moral valorisation accorded these changes respectively, i.e. one says they are good, the other bad. Is reality in this post-Fordist, almost post-modern world really WYSIWYG? Is it capable, therefore, of dealing adequately with the politics of neo-conservatism?

These then are the key characteristics of the evolving organisational framework both in the public and private sectors which post Fordists have to reconcile emancipatively with their theory. Overriding the sub-elemental details, is the recognition of what has been described as the core-periphery model. Within this scenario the crucial strategic, forward planning, horizon scanning functions of the organisation are gathered at the centre constituting the near permanent part. The actual operationalisation of those strategies is allocated to satellite components of the organisation via a devolved system with no guarantee of permanent membership of the overall organisation which means that such functions can be bought in from other organisations. The boundary that existed under the Fordist arrangement between intra and extra organisation therefore shrinks to the outer limits of the core. The most obvious example of this arrangement is the commissioning/providing split that has occurred in the health services and is occurring increasingly in local government to the extent that one local



authority which previously had all of its day nurseries in house, now contracts in those services from external organisations.<sup>183</sup> Whilst the core-periphery model reflects changes that have occurred in the private sector, it reflects as well aspects of the globalisation of capitalism in which the product development and design is accomplished in the metropole whilst the benefits of cheap labour are exploited by producing the product in the Third world. To what extent acknowledgement is made by pF theorists of the core-periphery framework that existed in colonial and imperialist studies long before the distinction could be made between Ford and post-Ford is not clear.

Two inter-linked sub-elemental principles underpin the operationalisation of the core-periphery organisation. The first is that of devolution of responsibilities to the service interface. That is to say that an ostensible rationale sees the development of services more sensitive to the client/customer/consumer as residing in the ability of those who actually provide it on a day to day basis being able to have control over a range of decisions, such as finance. The creation of business units in some local authorities is an example of this.<sup>184</sup> Obviously linked to this type of development is the issue of flexibility in which organisational flexibility is organically related to labour flexibility. In other words the transformation of previous large highly stratified hierarchical bureaucracies into an accretion of smaller units, some not even "owned" by the parent organisation, as under conditions of competitive tendering, so that it becomes possible to talk about "flatter, leaner" organisations, or even more grandiosely "debureaucratisation". Labour flexibility therefore covers the substantive areas of requiring workers to be "multi-skilled" whilst expecting them to accept that the era of a "job for life" with attendant conditions over. However pF theorists seem to have difficulty distinguishing between the extent to which these developments are part of the developmental logic of capitalism, in which case one can then talk substantively about counter-reactions of collectivity based democracy, or simply the effects of a cost cutting withdrawal of the state from areas of public life where previously it sought legitimation. Those of the pF schools appear to blur the difference between "multi-skilling" and deskilling, between "multi-skilling" and the requirement for public sector workers to work longer, for less and under worse conditions of service. For example the Leader of one of the new model Labour run authorities wanted, after there was a very severe gale, all workers in the council to be compelled to help in clearing up in the local borough.<sup>185</sup> Or another later Leader in the same council who could fatuously declare in response to questions about the flexibility based reorganisation of the council's refuse services, "I've thought about this for a long time, and I do think that making our dustman work four times as hard is a socialist act.". These were the very same councillors who sought part of their justification for the actions outlined above from the criticisms made of

Fordist bureaucratic welfarism by certain pF theorists.<sup>186</sup> It is therefore, as I outline later, premature of the pF theorists to talk about or intimate the demise of the traditional "iron cage" bureaucratic form in the public sector. The evidence to be presented suggests that these smaller, flatter, supposedly more flexible organisational units are not predicated upon the devolution of total responsibility. Instead within local government at least, party political control has been increased through the establishment of new forms of bureaucratic accountability more directly linked to a streamlined and reduced number of representative democratic fora, i.e. the number and frequency of council committee meetings have been reduced in many authorities together with an increase, through departmental amalgamations, of responsibilities thereby increasing the "business" of committees and decreasing the ability of "outsiders" to participate. Part of this new bureaucracy has arisen in response to the need to have a monitoring and evaluation function shadowing the new managerialist accountability processes and procedures, e.g. quality systems. The legitimisation problems that arise from the new formal democratic deficit are being dealt with through sleight of hand involvement exercises premised upon the promise of those participating actually being able to influence the elected representatives without necessarily having the right to substantive democratic participation. This process of administered "democratic" will formation requires differing forms of bureaucracy, e.g. a new Labour model borough which is establishing a "Community Affairs" department with the aim of enhancing local democracy<sup>187</sup>. Perhaps then, bureaucracy lives on, only slightly disguised.

### **3.4 Post Fordist Organisation of Welfare**

However it is in the organisation of welfare that the substance of the pF theories come to the fore. In looking at these I am concentrating on those readily identified on the left, and thus whilst some commentators have wanted to distinguish between neo-Marxists and radical technologists, I regard this as too arcane, and tend to see both of these as falling within the purviews of neo-Marxism. There is thus a heavy emphasis placed on an analysis which privileges the productive forces in the public sector. To wit, "We can think of the welfare state as being concerned with two essential processes:.....the production of goods and services and the maintenance of much of the physical infrastructure of society.....(and the).....allocation of resources...which always enjoy a relative scarcity."<sup>188</sup> These are but a reflection of wider productive forces which are technologically driven as a result of complex capitalist modernisation processes linked ultimately to the regime of accumulation. These new technologies and techniques are evidenced in the organisation of welfare through its organisational, technological infra-structural and managerial changes. Under this schema it would appear that the welfare state, and within that local government, are driven by the manouverings in and around the productive forces and



allocation processes so defined. The state therefore is not simply situated within the relations of production, itself a superstructural reflection of the productionist base sited within the private sector, but becomes mongrelised as the part productive forces, part allocative forces, and by inference, because this is not stated or spelt out, part relations of production. Is this then an extension what was normally seen as productive forces, or is it a unique site? Whatever, it does though allow such pF theorists to engage with the minutiae of welfarism through their ideas about technologies and techniques. Thus for example the issue of "quality services" can be reformed, not reconstructed, as a valid technique providing the emphasis is on a more democratic model and not one that is solely technique driven. In other words it becomes possible to talk about new forms of control in which there is a convergence - the MBA convergence - between pF'ism and the new right about the essential elements, but divergence over its accountability basis. For example in looking at the emergence of neo-managerialism in local government, one pF theorist constructs a comparative F'ist and p F'ist template thus:

Structure	F'ist Management Bureaucratic, hierachical, centralised	pF'ist Management Tight centre, broad, flat periphery, decentralised
Systems	Central hands on control, detailed oversight exercised through multiple tiers	Performance targets, cost centres with tasks and teams, internal markets, hands off control
Staffing	Large fixed permanent corp of staff, centralised bargaining	Small core of staff, flexible large periphery, localised bargaining
Superordinate culture	Sound administration, legal and financial probity, professional, quantity in service delivery	Flexible management, measuring output, customer oriented, quality in service delivery

The pF'ist column reflects accurately the idealised vision for local government that the both the Conservative and new Labour governments have, i.e. the new right vision<sup>189</sup>. The radical pF'ist vision, which has actually helped inform the Labour Party's new realist reconstruction of their local government programme, is part of a spectrum that appears not to have any epistemological break with the new right, and thus would still embrace these core idealised elements, but would seek to underpin them with identified openings for more democratic involvement. It is then a variation

of the "dented shield" approach which the apologists for new realist left politics within the sphere of local governance have used to describe their approach. Not so much the transition from Fordism to postFordism, as the transition from Fordism to Nissan, with the self comforting consumerist aside of, "At least they are more reliable". Perhaps this does unjustly caricature the pF'st position, but then for all their circumscriptions and qualifications about "new forms of control" etc., their narrowing of the critical gap robs their argument of the potential for immanent critique, thereby pushing it into the ontological realms of positivism.

### 3.5 Critique

I want now to develop my meta-theoretical and agency critique of pF'st theories of local governance along the lines outlined earlier, i.e. a substantively racialised interrogation. My concerns with pF'sm's inability or lack of intention to deal with race, and for that matter gender, has been voiced as well by another commentator who sees the problem as residing in the emphasis on the forces of production as opposed to the relations of production.<sup>190</sup> It is within the latter sphere of theorising, the contention is put, that issues of race and gender within local governance can be properly addressed to the extent that the later Stuart Hall's celebration of difference can be incorporated. This is only partially true. It is true that looking at the relations of production will enable a theorisation of race, but at a cost because it still relies on an underlying grounding in the productivist logic underpinning the pF'st emphasis on productive forces. The extent to which this productive relations theorisation allows for a trip over into post modernist celebrations of difference, as this particular theorist claims, is doubtful since for the post modernist those differences rely on an incommensurable denarrativisation, and thus deuniversalisation, of their species being. In other words you can have your Marxist materialist cake but can't eat the various icings. There is, however, a sense in which both pF'st and the relations of production critique elide with post modernist musings on race. That is because the former two can, by the internal substantive logic of their grounding theory, treat race as being no more than epiphenomenal, and thus they and post modernism sanction the new forms of ethnicity, or etnification, as I have argued elsewhere - the former as ultimately marginal to "true consciousness", the latter as evidence of authentically grounded multi-contextualism. This charge against Hoggett's brand of pF'sm of acknowledging "race" through the diffractive prism of different cultures without grounding those cultures is thus partially vindicated by his later toe-dipping into the pool of developing post-modernist social policy, classified, as his article is, under the catch-all of "towards a post-modernist...etc.etc."<sup>191</sup> But, then perhaps this elision of the distance between post-Fordism and post-modernity is not that unexpected since the prefix post- can only refer retrospectively, over the shoulder, to a



period that has passed, and thus despite the ultimate productivist teleology of pF'sm, the contradiction between that and its findings of a public sector world seemingly now "contingent, ungrounded, diverse, unstable, indeterminate (and with) a set of disunified cultures.." pushes it over the edge into de-grand narrativising its origins. This is but a trend that has occurred before with other structuralist based Marxist accounts of reality in which the gap between the explanatory potential of the underlying theory and the evidence of reality is such that either greater or greater areas of the socio-, economic and political areas are given over to "autonomous" development, or the theoretical project breaks down into the denarrativised contingent in which reality is but a palimpsest not for Reality, but, well... for just reality. Is this what is happening to pF'st thinking on the public sector? To judge by this article by Hoggett, the answer would appear to be in the affirmative. Briefly then the paper attempts to contribute towards the development of a post-modern social policy by examining its contention that "existing compromises between universalism and particularism, equality and diversity have been unsettled." which then requires that the "question of the appropriate balance between these values in the light of the issues post modernism raises"<sup>192</sup>.

In terms of a meta-theoretical deconstruction of pF'st constructions of local governance, it can be said that pF'sm's last instance referencing to Marxism, albeit of the Regulationist school, places it logically within the purviews of a critical realism as defined earlier. However the key question is whether pF'st local governance can make bare relations of unjust power inclusive of racism and, in performative synchronisation, critique as it attempts a reconstruction of such relations. As I outline below and as I have hinted earlier, pF'sm's last instance reliance on regulationist Marxism with its consequence that the state is read off as a functional derivative of changing forms of accumulation regulation means as well that there is a lacuna instead of a detailed argument showing how and why this should happen. On tologically therefore, whilst the adherence to Marxism as a grounding logically means that reality is not as it should be, i.e there is a deeper underlying reality, the pF'st argument is deficient when it comes to illustrating exactly how and why changing forms of accumulation regulation impact on political forms, and thus too, social relations of production. In the previous section I showed, via a Habermassian deconstruction of Marx's theory of commodification, how Marxist based analyses of racism marginalised Black people's struggles.

There are fundamental weaknesses in such a theory which in sum add up to a teleological evolutionism the principal effect of which vis-a-vis Black experiences is a reductionist conflation with the white working class as the agents of human history, or dismissive epiphenomenalisation. These weaknesses then underpin Habermas' contention that the concept of social

labour is not abstract enough to encompass the universals of human development. And, whilst as an example of this failing Habermas identifies the difficulties Marxists have with reconciling the welfare state with such a theory, I have included as well, and more importantly, the trans-epochal unresolved processes of unjust social differentiation, such as racism. This reprioritisation of other unjust forms of social differentiation over forms of differentiation of the "state apparatus", i.e. the welfare state, goes, as I show in my chapter on racism to the ontological heart of the social labour thesis and its derivatives which include amongst its ranks pF'st theories of local governance. Now whilst pF'sm, especially its forces of production variant, has eschewed any kind of engagement with race, what can be inferred from this regime of accumulation type analyses is a theorisation of racism that relies on a postulation of the fracturing of abstract labour. This is not a wild assumption, but rather is inferred analytically from the substantive logic of the Marxism upon which this brand of pF'sm is based. Under this analysis capitalists suborn their interests strategically to maintain the capitalist system, no doubt "voluntarily" suborn, so that there develops an asynchronicity between political and economic interests as well as an impure form of community struggle, as opposed to class based struggles. To reintroduce that key quote, "a capitalism which can foresee its own overthrow needs to limit and contain accumulation in a way that it maximises its own life even at the expense of the law of value....(so)....in South Africa the expansion of value, and so surplus value has been partially diverted by concession to white workers of a limited degree of control over the process of extraction of surplus value from Black workers."<sup>193</sup> Now because the medium of exchange is partially exposed, that is to say the process whereby concrete labour is transformed into abstract labour, or, in Habermasian terms, the relationship between lifeworld and system, this gives rise to the politicisation of white and Black workers. But, because the regime of accumulation is not "pure", i.e. the relationship between concrete and abstract labour is mediated via race and has therefore not run its full course to proletarianise all the workers, this politicisation expresses itself in the mongrelised fashion of white against Black workers, rather than that of all workers against the capitalist class. In other words the true reality is now overlaid by two other levels - an intermediate one of race, and an upper one that is expressed through the unalloyed medium of proper exchange value. The universalism of social labour around which such Marxist analyses pivot, because it clamps together too tightly the social with the system, allows judgement calls to be made against those forms of political expression which do not fit into its anticipated framework. Thus Black expressions of politics can occupy a lower form of political life because it addresses community issues rather than class issues. This together with the teleological evolutionism of such Marxist theories means as well that the experiences of the white working classes can be privileged both temporally, i.e. they are more advanced evolutionally, and ontologically. We can see therefore



that if the state is read off as a reflection of the regime of accumulation, then the state that discriminates on the grounds of race, and this includes the pF'st local state, has by the logic of the argument built into a fracturing of abstract labour underpinning it. Moreover it becomes possible to downplay, or even dismiss, attempts to change this as epiphenomenal wastes of political time. This is what I read into the pF'st aversion to race. On tologically therefore, Black people's experiences, if expressed through race equality politics that do not converge with class based moves, can be placed on the evolutionary backburner. They are on the edges of the totality, some of it falling into the true reality, i.e where race and class co-incide, the other part but an expression of that intermediate reality. Such critical realist theories therefore, whilst they create two "realities", unwittingly shadow a third intermediate one in which, on tologically the Black person is still temporally and spatially displaced. Now, whilst the progressive notion of racism as ideology allows for it to be condemned, the temporal/spatial displacement, because it arises out of an inadequately theorised universalism, allows as well the discretion for evincing reasons to be advanced for that displacement, reasons which can fall into cultural and/or biological determinism. That is to say that, as I have argued in the chapter on racism, since that form of social injustice's unique defining criteria, as against other forms of social injustice, are those of time, space/place and phenotype, then there is inherent in the social labour based argument the grounds for meeting all of racism's criteria.

Perhaps it can be said that pF'sm and its forces of production variant, has been unfairly singled out since the critique outlined above applies as well to other Marxist analyses. This is true in part so that whilst the criticisms of someone like Williams of pF'st inabilities to adequately consider race arise out of their failure to give proper consideration to the social relations of production have some value, their reliance on a social labour grounding makes my critique equally applicable. In both pF'sm and Williams, race is a zero-sum game in which either the capitalists or white workers gain what the Black workers have lost. They therefore end up sanctioning etnifikation, the creation of ersatz ethnicities which I have outlined in an earlier paper. PF'sm achieves this through a process of multi-cultural epiphenomenalism in which such cultures are acknowledged but denied substantive on tological groundings, whilst critics such as Williams, in their compensatory celebration of diversity, should take care that the on tological groundings now accorded are, in their construction, able to differentiate out those voices of inauthenticity. On tologically, therefore, if the state mirrors, albeit on a temporal afterburn, the development of the particular regime of accumulation, then the situation of race in local authorities in the eighties can only be, according to pF'sm, in particular the variant in question, a diversion. Harken to Hoggett's ill informed damnation of those efforts - almost an accusation of "false consciousness" on the part of socialist

councillors - "...socialists have found it far easier to "throw money" at the problem of racism in local government by setting up race units, employing race advisory officers etc., than to come to grips with the entrenched institutionalised discrimination embodied in white professional career structures."<sup>194</sup> As I shall show later, not only is his argument of a more substantive reality a nonsense, but his "facts" included in the quote are wrong.

It would appear then that pF'sm, in this variant, wants to have its cake and eat it. If it runs with its productivist underpinnings then race becomes epiphenomenal. If, in seeking to address this, pF'sm trips over into post modernism, then it requires a denarrativisation in contradistinction to its teleology. In both cases Black people lose their on tological grounding to the extent that we are left with a homogenising assumption of heterogeneity comprised of essentialised cultural units.

3.6 Summary and Conclusion

By way of rounding off this section on pF'sm we'll return to the meta-theoretical matrix framework in order to generate summary data sets for each of the vacant cells. The meta-theoretical level was chosen as that best able to reconcile race and racism, given the earlier argument of it being an unresolved trans-epochal carry over into present day modernity. The contention then is that the meso-theoretical level at which pF'sm pitches its argument cannot deal adequately with issues of race. Thus whilst other critiques of pF'sm have also picked up on the fault lines of teleology, functionalism and technological determinism, these have been from an alternative Marxist perspective which in themselves either have not dealt, or, where they have attempted to do so, dealt inadequately with race and racism.

The following matrix was proposed as the interrogative framework for racialising key theories of local governance.

	<i>Democratic will formation</i>	<i>Organisation of governance</i>	<i>Organisation of welfare</i>
<i>Meta-theoretical considerations</i>	1	3	5
<i>Agency</i>	2	4	6

In this the vacant cells are numbered as an aid to the summary remarks that follow.



It has been argued that the logic of pF'sm ties it into an Hegelian concept of totality in which the transformation of the participants' fortunes are tied into the transformation of the economic system; and, that this, because of the teleological evolutionism of such theories, gives rise to an implicit view that Black people's experiences, race equality wise if it does not equate with class based ones, can be put on the evolutionary backburner. It is also suggested, given the later flirtation with post modernism, that this might be because of the perceived increasing temporal and spatial distantiation between the economic core locus of pF'sm's dynamic and its actual effects, thus making it easier for it to be opportunistically ignored. This seems to have happened precisely because pF'sm was being taken to task over its inability to reconcile the issue of race and racism. The result in both cases has had the same effect. In the former the Black subject ends up doubly determined, which manifests itself in part in the epiphenomenal, and thus false consciously based expression, of cultural politics. In the latter now acknowledging the validity of such expressions is premised upon there being no subject, but rather the subject fracturing effects of a multiplicity of different discourses, discourses with material effects. This blending of post F'sm with post modernism might be described as syncretic if it were not for Hogget's attempt to retain some element of universalism; a universalism which does not arise out of an anti-foundationalist endeavour to create a post-modernist ethic but is still tied to notion, albeit a very background distant notion, of a historical subject. Perhaps it is not so much a blending then as an exercise in eclecticism. If this is to be the epistemological dynamic, with an ontologically ungrounded Black subject, then the implied normative framework repeats the effect of being overdetermined which the productivist version brings forth. That is to say tomorrow is but today is but yesterday.... In terms of democratic will formation and agency, (1 and 2) there are two options then: an empiricist pragmatism, and this probably applies to the Stoker variant of pF'sm, or an "offensive understanding of politics directed against the state apparatus", and this tendency appears to emerge from the Hoggett variant. For example in the few commentaries on race and local government, he rails against the inability of transforming large local state bureaucracies into non or anti-racist entities. In the publication done with Burns<sup>195</sup> which examined the issue of decentralisation in Tower Hamlets and in his latest foray into post modernist social policy, both of which had to deal with race and racism, he appears to go all the way in wanting to deconstruct the local state into a multiplicity of smaller democratically controlled units. Is this but then not another version of the republican model of democratic will formation in which "society is from the start political society -societas civilis.....(and) democracy becomes equivalent to the political self-organisation of society as a whole"?<sup>196</sup> This however still assumes a fairly homogenous culturally grounded consensus on the part of the citizenry which either exists or must be attained

through a philosophy of consciousness praxis. Whilst then the initial appeal of such an approach which asserts a need for new and more substantive forms of democracy as a remedy to the problems analysed, the actual way in which Black people and women will participate emancipatively in that process still throws up more questions than Hogett's pF'sm can answer.

If then pF'sm's local governance ideal in either its attenuated form as exemplified by Stoker, or its radical form à la Hoggett, is greater democracy, then it is reasonable to ask how this is to be achieved, and how, given the core concern of this paper, not to mention the implied normative framework to such democracy, Black people and others most marginalised by the current system, are to participate emancipatively? Some of the answers to this have already been outlined in the immediate preceding section on democratic will formation. Briefly then there appear to be two types of agency ensconced in pF'sm. The first relates to the critique voiced in this paper and by others that pF'sm licences a teleologically based technological determinism in which the changes to local government are and will be the outcome of changes in the mode of regulation of capital. The second emerges from the need, a need prompted by their "real world" work, no doubt, to engage with the reality of the meso and micro level of change in local government. Here there then appears to be a trip over into post modernist notions of voluntaristically based resistances, even weak resistances, which, and by the logic of the pF'st arguments can only, revolve around the issue of identity recognition problems because there is implicit in the central argument a common cultural background assumption. Is this to big a jump in the reading of pF'sm? The answer is "no" when one considers in more detail the future desired local governance as sketched out in one of the key publications. In this Hoggett et al expand on their vision for a democracy without bureaucracy, a state of affairs brought about primarily because of the "innovations in information technology which have permitted new forms of organisational control." These changes have resulted in the replacement of the bureaucratic pyramid by the core-periphery model. Their "vision for the future is therefore not one which seeks a public sphere still dominated by an extended but now accountable state, (but ) rather....one which is based upon a much greater plurality of democratic provider organisations and specifically ones that are collectively accountable or controlled." This vision is prompted because of their analysis that "a new paradigm of production is presently emerging which combines extended operational decentralisation with enhanced strategic direction." Consequently because, as they believe, "strong local democracy requires strong local representation", then "a political party committed to a genuinely democratic philosophy could greatly empower local government by giving emphasis to its strategic role at the local level."<sup>197</sup> And what about Black people and issues of racism within this vision. That is no problem,



according to the proponents, if the conventional thinking about majorities and minorities is done away with and instead, reconceptualised in terms of the “fact” that “we are all at some time and in some contexts, minorities”. In other words we are all “a part of a minority...part of a group which experiences discrimination and hence is denied the status of full citizenship.”<sup>198</sup> A distinction is thus made between “the majority” and the “general good” where, in contradistinction to the former, the latter has the “capacity to contain difference without becoming divided upon itself.” Upon this it is then claimed that “political leaders always have a choice” which is to opt for one or the other, i.e the majority tendency or the common good tendency.

I have allowed Hoggett et co. to speak for themselves because their words confirm the earlier critique made. Firstly there is a strong teleological tendency that backgrounds their technologically determinist view of why local government is changing. Secondly such an approach reduces the possibility of immanent critique and can only provide for reality that agrees with what is, despite the evidence that the case for local government becoming decentralised is not backed up by the available empirical evidence. Thirdly, the logic of such an approach means that when the issue of agency over which people might have control is broached, it can only be done voluntaristically in terms, for example, of choices political leaders have. (A hint of Marxist rational choice theory perhaps?) Fourthly, and this was not covered in the earlier critique, there seems to be a revisit to Millian representative democracy in their support for representative democracy at the local level and which can guide the development of good uses of resources, whilst for the local community democracy emerges in its republican format in the decentralisation of provider elements, dependent in the final analysis upon the statist strategy of a political party committed to democracy “seizing” power. Fifthly, racism and Black people now become one of but many equal value variables of difference struggling towards a Hegelian communitarian good. Behind this can still be heard the echoes of the “we are all one class” arguments, and which, in post modernist guise can emerge as “we are all different and equal”. In the intermediate spaces, however, can be seen the shift from the race equality specific strategies of labour local authorities to the broad based equal opportunity ones of new right Labour. But then these are but the consequences of advancing a theory of local governance which does not deal with the issue of power adequately. Once again then racism is shifted on to the margins and Black people, within the sphere of local governance, become squeezed into a potentially oppressive common good. Questions remain, such as, for example, why should Black women regard white men as but another minority? How are these two constituencies going to work together? What if there isn’t a political party committed to democracy -or are we to assume that this is the Labour party?

As far as the organisation of local governance and welfare is concerned, (3 and 4, and 5 and 6), whilst the outline of the change tendencies and the future vision have been provided, the position of the Black person therein, not to mention the unresolved problem of racism, has not been provided. Under pF'sm the organisation of local government and of welfare can be read off as a delayed correspondence to changes in the sphere of production, particularly technological changes. The large bureaucracies of the "old" model local government are then reflexes of the Fordist regime of accumulation. These in themselves were/are a mass of inherent interests to such an extent that any attempt at controlling or altering these from an equality perspective, is doomed to failure. History moves on, and thus it is a "good" thing that the regime of accumulation has changed because it has brought forth a new organisational mode which makes it easier to realise local democracy. This will be a local democracy organised around new forms of the production of services. But then here is the major faultline which throws up in sharp relief the basic contradiction in pF'st accounts of local governance. If the intentions of such an approach is to move beyond the orthodox thinking on local government which is that it is simply about the efficient, effective etc. provision of services, to one that looks at local governance in terms of groups participating in a localised political process covering a range of issues greater than just services, then pF'sm is in a dilemma. The issue of race illuminates this dilemma. Leaving aside the implication that the struggles for race equality by Black workers within local government and by Black communities outside of local government were but epiphenomenal, it has to be shown by pF'sts that the new forms of production of services in their pF'st emancipated mode, i.e. democratically controlled, provide the answers to the problems of local Black communities. Does this not reproduce the utilitarian argument for local government in a different form because democracy is being conflated with production? What is to be the bases of the relationship between those groups which are not service groups, and the local state or with the now decentralised service groups? Are Black people to be served by Black self-organised groups? What about decentralised units that decide to serve whites only? What about the vast majority of Black people who have very little to do with local groups of whatever persuasion? How is there to be a distinction between those campaigning for genuine need and those which are etnikfied projections? More importantly, will those, especially if they are Black, who, say disagree with the vision of the "common good" because it downplays race equality, effectively be disenfranchised from the democratic processes?

In sum therefore, approaching pF'sm from a meta-theoretical level allows us to show that as an emancipatory theory, and this is inferred from its analysis-of-capitalism underpinnings, it fails because, yet again, it can only resolve problems of racism by incorporating Black people, and for that matter



women, within a limited and limiting universalism which will compromise the claims for racial justice made by Black people. In this, as with orthodox Marxism, instrumental and communicative action is still conflated. The ill defined nature of its normative content, which has to be inferred, makes it open, to be charitable, i.e. I am not sure where Hoggett et co. stand on the issue of new right Labour and local government, to the types pf action mentioned in those those politician based examples mentioned earlier in the paper. The potential contained within the language of its vision - decentralisation, new forms of local democracy, difference etc. - whilst it cannot be realised by the substantive content of pF'sm, as its failure on race shows, does, however, provide a signboard of clues to the general direction in which local governance should be going, particularly in relation to Black people and women.

# Chapter 4

## Version 2- Localism

### 4.1 Introduction

“In what public discourse does the reference to Black people not exist? It exists in everyone of this nation’s mightiest struggles.....It is there in the construction of a free and public school system; the balancing of representation in legislative bodies; jurisprudence and legal definitions of justice.”<sup>199</sup>

The opening quotation to this section by Toni Morrison, whilst it refers to the American experience, could as well, with the questioning addition of, “well why then has it been written out?”, apply to the current state of mainstream local governance theories in the UK. Over the past fifteen years it can be said that in the UK a general explicit discourse on local governance has arisen, compared with the implicit discourse of preceding years reflected mainly in the grey image of “traditional local government.” Whilst pF’sm occupies one notch in the range of the general spectrum of this discourse, and that of the liberal new right another, by far the largest space is inhabited by what can be described as the localised theories of local governance. Their prominence owes much to the empirical reality that they have been espoused by a new Labour now controlling much of the UK’s large urban conurbations. PF’sm obviously overlaps and is informed by as well as informing these localised theories through the academic and contract networks surrounding universities, local authorities, public sector “expertisation”, if, once again I could “quotationalise”, agencies, such as the Local Government Management Board, and the new right Labour Party. Indeed one of the hallmarks of this new explicit discourse on local governance, has been the growth of “think-tank” like institutions within the sphere of the public sector which have fed into the networked momentum of this particular discourse. But, as I shall argue later, this, like localised local governance theories, is part of a wider redefining of politics, but not, as is needed a “re-invention of politics.” Local socialism, as encapsulated in the experiences of authorities like Lambeth and the GLC in the eighties, will not be dealt with in this critical examination of localised theories other than to sketch out the temporal contours of its origins. It will, however, be explored in greater detail in the sections dealing with the empirical data of the research. The relationship that exists between local socialism and localised theories is not so much one of theoretical continuities, though in some areas can still be seen the faint shadows of some elements of the former’s agenda, but of theoretical discontinuities and factual continuities. It is about deconstructing the Hodgian phenomenon<sup>200</sup>; about asking why



there was the great about face, a process achieved gradually in some local authorities and in others through what amounted to a political putsch within the local Labour Party. It is, in looking at the Hodgian phenomenon, asking why those councillors, and in some cases senior officers, could through some form of apostasy, happily migrate between the two eras. Above all it is, given the nature of this research, about asking how and why, in the practical emergence of localised local governance, there was at the same time the deracialisation of a previously positively racialised local socialism.

## **4.2 Origins of Localism in Local Governance**

So, what then is this localised, or “localist” theory of local governance? To answer that I am going to rely on the chronological and empirical framework provided by Cochrane<sup>201</sup> because it fits in with my own analysis of the period and covers, as well, the same supporting texts. However this does not mean agreement with Cochrane’s critique which is premised upon a variant radical analysis of local governance that, similar to pF’sm, places that political site within the framework of a global analysis of capitalism. To that extent there are still serious deficiencies in Cochrane’s analysis, deficiencies which, within the context of this section’s meta-critique, are commented upon. Chronologically within the sphere of local governance in the UK there is a commonly identified watershed period shift associated with the election of the Thatcher government in 1979. The elevation of this new right Conservative party to government is marked out as the beginning of a centralising onslaught on local government the aim of which was and is to depoliticise local government, siphon off a range of responsibilities to authorities not directly accountable to the local populace and facilitate the emergence, growth and influence of market forces in local government. Whilst this popular conception of the “beginning of it all” still persists in the minds of many, the fact is that at the local level changes were already taking place in local Labour parties which predated the election of the national Conservative government, changes which were reflected in the political complexion of those Labour groups running inner city councils in the wake of the 1978 local elections, particularly in London. In some these changes were characterised by the conscious informal alliances forged between certain Black community groups and the local Labour Party in which demands for racial justice from the former were brokered by the promise of action by the latter if those groups could help in delivering the Black vote. Labelled by some commentators as the “new urban left”, many of the class of ‘78 councillors were characterised by their journey through higher education and previous association or sympathy with Marxist extra-parliamentary parties. Others had cut their activist teeth through the optimism and then disillusionment of the post-Heath Labour government. This is mentioned not as a disparaging indicator, but merely as a rough guide

to some of the key theoretical influences underpinning not only the eventual reaction to the new right onslaught on local government, but as well the general programme labelled local socialism.

As a prefatory summary of a more detailed examination in the empirical section, local socialism can be defined not so much as the outcome of a coherent ideology but more as the loose framework for a number of core concerns which thus in micro-detail produced respectively an uneven pattern of growth in different local authorities. Gyford's pithy account is right, and that is that "these characteristics would include; a concern for issues hitherto absent or marginal to conventional local government, such as economic planning, monitoring the police, women's rights, and racial equality; a disdain for many of the traditional ways of conducting local authority business; a view of local government as an arena both for combatting the policies of a Conservative government and for displaying by example the potential of grass roots socialism; and perhaps most fundamentally, a commitment to notions of mass politics based upon strategies of decentralisation and/or political mobilisation at the local level."<sup>202</sup> Cochrane identifies three crucial features of local socialism:<sup>203</sup>

- ◆ a need to demonstrate practically that there was an alternative to TINA
- ◆ a need to demonstrate that there was an alternative to the corporatist Labourism of the Callaghan government
- ◆ a need to extend and develop democracy at the local level substantively in a way that recognised that "democracy is more than the mere right to cast a vote at elections."

What these summaries do not adequately capture, however, is the degree of differentiation and differential development of those three strands even in those authorities which can be readily identified as having attempted to achieve the political goal of local socialism; differences which attest to the myriad forces which were counter to that goal. Likewise the large number of Labour authorities which did not follow that route is evidence of the ideological differences in the Labour Party both within its sphere of local governance and nationally. As I shall show, if there is one issue that fractured and fissured the local Labour left, it was that of race and racism. On the face of it that should not be that surprising. There is a similarity with pF'sm in terms of the productivist change locus underpinning both such that at the level of meta-critique the racialised interrogation would release kindred general fault lines. For example the numerous times the interests of the "general working class", as embodied in the manual trade unions were privileged over the demands of racial justice; or the espousal, tolerance and encouraged development of a multiplicity of "ethnic/etnik" minority claims



in counter to political strategies of anti-racism; or the degree to which race equality structures were always marginalised in officer and member structures. Running alongside the turmoils of developing local socialism were a number of initiatives informed by and informing each other and which coalesced into the one dimensional “localist” reality of local government today. At the national government level, spurred on to a large degree by the racist representation of inner city council race equality initiatives - and a side that is under played by current leading theorists of local governance - the Conservative government was pushing through an explicit discourse the notion of an “enabling council”, by which was meant a depoliticised, de-democratised, greatly reduced co-ordinating structure which would facilitate the marketisation of council services and responsibilities. At the national level the Labour Party, smarting after the loss of the 1987 national election, accelerated the process of acceptability by initiating the exorcism of the race equality demons, along with other identified excrescences, through the deliberate *prima facie* acceptance of the existent of so-called “loony left councils.” At the local governance informing network level two academic and practice strands were coming together under the aegis of organisations like the Local Government Training Board, AKA the Local Government Management Board( a very significant change in name). Both were focussed on attempting to secure changes in local government which would achieve a needs led orientation to services, as opposed to the bureaucratic service led arrangements. In crude categorical terms, one was an initiative from the new right, à la Ridley’s enabling notion, the other an initiative from the centre which placed an emphasis on a community empowerment basis to needs led services. Key to the realisation of the former was a battery of enacted legislation, such as the 1990 NHS Community Care Act, the 1989 Education Act, the various pieces of Compulsory Competitive Tendering legislation together with a steady decrease in the level of central government funding, which forced the issue of developing a so-called needs led approach. All of these forces, including those discourses which are communicatively distorted, such as the racist conventionalisation of race initiatives, coalesced around the late eighties and early nineties to provide the engine house for the development of the localist variation of local government. Theorists, like Stoker, are correct in seeing this approach as the new ideology of local government.<sup>204</sup> In fact, six years on it should be called the new orthodoxy. As an example of the effects of such an approach, one cannot turn a corner in a local authority, whether Labour, Conservative or Liberal run for tripping over a “mission statement”, or similar declaration of “localism”. To all intents and purposes local authorities which ten years ago would have had distinct political cultures linked to the complexion of the ruling political group, are now almost indistinguishable from each other. This MBA convergence, which harks to the increasing tendency of local authorities wanting staff with a private sector background or qualification, covers a narrowed range of local

governance clustered around slight variations of localism. In looking for the reasons why previous local socialist councils have ended up adopting such an approach, it could be easily read, as some have done, as the most pragmatic response - the “dented shield” approach - to the Conservative national government onslaught. In which case those constant actors, as exemplified by the Hodgian effect, end up as being opportunists, and given the down scaling of race equality, racist opportunists. Equally it could be read, as the pF’sts do, as the organisational outcomes of changes in the mode of regulation of capital. In which case those comparator actors become the dupes of history. But that is too easy and convenient. Race then becomes again a footnote carried along with wider more substantive changes. We need to look beyond such simplistic notions, including the forces of production-relations paradigm. This will be achieved by examining the optimal version of localism, as espoused by Stewart, even if the reality is that most local authorities, even those which ostensibly “facade” their policies in Stewart’s direction, are in fact a hybrid of localist approaches.

As a brief prefatory contextualisation prelude to the detailed critique, it can be said that localism developed not so much temporally sequentially to local socialism, and not, therefore as Stoker describes it as a displacement of the urban left by urban managerialists, but contemporaneously to local socialism. It can be said as well that, whatever the criticisms of so-called local socialism might be, e.g. á las Lansley’s apostate version etc., it at least de- and reconstructed the public sphere of local governance away from the arid municipilism and towards one that became inclusive of constituencies, such as Black people, women, etc, which previously had been excluded.<sup>205</sup> It helped re-energise empirically the growing seventies critique of academic orthodox public administration. Consequently local governance, for both the right and wrong reasons, and in particular the attempts to positively racialise and engender it, came to occupy as prominent a part as national governance in both the local and national media. It is therefore surprising, given the nature of the recharged public sphere on local governance, that when examining the texts on localism, the dimension of equality, whether women’s or race, is so obviously absent, apart from the occasional briefest of nods in the direction of an amorphous “equal opportunities”. It appears that this latest version of the palimpsest of local governance has been constructed in a way that writes down the previous underlying myriad explicit references to race. But then, perhaps, this should not come as that much of a surprise because localism, in contra distinction to the attempts to involve the communities in a collective movement, as say the GLC attempted, and in contra distinction to the logic of its own consumer/customer/citizen involvement tenets, came about from above - the academic, Labour party, quasi-intellectual think-tanks network - and not from below. Even if it is a very crude measure of its race sensitivity, it can



be pointed out that there isn't one Black person involved in the writing of localism's texts. But then those who can be identified as pF'sm's leading local governance acolytes are not exempt from this type of criticism. As part of the research underpinning this section they were contacted to ascertain why they had devoted so little time and textual space to matters of race and equal opportunities. In each case there was a Pilate type displacement of referring me on to "other people" who are, or might be, dealing with it.<sup>206</sup>

#### **4.4 Optimal Localism**

What then is this optimal version of localism? This version runs with the new right notion of the enabling marketised local state and attempts to both subvert and invert it into that which is more community and collectivist based. This isn't so much a defensive reaction to Thatcherist local governance that attempts to maximise a position of disadvantage, as a parallel theory of local governance, which like pF'sm, ends up with a set of general anticipated end points which are coincidental to the marketeers. In general then, all three, new right, pF'sts and localists seek to achieve a needs led form of local governance by addressing three broad areas:

- ◆ the organisation of local government
- ◆ the management of local government
- ◆ the democratic base to local government

In the localised version being addressed in this paper, the organisation of local government was prefaced in the mid to late eighties via a trenchant critique of the then perceived inward looking, over professionalised, service interest dominated local government which, it was argued, had ossified into a structure that was too far removed and inflexible to meet the needs of the local community properly. The fact that internal to many of these councils were equality infra-structures voicing similar criticisms, but from a targeted equality perspective, seems, some how, to have been overlooked by the localists. In one local authority, as shall be shown in detail in the empirical section, this blindspot was deliberately used to argue, and push through, a more generalised community approach in direct opposition to the then race and women's equality programmes. The detail of the proposals for change built up by the radical localists over the intervening years, and they are proposals - their utopian vision if you like - because there is little evidence to show that any council has adopted this version in toto, are aimed at securing a form of local governance in which the polity, resultant politics and policies, are more sensitively and symbiotically attuned to the local community. Structurally, therefore, the overall contours of local government are not that much different from the new right vision, i.e. a

decentred structure with an organising and co-ordinating core with multifaceted needs sensitive antennae at the periphery. Substantively, however, because there is an accompanying explicit critique of the new right market co-ordinating approach, the differences between the two versions become clear when the accountability mechanisms are examined. The radical localist theory puts a premium, thus, on the necessary community, i.e. collective, bases to local governance stressing that institutionally what is being talked about is a political entity controlled by the people, and not a supermarket. So, where marketeers speak of customers, radical localists speak of citizen users, with the emphasis on the implied transitive nature of the latter. In terms of the organisational structure of local government, the vision is very much that which is in current vogue, and that is one which envisions an organisation that is hierarchically flatter, decentralised, more openly in touch with local communities, but still accountable in the final analysis, to democratically elected representatives.<sup>207</sup> This new responsive sensitivity to communities is to be achieved in large part by developing a management process that is outward looking, is pro-active and intelligent with regard to potential problems, is quickly responsive to a fast changing external environment, can forge new relationships with communities and elected members, and is dedicatedly service oriented, i.e. wanting to improve services in response to challenges and local needs. Like the new right theorists, management as an explicit process, is excavated from its implicit orthodox administrative entombment and placed centre stage. Management in the public sector as a distinctive discourse has arrived, as evinced by the increasing literature on the subject - so much so that leading bookstores now devote separate sections to it - and the emergence of specific post graduate degrees in the subject. Differences between the localist local governance camps on management occur around their respective positioning with regard to the private sector. Whilst the new right champions the private sector as a positive management resource for the public sector, one that has to be tapped and emulated, the radical localist school prefers that a distinctive public sector model be developed, one that builds on a community bases to accountability, rather than the market. The question of how successfully the latter has been achieved, has to be posed, especially given the announced intent of the previous "era's" equality programmes of trying to develop processes which would make local government better able to meet the needs of Black people and women. This can best be answered by putting another question which is that now the managers have been identified, what exactly is it that they are going to manage? All the localists are agreed that the core activity has to be the better management of the service process. Reading someone like Stewart's work on the sorts of changes necessary to improve local government services, one is struck, despite the fact that much of his theory is supposedly in opposition to the then Conservative national government's stance, by the extent to which it overlaps with what might be called private sector theories of service



improvement.<sup>208</sup> The dominant, in fact the only apparent recognised service improvement model in local government is that of the “quality” paradigm. This, derived from private sector models of improving industrial products, has, originally from America but latterly via Japanese manufacturing and management techniques, from very simple notions, assumed an autotrophic growth rate. Quality service management has produced an almost seamless means of transposition from the management of the private sector to the public sector. Needless to say that the various strains of “quality” - quality control, total quality management etc. - has also spawned a radical localist version in which the various review and planning points in the quality service cycle are targeted for ensuring that they include the community constituencies as a means of democratising the process.<sup>209</sup> Again, in both looking at the literature on the latter, and in talking to some of the leading writers on the subject, it is clear that equality considerations were not built in from the outset. In one case where the author used to be a senior manager in the leading decentralising local authority, it is an omission that has to be questioned not only because of that authority’s public equality stance, but also because of the author’s dismissive description of the equality staff as the “thought police.”<sup>210</sup> In the end, however, it is clear that up to now many local authorities, and their prime advisory resources, like the LGMB, have come to rely on an eclectic mix of management and service improvement techniques the sum of which, in its optimal mode, can no more than provide the hope for a slight attenuation of the forces driving the accountability processes in local government. Thus, for example, far from providing a means for the development of community based approaches, those local authorities which were previously identified as “local socialist”, have actually seen an increase internally in financial accountability systems, a “harder” macho type management style emerging very often linked to new highly specified systems of employee control, and, if it is still to be seen as the co-ordinating bedrock of equality and fairness within an organisation, a diminution in the priority previously given to equal opportunities. Accountability is structured systemically through the development of technical auditing process which mediate the relationship with communities, and become an instrumental substitute for democratic political processes of involvement and participation.<sup>211</sup>

With regard to the issue of local democracy there is a convergence of interests once again between the new right and the radical localists. Whilst in the former this does not emerge directly in the form of participation in the determination of political direction as it does with the radical localists, it does, however, emerge in the form of influencing outcomes via the expressed desire to see various consumer consultative mechanisms developed in local government premised on the philosophical traditional that this facilitates consumer choice. Despite, therefore, Cochrane’s<sup>212</sup> supportive observation that Stewart’s critique of the new right and counter

assertions make a strong case for the development of a distinctive public sector democratic model, the radical localists', if one now includes people like Hogget and Cochrane, case for greater democracy at the local level as one of the emancipative bulwarks against centralisation does not substantively differ from that of the new right. This is because in the end both camps can only ultimately offer a form of democracy that in terms of a content which can participatively include Black people and women non-conventionalisedly, is little different from what's available now. Thus, for example, on an issue like race equality, one strand of equality work in the previous public sector configuration holds that much of the initiatives undertaken simply fine tunes bureaucracy to avoid discrimination and that substantive equality requires a deconstruction and radical reconstruction of such organisations. If we look now at Stewart's proposals for democracy there is, at first reading, an attempt to innovatively inject new life into the core issue of local democracy<sup>213</sup>. Stewart describes local democracy as operating according to an attenuated model. By this he means that the overwhelming emphasis is still on local elections being the main focal point for local communities to be involved in democratic practices. He proposes, not so much an instead, as an enlargement of representative democracy through the establishment of a programme of initiatives, such as "citizen juries, which cannot only enhance the involvement of local communities as communities of participating citizens, but also act as an everyday critical counterpoint to that of the professional "expertise" of the bureaucrats. There is, at prima facie level much to commend this because one can almost see an overlap with someone like Habermas' theory of deliberative democracy. However, as shall be shown in the next section, there is equally an overlap with someone like Beck who contends that proposed exercises like Stewart's, because they still cling to representative democracy in its current form, amount to no more than "facadism"<sup>214</sup>. That is to say that it does not offer a "re-invention" of what is, but merely a fine tuning of emerging changes, because, if one re-appraises this from a Habermassian perspective, one which I think can be even more radicalised, Stewart emphasises the requirements for institutional stability without specifying the requirements of justice that will ensure "that the institutional arrangements actually are in everyone's interest." The contention then is that Stewart's localist version of local governance, i.e. the most optimal one, does not contain within it the necessary refinements which will ensure that the institutional arrangements are in Black people's interests; that despite the general inclusive nature of its implicit normative statement.

#### 4.5 Critique

Because the radical localist perspective of Stewart is not overtly situated within a wider epistemological framework as, say, p F'sm is, it would be very easy to subject it to the type of critique someone like Cochrane or



Clark<sup>215</sup> does because such a critique is premised upon a theory of capitalist society which has a stronger immanence than Stewart's weak normative vision. Thus it becomes easy to talk, as Clark does, about the managerialist changes in local government signalling, not so much the emergence of an enlightened managerocracy, as the confirmation of new constellations of power and control, because at the base of his critique is a notion of the locus of change residing in a globalising theory of capitalism replete with changing forces and relations of production<sup>216</sup>. But then such a critique runs the risk of being just as incorporative of Black people as Stewart's theory of local governance because it does not build in from the outset the considerations of Black people's interests from a non-oppressively, non-exploitatively and non-exclusionarily perspective. It is thus far better to deal with Stewart, as with pF'sm in the previous section, at a meta-theoretical level.

On tologically Stewart's radical localism shifts a little way along the naive to critical realist position. His adherence to too literal a representation of representative democracy as the apical goal to which ultimately democratic will formation and the organisation of local government and welfare focus means that if the limits to Black participation are identified in such institutional arrangements, then, in a matter of speaking "tough!". This short circuiting of what exists as institutionalised representative democracy and what could be, i.e. the implied normative content of Stewart's intentions means that Black people's interests will inevitably still have to be tied to existing institutional arrangements where institution is used by him in its literal sense. What such an on tological position then foregoes is a notion of representative democracy where institutional refers more to a culture of representative democracy, rather than hypostasizing the present system. In such a form, i.e. the former, the refinements proposed by Stewart might begin to take on a more substantively radical content because the normative principle of representative democracy is not circumscribed by the reality of the existing system, which in itself relies on the norm of liberal democracy. For example Stewart cites the experience of citizens' juries in some countries as those which if adopted in the UK would enhance democratic practices, and thus inter alia, be more inclusive of Black people and women. However, citizens' juries, because their remit extends only as far as advising and influencing the existing representative system on the issue at hand and not on either the arrangements for advisory/quasi-participative mechanisms or on the accountability of the representative system to the advice given, i.e. on the substantive types of changes to the existing institutional arrangements, do not offer that much more than the sorts of consultative and participative strategies attempted within the equality sphere under local socialism. In fact the one attempt at using a citizens' jury so far in the UK, conducted by a local authority held up as the shining example of new right Labour local governance, shows that far more was achieved for the public profile of the

authority, capitalising on the novelty value of citizen's juries, than was achieved on deriving new opinions, or enhancing local citizens participation in the democratic process.<sup>217</sup> It was, to all intents and purposes, an exercise in "facadism". Or as one critical councillor on the ruling political group put it when seeing the final report: "We have spent £30,000 to produce recommendations we already knew about."<sup>218</sup>

The problem might be in the form and content of liberal representative democracy. Mehta, in an interesting deconstructive critique, shows that J. S. Mill's "Representative Government" and "On Liberty" were quite explicitly not intended for the racially visible colonies, particularly India.<sup>219</sup> Thus Mill's description of India as "impenetrable", "a chaotic mess" and impervious to "all logical inquiry", as some of the indices marking it out as unsuitable for representative government, finds an echo in some of the criticisms voiced by both the Conservative and Labour governments of the eighties inner city local government as justification for greater control over, and intervention in local government. However, in terms of the racialised de-racialising, so to speak, the Labour Party's distancing and, in relation to the 1987 election, actually blaming of London race equality initiatives stands out as well. The subsequent dismantling of the race programmes, the departure of large numbers of Black employees, and the overt attempts to manage 'race' by the Labour Party, confirms the process and effects of that distancing. Likewise Dhaliwal's post-modernist critique of representative democracy, the sort that Habermas argues can be counter-steered, is correct in some ways when she writes that the exclusions of racialised subjects in such political systems "are implicated not as mere absences but rather as constitutive of, perhaps even necessary for, the formation of liberal democracies." She makes use of and quotes Guinier's work in the United States to show that "voting alone does not signal fairness....; majority rule is not a reliable instrument in a racially divided society...; majority rule may be perceived as majority tyranny...; there is nothing inherent in democracy that requires majority rule...; (majority rule remains) unquestioned as long as the majority admitted a fair number of blacks to its decision making council."<sup>220</sup> The latter point, which 'represents' to day the acme of thinking on race equality and liberal democracies, is problematic because "whilst black people may vote they do not govern (so that)..when the minority votes, it does not mean their interests will get represented."<sup>221</sup>

On tologically Stewart's localism has an implicit communitarian basis in which Black people are incorporated in the moral "good life" vision of the community and the local authority functioning largely as one, only ever allowed a brief social on tology via the status of being an ethnic minority. The potential for a quasi-fascistic avenue occurs when the question is put about what happens when, say Black people, speak or act out against this supposedly shared notion of the ethical good, i.e. question that normative



value. What, as is pertinent now, happens to those Black employees within those local authorities who speak out against that constructed ethical good because it presumes a priority of the community wanting better services, even if the realisation of that means intra authority bad treatment of those employees. For example many of the London local authorities which previously might have had explicit employment based race equality policies, have embarked on more generalised human resourcing policies aimed at making the workforce a more flexible resource in the service of “services for the community.”<sup>222</sup> The rate of haemorrhage of employees, in particular Black employees, from such local authorities is rising. Many of these local authorities would happily cite the new orthodoxy as a counter to the charge of reneging on their commitment to race equality; a new orthodoxy in which the community and local authority constitute the ethical good. With some local authorities there has been a dissolution of attempts at a Black social ontology by collapsing their previous recognition of ethnic minority “communities” into a recognition and valuing of “diversity”. But then this is but the new homogeneity of the position that if all is diverse there is no real diversity.

Epistemologically, therefore, in the absence of genuine discursive knowledge processes, this radical localism, whilst nodding in the direction of breaching the subjectivist-objectivist divide, and thus engaging in a critical dialectical perspective, i.e. “draws attention to the relations of power that shape social reality”, simply ends up refurbishing traditional local governance objectivism. Thus it would appear that even in this version of local governance the voiced experiences of Black people is interpreted not dialogically, but through the ultimate authority of political representatives and/or the use of quantifiable “facts”. In terms of democratic will formation, because the “common good” of quality services, where it is assumed that communities and the local political representatives speak with one voice, pre-empt the limits of the framework for action, idiographic accounts of injustices are unilaterally filtered in the name of that “common”. Thus even the various participative mechanisms outlined by Stewart as a means as well to enhance citizenship, many in contra-distinction to the objectivist “survey of opinions”, because they will operate in a system that must preclude will formation in the form of discursive solidarity, will still relegate Black people to the status of second class citizens. The potential for the realisation of emancipatory knowledge interests which Stewart’s attempt to further local participative democracy promises, exists only at the general level, i.e. the level that more, not less, democracy is good. However, stoking that emancipatory potential, through for example the involvement of Black Workers Groups, or community groups which demand to be heard, as opposed to being invited to be heard, requires a procedural framework that facilitates distortion free communication, including in this the right of such potential participants to participate, and not the prescription

of the ethical good; otherwise once again Black people become incorporated into processes. For example in the one local authority which has run a citizen jury, one senior insider has commented that for the council involved, "their only interest is ordinary Joe Public and not the activists."<sup>223</sup> Race, or issues to do with the Black communities are a no-no because they are too contentious, and "Black people are seen as activists."<sup>224</sup>

As far as the organisation of local governance and welfare is concerned, one is hard pressed in Stewart to find anywhere a rationale for why the changes to local government are taking place other than as a reaction to national initiatives in this area. In his first agenda setting book of the eighties, "The New Management of Local Government", Stewart cites a range of external environmental pressures - the end of continual financial growth, clear explicit differences amongst the three main political parties on local government, community pressures etc. - as the main reasons for the organisation of local governance, i.e. the intra, inter and extra political and managerial processes, needing to change.<sup>225</sup> Ontologically, therefore, this lack of any further grounding to the theorisation means that there appears to be a naive realistic approach in which local government corresponds to and reacts to the reality given. This correspondence oscillates at variance with the dominant determinant forces only to the extent that the weakly defined normative framework - its utopian vision - of a local governance polity in which local government becomes a political organisation in, for, with and on behalf of the communities, can be realised. However, the main agents charged with securing these changes are identified in those very same political representatives and professional bureaucrats that are directly and implicitly criticised. Stewart's writings are aimed at managers and local politicians, not communities, the other important actors in his equation, whose Damascene conversion is to be secured through the traditional, very limited, local governance network of influence, i.e. academic institutions, training networks, local political networks. In reality many of the localist ideas emerged in local authorities via the knowledge conduit of the internal training functions. Epistemologically, localism, with regard to the organisation of welfare and local governance did not venture out of the traditional knowledge sources, i.e. empirical and analytical. Even the hermeneutic sources, for in bringing communities into the fold the everyday experiences of local people should be on the agenda, are not used, and by all accounts are still not being used, in the construction of localism theoretically or in practice. There is, thus, very little to no immanent standpoint from which Stewart can criticise the changes in local governance, some of which have been done in his "name", changes like the watering down of race equality, or the shedding of large numbers of Black employees, or the introduction of worse conditions of service for employees, or the displacement of equality grounded community and service programmes with broad based non-contentious community ones etc., other than attempt to



introduce a focus on public rather than market approaches. The consequence of this is that because the ontological and epistemological bases to the broad sweep of local governance changes envisioned by Stewart's localism differs little from the new right, the outlines of the normative frameworks converge - a physically, but not politically, decentred local state, a flatter hierarchy, a bureaucracy reduced and more accountable to the local populace, and a de-emphasis on targeted equality initiatives. This weak immanently based theorisation of local governance, i.e. radical localism, cannot therefore prevent as well a methodological convergence within local government processes achieved primarily through a more highly refined quantifiable instrumentalism in which priority is given to positivistically based emprico-analytical forms of accountability where the small range of differences hinges on the degree of emphasis of financial factors, such performance related pay. The irony is that the differences over local government by the major political parties first highlighted by Stewart in the early eighties, differences made visible because of initiatives like local socialism, no longer exist. Internally there is little difference now between Labour and Conservative run local authorities in London. Whilst it can be said that these refined forms of control are but a continuation of paternalistic authoritarian processes linked to a backward looking vision of local government in Conservative authorities, in Labour run ones this has been achieved by shackling ever more tightly the workforce. It is clear that this new instrumentalism,, that is to say "means-ends action ....which is judged solely on the basis of its success in realising the "end" to which it is oriented," especially in the aftermath of the 1987 Labour national election defeat, was brought into London Labour authorities as a counter race equality initiatives. The perceived necessity for political representatives of one party being re-elected was tied into promoting a backward looking, narrowed vision of local governance in which the community as a whole would be promoted via ensuring that the focus of local government wasn't equality, or flying the red flag, or other symbols of "irrelevant" activities, but good, plain old better run services; and by better run was meant imposing new forms of instrumental and strategic control over the workforce. Internally the participatory promise of localism was short-circuited through the defining and narrowing of the organisations values, usually expressed in the form of that organisation's core values. Again this was achieved in most authorities by senior managers working with members. There was very little to no involvement of communities, on whose behalf this was being done, or employees, those so often "valued" in one of the core values. This stark, quasi-fascistic prescriptive definition of the ethical good, served as a totalising lynchpin upon which was not only hung phalanxes of quantified accountability processes, e.g. targets, performance measures, industrial production techniques etc., but as well a philosophy of consciousness based educational programme against which employees degree of alienation could be benchmarked. Where as

previously when race was a priority, the beginnings, no matter how flawed, of a redefinition and recognition of the Black person's ontological and epistemological processes, in the local polity e.g. the debates in and around "Black", in and around racism in organisations, in and around accountability to communities contributed participatively to the emergence and defining of local governance norms, now the normative framework was once again imposed. The critical emancipatory thrust of those discursive processes around racism has been disarmed twofoldedly by either acknowledging racism, but in a form that denies its socio-cultural and political construction by reducing it to an administrative responsibility, e.g. the argument that diversity approaches are a progression from the equality ones because they fit better the business argument for equal opportunities, and/or a displacement of racism by arguing the everlasting nature of it and thus very little can be done about it. As an example of this one of the then Leaders of a council held up as the new model Labour authority, could contemptuously dismiss the different equality programmes and advisors as "misfits" and hold out to a Black councillor colleague that the new approach is better because "racism will always be about."<sup>226</sup> It can be said, therefore, that because Stewart's localism is so ill defined, it lends itself more readily to be used as rhetoric for politically instrumental ends. Thus despite its inherent promise of de-bureaucratisation, community participation, and accountability, localism where it has been given this ostensible legitimating role, has in fact been a "new coat of paint" job for a local government that has repositioned the hierarchy, is far less participative, and far more authoritarian. Compared with the "old" organisation of local government and welfare, the average Black user, if one uses that category of user as exemplifying those most likely to be in need, has in actual fact a greater distance to cover to get to arenas of decision making than she/he did before. Using the Habermasian knowledge categories as simply that, i.e. categories and not in any foundationalist quasi-transcendentalist way, allows us to show how local governance epistemologies have become more empirico-analytically organised, i.e. aimed at technical control over external and internal nature, and not less, as is held out in the claims made by its publicity handouts. This is not a further digression into meta-theoretical matters of epistemology, but a means of getting to grips with the early manifestations of a racism reforming itself within the provenance of the "equal opportunities" public sector which is distinct from previous scientific and cultural forms of racism. More importantly it is a form of racism that coincides within local governance with the emergence and attempted implementation of localism. The process of the emergence of this new form of racism will be illustrated by the empirical details contained in chapter 11. The key question for this chapter is the extent to which this co-incidence of localism is not that but in fact a more substantive relationship. That is to say that localism is being defined in practice deliberately against the previous era of local governance which attempted to build in an explicit space for Black people, and being



defined within an environment that no longer allows for anti-racists and Black people to contest the chosen means and resultant outcomes. Certainly if we look at the afore mentioned new model labour authority, one which has overtly used Stewart's theories and which is an influential element in the redefined network of influence on local governance in the UK, then a number of features can be mentioned.<sup>227</sup> It took on board the perceived need to make the authority a more flexible, more sensitive to the changing environment, and more accountable to the local communities organisation, á la Stewart. It has initiated a series of quantitative and industrial manufacturing based internal management accountability systems, e.g. quality service programs. It has also embarked on a developing programme of community affairs ostensibly aimed at improving the level of citizenship in the borough and inter alia the level of feedback from the local populace. On the other hand it has also, in the name of a more general community, wiped out first its race and women's equality infra-structure, and latterly its replacement generic equality infra-structure. It has made employees more authoritarily accountable to its internally defined core values to the extent that Black employees have been sanctioned for disagreeing with the newly defined equality disposition of the organisation. It has run down the level of consultative processes on race issues both within and without the council. In sum it has come to characterise the new form of racism, a pattern that is being repeated in other local authorities and which lies implicit in the new right Labour's communitarian stance on local issues. This is perhaps best summed up by one of that council's ex-Leaders who was overheard saying, after a heated debate at committee with race equality advisers, "What exactly do they want or expect? This is all they are going to get."<sup>228</sup> By the latter was meant that the Labour perception of racism and its solutions were the limits to change. At the local level, both internally within the organisation of local government, and externally for the "local communities" via national political parties' nascent election manifestos, rights and responsibilities are being defined, including citizenship rights which have attached expected duties. For example within local government one of the new internal control processes being initiated is the management led defining of a supervision policy in which are specified the rights and responsibilities of managers and employees in the supervision process; this being done in the name of better management in the public sector.<sup>229</sup> In one authority attempts to include within the policy a clear race and women's equality dimension, as would have been done a few years ago, were opposed by senior management and removed from the policy despite the large female and Black workforce.<sup>230</sup> Thus the responsibility placed upon Black employees in the policy "not to be late for supervision sessions" coupled, say, with the unspoken "public knowledge" of B(lack) P(eople's) T(ime), within a work environment that has seen the equality support infra-structure for Black employees wiped out, means that their so-called right not to be harassed in the process might exist only as a paper

right. Likewise the debate about responsibilities, a debate taking place without the participation of huge swathes of the population, particularly the Black populations, are throwing up “common sense” responsibilities which appear to stand in stark contrast to certain sections of the Black populations without actually saying so. It becomes another way in which the old unresolved anthropophagi are re-activated, maintaining the communicative dominating hierarchy. The emerging political consensus around the non-desirability of single parent mothers as the space inducing and temporal afterburner placing stick with which to beat the young feckless, irresponsible Afro-Caribbean women, is symptomatic of this new process. Might one call this “ethico-rational” or “ethical” racism?

4.6 Summary and Conclusion

It is not being suggested that this new form of racism can be laid at the door of theorists like Stewart, but rather that his general, non-specific ontologically grounded theory has facilitated the emergence of this racism in local governance practice possibly because it has become a convenient peg upon which local politicians could hang a less overtly positively racialised local government arrangement. As with post-Fordism, we can summarise localism within the following meta-theoretical matrix.

	<i>Democratic will formation</i>	<i>Organisation of governance</i>	<i>Organisation of welfare</i>
<i>Meta-theoretical considerations</i>	1	3	5
<i>Agency</i>	2	4	6

At this level of analysis we have not sought to engage with the detail of a meso-theoretical approach, as say Cochrane attempts to do because that level of analysis, whilst it is adequate in providing an empirical point to point contestation, is still not abstract enough to reconcile the issue of racism and Black interests, where the latter is used categorically and not essentially. However, this abstracted form of critique does provide the framework within which the meso details of localism can be accessed. For example, it will be possible, as I show in the next section which attempts to delineate a Habermassian perspective on local governance, to deal with an issue like “quality” which moves beyond the productivist type critique of managerialist techniques which someone like Cochrane indulges in. For the purposes of this type of critique empirical examples have been provided at key points to illuminate critical themes.



As far as democratic will formation (1 & 2) is concerned it has been argued that Stewart's radical localism is still ontologically not critical enough to the extent that he remains too tied to an orthodox notion of representative democracy, i.e. one that, even with his participatory embellishments, still relies on the existing party political power configurations. As a result the problems of race and racism, which under local socialism were explicit considerations, remain and are exacerbated because the avenues for Black political involvement, that is to say the conditions for non-distorted communication, become incorporated into general notions of the community. The danger thus is that because localist theorists, like Stewart, have not outlined the baseline parametrical principles, other than by alluding to them via liberal usage of key terms, like "democracy", "citizen", "community", etc. is that his outcome vision, which has the potential to be substantively radical, is short changed because the naive realism of the practitioners ensures that the minimalist path, which is ever present in a generalist approach such as his, is clung to. Epistemologically therefore, his theory allows for the hermeneutic, i.e. the expressions, values and experiences of communities, to enter the decision making arena, but because his grounding for his version of democracy does not cross over into what could be described as critical emancipatory, in other words his notion of representative democracy is conflated with existing institutional arrangements, it allows for so-called democratic enhancement initiatives, such as citizen juries etc., to be strategically hijacked. That is to say that even here the democratic interaction with others is dependent upon background taken for granted norms, and/or strategic power and money, rather than discursive agreement. It is thus the continuing basis for Black people remaining as second class citizens.

In terms of the organisation of local governance and welfare (3 & 4, and 5 & 7) there is within Stewart's localism a glimmer of ideally what could be, emancipatively. The notion of more flexible, learning, possibly reflexive, democratic organisation providing local services with and for local communities via active citizen involvement has a distant resonance with the implications of a theory like Habermas' where emancipatory impulses can be seen to emanate from attempts to reduce the seams between lifeworld, civil society and the state. However in the latter case this is grounded in a social theory that seeks to reduce the structures of force and power in the relationships of communication. In Stewart no such critical ontological grounding exists. As a result the form of democratic politics in which public opinion becomes a form of "social-psychological variable to be manipulated" continues because at the end of the day dominant power relationships tied to party political interests ensures that it is not possible to "to create by means of public communication within these organisations" an open communicative structure. Little wonder then that internally within



local government in the UK there has been not so much an increase in “open discursive” communicative structures as an increase in non-communication action based forms of instrumental and strategic action processes designed in the first instance to re-assert newer forms of control over the workforce; controls which cut off their involvement, which they previously might have had, in the communicative processes of the organisation. For example in the boroughs being looked at in the empirical section it is noticeable how, in the first instance, the implementation of these processes were accompanied first by reducing the involvement of trade unions, then a worsening of employee conditions, then a reduction in the official time allowed for various self organised groups. At the same time the bases for the programme of community development, funding and participation changed to a more overtly instrumental based financial contract one. Epistemologically thus the knowledge bases of local governance and welfare has changed over the past ten years, not in the direction of more inter-subjective contingent constructions agreed between public and bureaucracy, but more in the direction of an increase in empirico-analytically arrived at quantifiable information which allows politicians and managers to exert more direct control over employees and the interface between the organisation and the local communities. For Black people we can summarise it by imagining the response from one of these council’s legal departments, “You cry racism, and we can show statistically that we are a fair and non-racist organisation.”

Finally if we look at the issue of agency across all three categories, we find that there is a common thread. This is that whilst Stewart outlines an end vision in his localist theory in a way that suggests he is talking, as Habermas does, about change through radical democratisation, the actual loose structure of his thinking allows the fulcrum of change to be sited with those self same managers and politicians who have most to lose by those changes. Change is to occur voluntaristically through attitudinal change strategies occasioned via such mechanisms as training. The role of local communities, at whom these changes are ostensibly directed, and in particular Black communities, remains relegated to that of being participants without substantive power or influence in a series of existing institutionalised councillor representative democratic fine tuning initiatives. The question thus of who exactly will put race on the agenda is pertinent. For example in one of the boroughs concerned in this study, the initial pursuit of Stewart inspired Public Service Orientation programmes was conducted quite distinctly and deliberately parallel to already existing detailed race and women’s equality service programmes within a local political climate that favoured a more general “everyone-is-disadvantaged-community” approach.<sup>231</sup> As shall be shown in the chapters on the empirical details, localists like Stewart, have unwittingly allowed themselves and their theories to be part of the process that has turned back the clock in local government on race equality.



## Chapter 5

### Version 3 – The Critical Theory of Habermas and its Implications for Local Governance

#### 5.1 Theoretical Overview

Whilst both pF'sm and Stewart's localism have been critiqued as exemplars of current so-called progressive local governance theorisation that still omit from substantive considerations the reality of the UK as a multi-racial/cultural society, and thus omit this dimension from proper recognition in the political processes, there is another level at which these two variants of local governance theory can be compared. This is that whilst both advocate more democracy, though in different ways, as a solution to the regeneration of local governance, each in their own respective ways represent as well the two key categories of social theorising. In the former can be seen an objectivating attempt to ground local governance in a productivist teleology which ultimately has immense difficulty in reconciling the subjectivist experiences of those participating in this playing out of deeper level determining forces. In the latter can be seen an attempt to bring those subjective experiences into the equation, but by limiting the objective level to that of a communitarian horizon. In the gaps exposed in the critique provided above of these two, Black people fall through. It is thus apposite to try and outline a Habermasian approach to local governance because ultimately he attempts a radical communicatively negotiated third way in social theorising, as opposed to the speciousness of new right Labour's 'Third way', one that avoids the pitfalls of previous philosophy of consciousness approaches.

Whilst Habermas has not written specifically about local governance, he has outlined a detailed theory that attempts to link individual, and, under certain circumstances, collective agency, with wider structures and forces. There are thus within the greater purviews of his work, theories of the state, power, democratisation and individual and social ontology. Within this the contention is that there is the potential scope for the inclusive participation of smaller narratives without any form of deleterious incorporatism. I use the description "potential" because it prefaces and marks up, as shown in the previous chapter, the fact that in relation to the full recognition of Black people's existence, parts of his theory need greater refining. In summary then Outhwaite<sup>232</sup> has pithily described his work in terms of that of being "modernity ...seen as offering a highly conditional promise of autonomy, justice, democracy and solidarity". Thus his project over the past 35 years



can be described as follows: “to reanimate in new and expanded forms the critical thrust and the practical impulse of Marxist philosophy and social theory, recombining theory and practice in a manner which can be defended in the modern world.”<sup>233</sup> More pertinently the modern world is seen as that in which the democratic processes of the West are being severely tested by the problems of increasing social complexity, racial, cultural, class and gendered pluralism and the legacy of welfarism. In other parts of the globe where democratic impulses are increasing, the process of the conscious construction of democracy and law includes as well the choice between working with second-hand democratic institutions and processes, ones that are and have been under serious questioning, or seizing the window of opportunity to learn from these critiques, and embark on a radicalised democratic venture. In the latter regard Habermas has already addressed the area of Korea and the similarities and dissimilarities between the problems of reunification there and that of Germany.<sup>234</sup> One might add to this list as well the construction of democratic institutions, processes and post-apartheid law in South Africa as another area with significant potential. Nearer to home, but pertinent as well to countries like South Africa, Gutman puts the key question as:

“What does it mean for citizens with different cultural identities, often based on ethnicity, race, gender or religion to recognise ourselves as equals in the way we are treated in politics?”<sup>235</sup>

To this must be put the crucial qualification, as was done in the ‘introduction’, that these differences are often unjustly structured through racism and sexism.

The goal Habermas is attempting to reach is summarised in his own words thus:

“Even in established democracies.....the unrest has a still deeper source, namely, the sense that in an age of completely secularised politics, the rule of law cannot be had or maintained without radical democracy.”<sup>236</sup>

And that we can still talk about “socialism” if one conceives it

“as the set of necessary conditions for emancipated forms of life about which the participants themselves must first reach an understanding, then one will recognise that the democratic self-organisation of a legal community constitutes the normative core of this project as well.”<sup>237</sup>

## 5.2 On the State

How then is this vision of a radicalisation of democracy connect with his theory of the state? Habermas writings on the state have evolved over the



past three decades. There is thus a certain tension between differing emphases of certain elements over time. His theory of the modern European capitalist state emerges out of his reworking of historical materialism into that of an evolutionary theory of social development and social learning which is not teleological but simply attempts to provide the ideational framework in which underlying trends in different societies can be recognised. Within this framework the modern capitalist state can be understood in relation to internal and external aspects. Internally the modern state is the “result of the economic differentiation of an economic system which regulates the production process through the market....(and)...organises the conditions under which the citizens as competing and strategically acting private persons carry on the production process.”<sup>238</sup> The state thus vouches safe the conditions - civil law, money system etc. - for the continuing existence of a depoliticised economic process free from moral norms and use value orientations. Externally, because of the nature of the evolution of the European state, the political autonomy of the state “is based on a reciprocal recognition that is sanctioned by the threat of military force...despite the agreement of international law...”<sup>239</sup> The core problem for the modern state is that of legitimacy where this is understood as “the worthiness of the political order to be recognised.”<sup>240</sup> Legitimacy of the state is linked to the ability of the state to secure its social integrative responsibilities at the same time that it guarantees systemic integration. The three cardinal tasks for the state thus are: “shaping a business policy that ensures growth, influencing the structure of production in a manner oriented to collective needs, and correcting the pattern of social inequality.”<sup>241</sup> There is thus in built a substantive conflict or contradiction which is that the state has to perform all these tasks without “violating the functional conditions of a capitalist economy.” The main legitimation problem then, is that the accomplishments of the capitalist economy has to be represented by the state as the best way of satisfying generalizable interests, i.e. it obligates itself to “keep dysfunctional side effects within acceptable limits.” The success then of the state in aiding legitimation turns on the degree to which it can satisfactorily carry out its programmed tasks. Within the processes of the modern state there are two models of legitimacy - the technocratic and participation models. Sociologically these in turn devolve upon two types of legitimation; the empiricist and the normativist. In the former legitimation turns on “the belief that the structures, procedures, actions, decisions, policies, officials or political leaders of a state possess the quality of rightness, of appropriateness of the morally good and ought to be recognised in virtue of this quality.”<sup>242</sup> However in the latter legitimation arises out of good reasons where such “good reasons” have been ascertained through “the performative attitude of a participant in argumentation and not through the neutral observation of what this or that participant in a discourse holds to be good reason.”<sup>243</sup> This locks into Habermas’ conception of power. Some critiques have erroneously contrasted what they perceive to be



his concept of power with that of Foucault via the twofold categorisation of power theorising as that of either being juridical or disciplinary. The former is based on viewing power as being possessed, flowing from a central source from top to bottom and primarily repressive. The latter views power as being exercised, coming from the bottom up, and not so much repressive as productive. The criticism of Habermas is that his model belongs more to the former and fails to take account of the implications of the latter. However as Outhwaite has pointed out, Habermas, whose concept of power is derived from theorists like Arendt where power results from the self-empowerment of a political collectivity, unlike Foucault, has a "model to oppose to that of the undifferentiated universality of power relations".<sup>244</sup> There is thus a distinction which can be made in Habermas' theory between authorial power, i.e. the exercise of power authorised as a result of processes involving participants in argument, and domination which is the exercise of unauthorised power. Whilst both were committed to the critique of power and the pathologies of power in the polity of the modern bureaucratised welfare state, it is only in Habermas, because his normative position allows for the potential of an alternative, that there is the beginning of an attempt to work out a more democratic control of state. This is based on his communicative grounded notion of rationality, where "rationalisation means extirpating those relations of force that are inconspicuously set in the very structures of communication and that prevent conscious settlement of conflicts and consensual regulation of conflicts, by means of intrapsychic as well as interpersonal communicative barriers,.....means overcoming such systematically distorted communication in which the action supporting consensus concerning the reciprocally raised validity claims....can be sustained in appearance only, that is, counterfactually."<sup>245</sup> This of course links back into his categorical distinction made between purposive rational and communicative actions, between objectivating learning processes and those of moral-practical insight, between forces of production and social integration; and the prioritisation of the development of normative structures and new forms of social integration in social evolution which then make possible the development, deployment of productive forces. It is clear then that in Habermas' conception of power that purposive rational action, which encompasses instrumental and strategic action, of itself gives rise to domination and thus distorted communication; and that communicative action as the interactive process of inter-subjective communication, can only occur when there isn't an asymmetry of power. If new forms of social learning, social development and social integration can only arise out of communicative action which then make possible alternative productive forces developments, and by new Habermas here I think means better, where better is referenced to his ideal end goal, then the crucial question is how processes and experiences of intersubjective communication can, oxymoronically speaking, become dominant in democratic control over the polity.



To answer that means firstly putting more flesh on Habermas' thinking on the relationship between the market, the administrative state, the public sphere and individual lifeworlds. It is true, as Ray points out, that Habermas sees strategic action as being "stored" in markets and bureaucracies; though I would add that his view is that it is purposive rational action, i.e. both instrumental and strategic action that is stored.<sup>246</sup> These, in the evolutionary path of modern capitalist society, become separated from the lifeworld which they "then retroactively colonise". In Habermas' second volume of his "Theory of Communicative Action", he appropriates Parson's concept of steering media to explain the development of money and power, exhibited through the market and state administrative apparatus, as the main forms of systemic separation from the lifeworld. The notion of storage derives from Parson's three defining criteria for such media: they can be measured, they can be alienated in specific amounts, they can be stored. These media co-ordinate social exchanges without the need for consensus. That is to say the form of exchange is no longer dependent upon linguistic interchange. The arguments against the use of systems theory will be dealt with later, suffice to say that for Habermas the notion of systematic steering is required in order that the complexities of modern capitalist society can be explained. In addition to which, unlike Marx who envisaged a "redemptive" return to societal structures favouring a direct unalienated control over labour processes by those involved, Habermas sees the advent of such steering systems as an evolutionary gain. Now whilst these media react back upon the lifeworld, they do not necessarily do so in a way that prompts a questioning of their normative anchoring. In fact such media are embedded in the institutional, social organisational and normative frameworks that criss-cross the lifeworld. They are, in other words, legitimated. For example the belief that local government generally is a "good thing" is one level of normative framing for people. However the actual institutional, organisational and extent of democratic content structuring is subject to various degrees of legitimation crisis prompted by the inherent contradictions of such media attempting to maintain systemic integration at the same time as satisfying the requirements for social integration. These questionings of the normative underpinnings of, say, power media, become more pronounced as more areas of the lifeworld are "colonised" by monetization and bureaucratisation. As an example of the latter, the intrusion into the lifeworlds of single parent families in inner city areas by housing department rules and regulations, latterly prompted by the racist constructions of morality of the conservative national government, increases the likelihood of there being a questioning by those groups of service users, of the way in which Housing departments work, or local government, or both. However, more often than not, it is the embeddedness of these media in normative frameworks that allows structures of inequality, domination and oppression to become invisible. Because of the inherent



nature of media in which social exchange occurs through purposive rational action they evade the need for the sort of justification contained in the validity claims of linguistic communication. Questions of legitimacy are either avoided, or, where they surface, “public related”.

Habermas’ theory of lifeworld colonization was touched on in the last section. In his “Theory of Communicative Action”, he uses the welfare state to exemplify his concept of lifeworld colonisation and in the process flesh out the types of relationships between the steering media and lifeworlds. A brief summary would be useful because it would be the basis upon which to go on to look at the earlier mentioned shift in emphasis between the earlier and later Habermas over the core concerns about the degree or extent of radicalisation of the representative democratic process. For Habermas the welfare state arises in order to fill the functional spaces left by the market and, Keynesian style, to offset the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. This results in a re-politicisation of the market and in so doing gives rise to counter demands from the beneficiaries and participants in welfare, trade unions, “clients”, political parties etc., for more state intervention and planning. Two fault lines then begin to appear. Firstly because the welfare state does not “produce” but is reliant upon fiscal revenue, it becomes an area of contestation between those wanting more and those wanting less. At the same time that the expansion of the welfare state carries with it the capacity to meet certain needs, the power to intervene, in a dependency making way, into the lifeworlds of “clients”. Social integration, one of the welfare state’s primary goals, also results in lifeworld disintegration. This process of social differentiation can lead in three possible directions: individual pathology, e.g. mental illness or apolitical “career/familial privatism”, a defensive reclamation of imagined pasts, e.g. the new moralists constructions of the “ideal family”, or the individual and/or social questioning, through new discursive practices, of capitalism, e.g. new social movements. Important to the latter, and thus emancipatory politics, is the development of new autonomous, critical public spheres. These are important because they provide they provide the amniotic fluid in which the processes giving rise to the consensual resolution of conflicting validity claims can grow. They are therefore the seed beds for forms of democratic will formation arrived at through inter-subjective communication. What exactly is the public sphere? Habermas developed the notion of the public sphere via an examination of early bourgeois society “when the developing market economy extended beyond the bounds of private authority and constituted a sphere of public opinion where argument proceeded according to rules of public debate (as opposed to prejudice or custom).”<sup>247</sup> There are two core concerns. Firstly there is the conception of the public sphere “as a sphere between civil society and the state in which critical public discussion of matters of general interest was institutionally guaranteed....” Secondly there is the interest in the quality inherent in such a



sphere where communication was conducted on the basis of mutual acceptance of participants on equal footing. Habermas is aware, however, of the underlying contradictions notably that whilst such a sphere asserted that it was there for the general interest, the right to participate was constituted on the basis of private property. The homogeneity of cultural background of the permitted communicative participants, which, whilst it allowed more easily for the process of inter-subjective communication, i.e. a commonality of background values and normative frameworks, to occur, also excluded, the heterogeneous - women, nascent working classes, Black people, of which there were relatively many in 18th century London. However, with the advent of mass democracy whilst some potential participants were systematically excluded from the public sphere via a range of pseudo scientific reasons, e.g. the natural inferiority of women, or Black people, others, i.e. white working class men or those representing those interests, entered with demands for state intervention to cover the failings of the market. Thus we arrive at the public sphere of social welfare democracies which is characterised by competition among different organisations representing associated constituencies which enter into power broking agreements with the government, whilst excluding the public. In such a climate rational political debate is replaced with publicity machinations through which loyalty to political parties is achieved instrumentally. It is with the analysis of the latter developments that Habermas can derive the focus of his study as that of being about the transformation and disintegration of the public sphere. Despite the “fact” of the current state of the public sphere, there is a “norm” which can be critically revived within which citizens can debate the key issues of the democratic political process and thus influence the direction of political action. Leaving aside the implicit assumption of “cultural” homogeneity in Habermas’ public sphere theory, about which, in any event, it is not clear whether or not it is a principled condition or merely a practical convenience, it can be seen how the “public sphere” comes to be an important intermediary in the development of a changing, flexible, interactive seam between the lifeworld and the political system. The extent to which influencing and guidance become actual “taking of decisions” remains an area of ambivalence in Habermas. Clarification of this, or a radical development of this, is important in the area of local governance, especially in relation to areas of constructed gender and racial inequality, for it begins to tell us how far it is possible to include as a reasonable demand, the democratic reconstruction of representative democratic institutions which are genuinely open to all. Thus the earlier writings of Habermas indicate that a radical, democratic and directly participative restructuring of representative democratic institutions is desirable. In other words “it might yet be possible to create by means of public communication within these organisations ‘an appropriate relation between bureaucratic decision and quasi-parliamentary deliberation’”.<sup>248</sup> Yet in his Theory of



Communicative Action, and in the subsequent debate over that piece of work, he had come around to the view that:

“there is no longer much prospect of the democratic reshaping from within of a differentiated economic system by means of worker self management, in other words by switching from money and organisational power completely over to participation”<sup>249</sup>

In a sense this is no more than a restatement of his thinking that bureaucracies because they are repositories of strategic and instrumental action, cannot be transformed into inter-subjective communicative action based organisations; or is it a surrender to systems theory of the sort Marxists did in the name of “political autonomy”. Outhwaite attempts to state the problematic in terms of two possible hypothetical extreme interpretations of Habermas. These are;

“Everyone affected by legal and political decisions should discuss them until there is complete agreement about them.”

and

“Legal and political decisions are complicated matters which should be left to experts.”<sup>250</sup>

The first equates to a form of radical anarchism, almost like that of Chomsky's. The second is associated with a form of politically conservative systems theory, such as that of Luhmann. Now whilst Habermas has been interpreted as meaning the first version, and his earlier work gives that impression, his later work actually demonstrates that he rejects that version on the grounds of practicality. As for the second version he rejects that on principle. This is an important distinction because it sets what I believe to be a continuum, rather than a rupture in his thinking, and, that therefore, the principle of the first version, which I think is contained in his theory, is the normative framework. Thus unlike Ray who, following Benhabib, describes Habermas' theory as “normative critique”, which it is, as opposed to “utopian transfiguration”, which is associated more with the earlier Frankfurt school. The former is oriented towards achieving what is promised by the official values of society, such as women's and race equality. The latter is oriented towards establishing “qualitatively new needs, social relations and modes of association” as the utopian prerequisite for emancipation. Habermas' theory is aimed at the politics of “fulfilment”, i.e. “mature realism about attainable objectives and plural democratic practice, and not the politics of “redemption” involving “immature anti-modernist romanticism and totalitarian leanings towards total reconstruction”.<sup>251</sup> This, however, is too caricatured a dual categorisation. Habermas' theory does contain a utopian element, even if it is one that



insists on participants constructing it in communication. It is certainly modernist and oriented towards achievable goals, but within a continuum framework that links it to greater inter-subjective communicative practice. Where one draws the definitive, demarcating line between the two ends of the spectrum is a matter of practicality, still to be discursively defined, and not principle. Outhwaite's assessment of Habermas' political stance, especially vis-a-vis socialism, appears to be "realistic" about his "realism"; and an encapsulation of this "realism" will serve as an introduction to his latest work. Thus Habermas' "politics were always reformist, rather than revolutionary, social democratic, rather than communist, .....(contends that) ...modern societies cannot realistically hope to replace market structures as a whole without risking worse problems than those of capitalism itself....defines socialism as radical democracy".<sup>252</sup>

Habermas' latest work, "Between Facts and Norms", is to date his most definitive elaboration of the theoretical and conceptual implications for politics and the state arising from the "linguistic turn" in his thinking.<sup>253</sup> It is also a work that at one level confirms Outhwaite's "realistic" summation of Habermas' direction, and yet, which, if held up to scrutiny against the internal normative framework of the project, must hold out for the possibility of a more radical outcome. The "linguistic turn" is premised upon a core idea that every normal act of language usage involves certain presuppositions, universal presuppositions, which are:

- ◆ that what is being said is true
- ◆ that what is being said is normatively correct
- ◆ that what is being said is done so sincerely and authentically.

This is a conception of communication oriented towards understanding. Of course other acts of communication, such as lying, jokes, commands etc. are acknowledged as forms of communication, but not forms which give rise to understanding. The latter, i.e. ones in which agreement is reached in advance of action, are identified as one form of co-ordination of action. It arises out of deliberation. The other form of co-ordination is post event. That is to say it co-ordinates the consequences of certain types of action. Habermas identifies, as examples of that, the market, legal and administrative political systems. Democracy, or more specifically "deliberative democracy", as shall be outlined further on, should be the determining co-ordinating mechanism, one that enables everyone having the opportunity to participate in decisions which affect and concern them. On the basis of this, and as a supplement, Habermas has developed a discourse, communicatively grounded theory of ethics which contends that agreements arrived at through deliberation are not only issues of fact but as well moral issues involving universalistic questions. There is a distinction made



between ethical considerations related to specific contextualised forms of life, and moral questions necessitating universalist reasoning. A discourse ethics, on the other hand, rides the tension between “the formal and communitarian traditions of ethical thought: moral judgments are neither just expressions of social conventions, nor reached deductively by individuals who are in principle isolated from one another and alone with their consciences.”<sup>254</sup> In “Between Facts and Norms”, Habermas applies these principles to the arenas of law and the political state; principles which can be attained through “deliberative democracy.

When Habermas writes about the constitution he writes as well about the Western constitutional state embodying a postconventional consciousness because the inhering differentiation between ‘fact’ and ‘norm’ requires that all legislation should be evaluated according to the normative principles underpinning the constitution. These precepts hold out the unredeemed validity claims that all citizens, in its broadest sense of living and/or working in that country, should be involved in the consensual formation of that norm. Constitutional democracy, or more accurately deliberatively discursive democracy, is thus also held up, as well, against those who argue not only from a religiously fundamentalist point of view which has inherent a conventional group and/or national identity, but as well from an essentialised notion of communities. The constitution, then is not held up as some form of social utopia, but as the “ideal projection of a concrete form of life.”

### **5.3 On Democracy**

Deliberative democracy, as outlined in this work, is a coincidence both of his previous thinking and at the same time a response to legitimation deficits which afflict industrial democracies, and thus ultimately impinge upon and influence the world wide democratising movement. In general such notions of democracy, and there are other theories of deliberative democracy, e.g. Fishkin, “reflect a concern that citizens’ participation in the democratic process have a rational character.....a process of thoughtful interaction and opinion formation in which citizens become informed of better arguments and more general interests.”<sup>255</sup> For, Habermas, however, as evidenced in BFN, deliberative democracy is the practice of realising the legal, political and institutional implications of his earlier thinking. In his analysis of the law and the polity Habermas approaches it in terms of a tension between facts and norms because, in the case of law, say, it is “a system of coercible rules and impersonal procedures that involves an appeal to reasons that all citizens should, at least ideally, find acceptable.”<sup>256</sup> In arriving at this position, whilst Habermas is indebted to Kant’s notion of legitimacy, he realises that the growth of empirical science and other world views have rendered such grand metaphysical schemes implausibly untenable. One of the key consequences of this is that reason has become conflated with such



approaches and thus instrumentalised. The solution lies in adopting a post-metaphysical approach to reason, where “a post-metaphysical vindication of reason is possible only insofar as philosophy can show how the use of language and social interaction in general necessarily rely on notions of validity, such as truth, normative rightness, sincerity and authenticity.” For Habermas the idea of validity in communication and social interaction involves a recourse at some point to unconditionality, which I understand to be a universalising moment, that takes that claim to validity out of its immediate context. Or, as Rehg, puts it, “the tension between the strongly idealising, context transcending claims to reason and the always limited contexts in which human reason must ply its trade.”<sup>257</sup> Now with regard to law, it has been pointed out that Habermas regards law as a co-ordinating mechanism post event, as opposed to communication which is pre action. Communicative co-ordination in Habermas’ work assumes a “large background consensus on matters which are unproblematic for group members because it brackets off an assumptive context which other wise might be open to challenge. However in the case of law in modern societies resolution of conflicts must occur across a number of groups with different cultural backgrounds, and thus different shared assumptions. The conditions for reaching shared agreement is thus decreasing. Under such conditions strategic action assumes a greater importance in the medium of co-ordination, e.g. as in the case of the market. Modern law enters the realm of social co-ordination, thus, where “societal pluralisation has fragmented shared identities and eroded the substantive lifeworld resources for consensus and functional demands of material reproduction call for an increasing number of areas in which individuals are left free to pursue their own ends according to the dictates of purposive rationality.”<sup>258</sup> Mirroring this internal duality, this tension, is as well, an external tension between the normative promise of the constitutional democratic legal order and the ways in which social power intrudes and disrupts the attainment of those goals. Habermas draws this out in an analysis of what he perceives to be the one sided approach of theorists, like Rawls and Luhmann, an analysis which will not be gone into at this stage. The crux of his argument is, however, this: “if an account of modern law is to be neither sociologically empty nor normatively blind, then it must incorporate a dual perspective...(which).... can ignore neither the participants’ own normative understanding of their legal system nor those external mechanisms and processes that are accessible to the sociological observer.” To this extent then “the rule of law is internally related to deliberative democracy.”<sup>259</sup>

But what then is Habermas’ specific conception of deliberative democracy? His, as opposed to what Benhabib has described as “an agonistic” model, is a proceduralist view of deliberative democracy and politics.<sup>260</sup> This is developed in contra-distinction to the liberal paradigm and, not so much in contra-distinction as a refinement, of the republican paradigm. Briefly, in



the liberal view the democratic process programmes the government in the interest of society “where the government is represented as an apparatus of public administration and society as a market-structured network of interactions among private persons.”<sup>261</sup> In the republican paradigm politics does not play a mediating role but is instead constitutive of society itself. “Politics is.. the medium in which the members of somehow solitary communities become aware of their dependence on one another and, acting with full deliberation as citizens. further shape and develop existing relations of reciprocal recognition into an association of free and equal consociates under the law.”<sup>262</sup> Whereas, thus, in the liberal model, administrative power and individual self interest are socially integrative mechanisms, in the republican scheme of things, both solidarity and orientation to the common good, are a third source of social integration. Another distinguishing feature of the republican paradigm, compared with the liberal one, is that the a fore described “praxis of civic self determination” is predicated upon it being independent from the media of public administration and market based private commerce. Contained within these two paradigms are thus two contrasting images of the citizen.

Within the liberal model the citizen is defined according to negative rights they have in relation to other citizens and the state. This entitles them to protection from the government so long as they pursue their private interests within the purviews of the statutory framework. Political rights, such as the franchise right, allow the private individual to influence political will formation through mechanisms such as elections which impact on elected government bodies. In contrast in the republican model, “ democratic will formation takes the form of ethicopolitical self understanding.... (with deliberation relying)... on the substantive of a culturally established background consensus by the citizenry.”<sup>263</sup> Political rights, such as those of political participation and communication, are thus ‘positive liberties’. This process of citizens’ power produced communicatively imbues the state with authority and thus legitimates itself by institutionalising public liberty. In terms of the political processes of opinion- and will- formation, for the liberals, this amounts in the end to the competition between competing blocs of interests expressed through opinion polls and voting acts. Politics thus in the republican sense depends upon dialogue, not the market, and concerns issues of value, not just preference.

At face value there is much in the republican model that appears to overlap with Habermas’ theoretical concerns. Indeed his argument with the republican model is not so much in terms of its substantive principles, since those still adhere to the original meaning of democracy, i.e. “the institutionalisation of a public use of reason jointly exercised by autonomous citizens”<sup>264</sup>, as with the communitarian version of republicanism. This latter variant is guilty of an “ethical constriction of political discourse” by reducing



political questions to those of asking “who we are” etc with the aim of achieving a shared collective identity - shades of this perhaps in new labour’s community neo-collective posturings.<sup>265</sup> This form of republicanism links deliberative democracy to one “concrete substantively integrated ethical community.” In other words the individual comes to know/identify him/herself in the public processes linking him/her to others who have the similar identities and traditions. However reflexive hermeneutic discourses in which citizens want to get a clearer understanding about themselves vis-a-vis the nation or locality etc., whilst they are important in politics, are quite distinct from moral questions which pose universal questions about justice. Questions about which norms individuals want to adopt to govern themselves, i.e. what is equally good for everyone, are not, and should not be, connected to specific forms of collective life.

Discourse theory based deliberative democracy, on the other hand, steers a path between the two aforementioned democratic paradigms. It takes elements from both sides and integrates them in the concept of an ideal procedure for deliberation and decision making. The image of society therefore is radically different from that of the liberal and ethical republican models. The latter two both presume a state centred society either, in the case of the liberals, with the state guaranteeing the market society, or, in the case of the republican, with the state as the “self-conscious institutionalisation of an ethical community.” Both view the state as being separate from society. Normatively the republican model over invests in a vision of a political society where democracy becomes the political self organisation of society itself and in which politics is directed against the state. In the liberal model there is an under investment in the normative connotations of the state. Here the constitution tames the state apparatus through such mechanisms as basic rights, separation of powers and through party political election processes. On the other hand with discourse theory there is a normative framework that is stronger than the liberal model but weaker than the republican model. Like the republican paradigm, discourse theoretically based deliberative politics gives priority to the processes of democratic opinion and will formation, but also views the “principles of the constitutional state as a consistent answer to the question of how the demanding communicative forms of democratic opinion- and will-formation can be institutionalised.”<sup>266</sup> The “success” of deliberative politics within a discourse framework depends not on action generated by collectivities of citizens, but on the institutionalisation of procedures regulating different avenues of communication. By this means is it possible to connect those marginalised and peripheralised elements and networks of the public sphere to the political system to release an image of society that is fundamentally decentred. Finally lets round up Habermas’ idea of deliberative democracy through the following longish quote:



“Informal public opinion formation generates ‘influence’; influence is transferred into communicative power through the channels of political elections; and communicative power is again transformed into administrative power through legislation. As in the liberal model, the boundaries between ‘state’ and ‘society’ are respected; but in this case, civil society provides the social basis of autonomous public spheres that remain as distinct from the economic system as from administration. This understanding of democracy suggests a new balance between the three resources of money, administrative power and solidarity from which modern societies meet their needs for integration....the integrative force of ‘solidarity’ which can no longer be drawn solely from sources of communicative action, should develop through widely expanded and differentiated public spheres as well as through legally institutionalised procedures of democratic deliberation and decision making.....Discourse theory brings a third idea into play: the procedures and communicative presuppositions of democratic opinion and will formation function as the most important sources for discursive rationalisation of the decisions of an administration constrained by law and statute. Rationalisation means more than mere legitimation but less than the constitution of political power. The power available to the administration changes its aggregate condition as soon as it emerges from a public use of reason and communicative power that do not just monitor the exercise of political power in a belated manner but more or less programme it as well. Notwithstanding the discursive rationalisation, only the administrative system itself can ‘act’. The administration is a subsystem specialised for collectively binding decisions whereas the communicative structures of the public sphere comprise a far flung network of sensors that in the first place react to the pressure of society wide problematics and stimulate influential opinions. The public opinion that is worked up into communicative power cannot ‘rule’ of itself, but can only point the use of administrative power in specific directions.”<sup>267</sup>

The above model of proceduralist deliberative democracy with its attendant societal image, I take to be Habermas’ delineative sketch of the likely structures and processes that logically flow from his theory’s normative content. It therefore provides the amplification to return to the questions of how positive law can be legitimated. The liberal model stresses that coercible law is legitimate insofar as it guarantees private autonomy whilst the republican model stresses public autonomy so that the legal medium issues from “citizens’ rational self-legislation”. Habermas, however, as outlined in his proceduralist model, attempts to avoid an over-investment in either too moralistic or ethical interpretation of law. To this extent legitimation is tied to his notion of the discourse principle which defines that norms are only valid if all who are affected can participate and agree to them in rational discussion. For law to be legitimate it therefore has to ensure that it can engage with the full range of different types of discourse, i.e. moral, ethical and pragmatic, inclusive in the last category the facility of compromise where consensus proves impossible. The relationship between private and public autonomies can therefore be recast in terms of five broad categories of rights which substantive demos’ must specify and which “delineates the general necessary conditions for institutionalising democratic processes of discourse in law and politics.” These rights then are three, covering negative liberties, membership rights and due-process as a



guarantor of private autonomy, a fourth right guaranteeing political participation, i.e. public autonomy, and a fifth right, a social welfare right, guaranteeing the effective participation of citizens by ensuring that certain minimum material and social conditions are satisfied.

Now, whilst these rights govern the relationship between equal citizens, the impact of state power causes a tension between that and legitimate law. The exercise of law by the state must be legitimated through an extensive process of discourse involving the citizens and their representatives. This requirement makes available the normatively based question about the relationship between the state and the public sphere(s). In other words how are the “informal discursive sources of democracy ..(linked)...with the formal decision making institutions that are required for an effective rule of law in complex societies.”<sup>268</sup> For Habermas law represents “...the medium for transforming communicative power into administrative power”<sup>269</sup>. It thus becomes clear why he views the constitutional state as being invested with the normative potential to convert citizen’s communicative power into legitimate administrative activity. The “empirical facts” of the realities of everyday practices in constitutional democracies places, however, places a question mark over the achievement of that potential. The fact that the constitutional state is subject to forces is not, however, an excuse to abandon the everyday relevance of deliberative democracy which is contained in the acceptance by citizens that they can and should participate politically. This dual perspective underpinning the proceduralist concept of deliberative democracy means that whilst it is acknowledged that only the state as a body invested with decision making powers can act, it can only do so if the legitimation of its decision making is tied into “ a discursive character that preserves under conditions of complexity the democratic sources of legitimacy in the public at large.”<sup>270</sup> The political institutional implications of this are spelt out by Habermas:

“.. the discourse theory of democracy corresponds to the image of the decentred society, albeit a society in which the political public sphere has been differentiated as an arena for the perception, identification and treatment of problems affecting the whole society. Once one gives up the philosophy of the subject, one needs neither to concentrate sovereignty concretely in people nor to banish it in anonymous constitutional structures and powers. The ‘self’ of the self organising legal community disappears in the subject-less forms of communication that regulate the flow of discursive opinion- and will-formation ...”<sup>271</sup>

This means that a very large normative responsibility for democratic processes is put upon those public fora, social movements etc. in which citizens can participate in debate, or voice concerns over relevant issues. For this to succeed requires as well a strong public sphere that is communicatively linked to civil society and its fora. Such communicative



linkage will rely as well on a range of initiatives such as responsibly restructured media, mechanisms for agenda setting on social issues etc.

## 5.4 On Welfare

Finally in Habermas' "BFN" he returns to the issue of the welfare state, as he does in TCA, to illustrate the superiority of the proceduralist paradigm of democracy and law over two other competing ones - the liberal one, and the social welfare one. The former relates to the notions of equality before the law, minimal government etc. whilst the latter relates to the use of law to realise substantive social goals and values, e.g. welfare provisions, social security etc. The key issues are highlighted via a reference to women's equality. Thus the call for equal voting rights conjures up the liberal paradigm of equality before the law, whilst the need for women specific benefits, e.g. maternity provision, relates to the social welfare paradigm. However, as feminists critiques have shown, a concern simply with formal equality ignores other social equalities that occur whilst state welfare programmes often over intrude into areas of private autonomy as well as reduce the potential for public autonomy. The proceduralist approach, on the other hand, requires that for such issues to be legitimate, that women themselves must participate in the public discussions that determine which gender issues are relevant to equality definitions. It therefore allows for a more substantive and critical relationship to emerge between private and public autonomy in the demos. Finally pace his earlier critique of the welfare state (TCA), Habermas suggests that a proceduralist approach demands a new way of thinking about the separation of powers, for example, a more democratic, participatory form of administration.<sup>272</sup> In sum therefore, the optimism of the will, paraphrasing Gramsci, in Habermas' earlier works led him to a philosophy of consciousness based espousal, i.e. too ethically framed, version of radical democracy, especially in relation to administrative power. His intermediate to later work, TCA I and II, gave rise to a pessimism of intellect in which the hope of radicalising the welfare state's administrative bureaucracy seemed beyond achievement. However, his latest work rides the tension between optimism and pessimism to proffer a deliberative concept of politics and democracy; one that provides more potential for a revitalised and radically more inclusive model of local governance. However, before sketching out the "fact to norm" framework on local governance which can be derived from his work, it is pertinent to ask where exactly issues of race and Black people fit in.

## 5.5 On Race

Habermas has only specifically addressed such issues latterly; and then via a consideration of multi-culturalism within the context of the constitutional democratic state.<sup>273</sup> Part of the reason for this is no doubt due to the



criticisms and promptings of both supporters and post-modernist detractors, such as Spivak<sup>274</sup> and Said<sup>275</sup>. A substantive reason, however, is the empirical need to respond to this in the light of the racist manoeuvres of the conservative German government in relation to the status of “immigrants” in Germany and as well, in response to the increase in rightwing racist violence against Black people in Germany, especially post-re-unification. Normatively, apart from the obvious pressure such events place on a theorist upholding the still unfulfilled promise of modernity to address those empirical issues which directly or indirectly call into question the notion of universalism, there are as well the theoretical refinements and advances made by thinkers like Honneth<sup>276</sup>, one of his ex-students. Ultimately, however, there is the realisation that amongst critical theorists in America and Europe the fact of both being multi-racial and multi-cultural societies has to be conceptualised in a way, if pace post-modernism, that moves on from incorporative notions of universalism. How does Habermas then answer the question posed by Gutman earlier in this section, especially given my qualification with regard to unjustly structured differentiations .

Habermas’ thinking on race is very much framed in terms of culture. Two things are clear: the first is that this appears to emerge very much from the thought processes that have informed his latest work, BFN; and the second is that, as pointed out in section II, it requires refining. Thus for Habermas because “modern constitutions owe their existence to a conception found in modern natural law according to which citizens come together voluntarily to form a legal community of free and equal consociates”, these “state sanctioned relations of inter-subjective recognition” are individualistically constructed” and thus it is pertinent to ask whether or not it can “deal adequately with struggles for recognition in which it is the articulation of collective identities that seems to be at stake.”<sup>277</sup> Here there is the explicit acknowledgement of Honneth’s work in which it is shown that the struggle for unredeemed claims of recognition in society, especially from those visible minorities, involves collective actors. Can these phenomena therefore “be reconciled with a theory of rights that is individualistically framed?”<sup>278</sup> With reference to the political achievements of liberalism and social democracy, Habermas thinks that the answer is in the affirmative. Thus despite the fact that the struggles for recognition currently being waged, e.g. women, racial minorities in Europe, anti- neo-colonial struggles etc., the question is whether or not “some kind of collective rights that shatter the out-moded self-understanding of the democratic constitutional state which is tailored to individual rights”<sup>279</sup> need to be instituted.

The answer to this is developed by Habermas in a critical response to Charles Taylor’s solution to Gutman’s question which is in essence that group rights are required. Taylor’s “politics of recognition” thus assumes that the protection of group identities can come into conflict with individual



rights of equal liberties and that where this occurs, a decision has to be taken about which takes precedence.<sup>280</sup> Where the politics of difference clash with that of the universalisation of individual rights then the constitutional state can advance the rights of that group. This is put forward on the communitarian basis that the law is not ethically neutral. There is an argument made by Taylor, with specific reference to the situation of Quebec, which is that under certain conditions it would be just to curtail certain basic rights so that "the survival of endangered cultural forms of life" can be promoted. Taylor's logic derives from a critical reading of one version of Liberalism in which he recognises the principle of equal respect only in the form of legally protected autonomy; a form of autonomy that involves placing cultural and social differences on a level playing field - *ceteris paribus*. To this he proposes a second model of Liberalism, one in which group rights are recognised in principle and triggered in practice according to pragmatic criteria linked to situations where equal respect threatens group rights.

To this Habermas counter poses and develops, with particular reference to racial and cultural minorities, his proceduralist model of law. Taylor's account of autonomy in relation to individual rights is described as "paternalistic" because it only accounts for half the picture. The other half would make clear that autonomy can only be realised vis-a-vis the law insofar as "those to whom the law is addressed.....can understand themselves to be the authors of the laws to which they are subject as private legal persons."<sup>281</sup> The internal connection between democracy and the constitutional state has to be taken seriously so that "the system of rights is blind neither to unequal social conditions nor to cultural differences". In other words those with individual rights have identities which are, or should be, formed intersubjectively. This process of socialisation presumes a theory of rights that complements a politics of identity that "protects the integrity of the individual in the life contexts in which his or her identity is formed.....(and which).....required ..the consistent actualisation of the system of rights."<sup>282</sup> Whilst Habermas illustrates this with specific reference to women's struggles,<sup>283</sup> where the old dichotomy between individual freedom versus objectively guaranteed claims to benefit is being replaced with a proceduralist conception in which private and public autonomies have to be safeguarded at the same time, he is aware that there are differences, as well as similarities with other struggles for recognition, e.g. anti-neo-colonial struggles and those of Black people in Western countries. With regard to the latter those liberation movements, because they are tied into overcoming an illegitimate division of society, affect as well the majority culture's self-understanding. However, the effects of this are different to those that occur as a result of women's struggles because the social movements associated with, what Habermas describes as "multi-cultural" ones, are so multi-faceted. One of these facets which appears to be of particular concern to



Habermas is that which presents itself in fundamentalist form, presumably because it then places itself beyond the realm of democratic politics. However, as shall be argued in the next section, these are not limited to so-called “multi-cultural movements”, as evidenced in the extreme right wing religious groups in the United States. Philosophically the questions raised thus go to the heart of the relationship between morality and ethical life. As the West and the globe unfurls within those discourses critical of universality, as those of a fragmenting and fractured society with its multitude of languages and contexts, the issues of universalist claims and of rationality within the purviews of the struggle for recognition, become, for Habermas, still open to debate. Despite this he is clear that Taylor’s conceptions are substantively different. The rights of minorities are legitimately enacted and upheld when the criterion for autonomy, i.e. all are participants in their authorship, ensures that “the legislative processes are regulated in such a way and take place in forms of communication such that everyone can presume that the regulations enacted in that way deserve general and rational motivational assent.”<sup>284</sup> What multi-culturalism legally thus raises for Habermas, is the question of the ethical neutrality of law and politics where ethics is taken to refer to conceptions of the good life and the moral point of view to that which is equally good for everyone. For the communitarians, like Taylor, the version of liberalism which they critique, political questions of an ethical nature have to be excluded because they cannot be impartially regulated. They therefore propose their own version of liberalism in which the state guarantees the fundamental rights and in addition intervenes on behalf “of a particular nation, culture, religion, or of a ..(limited) set of nations, cultures and religions.”<sup>285</sup> What they fail to understand, however, is that equality based politics, in pursuit of a system of rights, aim at ensuring that both general and collective goals are included in that system. Legal norms, because they are, or should be, the outcome of participants in communication, incorporate ethical perspectives. In arriving at the overall ethical perspective requires that a number of discourses are brought into the communicative sphere where communication is regulated by moral norms. Of course conflicts arise. But these are because of structures of communicative distortion, i.e. the underdevelopment or absence of appropriate norms guaranteeing that all can participate equally. The struggles for recognition are aimed at removing those barriers so that ethical notions can enter into the discussions equally. They are about inequalities. They are not about the inherent value or not of particular cultures, as the communitarians allege. In other words, “the right to equal respect which everyone can demand in the life contexts in which his or her identity is formed as well as elsewhere has nothing to do with the presumed excellence of his or her culture of origin....”<sup>286</sup> Group rights based on the preservation of specific cultural and value structures as presented in one point of time amount to no more than attempting to preserve in aspic a certain construction of particular cultures. What this misses out are that



cultures are dynamic and change and that there is no necessary organic link between individual identities and ascribed cultural origins. In other words living in a multi-cultural society means having the right and opportunity to grow up “within the world of a cultural heritage....without suffering discrimination because of it....(having) the opportunity to confront this and every other culture and to perpetuate it in its conventional form or transform it; as well as the opportunity to turn away from its commands with indifference or break with it self-critically and then live spurred on by having made a conscious break with tradition, or even with a divided identity.”<sup>287</sup> There is a relationship, thus between private identity and declared public identity which cannot be conflated, or objectivated. Rather there is a process of identificationising (to neologise again) which is available only through inter-subjective processes.

Finally with regard to race Habermas considers what he regards as the major issue in Europe today - immigration, and not just any immigration, but specifically immigration of Black people. The late acknowledgement of the centrality of race to Europe will be tackled later. Of more importance is the way in which Habermas theorises the particular issue of immigration and the just response. Singling out the effects in Europe of a “Fortress Europe” approach to immigration, and in particular, how this has been prompted by and reinforced in Germany a xenophobic approach to immigration, Habermas re-emphasises his earlier point, viz. ethically political integration that attempts to unite all citizens must remain “neutral” with regard to the “differences amongst ethical-cultural” communities. However immigration poses questions about the cohesiveness of maintaining the overall communities’ loyalty to the state. Does this mean, as it does, say in France, that immigrants have to relinquish their cultural identity? The answer to this is provided by Habermas, not at the level of immediate action, but philosophically in the form of two possible approaches to assimilation. The first, which he dismisses, is the acculturation approach which requires that the immigrant divest her/himself of her/his culture, values, practices etc. and adopts the “indigenous” culture. The second, which he supports as the only possible level of “assimilation” requires that the immigrant:

“assent to the principles of the constitution within the scope of interpretation determined by the ethical-political self-understanding of the citizens and the political culture of the country; in other words, assimilation to the way in which the autonomy of the citizens is institutionalised in the recipient society and the way the ‘public use of reason’ is practised there”  
<sup>288</sup>

Immigration is therefore not permitted to encroach upon the identity of the political community. However, as the “other” forms of life become established, so the context within which the constitutional principles are interpreted will also expand. Hence “a change in the composition of the



active citizenry changes the context to which the ethical-political self-understanding of the nation as a whole refers...”<sup>289</sup> With this in mind, therefore, the right to immigrate is situated within the understanding that white immigration played, not only in the industrial development of Europe, by relieving the population burden, but, as well in the underdevelopment of Third world countries, through imperialistically sanctioned emigration of whites to conquered lands. There are therefore good moral grounds for an enlightened immigration policy in the west, such as:

- people do not leave their country of origin for no good reason
- the west, because of its imperial past and because of the inter-meshing of the global capitalist economy has an obligation to help

For Habermas, therefore, “we must ...take into account the perspective of those who come to foreign continents seeking their well being, that is an existence worthy of human beings, rather than protection from political persecution”.<sup>290</sup>

## **5.6 Local Governance**

Having thus summarised the main thrusts of Habermas’ thinking, it is now possible to delineate the implications of his thought for local governance even though he has not specifically addressed these issues. There are two inter-connected strands - the empirical reality of the here and now in the UK, and the normative outlines of what could be. In outlining the key empirical features of local governance in the here and now it will be necessary as well to indicate the changes and processes of change that have occurred over the past two decades; changes which it is claimed both pF’sm and localism have unsuccessfully conceptualised. There is in both a form of “presentism” in which the changed form and substance of local governance appears to converge with their respective analyses in what is. Because of this, what ought is relegated to a matter of practicalities. There is a substantive difference, however, in a Habermassian perspective because the latter provides a holistic framework within which to analyse local governance that keeps alive the critical dualism oscillating between the “facts” of the present and the “normative” potential for the future.

## **5.7 Local Governance in the UK**

What then are the main features of local governance in the UK today? This can be answered through the interrogative framework used in looking at pF’sm and Localism, viz. the organisation of welfare and local government, and the processes of democratic will and opinion formation. With those as the key principled reference points, we can sketch the following scenario.



## 5.8 The 'Facts'

If local government is treated as a political institution, i.e. firstly and foremostly one that is an integral part of the constitutional make-up of the country, either explicitly or in practice, then it can be said that the shape, scope and functioning substance of local government appears to have changed markedly from that which it was twenty five years ago. The relationship between central and local government has changed considerably. Whilst twenty five years ago it could be said that local government's enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy, the fact that most of their funding still depended on government grants notwithstanding, today there is a greater degree of centralised control over local government. And yet this is despite the explicit new right agenda of the Conservative government to roll back the state, to increase individual autonomy and control over their lives, and to decrease state interference. To begin teasing out this apparent contradiction means first looking briefly at three areas: why local government came to have the role and content that it did in the seventies, at the main factors influencing the rise of the new right in the seventies, and the substance of their agenda.

If one backtracks temporally over the development of local government in the UK up to the seventies, then four characteristics are pertinent. Firstly there is the large range of services administered by local government. Secondly there is the key feature of local government being defined as that of its democratic nature, despite the actual practice which appeared to indicate that not many local people actually participated. Thirdly there was the degree of consensus between local and national government, and amongst local government units, about the scope and nature of local government. Finally there was, as is implied by the first three factors, the perception of local government and the provenance of local governance as being rather dull. Yet the evolution of a local government, as summarised by those four factors, lay in the laissez-faire period of nineteenth century industrialisation. A period which saw the urbanised concentration of people and parallel growth in poverty, health problems and lawlessness, also saw the developments of social ameliorative initiatives, many of them locally based. These nascent social services, in the widest use of that term, were contained within the purviews of the locale and were only picked up by the nineteenth century state in the last instance. What is interesting is that such local, often political initiatives, were pursued when it became clear that private industry was incapable of policing the deleterious effects of its functions by itself. The beginnings of collectivist solutions, some of them state initiated or state sanctioned, to the social effects of capitalism occurred in the same period the new right today so glorifies in its backwards glances. Commentators, like Butcher, Law, Leach and Mullard attribute the local control of such services to three inter linked key factors: many of these



initiatives were local ones, even if they did have national consequences in some cases; the administrative structures simply did not exist at the national centre, and there was as well the ideological opposition to large bureaucracies, e.g. Disraeli; there were at the local level authorities and agencies, e.g. boroughs and counties, which could be adapted.<sup>291</sup> There is, as well, a fourth key factor: many of these services were paid for locally through charges and rates and it was economically prudent for the national state to support a developing polity in which legitimation for national government was in part secured through initiatives paid for locally. On the democratic front the growth of social interventionist initiatives paralleled the growth of the franchise through parliamentary reform. It was thus not uncommon for localities to have a number of single purpose democratically controlled services, e.g. the School Board. Whilst in the beginnings of local democracies in the UK there was intense differences between political parties and social collectivities, the passage of time through two world wars saw a growing consensus developing between local and national government about the role and substance of local government. This intervening period saw as well the growing collectivisation of responses to what can be described as the asynchronous systemic effects of capitalism with many of these responses falling to local government to control. Any tension that did arise between centre and locales was primarily over those services which moved from local to national control, e.g. the utilities etc. However even then such losses were made up for by the accumulation of new services by local government. The praxis of local democracy still relied on that of the liberal democratic model à la Mill. That is to say the minimalist state vis-à-vis the citizens' private and public autonomy and which in return undertakes to administer such services, efficiently on their behalf. Constitutionally, whilst there is no direct writing in of local government, or for that matter a written constitution, and local government thus operates within the framework of a unitary state, the consensus that developed around local government amongst political parties meant in effect that such governmental institutions operated with a high degree of autonomy.

The post second world war expansion of the welfare state saw the beginnings of a growing tension between national and local government; not one that disrupted this consensus, but one that took about thirty years to develop into a visible crisis centred primarily around the question of finance. By 1975, or thereabouts, the average central government grant to local government had grown to being twice that raised through the rates, a de facto centralisation picked up by commentators at the time. Part of the solution to this was sought by national government in the attempts to reform local government in the early to mid-seventies. The bases to this reorganisation did not include the area of local democracy itself, but, instead concentrated on attempting to improve the efficiency of local government. There were two key outcomes: the proposal and implementation of a restructuring which



saw the creation of larger local government administrative structures, e.g. the metropolitan authorities, and internal to local government, a managerial reshaping along the lines of corporate developments in the private sector. The reality was that the introduction of such technical changes as “Chief Executives”, Chief Officers management processes and structures, neither addressed the rest of the organisation or, for that matter, the actual content of management, service development etc. in local government. The failure of these measures is evidenced by the growing tension over resources between national and local governments which actually prefigured the 1979 Conservative government. But it was not only on that front that the consensus was breaking down. Within individual councils and amongst councils marked divergences were beginning to emerge. Butcher et al. point to the creation of metropolitan councils with their new mix of rural and urban populations and likely political representatives of different hues as the main cause of this dissensus.<sup>292</sup> In part this is true. For example the creation of Bradford metropolitan council in the early seventies saw dramatic new tensions develop within the council administrative structure, amongst politicians and between different parts of the new authority because of the grafting on of outlying rural areas on to the old Bradford City Council local governance structures. But that is far from the whole picture. There were other changes occurring as well. For example the seventies witnessed as well an increasing professionalisation of local government marked by the recruitment of more university educated people, many with a positive and sometimes radical orientation to public sector values. There was as well the development of new forms of NGOs in the urban areas and of new constituencies, such as women and Black people, making their voice heard from the outside. The so-called new left were, in many local Labour parties, displacing the old guard. An examination of local Labour councillors in one of the boroughs under study shows that in the ‘74 and ‘78 elections that there was a rising number of university educated councillors displacing previous ones who had tended to come from industrial worker backgrounds.<sup>293</sup> Internally the complexion and outlook of the officer unions changed in many inner city councils from right of centre to very much left of centre. The agendas, thus, of many inner city authorities were opening out to embrace a host of issues previously not considered by local government.

It can thus be said that Thatcherism, rather than cause the break-up of consensus, simply exacerbated the tensions. Certainly there was a time up to the 1987 election, when large parts of the national Labour party almost saw the attempts by local Labour councils to resist the national government onslaught, as a vicarious fight by proxy which they were themselves unable to carry out. Perhaps it can be said that what Thatcherism did, where that term is used not ad hominemly, but as a description of new right policies towards local government, including the current leadership of the



Conservative party, was, from its own political perspective, to develop the fissure to its logical conclusion.

What then was and is the new right agenda? Obviously it is not possible to speak of a homogenous new right agenda in detail. There are, as other writers have pointed out, different groupings, perhaps broadly summarised under "liberal" and "conservative".<sup>294</sup> Nevertheless it is reasonable to point to overlapping general areas, which for the purposes of looking at local governance, will suffice. The prime target of the new right was and is the form of social democracy exemplified by many western European countries. This was "the existence of a democratic constitution under which all citizens enjoyed certain civil, political and social rights ....(and in which)...political participation was not restricted by property, birth, race or gender."<sup>295</sup> By the seventies, however, there is a generally acknowledged crisis of social democracy which invited criticisms from both the left and right, particularly the new right. Whilst the cause of the crisis has been laid at the door of global capitalism by commentators on the left, the new right saw the problem as residing in the collectivist policies, practices and state institutions of social democracy. They undertook to achieve a new relationship between the individual and the state along the lines of the classical liberal model as outlined earlier. There are a number of key features to this remodelled world. It aimed "to discredit the social democratic concept of universal citizenship rights guaranteed and enforced through public agencies and to replace it with a concept of citizenship rights achieved through property ownership and participation in markets."<sup>296</sup> The corporatist social democratic state, with its attendant weak notions of government was to be restructured into a strong state that would be a guarantor of the market. It was not simply a matter of rolling back the state. It was, however, a matter of changing the then existing state into something stronger, and I would argue, larger, even if the ostensible picture was that of decreased state interference. To achieve the new state required and still requires two increased levels of state activity - that relating to securing the implementation of the changes and that relating to the policing of the newly formed marketised areas of previous direct state activity, e.g. privatisation. Or, as Gamble puts it, "...the state makes the protection of the free economy its priority...all illegitimate functions and responsibilities are stripped from it ...(making it) ..no longer the weak state of social democracy, overburdened by ever-widening responsibilities and infested by special interests..."<sup>297</sup> On public welfare the new right launched an attack that had resonances with criticisms from the left. For them welfare services are not only expensive, but their collective nature make them less likely to meet the needs of the people they are supposed to help because they encourage dependency. Freedom and equality was to be "achieved through the daily plebiscite of the market and not the infrequent plebiscite in the political system."<sup>298</sup> - another variation, perhaps, of the decentring of the state. But there was as well



another side to the critique of the welfare state and that was the belief that social democratic liberal values were responsible for the moral degeneracy and decline in the west, exemplified by the breakdown in traditional family values and disrespect for the rule of law etc. Identified as one of the chief culprits in this decline is the new class of professionals, most from the sixties and seventies university output, that were seen to be infesting every sinew of the welfare state. This but “continues the critique of rationalism and the enlightenment which has long been a key theme of Conservatism.”<sup>299</sup> This technicised post-modernism, or counter modernity, shall be discussed later. For the moment the key features of the new right together with the sketch of the key strands informing local governance up to the mid to late seventies provides the means to highlight the major changes to the structure and functioning of local government through to the early nineties. The detail of this will be dealt with in the chapter on the empirical findings.

The effects of Thatcherism on local government, if it can be shorthanded thus, fits in well with the overall aim of the new right, viz. a strong interventionist and policing central state at the expense of a collectivised welfare state, and thus a protected marketisation process. Within this framework a broad twofold strategy evolved in relation to local government: a centralised control over local government expenditure and a pursuit of this duality vis-a-vis the state through a politicised depoliticisation of local governance. Interestingly, before pinpointing the main changes in each area, the 1987 general election in which local government played such a prominent part, was the watershed in the labour Party’s approach, and the aftermath saw a process of rightwing shifts in Labour culminating, both in theory and the practice of Labour councils, in a new consensus with their Conservative counterparts over the form and substance of local government. In terms of centralising and controlling local government finances a number of initiatives over the years can be pointed to. These include altering the formula for allocating central grants, rate capping, changing the local tax system and base, e.g. the infamous “poll tax”, altering the rules governing local authorities distribution of grants, through statute defining what local government can legitimately spend its money on etc<sup>300</sup>. The politicised depoliticisation involves a number of sub-strategies which targeted employees, the local democratic control of key areas of local government responsibilities, and the cultural orientation of management content and substance.

Local authority employees, more than any other category of public sector worker, because, in the UK, they were the interface between communities of service users and the welfare state, were seen as the culprits supreme, the “left/liberal-entryist-subversion-of-public-sector-neutrality” scenario. They came under sustained attack through a number of devices: wage restraints, government orchestrated attacks on behaviour, opposition to officer trade



unions etc.<sup>301</sup> The desired end product, and towards the late eighties this was an explicit goal of some Labour authorities, was to both break the strength of the trade unions in the Town Hall and to make the labour force less visible, less vocal and more flexible. The former two desired characteristics were partially achieved through the report from the Widdicombe Committee, and the resulting 1989 Local Government and Housing Act.<sup>302</sup> which made it illegal for local government employees above a certain grade to hold political office in another local authority. There were other central administrative changes as well which bore on the attempt to quieten local authority workers, if not directly, then through effectively hiving off large service sectors to the 'market' thereby threatening the terms and conditions of the people employed therein<sup>303</sup>. For example the rules governing section 11 money, money which funded most race equality type posts, was changed so that such posts were no longer eligible. Within a short space of time many posts like these no longer existed in local authorities. The communicative spaces which existed at committee level for non councillors, as well as the multiple access points to some form of democratic decision making, represented by the committee structure, were closed down. Part of the recommendations from the Widdicombe committee advocated curtailing the drastically the number of outside co-optees to council committees, whilst in 1991 Heseltine, as Minister for the Environment, published the Internal Management of Local Authorities in England. This set out his objective of promoting speedier, more effective and more business like decision making in councils, through amongst other measures, the adoption of a 'cabinet' system of councillor decision making.<sup>304</sup> Many of these recommendations have been uncritically adopted by new Labour. The extent to which this strategy was successful can be gauged by a brief summary of the changes that occurred in the primary authority under consideration. By the end of the eighties, the back of the officer union had effectively been broken by the ruling Labour group; that consensus between Labour and the town hall unions no longer existed. Most of their equality structures and posts were dismantled. New employee relations procedures and rules governing conduct were drawn up. Managers were given more powers to deal directly with a range of human resourcing issues, including the discipline and control of employees. This pattern was to be seen to be repeated in other London local authorities through the nineties.

De-democratising local government by removing from orthodox democratic control large tranches of services and complementary levels of regional governance in the name of a stronger central state and greater individual market freedom, is still an ongoing process which has been well documented. An additional weapon, thus, in this particular armoury was the ostensible rationale of doing away with so-called unnecessary levels of regional governance by simply abolishing them via parliamentary legal fiat. The demise of the GLC and other metropolitan authorities comes under this



category. This sets the scene to pinpoint three important routes taken by the then Conservative government to remove services from local authorities: the establishment of appointed quangoes to run services, particularly those previously under the control of former regional spheres of governance, e.g. in the greater London region; consumerist led marketised democratic control of certain services, like housing and education where, in the latter, the emphasis is on schools with devolved budgets and responsibilities “getting closer to the customer”; and the privatisation of key local government services. All of these have not only had the effect of removing key responsibilities from local democratic control, but have also impacted on the other two strategies. Such practices have thus imposed a new regime of uncertainty, especially that related to the possibility of redundancy, on employees.

Finally the content and orientation of management within local government has undergone a change that takes it away from adherence to the values of the intrinsic worth of local democracy and public services. Whilst criticism has been levelled at the management of local government from both Conservative, and, from the mid eighties onwards, Labour as well, on the grounds that there is an absence of explicit values and direction, at least this supposed vacuum contained within it an unspoken commitment to the public ethos. This now is being assiduously replaced or filled by a private sector notion of management tied into tighter control of employees, the prioritisation of financial performance parameters and a restructured relationship with the community via the marketised notion of the consumer. To this extent then, the criticism of Stewart that such a managerial model, or, at least the dominance of such a model, is inimical to the democratic interests of local governance is true. Nevertheless the “facts” are that there is within local governance a distinct school of management which is primarily private sector oriented, characteristics which mark it out from previous public sector managerial knowledge and practices.

In sum then the “facts” of local government today in the UK show not only the emergence of a strong central state in relation to local governance, but, as well, the constitution of a new consensus. The reactive mode of the Labour party in response to the new right onslaught - humane Thatcherism, as Hall has described it - has meant that the once gap between the Conservative and Labour vision of local government has closed considerably. Both, for example, are agreed on the validity of the reconstituted content of local governance vis-a-vis the overall structure of local government - the enabling core-periphery model - ; the status of employees - the flexible workforce -; and on the parameters of management. In fact there is agreement on the need to get back to a depoliticised intra-local government. The restatement and revalorisation of the positivistic notion of a neutral, but now supposedly more efficient, management, finds



an echo in the statement of one of the ex-Leaders of the Labour Group in the primary local authority in the research, who has opined that ideology and philosophy do not enter into the issue of management because it is simply a matter of ensuring that ratepayers money is better and more efficiently used.<sup>305</sup>

Before embarking on what, logically would be a Habermassian type analyses of these facts, which is different to the normative vision, it is necessary to address briefly one other “fact” that runs throughout the various processes shaping local government in the UK today, especially in large urban areas; and that is the “fact” of race. I don’t want to jump the gun on the chapter which deals in detail with that of race and local government in the target boroughs, but I do want to indicate three major considerations of race which run throughout the “facts” of local governance. The first relates to the increasing political and social visibility of Black people in major urban areas in the UK over the period leading up to the late seventies. Whilst these were expressed very often through local struggles and campaigns with some capturing the national spotlight, there were commonalities that emerged - those relating to the racism and its effects in key areas which impacted disproportionately on black people, e.g. criminal justice, education, housing etc.; those relating to the failure of action mandated institutions to do anything about the situation, e.g. political parties, welfare state bodies, including local government; those relating to the positive self identification of Black cultures and to the recognition of solidarity amongst Black peoples and communities. It is a fact, as other commentators have pointed out, that the development of urban policy in the UK from the sixties onwards by national governments, was substantively informed by notions, i.e. not fully worked out positions, of trying to manage the “race problem” in urban areas.<sup>306</sup> The second consideration is informed very much by the first consideration because it is to do with the re-articulation of the redemptive white nation by the new right; very much in opposition to the claims made for recognising the reality that the UK is and will be a multi-racial, plural society. Other commentators have pointed to the racist urges underpinning the new right’s onslaught against their perceived moral decay of the social democratic welfare state, exemplified by that most audible and visible televised enunciation of Thatcher’s “swamping” utterance.<sup>307</sup> The attempt to relegitimate political practice via a recourse to nineteenth century nationalism and unresolved anthropophagi myths from earlier periods will only be noted now and dealt with in more detail later. There is an addendum need to qualify this “note” by pointing out that the key difference between the new right era and previous centuries is that the accusatory finger was hardly ever directly pointed, i.e. no “look, a Negro” revisited. Instead practices were proscribed and others promoted which effectively defined away Black people’s rights. The final consideration is obviously that which highlights the way in which anti-racism and race equality was taken



up by many inner city local authorities. However, it is not, as Gilroy has erroneously argued and has been uncritically borne aloft by fellow critical, or “not-so-critical”, culturalists, the case that anti-racism relocated to the town halls.<sup>308</sup> It might have been interpreted as that, but the reality was different as the section on the empirical details of race equality development in the target boroughs will show. What will be clear from that exegesis is that the picture was, and is not, as homogenous as Gilroy attempts to portray - and here that might be the fault of him attempting to extrapolate from his brief foray into “real” work in the GLC - and that the claims made for race equality were local authority targeted specifically and not an attempt at putsch based take over of anti-racism by the denigratingly referred to “race relations professionals.”

### **5.9 The ‘Norm’: Social learning for Domination, or Social Learning for Emancipation?**

Having briefly set in place the main facts of local governance in the UK the main task now is to resituate this within an Habermassian level analysis. This can be, and should be, done within the same framework adopted to examine the pF’st and localist variants of local governance. That is to say attempting to generate the analytical contents which will enable the meta-theoretical matrix used in the examination of the other two positions to be completed from a Habermassian perspective. This will be facilitated by first predefining what might be the outcome of such an analysis by characterising it as centring on the notions of crises and legitimacy. The idea of “crisis” as pivotal to theories of society is not new obviously. Marx’s theory turns on the concept of economic crisis. Variations on this include the Regulationist school, and inter-alia therefore the pF’st school, and their idea of crises in regimes of accumulation. Likewise Hall’s et al’s re-working of the Marxist crisis via the racialisation of the criminal justice processes in the UK of the seventies is another example.<sup>309</sup> The difference between those and Habermas’ concept is that for the latter the crisis occurs both within the sphere of work and that of interaction. There is thus, as the clarification of the term legitimacy will show, a longer temporal framework to Habermas idea than is contained within the common notion of Marxist crisis, to the extent that the redemption promised in the “purifying” sudden overthrow of capitalism has perhaps to be surrendered - temporarily?

If legitimacy is linked to the recognition worthiness of a political order, then this means that there are good arguments for a political order’s claims to be recognised as right and just. Legitimacy is thus a contestable validity-claim, i.e. it is open to dispute. In the modern constitutional state, even with the institutionalisation of the opposition, legitimation in the practicalities of politik and in the theory of politics, is a permanent problem. For Habermas only political orders can have legitimacy. This is not the case for multi-



national organisations in the world marketplace. Legitimations within the political order serve to show why and how existing institutions should employ political power and how this will enable the identity of the society to be constituted. In other words these processes are linked to the “social integrative preservation of a normatively determined social identity”. The strength of these legitimations, that is to say the extent to which they shape motives, and thus are able to produce consensus, depends on the level of justification in any one situation. In modern times there is the normative expectation that justification is not based on myth or material principles, like Nature or God, but on the formal conditions of justification, i.e. the procedures and presuppositions of rational agreement themselves become principles. There thus are no ultimate grounds for legitimating forces other than the formal conditions of possible consensus formation. Habermas links the levels of justification to social learning in both core categories, i.e. objectivating thought and practical insight, and thus to social evolutionary transitions to new learning levels. What is important is that in the modern period such justification has become reflective. This is quite crucial as an insight into Habermas’ approach to ontology which can be characterised as critical ontology. That is to say that any notion of a grounding cannot be a priori but has to be locked into processes that enable all to participate equally, and thus makes the ontic fallibilistic. So, for example, in the matter of democracy, this can only be imagined “as the attempt to arrange a society democratically...as a self controlled learning process...a question of finding arrangements which can ground the presumption that the basic institutions of the society and the basic political decisions would meet with the unforced agreement of all those involved.”<sup>310</sup> Democracy cannot then be equated with any one type of organisation, e.g. direct democracy, any more than it can be equated with the particular institutions that flow from that. This is quite different from localists like Stewart who are too closely tied to one particular form of democracy and to its institutions; that despite his attempt to enlist Habermas in looking at the public domain. This relationship between normative theories and empirical ones is important, as shown earlier, because the former should not “confuse a level of justification of domination with procedures for the organisation of domination”.

This slight digressive introduction to what a Habermasian analysis of local governance might look like gains importance because of the clarifications Habermas has made to his theory of communicative action which highlight again the tension between philosophy and sociology. It is thus necessary to spell these clarifications out because they link back to the a fore detailed background to Habermas’ work. In a sense this refers to my interpretation that Habermas speaks of ideal situations, often philosophically parametrically set and within which framework a recourse to sociological accounts test the fallibility of the theory. For example his idea of non-distorted communication is often criticised because critics conflate the two



levels of analysis. Here fallibilism does not relate to some Popperian notion of falsification, but simply “to the fact that we cannot exclude the possibility of falsification even given the convincingly justified theories which are accepted as valid.”<sup>311</sup> With this in mind then further clarification can be given to concept of societal integration via two tension ridden but inter-related spheres of social and systemic integration; a concept that goes to the heart of the idea of legitimation. These two spheres have to be treated as analytically and categorically separate. Social integration refers to “consensus forming mechanisms” where as systemic integration refers to “exchange and power mechanisms”. As far as their structures of action are concerned social integration is linked to action orientations whilst systemic integration go beyond action orientations and integrate action consequences. Now, both critics and supporters of Habermas’ theory have assumed, wrongly, that the analytical distinction carries over into the empirical reality and have therefore concluded that both spheres have mutually exclusive action types, e.g. systemic integration is given over solely to purposive rational action, and social integration which can be tracked back to the lifeworld, is only communicatively action based. However, this is not the case. Of the four identified mechanisms of systemic integration, three are neutral in relation to action types, viz. segmentary differentiation, stratification, stratification and political organisation. It is thus only the steering media of money and power “that demand a strategic stance on the part of the actors.” That is to say that they are in an environment that is programmed strategically. It is not to say, alas some aspects of post modernist theorising, that they are constituted as an effect of organisational or money power. There is an avenue for communicative based opposition. This is important when looking at a phenomenon like local governance, especially in relation to the action neutrality of political organisation, and here I read this as saying it is open to both types of action, and in relation to bureaucratic administration and the scope in the latter for emancipatory change. It also forestalls one of the critiques I had based on my original reading of Habermas. The issue of clarifying social integration is equally significant because of the interpretation placed upon Habermas original concept by feminist critiques that it assumed a power free communicative action based context; critiques which, under that reading, could similarly be made from a race point of view. the clarification can be best put in his own words. “As the life world, however, by no means offers an innocent image of ‘power free spheres of communication’, the presupposition for orientation toward reaching understanding are met without reservations, i.e. without deception and self deception, only if the improbable conditions of non-repressive forms of life prevail. Otherwise, social integration proceeds via norms of domination which sublate violence, on the one hand and consensus formation in language which fulfils the conditions for latent strategic action, on the other. To this extent, social integration is also not allocated a priori to some specific type of action.. This links into the point I



made about over colonisation and Black identities in the previous section. Finally there is a further clarification, one that provides a link to his latest work, "Between Facts and Norms", a clarification which expands on the communicative action side of systemic integration. It thus tracks back to the notion that with the advent of the capitalist system action domains differentiated out which are primarily systemically integrated. Hence, "these are now integrated only indirectly through the agency of consensus mechanisms, namely to the extent that the legal institutionalisation of steering media must be coupled to normative contexts of the lifeworld."<sup>312</sup> To this extent, therefore, the analytical distinctions made mean that the hurly-burly of the real world sociological investigations will reveal that there is indeed an intertwining and separation of two action types, but, that overall, the two spheres of integration can be associated with the two types of action. Thus it is no longer possible to talk, as Habermas had done in texts prior to TCA of "systems of purposive rational action". Within the revised contexts now the actor can switch back to his/her lifeworld context - important in considering action in bureaucracies, say, - even if the action bases to lifeworlds have lost their co-ordinating efficacy. Steering mechanisms of system integration are predisposed towards purposive rational action through processes like their specialised codes which have diverged - expertisation, "techniques" - from normal language. Media steered interactions results in an objectification of social relations in which ends and means become inverted.. Habermas goes on to conclude that unlike in his earlier version of purposive rational action in which media steered interactions "embody an instrumental...form of reason", he now thinks that these processes instead embody a functional form of reason.<sup>313</sup> I think, as I shall argue later, the examination of local governance in the UK shows that functional reasoning embodies a large element of instrumentality. The problem facing emancipationists in the capitalist system is one "of how capabilities for self-organisation can be developed to such an extent within autonomous public spheres that radical democratic processes of democratic will formation can come to have a decisive impact on the regulatory mechanisms and marginal conditions of media steered subsystems in a lifeworld oriented toward use values, towards ends in general...(with a core)..task...(which) involves holding the systemic imperatives of an interventionist state apparatus and those of economic system in check and is formulated in defensive terms."<sup>314</sup> What this expresses is his normative vision of a society in which there is the free interplay of the three culture-value spheres that, under conditions of modernisation, have become differentiated out, viz. moral practical, aesthetic and cognitive instrumental. The question then is whether or not functional rationality is the same as purposive-rational action. Some sympathetic commentators, in arguing that they are not the same, have concluded that this undermines the normative vision. The reason for this would appear to lie in their reading of Habermas that, because action requires some one to enact it, and that therefore purposive-rational action means that people behave in an



objectivating way towards each other - "participants in action instrumentalise one another as a means for their respective success" - that therefore functionalist reason, insofar as it "bypasses people's consciousness", can never be in a situation where there is an interplay with communicative rationality.<sup>315</sup> I think this is a misreading, especially when placed in the context of his comments on the key problems and tasks, as quoted above. The analytical use of functionalist reasoning is a refinement introduced to deal with what I think is an earlier anomaly. If action is directly linked to participants and the three spheres of reason are differentiated out from a lifeworld origins, then one cannot claim that there are systems of purposive rational action which reproduce themselves. That would be a restatement of Adorno's and Horkheimer's arguments, not to mention the close affinity with Foucault. Under such a system participants' actions would indeed be constituted in an ends-determining-means fashion with little prospect of being able to change it. I therefore read the introduction of the functionalist rationality clarification as rather confirming the normative vision. Thus systems of functionalist rationality which, if not under the control or substantial influence of democratic will formation, are likely to facilitate purposive rational action from participants. On the empirical side it accords better with both organisational studies, say, and my research within local government, where situations of communicative based functionality are possible and can compete with, or challenge the overall paradigm of purposive rational action even if the extent to which such challenges are still possible, in local government in the UK appears to be diminishing. Nevertheless, functional rationality expresses the processes whereby under capitalist modernity the "inversion of means and ends is experienced in the form of the reifying character of objectified social processes."<sup>316</sup> In other words, decisions are made, positions taken in one context, either the economic or administrative which have an internal logic, e.g. financial accountability, which can only be taken by participants consciously or unconsciously separating out the dynamic of the rationale of those decisions from the participants' lifeworld contexts; yet which, if applied to the decision takers own lifeworlds, might be perceived by them, as colonisingly intrusive. It is a question of whether or not use-values are democratically controlled or instrumentally subverted.

We can now return to local governance within the intended Habermassian type analysis which revolves around the core issue of legitimation. Local government and legitimation is situated within the context of the following quote from Habermas on the kernel of the problem for the state in modern capitalist society.

"Viewed historically, the state was from the beginning supposed to protect a society determined normatively in its identity from disintegration, without ever having at its free disposal the capacities for social integration, without ever being able, as it were, to make itself master of social integration.....The legitimation problem of the state



today is not how to conceal the functional relations between state activity and the capitalist economy in favour of ideological definitions of the public welfare. This is no longer possible - at least not in times of economic crisis - and exposure by Marxism is no longer necessary. The problem consists rather in representing the accomplishments of the capitalist economy as, comparatively speaking, the best possible satisfaction of generalisable interests - or at least insinuating that this is so. The state thereby programmatically obligates itself to keep dysfunctional side effects within acceptable limits. In this assignment of roles, the state provides legitimating support to a social order claiming legitimacy.”<sup>317</sup>

However, my reading of Habermas leads me to conceive of legitimation as being of two orders, along the lines, so to speak, of a “facts” and “norms” differentiation.. The primary order refers to the legitimating or delegitimizing acts which support or call into question the very bases of the political order. The secondary order of legitimations refers to the empirical results of the continual politicking and jostling that is the feature of the in-built legitimation problems of the modern capitalist state. These overlap with, but are slightly different to Habermas’ notion of ‘empiricist’ and ‘normativist’ legitimations. In other words the latter refers to the experienced and visible effects of institutional politics. An example of this at the level of local governance is the way in which the realistic pragmatists in local Labour Parties, as opposed to the “Red-Ken-loony-left” type, pursued the strategy of the dented shield as the only viable local option to Thatcherism - an early attempt to promote and legitimate a labour version of the TINA approach which prefigured the uncritical embrace of capitalism by new Labour<sup>318</sup>. Further the process of legitimation is not homogenous. Whilst I take Habermas to be mainly writing about the primary order, the processes of the secondary order legitimation are unevenly presented and developed over time and geographically, especially in societies which are federalised or, like the UK, have local representative structures which were for a long time relatively autonomous. The outcomes of secondary order legitimation dynamics can be broadly twofold: a change of the dominant political party in government, used in its broadest sense to pick up on different levels of government, through institutionalised voting mechanisms; or, a questioning of the very foundations of governance, and thus a move into the realm of primary legitimation problems.

The identified watershed period preceding the changes in local government, i.e. the seventies, is one co-identified by other commentators as being that which stands out as manifesting the symptoms of some form of deeper “crisis”. This is evidenced in from both the analyses of the Marxist and new right varieties. Habermas has also analysed this period as marking a shift, but a shift that is substantively different from both the above mentioned types insofar as it operates at the primary and secondary level problems of legitimation. Where the UK stands out from other European countries is that, whilst in those European countries there were as well secondary order



legitimation type manifestations, it was only in the UK that this coincided in the seventies with a visible, dramatic volte face change of government; dramatic in the sense that the programme of that party attacked the very basis of the political consensus, i.e. the welfare state. The “radical” agenda for this type of shift appeared later in the USA in the early eighties, and latterly in France and Germany. What is clear is that these shifts, whilst they are symptomatic of the core problem of the capitalist system and state, as indicated above, give rise to the need to produce new forms of legitimating rationale which are both related to the requirement to underpin the secondary order political programme as well as the primary level political order; and these new legitimating practices in turn can recursively invoke an even deeper crisis in participants motivations to want to continue supporting and legitimating that political order. To illustrate this we can refer to Habermas’ analysis of that watershed which he characterises as giving rise to the new obscurity.<sup>319</sup>

In the chapter on Racism and Black Anti-Racist Politics I attempted to re-introduce and reconstruct the notion of “utopia” as a necessary precursor to progressing to anti-racism. Interestingly Habermas in his analysis of the changing welfare state, an analysis I had not read at the time, also begins by re-examining the idea of “utopia”. In the development of the modern age, where the latter designated period can be understood to have begun in the latter part of the eighteenth century, with its rapid rate of change, “the present is understood at each point as the transition to something new.”<sup>320</sup> Whilst thus utopian impulses have become fused with historical experience, ie. a devaluation of certain aspects of the past in preparation for a better future, these utopian energies are at the same time held in check by the past. At certain periods this control crossed over into perjoritivation of utopia as a form of epithetical short hand to denounce political ideas as being too abstract. For Habermas it was Bloch and Mannheim who rehabilitated utopia “as a legitimate medium for depicting alternative life possibilities that are seen as inherent in the historical process itself...(as being) ....inscribed within politically active historical consciousness itself.”<sup>321</sup> Today, however, where today is taken to be the changed world of Western capitalism, it would appear that all utopian energies have been exhausted because the horizon of systemic overload – under-development, environmental catastrophe, etc. - seems never ending. Such is the appearance of the new obscurity.

Now the origins of the welfare state are seen as the outcome of compromises around the utopian ideas of society based on social labour. By that is meant that the demands of organised labour are partially met through the state as means to mitigate the worst excesses of class conflict. The social democratic variant, which has been adopted by most western European states, has been since the mid seventies, and is subject to a growing



awareness and action that is informed by interpretations of its limitations and yet has no idea as to the alternatives. For Habermas “the new obscurity is part of a situation in which a welfare state programme that continues to be nourished by a utopia of social labour is losing its power to project future possibilities for a collectively better and less endangered way of life.”<sup>322</sup> The welfare state is legitimated at the secondary and primary level through elections, through using the power of the state to intervene in the economy, to push through welfare benefits and services legislation and, importantly, to oversee the implementation of the latter. Thus the “substantive side of the project is nourished by the residues of a utopia of social labour: as the status of the employee is normalised through rights to political participation and social ownership, the general population gains the opportunity to live in freedom, social justice and increasing prosperity.”<sup>323</sup> Whilst the latter characterisation is aimed generally at the position of the wage labourer within the context of the pacification of class conflict, it serves as well as a particular palimpsest for those who work(ed) for and within the welfare bureaucracies, including local government. Thus whilst the financial remuneration in the public sector was regarded as being not too good, that was offset by the favourable terms and conditions and prospect of a “job-for-life”. Contrast that now with the vulture-like dawn chorus of both Labour and Conservative councillors in local government who, in prefatory support of “rightsizing” welfare bureaucracies seemingly overstuffed with recruits from the equal opportunity programmes, are heard to parrot in unison, “we are not an employment agency”.<sup>324</sup> There are, however, two key substantive factors which have a direct effect on the legitimating potential of the social welfare state. The first relates to whether or not the state has sufficient power at its disposal and the means to use that power to keep in check the capitalist system. The second relates to the way in which such power is used to attain the welfare goals. On the first, Habermas sees the state as being too narrow a framework to adequately uphold its side of the welfare “bargain”. Even if it is successful it becomes at the same time a victim of its success, particularly within a context of falling profitability, poor investment etc., as the UK was in the mid seventies. Under such conditions it becomes all too easy for the two areas to be falsely related in the mind of the public, especially if the public sphere is distorted through the dominance of biased communications media. As happened in the 1979 election the social base of the welfare state decreases and “upwardly mobile groups of voters who received the greatest direct benefit from the welfare state development can develop a mentality concerned with maintaining their standard of living and may ally themselves with the old middle class and in general with the strata concerned with “productivity.” to form a defensive coalition opposing underprivileged or marginalised groups.”<sup>325</sup> The leitmotiv of the ‘79 UK election and the subsequent programmes of the Conservative government are well epitomised by the latter’s quote with their spoken, hinted at and defined by exclusionary notions of spongers, bully-boy



labour unions, and swampers. In relation to the second factor Habermas re-emphasises the point that the attainment of the welfare state programme requires that the interventionist state draws on the full extent of the government's power. These prove counter-effective because "the legal and administrative means through which welfare state programmes are implemented are not a passive medium with no properties of its own....they are linked with a practice that isolates individual facts, a practice of normalisation and surveillance..(which) ...Foucault has traced the reifying and subjectivising power of this practice down to its finest capillary ramifications in everyday communication.." <sup>326</sup> This subtle form of deformation of the lifeworld is less obvious than open exploitation and means that the overall goal of the welfare programme cannot be achieved by the putting the means in an administrative and legal form.

This dilemma facing societies in the West elicit responses, two of which are end parts of a narrowing continuum between neo-conservatism and conservative social democracy, in other words between the Conservative new right party and old Callaghan style Labour. As far as the latter are concerned they "are the true conservatives who want to stabilise what has been achieved ...(in order).. to find a point of equilibrium between the development of a welfare state and modernisation based on a market economy." <sup>327</sup> This removes from the welfare programme that residue of utopia associated with social labour, but also fails to realise the over intrusive nature of the welfare state as well as the fact that the social base of that sort of welfare programme is slipping away. With the latter, i.e. neoconservatism, whilst it is also oriented to industrial society, it is at the same time extremely critical of social welfare, seeking change along three fronts. The first of these critical re-adjustments is related to the introduction of a supply side economic policy which will increase the valorization of capital, even at the risk of higher unemployment. The second re-adjustment is tied to removing large sections of the welfare state from public will formation in order to achieve two sorts of savings: a reduction in the provision of certain services and a reduction in the cost of legitimating services. Finally cultural policy is re-aligned to achieve the discrediting of intellectuals as those over encouraging a post material, unproductive, Enlightenment based critical valorization, and to achieve the backward looking resurrection of traditional culture. This certainly has a resonance with the previous Conservative government's cultural programmes and agendas, such as demoting the social "sciences", the narrowly conceived National Curriculum in schools etc. It is certainly true in the UK that neo-conservatism did "find a base in the bipartite segmented society" <sup>328</sup> it promoted, as evidenced by the eighteen years of control of the UK government. To that extent the broad outlines of Habermas analysis appear to be borne out by the empirical evidence of the rise within the UK of the new right to power.



The question, however, is how local governance fits into this theoretical schema. In part the answer to that lies in the particular configuration of the welfare state and local government in the UK, a historical development far more pronounced than in other European counterparts, whereby local government has assumed responsibility for large tranches of welfare resources which have a direct material impact on the well being of communities within its purviews. There is another specific relationship linked directly to the election of the '79 Conservative government, and that is to do with the media distortion of the public perception of local government because of the "winter of discontent" episode. In reality, then in the run up to that election the "malconstruction" of social welfare, local government and irresponsible trade unions had become firmly fixed in the minds of large segments of the public. But local government, especially in large urban areas in the UK also came to express the confluence of a number of differing but related influences, as outlined before: The rise of new left activists in the Labour Party to first step political office as councillors, the growing influence of race and women's equality as pursued through community pressures, and, initially, the geographical fallback political space of a demoralised Labour Party in opposition. There is a sense then in which it can be said, especially if we look at the politically colour coded local government map of the UK, that within certain urban areas, particularly those in inner city areas with large Black communities, local struggles around the legitimisation of a welfare project still nourished by a residue of a utopia of social labour, occurred. There is an element of truth thus in the media scaremongering of the "Red Teds and Kens" or the "People's Republic of Islington." But in seeking local legitimisation for the pursuit of a social labour imbued utopia of the welfare state, contra the national government, decisions were taken by the political leaders of the local polity, often strategic decisions, that this would require the engendering and positive racialising of that utopia, given the contiguous constituencies. This was not the seamless bases for new forms of solidarity, as envisaged by many local activists, but rather the scenario for debates, divisions, competition and, on the few occasions, allied solidarity, within the sphere of local governance. In terms then of legitimisation, the sorts of reasons for the fragmentation that occurred is exemplified by one of the then Labour leaders of a council who, in well intended but damning praise of his Principal Race Relations Adviser said, "At least he delivers the Black vote."<sup>329</sup> There is, however, another substantive theorisation side to this depiction of local government. This is to do with the fact that the ascendancy of neo-conservatism in national politics is based on the consensus breaking exclusion of the marginalised who "have no veto power since they represent a segregated minority that has been isolated from the production process....(to the extent that)....the established powers are less and less dependent for their own reproduction on the labour and willingness to



co-operate of those who are impoverished and disenfranchised.”<sup>330</sup> It can be said then that the new right national governments’ policy of reducing public expenditure certainly was not threatened by these pockets of opposition; certainly not when measured against the power the state had and still has at its disposal. The threat lay more with the legitimation costs involved in attempting to secure support for national policies in a context within which there were still visible and vocal supporters of a labour based welfare. Incorporated in this oppositional space and voice were as well the realities of Britain as a multi-racial society, a vision that ran counter to the third aspect of neo-conservatism which is to do with recreating the white golden past. There is a linkage here as well with my own contention, briefly outlined in last chapter which derives from the Habermassian notion of social learning. This is to do with the contention that societies learn both technically and normatively in ways that can either progress or impede its development. Harking back then to the Arendtian conceptual linkage of the development of state bureaucracy, colonialism and totalitarianism<sup>331</sup>, it can be postulated that the development of neo-conservative policies on democracy and the local state have a historical resonance with the colonial state. It is within that sort of conceptual framework that I shall want to talk about later, in outlining the general characteristics of a racially inclusive form of local governance, the post-neo-colonial city in the metropolis. Habermas as well seems to be hinting at as much when he writes that “the pattern of relations between the metropolises and the underdeveloped peripheral areas that have become established in the international arena seems to be repeating itself within the developed capitalist societies.”<sup>332</sup> New Labour then, despite its renewing democracy posturing, is still a defensive reaction to the changing constellation sans any utopian content. Labour has become part of the neo-conservative programme - “humane Thatcherism”, as Hall so aptly puts it.

Whilst during the eighties and nineties the accelerating neo-conservative programme of deregulating local government, alongside other sectors of the welfare state, aimed at reducing the cost of legitimation, there was in reality, an actual transfer of costs to new legitimation processes. At the level of secondary order legitimation areas previously under the control of local government were either removed or had put in place an intermediary accountability stage. Whilst these costs were thus no longer the provenance of local governance, they did not disappear in the ground swell of marketisation, which no doubt was the intention of the neo-conservative national order, rather they were absorbed into the national level of legitimation costs via new processes. In other words deregulation was not market inspired, it was politically inspired. Offe proposes a similar argument when he writes :



“In the name of increased economic efficiency and in the interests of an expanded freedom of economic action, the political theoretical demand for, and practice of, deregulation is directed at an alleged excess of state norms, rules and prescriptions.....There are theoretical-ideological affinities between arguments for deregulation..the political positions of neo-conservative ..parties..and ‘postmodern’ cultural phenomena which on both political and aesthetic planes promote flexibility and an ‘indeterminate evolution.’....In both cases the possibility of developing binding norms for action is disputed.”<sup>333</sup>

Offe goes on to argue, correctly I think, that the politics of deregulation require a massive state intervention. Whilst he does not specify as such the level of intervention, it is my view that, given its comparatively shorter time span, e.g. in the UK about fifteen years compared to the thirty years of welfare evolution up to 1975, is probably more intensive and intrusive than that which supports the regulatory welfare state. Offe sees the differences between the two “regimes” as being that of between “commission” and “omission” where the latter “involves nothing more than the negative decision no longer to regulate the activities and life chance of citizens through ‘tutelary’ prescriptions, prohibitions, price controls and decrees, and to do so instead through the contingent dynamics of market processes.”<sup>334</sup> However the surety with which the proponents of deregulation laud the efficiency of the market is undermined by the performative contradiction that the “failures” of regulation did not self-correct themselves because of the dynamic of the “efficient” market; rather it required a political solution. Offe, however, appears to overestimate the efficacy of such a programme. Political programmes require political legitimation. Deregulation thus has four defining components. The first is that it relies just as much as the welfare state programme on policies, legal and other regulatory instruments. The second is that what emerges is not the pure, pristine market, but a politically supervised market. The third is that the programme gives rise to new forms of legitimation processes which, in many cases, shift from the local government scene, on to the national scene. I am thinking here about the manifold “accountability” facades, such as the National Audit comparative tables of targets, or the school performance tables etc., with which the neo-conservative programme hopes to secure the support of the populace. The fourth is that the supervised market turns out to be, because of the tutelary aspect, in fact a quasi-market, whose guardianship costs, not to mention legitimation costs, undermine the original intention of reducing absolute expenditure. Those who have moved from being “service managers” to “commissioning managers” in the reshaped world of social services in the UK, can attest to the new forms of controls presenting as accountability systems and thus new forms of cost, which the deregulated regime requires. Performance “facts”, the performance indicator (PI) syndrome, become the means by which the “quangoised” public sector in



general, and specific sphere of local governance become the ostensible bartering chips for national government legitimation as it seeks approval by measuring the performance of the welfare and public sectors against the standard of market efficiency. The state can hold up these one sidedly derived “facts” as a means to both point to successes and to spotlight areas that require further state action. Thus whilst between 1979 and 1997 the level of central government funding allocated to local government in terms of direct grant funding fell - a legitimation plus for them given their neo-conservative manifesto - the re-accrual of other costs via other means as the state assumed responsibility for policing deregulated areas means that the actual level of savings is small. In the absence of a written constitution, local governance is now, far more than it was in 1979, effectively constituted through a battery of centrally derived pieces of legislation all aimed at politically deregulating its areas of activity. Whilst, at the secondary level, because of the successive election victories of the Conservative Party, and latterly new right Labour, whose programme with regard to local government is even more centrally directed, a claim can be made for this state of affairs being legitimated, at the primary level this new central guardianship of local government, falls far short of having its legitimation claims redeemed. In terms of Habermas’ theory of proceduralist democracy, “only the state as a political system invested with decision making powers can “act”...(Where)..its action is legitimate only if the formal decision making procedures within the constitutional state have a discursive character that preserves under conditions of complexity the democratic sources of legitimacy in the public at large.”<sup>335</sup> Certainly as far as the national government’s state action towards local government over the eighteen year period is concerned, this was not the product of discursive practices, other than those limited debates with various right wing think-tanks, but rather the outcome of parliamentary diktat. If the participants’ views, an operational principle which under-girds Habermas’ substantive discourse principle, is absent from the process of decision making over local governance, then it is even more markedly absent from the panoply of laws that have come to surround local government. Thus, “legitimate law must pass a discursive test that potentially engages the entire range of different types of discourse...(including)...moral and ethical discourses...(and)...’pragmatic’ discourses in which alternative strategies for achieving a given aim are assessed..”<sup>336</sup> In other words the law used by the state must be legitimated through a “broader discourse of citizens and their representatives.” In the absence of the latter the state has to continually renew the built-in obsolescence of its instrumentalised legitimation programme, thereby incurring more costs.

What then about those localised areas where, under the vision of a welfare state still imbued with the utopia of social labour, the variegated attempts to combine that with race and gender - the subject empirically of this research



project - as an opposition and alternative to the neo-conservative vision were being played out? This is a question made even more important in relation to a Habermasian analysis because it is in those localised areas, those where local issues of democracy and services inter-relate, that the development of the inter-face between lifeworld and system is enacted. A large part of the answer to that question resides in looking at the changes that affected the Labour party in that same period.

If 1979 is the watershed year for the formal elevation to power of political neo-conservatism in the UK, then 1987 is the watershed year for the Labour Party in its evolution into a social democratic mimic of neo-conservatism. The so-called London Loony effect and its role as a media inspired misrepresentation of London Labour councils in the developing “narrative” of what the nation had in store if Labour won the election, appears to have been pivotal in allowing the new right wing in Labour to assume overall control. The “Loony” tag was a not so subtle reference for the equality priorities and initiatives of these councils, particularly race equality initiatives.<sup>337</sup> It cannot be said that the Labour party nationally was responsible for directing the changes at the local party and government level, though there is substantial evidence to show that a lot of arm twisting and ideological strait-jacketing did go on, e.g. the imposition of Kate Hoey in the Vauxhall constituency. It can be said, however, that the “modernising” impetus the loss of the election gave to the Labour party allowed it to confluence with other related “progressive” processes all aimed at reconstructing new forms of legitimation for the state; new forms which are based on the technocratisation of political accountability. Whereas, thus, as I shall argue later, there was a window of opportunity provided by the equality era in local government to begin looking substantively at new forms of inclusive political legitimation for local government; forms in which the co-ordination of action could be achieved through non-distorted communicative processes, themselves deriving from reconstructing inclusive utopias and therefore recasting local governance structures, this potential was elided by the Labour Party through favouring an over instrumentalisation of the public sector, and, inter-alia, local government as well. What this amounted to was the abandonment of the utopia of social labour for the “new obscurity”.

Which other related tributaries formed this confluence referred to above? In the main these derived from the almost compulsory techniques and instruments that flowed from the new right legislatively based restructuring of local government. These techniques were, and are, management accountancy ones which, in their operation and development, shifted a poorly defined arena of democratic accountability in local government into that of a finely tuned financial accountability system. The previously differentiated and differently valorised spaces of the public and private



sectors were now converging with the latter model dominant. If we put this convergence under the general rubric of the “new managerialism”, because that term has common currency with other forms of analyses which are attempting to make sense of the changes in the public sector, it allows us as well to enlarge on a Habermassian type examination of what I have already described as an over instrumentalisation of public sector processes and practices. Up to this point, as far as my research shows, the attempts to deal with this phenomenon in the public sector have, not surprisingly, been from a perspective that engages in a social labour based critique, and, thus by inference, hopes for a Lazarine resurrection of a social labour constituted new welfare system, even if the bases of that consensus is revitalised. For example the neo-Gramscian critique of Clark and Newman<sup>338</sup>, perhaps because of the limited bases to their analyses, rather states the obvious when they write: “The problems which the managerial state is intended to resolve derive from the contradictions and conflicts in the political, economic and social realms.....(resulting in)...the managerialisation of these contradictions: they are redefined as ‘problems to be managed’...(where)..terms such as ‘efficiency’, ‘effectiveness’, ‘performance’ and ‘quality’ depoliticise a series of social issues.”<sup>339</sup> That much is true. The key question however is not so much why this occurs as how this occurs, since it could be argued that these “transmogrifications” occurred as well under the old set-up and thus it would be reasonable to ask what marks this depoliticisation out from what happened previously.

The partial answer to that last question is contained within the following quote which stems from a post-modernist inspired analysis of current management thinking; an orientation which, as argued in earlier papers, at the general level identifies similar problems as that of critical theory but which, in terms of defining the solutions, differs markedly.

“Recently bureaucracy has suffered widespread denigration as a model for management; whatever role bureaucracy might have played in the past, it is not an appropriate template for the future of modern management, whether for corporate giants or the small and medium sectors. Yet, formal models of bureaucracy such as Weber’s always implied a highly developed liberal ethic of universal rights impartially applied without fear or favour. Bureaucracy always contained certain classically liberal guarantees, such as the promise of equality before the law. Bureaucracy, for Weber, was always a moral project....The triumph of economic over political liberalism places rights crucial to the political liberal project on the defensive. The attack on bureaucracy....has diminished rather than augmented or replaced core liberal values.”<sup>340</sup>

This seems a better contextual framework within which the claims of the new managerialism can be assessed because it is referenced backwards to the positive aspects of the “old order”, which can be stood against the modernisation and progress claims of the new processes and systems. The above quote can be re-aligned in Habermassian terms by noting that whilst



the bureaucratic mode was 'inefficient' and did 'intrude' into the private spaces of welfare participants, those areas labelled 'inefficient' did at least allow in some cases for the communicative action based discourses around issues requiring consensus. For example, the dismissal under the new managerialist regime of equality based employment procedures on the grounds that they cause conflict and are inefficient. Further, as I have argued earlier by looking at Offe, de-bureaucratisation has not resulted in "de-controlling" or "de-organisationalism", but in follow up forms which are differently constituted. Thus Clegg and Palmer, in the post-modernist look at management cited above, go on to pose a series of questions: "What is lost in the dismissal and critique of bureaucracy? What are the ethical bases of that which replaces it? What are the consequences, particularly for public sector management, of this denigration of bureaucracy?"<sup>341</sup> We begin to answer that by looking at a Habermasian based critique of managerialism and associated techniques, a critique which has been developed with reference to the private sector, but, which, with the colonisation, in Habermas' sense, of the public sector by such instruments, is far more pertinent and fecund than the critiques briefly introduced above. It also dovetails with, and begins to provide some of the detailed internal supports for my initial overall assessment that the new forms of control in the public sector rely not so much on traditional bureaucratic hierarchy and command, though these can also be called-up when necessary, but on value inculcating socialising processes that give rise to organisational totalitarianism.

Continuing with the metaphor of colonialism and its related concept of imperialism, the importation of second hand ideological technologies into the public sector is similar to that of the inequalities that inhere in the knowledge relationships between the first and third worlds - a facet of the "think global act local" perhaps. Such technologies come garishly packaged with endorsements and the critical processes giving rise to them are omitted from the accompanying installation guides. Thus the increasing inventory of techniques - quality management, strategic management, human resource management etc. - have been taken up not only uncritically in the public sector but without much regard for the history of their evolution in the private sector. In opening their account of critical management theory and studies, Alvesson and Willmott comment, in relation to the private sector, that, "the last ten to fifteen years..(have seen)..old certainties about 'how' to manage...unsettled by a number of developments...(such as)....increased concerns about the 'ethics' of business and management, the social and ecological consequences of economic activity, the widening application of information and communication technologies and, not least the commercial success of 'new'[e.g. Japanese] philosophies and practices."<sup>342</sup> Within such an environment of uncertainty and potential for change, management 'guru' texts, usually empirically challenged, ethically precarious and theoretically inconsistent, have tapped into a particular climate which has



resulted in massive sales of these products. The “In Search of Excellence” book published in 1982 and, six years later highly influential in the emerging neo-managerialist drive in local government, is a good example of this.<sup>343</sup> Such texts promise(d) much in relation to new ways of thinking and doing management so much so that a subsequent book by one of the authors of the ‘Excellence’ text entitled his follow-up endeavours “Liberation Management”.<sup>344</sup> The reality however, is that despite the appropriation of critical words such as “empowerment” and “liberation”, these works are “actually preoccupied with preserving established priorities and privileges.” Alvesson and Willmott note that the term ‘manage’ is derived from the Italian word ‘maneggiare’ which means to handle horses.<sup>345</sup> This etymologically rooted ambivalence about the object of such practices has carried over into the evolution of managerialism which, despite the fact that it is readily acknowledged that the most recurrent problems in this sphere of activity are people centred, has shown instead a proclivity for “identifying and legitimising technologies of management control.” Alvesson and Willmott go on to take apart critically orthodox notions of management noting that current theory and practice is based on a narrow conception of reason - instrumental reason. Other management theory commentators have identified a similar problem, viz. the consideration “of many deep-seated features of organisational life - inequality, conflict, domination, subordination and manipulation is neglected or suppressed in favour of behavioural questions associated with efficiency and motivation.” Whilst, as shall be shown, these and other deficiencies are prompting a re-think about the so-called “scientific” nature, and by implication, neutrality, of management, these techniques are being brought into the public sector on the explicit back of those latter “virtues” as the cleaner, more technically advanced managerial way of doing things. Very often there is the claim that these techniques are better than, and will sort out for managers, the “messy”, “inefficient” bad old ways of doing things; a claim that has the narrative sub-text that managers no longer have to concern themselves with the old equal opportunity agenda of inequality, conflict, domination etc. What is being presented to the public sector then is a one sided notion of management - the “facts” of the new management, if you like - which in fact hides the actual “confusion and uncertainty about what management is.” Alvesson and Willmott are correct thus to say that management is being “presented as a technical activity” which is “blind to the social relations through which managerial work is accomplished, “ and that this technical representation of management “creates an illusion of neutrality.”<sup>346</sup> This illusion not only masks, but contributes as well to the non-resolution of the substantive problems and challenges “associated with organising everyday tasks...where there are divisions of class, gender, ethnicity etc, between managers and managed” to the extent that it is not realised that “whenever communication between managers and managed is impeded and distorted by institutionalised forms of domination, co-operation is conditional and precarious.”<sup>347</sup>



How then is this relationship of distorted communication maintained by the prevailing orthodoxies of management? Two broad interlinked and related processes are seen to be underpinning this which in the end give rise to a fourfold characterisation of current management theorisation and practice as instrumental reasoning. This descriptive paradigm is seen to fit both the “hard” schools of management, i.e. those which see management as a “science”, and the evolving “softer” ones, i.e. those who frame management in more “humanistic” terms. In relation to the two broad themes, these are seen to devolve upon the inter-related notions of “rational progress” and “expertisation” which can be analysed in managerial thinking. Both schools, but particularly the “scientific” school make unredeemed claims about the modernised and modernising ever more rational world we live in; claims which assume we live in a better managed, i.e. more efficient and effective, world. In this assumption the manager emerges as the “expertised” hero; the latter appellation because the first syllable is assumed to be the substantive reality in practice. As Alvesson and Willmott describe the scene, a description which captures the unfolding managerial narrative in local government, professional “managers ensure that the claims of all groups are effectively acknowledged, rationalised and satisfied” so that the needs of the organisation can be better met by the “replacement of amateurs by ‘professionals managers’ who are in possession of the requisite expertise.”<sup>348</sup> Societal progress is too narrowly conceived in a way that conflates such vision with the advance of capitalism. Even within the more humanistic thinking on management where in some texts it is acknowledged that social and political forces operate within an ideological framework, the purviews of those forces are contained within the organisation. That is to say politics becomes reduced to the micro-politics of positioning within the organisation which of themselves still leave unquestioned the key problematic of “management for what?” The rationality thus employed is also constrained. Thus it can be said that when managers working within this conceptual framework “devise or adopt methods on the ‘rational’ grounds that they are more effective or efficient, they implicitly endorse and legitimise a society in which it is acceptable to treat human beings as means rather than ends.” In other words it becomes acceptable to treat people who are managed as “objects” of management decisions who/which have no rights to participate in those decision making processes - not the “we” but the conventionalised “you” and “it”. Research quoted by A and W show that the political and moral context to management decision making is still dominated by a propensity for technique rather than critical reasoning. This could equally be said of the new managerial techniques of local governance where, for example, improving services to the communities have become funnelled through the bottleneck of TQM techniques, techniques which are more at home in manufacturing, and which, very often by retrospective comparison with the “bad-old-efficient-days” -



for which read 'equal opportunity times - are presented as a supposed advance on the community participative intentions of the equality programmes. Thus "the overriding emphasis upon seemingly impartial technique and procedure attracts support from shareholders, (and in the public sector politicians) because it seems to define the limits of managerial discretion....(as well as securing).. the social position of management....(as the)...impartial [apolitical] expert whose skill is deemed to be of critical importance for the maintenance of modern complex societies."<sup>349</sup>

Certainly the process of depoliticisation of employees in the sphere of local governance over the last decade is very much evident. On the other hand the managerialist cheerleaders can point out that these techniques, new to local governance, have been introduced replete with their accompanying claims of "empowerment", "leadership" not to mention "valuing" employees and welcoming "diversity". A and W are clear that these so-called 'progressive' accounts of management actual seek to achieve no more than "supplementing and revising established means and recipes of management control...with the strategic re-engineering of employee norms and values in line with the 'new concept of strategy' and the 'legitimate problems and solutions'...(thereby giving rise to a process in which) a technocratic ideology of management is effectively reinforced, not challenged."<sup>350</sup>

These two broad dimensions of current management thinking and practice are the bases upon which to derive a Habermasian style fourfold characterisation of management - management as distorted communication, management as mystification, management as cultural doping, management as a colonising power.<sup>351</sup> A and W create these categories of critical management metaphors as a counterpoint to the prevalent metaphorical frameworks which are dominant in management theory. These usually allude to images of cleancut engineering processes, or to organicist notions, or to militaristic yearnings. The common thread is that all seek to achieve the "portrayal of organisations as robust, stable, unitary, apolitical and fundamentally conflict-free phenomena." Habermas himself in his later clarification of TCA - a clarification that does not undermine the original intention of TCA which is to critique functionalist reason - notes that:

With systems theory, the phenomena...are described in a manner independent of the language and self-understanding of the actors. The objectivating change in stance triggers off an alienating effect, repeated with each individual systems-theoretic description of a phenomenon previously grasped from the participant's perspective."<sup>352</sup>

Management as distorted communication mirrors my own interpretation of experiencing the introduction of these management techniques new to local government; distorted insofar as the management that constitutes and is constituted by these, privileges instrumental rationality. The over attention to means, which, for example, is evident in the intensive investment in neo-



managerialist systems in local government, becomes and will become, an end in itself. The key point is not that instrumental action is of itself “bad” - its potential to organise resources is a positive - but that instrumental rationality in the absence of practical reason gives rise to the situation in which “the legitimation of managerial rationality through the dominance of technical interest necessarily produces systematically distorted communication insofar as all forms of discourse are made sense of via the interpretative template of technical-rational knowledge.”<sup>353</sup> Habermas’ four conditions of communicative action are certainly not met here. Thus despite the ‘progressive’ claims made as well about such values as the “learning organisation” - very common now in attempting to fine tune local government - these forms of communication do not enhance the process of social learning. A and W perceive modern corporations, and to which I would add increasing larger parts of the public sector, as “proto-totalitarian institutions insofar as they assess the value and relevance of all contributions in terms of the monolithic template of technical-rational knowledge.”<sup>354</sup>

The mystification of management and the creation of a managerialist mystique, itself a subtext of distorted communication, has gathered a constitutive momentum in the public sector, propelled by the inter-acting constituencies of local government, intellectual support agencies, such as the LGMB, politicians, and the ‘auto-momentumised’ careers of newly constituted undemocratic “leaders” of management in the public sector. Management, then, is “an institution whose agents mould and influence people’s beliefs, meanings, values and self-understandings.”<sup>355</sup> The array of neo-mystifying elements that appear to undergird the developing symbolic orthodoxy in local government can be clearly seen in the manifold advertising literature which local governments appear to use to communicate with the internal workforce and local population; and in many instances these are acts of substantive communication insofar as they deal with areas that would be best handled discursively. But the two groups of addressees require respective legitimating discourses which are not necessarily complementary, and in many cases are contradictory. For example, employees are promised flexibility, creativity and flatter hierarchies, whilst the local electorate are siren songed with leaders and executive directors. However as A and W comment in relation to the private sector, but which is equally applicable to the public sector, this attempt to create order in a period of uncertainty for both employees and communities comes into conflict with the lifeworld expectancies of the individuals in those constituencies who bring into the pristine world of clear strategy notions of fairness, justice, etc. To this may be added that this is particularly so of Black people and women. Ultimately however hierarchy re-establishes itself through the de facto right of managers to “decide how and when people are truly themselves and what counts as being creative”.<sup>356</sup> Nowhere is the critique of mysticism more pertinent than in the area of marketing. A and W point to the



‘representationalness’ of marketing insofar as it “represents itself as a technically rational apparatus for closing the gap between producers and consumers by identifying and satisfying the customers needs”<sup>357</sup>. Its uncritical transference to the sphere of local governance has meant that at a stroke previously transitivised users and community members had become instrumentalised customers with a uni-dimensional relationship with the local state with the implied brokerage via the medium of money. Marketing is now a required skill area for many local authority jobs both in relation to employees and so-called customers. Thus for example within one of the new technical orthodoxies, Total Quality Management, there is the attempt to “induce employees to identify themselves as customers within a supply chain.....Their intent is that employees should derive a sense of self esteem from the service given to the next person in the chain rather than from the intrinsic meaning or pleasure associated with the work they do....In such programmes metaphors such as ‘team’ and ‘customer’ are mobilised in ways that mask and mystify more or less intentionally their embeddedness in and contribution towards relations of domination and control”.<sup>358</sup>

The third managerial metaphor, management as cultural doping, gains greater prominence within the public sector if set against the developing past decade’s tide of core values, mission statements - even up to the Foreign Office - which has swept over the various agencies of the public sector. These narrow band of values, invariably defined unilaterally by management, are the ones which the organisation attempts to socialise employees into. They are there to define the parameters of the employee’s belief and orientation to the organisation. Increasingly then, and particularly so in local government, there is the attempt to extend the organisation’s reach into the psyche of the individual so that a new form of control emerges. Despite the claims made for liberation, flatter hierarchies etc, and where, within that idealised context the notion of new values as a guiding template might gain some currency, very few local authorities have actually deconstructed their bureaucratic hierarchies. These imposed values, then come to rest on top of the existing forms of control; they in, effect, mediate the communicative space between managed and manager. In one local authority which has seen an accelerated development and implementation of these sorts of techniques, stress amongst staff has increased to such an extent that the council was forced to buy in stress counselling services.<sup>359</sup> A and W point to the role marketing has in assisting the cultural doping phenomenon in the private sector because it is “involved in producing and governing people as their sense of personal identity becomes closely associated with, and dependent upon, what they own and consume.”<sup>360</sup> Likewise in local government the attempt by many to market the organisation and services to both the local communities and employees, an attempt to secure legitimation not through discursive practices but through the representation of efficiency and effectiveness, is done so with the aim of



socialising the target viewers and audiences into the values of the organisation. In two of the target local authorities, one of the phenomena that has occurred and which has been highlighted particularly by those who are managed, especially Black employees, is the increase in the number of white women senior managers, often displacing Black senior managers, and who are perceived to have got there through their involvement in relevant networks within the sphere of local governance, sometimes crossing over into that of the new Labour Party networks. What has been noticeable is the extent to which for these managers there appears to be the identification with the organisation through an implicit dress code which they adhere to and which has been tagged, by their underlings, "power dressing."

Finally, in presenting management as colonising power, I agree with A and W when they write:

"Colonization describes the way that one set of practices and understandings which are strongly associated with instrumental reason that is dominant in the organisation and management of complex systems comes to dominate and exclude other practices and discourses that are present within the everyday cultural media of the lifeworld where human beings develop their basic sense of being purposive, wilful subjects with distinctive social identities. Instead of understanding social phenomena from the cultural perspective of the participants, instrumental reasoning represents these phenomena as impersonal interchangeable elements of the system."<sup>361</sup>

The one classical example that springs to mind, and which is drawn from the principal authority in the empirical research, concerns the processes and machinations involved in the transformation of the then separate race and women's equality programmes into a broad based equal opportunity programme. Whereas the former two programmes had attempted to develop around them relevant public spheres comprising of constituents from Black people and women, both employees and from within the local communities, the latter was based upon severing those links and upon treating the differing equality strands as equal value interchangeable management determined priorities. In other words, as Habermas has pointed out and as A and W making use of that insight, write, "in advanced capitalist societies the lifeworld is too often regarded as an irrational impediment to the perfection of systems' properties, or ...as a resource for breathing new life into tired bureaucracies"<sup>362</sup> Thus they conclude, with reference to the private sector, but which is of increasing relevance to the public sector, in particular local government, that colonisation occurs where "the current talk of 'business ethics' and of strengthening corporate culture to facilitate empowerment, trust and teamwork can be seen as a - largely synthetic - 'system' response to its own corrosive effects upon lifeworld values and practices."<sup>363</sup>



In sum Habermas' theories have been used to attempt to derive both an analysis of local government and a theory of local governance - the facts and norms parameters - which unlike the critiqued pF'sm and localism, is, no more than should be expected according to the fallibilistic tenets of his discursive ethics, inclusive of the experiences of Black people. In so doing it has been necessary to look at local governance at three inter-related theoretical levels - the meta-, meso- and micro-levels. Continuities have been sought between all three by reference to the existence of, potential for the existence of, denial of, or absence of, a framework for discourse ethics. That is to say "those rules and communicative presuppositions that make it possible for participants in a practical discourse to arrive at consensus.."

The meta-level has dealt with the "stepping-out-and-looking-back" theory of theories examination of enlightenment derived critiques of modernity, and within this are included the productivist analyses of modern capitalism as well as the post modernist approaches. Within this abstracted framework, the meso-level has, through examining state and democratisation theories, as well as referring where apposite, to the relevant empirical "facts" sought to outline the intervening range of theorisation which links the meta to the micro. Included in this has been an examination of the increasing undemocratic technicisation of local governance; an examination that does not rely on a last instance determination link with social labour. Finally the micro-level locates the actor in a communicative framework where there is the potential for inclusively examining issues of race and gender within the analytical categories of identity, individual and collective agency, and in a way that does not privilege through incorporation, one particular perspective. This brings this attempt to sketch out a Habermassian approach to local governance to the point where it is necessary to hold it up to that benchmark, i.e. race, against which the other main theories of local governance were measured. The claim has already been made that this approach allows for an inclusive examination of race, i.e. one which more successfully walks the boundary line between universalism and relativism. How then does one bring race into a Habermassian type analysis of local governance?

## **5.10 On Habermas, Race and Local Governance**

Earlier on in this part of the chapter I outlined Habermas' proceduralist model of the law, with particular reference to racial and cultural minorities. The discourse ethical principles underlying that hold as well, I contend, for the inclusive participation and co-determination of processes and outcomes by Black people in the democratic and institutional practices of governance. That is to say that any claim to authorial power, which implies therefore the right to act for people, which excludes Black people from having the equal right to participate in the practical discourse leading up to those actions, is



not valid and is, in fact, an act of domination. This is but a restatement of Habermas' meta-theoretical contention that the defining kernel of human experience is communication; a conclusion reached in a more abstracted rethinking and re-examination of Marx's idea of determinist social labour. In the section prior to this I, in an extension of Habermas' theory defined racism as "the maintenance of relations of force in the structures of communication through conventionalisation of biological differences or ascribed biological differences." Logically it therefore follows, as outlined earlier, that conflicts arise within multi-racial societies because different discourses, testing the right to participate, face the underdevelopment or absence of appropriate norms and structures that guarantee their participation. The key problem is not that of the respective cultures and their values, or for that matter the identity claims made by individuals therein, but of inequality.

At the meso-level, that is, at the level of the interlinking analysis of the institutional arrangements, the "race problematic" has been situated within the core problem of the modern state which is that of legitimacy. The only grounds for legitimating forces are the formal conditions for possible consensus formation. It was argued that, on the race front, two, possibly, three dimensions to legitimation could be traced. The first related to the then new right government's attempts to re-articulate the white nation and to use that as part of the centralising assault on local government. In deed management of the "race issue" was a core concern of government thinking vis-avis the management of inner city urban areas. The second concerned the pockets of local legitimation struggles taking place within local authority boundaries as the issue of race equality became a priority within many inner city councils. This was very much two legitimating forces clashing head on. The first finding expression through the government attacks on loony left councils, and in the case of the GLC actual action in the form of abolition, as well as through the distorted portrayal of race in local government through the right wing media. The second was expressed through the claims made for and on behalf of Black people by some local councils in that brief period, about the right to tackle racism. Whilst in the latter case there were a number of possible reasons for councils adopting race as a priority, as outlined earlier, by far the largest influence came about because of the collective claims made for racial justice by Black communities, claims which they wanted redeemed. Habermas, following Honneth, following the early Hegel, calls these claims, claims for "respect" where the converse, i.e. "disrespect" comes about because of structures and processes of communicative inequality. At this preliminary stage a number of redemptive spheres of action and re-action can be categorised, not necessarily in any order of priority, but simply as a heuristic accounting measure. It stands to reason, therefore, that the categorical distinction should not be read as an absence of inter-relationships between the action



areas. If these categories could be placed in any kind of order, then it would be that of those actions which fall under the area of secondary legitimation and those that come under primary order legitimation. In other words actions which are acceptable within the normative parameters of the liberal democratic state, and those which by their very nature seek to extend, or break those parameters. Obviously, as well, in ordering the actions thus, it is not intended to prefatorily infer that they can also be split into Black and white actions, but rather as shall be shown, there were any number of Black actions in the era under consideration which could not or did not want to, extend the boundaries of the given, and thus contributed as well to the demise of race equality in local government.

The first type of race remedial action can be ideal typed around those that sought to extend and run to the full the “liberal ethic of universal rights impartially applied without fear or favour” which supposedly inheres in bureaucracy and which the formative development of race equality in local government promised. These actions, because they were often structured within the normative framework of the 1976 Race Relations Act, could be accommodated within the elasticity of secondary order legitimation at the local level. Whilst the ethical promise of racially fine tuning bureaucracies still had run its course, i.e. such actions had not yet exhausted the spaces available, the frothy wake of these local churnings could be taken as the result of claims for racial justice being redeemed. For example, in the area of recruitment and selection, racially anti-discriminatory organisational rights, which ultimately owed their legitimacy to the support afforded them through having been formally approved through the decision making processes of representative liberal democracy, were enshrined in mandatory written procedures governing most aspects of recruitment and selection. In many authorities the involvement of race equality advisers together with ensuring that the relevant aspects of key documentation, such as the person specification, had explicit reference to the anti-discriminatory elements to and responsibilities of the job, meant that in the actual decision making stages of that process, a communicative discourse around racial justice was possible, involving as well in the interview stage, the actual applicant. This is not to say that these discourses were non-distorted, certainly not within the context of the relevant line management having the final decision. However it is to say that within the grey area of managerial discretion in local government bureaucracies was the potential to create a space, boundaried by written rights, within which racial conventionalisation in the structures of communication could be challenged. This was relatively successful in increasing the number of Black people employed in certain councils, even if there was the underlying anthrophagii accompanying their sojourn in local government of “not being good enough” - a throw back to the less-than-human trans-epochal unresolved problem. Where, in key processes, communicative spaces were created which influenced decisions,



these were never translated across the whole of the local government structure. Consequently, thus, as an example of one of the counter tendencies, Black employees, especially managers were expected, or, as some of them did, actually vocally carried into the structure, the intention to dispense racial justice. This often led to the simplistic equation that Black-bums-on-seats (BBOS) to the nth power is directly proportional to the level of racial equality in the organisation. The folly of believing that if the structure were filled with Black decision makers then racial justice would ensue, is but part of the leadership managerial myth in which those with delegated power within the bureaucracy can individually de-hierarchicalise it through force of will without structural changes inclusive of disarming the constitutive power of such structures. Within the broad context of the utopia of racial justice, a utopia which in the early part of the race programmes in local government had to ride the tension between competing utopias of social labour and women's equality, the limited spaces available for communicative discourse around the subject, meant that often defining the problem became conflated conventionalisedly with the possible solutions. Thus as examples of the latter tendencies, representationalised claims to a homogenised "Black perspective" as evinced by the groupings and organisations of Black social workers, or to essentialised ethnic characteristics, such as the all-beating-Afro-Caribbean child-rearing process, were common as proffered solutions; often proposed for implementation within the same relations of force structuring communication<sup>364</sup>. With the increasing rate of technocratisation of local governance throughout the late eighties and nineties, and consequently as the communicative spaces closed down - the depoliticisation of local governance - so the tendency to etnikfy increased. This, I would argue, is but one of the symptoms arising out of organisational stratification and the inter-relationship between that and Black social differentiation. Two areas need quick mentioning. The first is that of the converse of etnikfikation, which is racial conventionalisation. Of course the more obvious instances occur, i.e. those actions which are overtly racist. But these can be and are dealt with under the expanded written organisational rights which themselves are locked into the legal norms of the 1976 Race Relations Act. The more subtle ones are those that occur, often without the participation of Black people, and which are logically justified, sometimes within the parameters of the organisations own equal opportunity policy, but which, if not directly having an adverse effect on Black people, set up the conditions for that to happen later. The increasing use of business, the "need" for more skilled or qualified staff, a more consumerist approach to services, types of arguments from the mid-eighties onwards, are examples of this. Within those contexts it was, and is, quite easy to circumvent the normative framework of the legal obligations. The second area relates to that of Black employees, especially managers being in situations where it is easy to make decisions which favour systemic integration, e.g. individual career moves, or strategic purposive rational ones



which undermine race equality, and still self-justify those and/or make appeal to adherence to racial justice principles, through recourse to etnikfied socially differentiated value systems. For example, one Black manager in one of the target boroughs had the most appalling record vis-a-vis women, especially Black women, made some very questionable decisions in relation to the funding of certain Black groups, but also, within the organisation, made use of an "Afrikaanist" perspective to both ward off criticisms and to legitimate his actions to other Black staff and certain council members. One can see, therefore, why social integrative mechanisms, i.e. consensus forming, in this case around the issue of racial justice, have a critical tension-ridden interface with mechanisms of systemic integration, i.e. exchange and power mechanisms. One can begin to see the outline, as well, of the argument which seeks to analyse how systemic colonisation replaces the social integrative processes which are necessary to redeem the claims of racial justice made by Black people. It links back to the idea of functional rationality where the means of equalitating then, now become the empty ends of nineties local governance. It is possible for some local authorities to generate the virtual equality programme and profile without involving, where involve refers to conditions of force free, or reducing, communicative processes, Black people. The idea put forward earlier of "ethical" racism means that such organisations can create the ethical facade of respect for Black people which can, if necessary be tested, at relevant tribunals, and yet engage in acts of utter disrespect. Nevertheless, getting back to the idea of race remedial action which satisfied secondary level legitimation, there was a time in the early to mid-late eighties when, at the local level, such acts could be accommodated within the legitimating parameters of the local governance polity, the reactions of the media and national government notwithstanding. It is within this sort of framework that much of the empirical details arising out of the study of the target authorities can be analysed.

The second category of race remedial actions can be located within those that could be seen to wanting a more deliberative democratic communicative discourse. These can be placed more readily within the border areas of secondary and primary legitimation. That is to say they had the potential to raise fundamental normativist questions relating to legitimation. Within this paradigm can be placed all those actions which sought to allow the participation or bring to bear the views of Black people in and on the functionings, including the decision making processes, of local governance. These would range from the simple co-options to various committees, through the conferences and seminars organised around race related issues, via the written right, in some cases, specifying that all consultative and participative council processes must include the different Black communities, to the development of the various Black worker groups in the council and local trade union branches. Now, whilst it is true that in raising the utopia of racial justice as one of the major unresolved



transepochal problems of modernity, that this either places or always has the potential to place, primary legitimation questions on the agenda, it is not true that this will always occur, unless one sees Black people as the new historical agents of societal change, which I do not. These sorts of action, however, always contained the normative principle that Black people should be the equal participants in legitimation processes where the reasons for actions are the outcome of consensus arising from "the performative attitude of a participant in argumentation." Whether or not this was ever attained is another matter for the moment since what is important is that it is within this interplay of Black lifeworlds and the system of local governance that a nascent Black public sphere around race and the local state could be discerned. At this stage I will only outline the argument to be made that the window of opportunity for radically rethinking and reworking local governance along the lines of communicatively redeeming the claims of racial and gendered justice through a form of deliberative democracy existed, albeit fleetingly. Such a rethink, would as well have to re-examine ways in which the actual organisational structure could be made more democratic and accountable in recognition that "this mid-level range of institutions ...links the lived world of actors to the broader structures of society." The opportunity thus to test local government's truth, rightness, sincerity and understanding of racial equality and justice has never been achieved. In this sense, perhaps, can the decentering of the state be spoken about. The fact is that this utopia was deliberately suppressed in favour of an accelerated programme of economic rationality within local governance in order to satisfy short term secondary legitimation concerns, and thus in favour of the new obscurity.

There is a possible third area of action which cannot strictly be described as remedial because it refers to the action undertaken in the neo-managerialist era of the nineties. This new scenario cannot be equated with the old bureaucratic set-up. Instead, as has been argued before, a form of organisational totalitarianism has displaced the old bureaucratic, hierarchical form of power in which ersatz value laden organisational beliefs come to be the medium through which explicit financial accounting based management processes are legitimated both within and without local government. The re-energised mythology of management coupled with the complete capitulation to capitalist rationality, has thus given rise, not to the more-locally-accountable-decentred local government, other than in the crude *prima facie* hive-off of key services to the private sector, but to the creation of managerial fiefdoms. Within this race equality is no longer a priority, ostensibly, according to local politicians and assorted experts because of the progress made in the eighties, and that despite the continuous weight of counter-evidence detailing the prevalence of racism. In reality the strategic decisions taken, not taken conspiratorially so much as gaining increasing secondary legitimating momentum in the networks of local Labour power,



were that the Black vote either was not that important, or would not collapse if race was de-prioritised. This has, in essence meant cutting away the moral bases to such programmes by removing the rights and avenues for communicative discourse that evolved from these programmes. For example in one of the target boroughs, apart from scrapping all of their equality structures and posts, the union Black Workers Group has also lost their right to have time-off for meetings; their equality based employment policies and procedures have been scrapped and replaced with greatly reduced corporate human resource standards which managers have, in a context in which such responsibilities will be totally devolved to them, to adhere to, but without any direct organisational means of ultimately making them accountable.<sup>365</sup> Yet this organisation can still make claims to an equal opportunity policy and to an internal equality information system which can deliver “facts” about its equality responsibilities. This is but part of a process which can be witnessed in other local authorities where, on the race front in both a confirmation of the neo-conservative implications, and yet a mockery as well, of post-modernism, diversity is celebrated in explicit contra-distinction to race equality. It represents a clear move away from recognising and dealing with the collective nature of racism. However diversity, because it addresses the individual by claiming to meet the needs of individuals through positively acknowledging the unique diversity of each person, fits in well with the economic liberalistic individuating thought processes that inform current thinking on human resourcing, both in the private and public sectors. This is quite distinct from the individuation arising out of postconventionalisation. There is no longer recourse to arbitrating organisational rights or influencing fora, for Black employees, or for that matter recognition of group wrongs and experiences. The relationship between manager and employee, mediated, or “facaded”<sup>366</sup>, by the narrow band of organisational values, themselves supported by an array of new techniques, e.g. appraisal and supervision procedures, thematic focus groups etc., is all. In a sense this part of the implosion of the social labour, race and gender utopias in local government where the rights of employees, including their participative rights, have been suppressed as their increasing commodification - flexible working, sold off to private companies who win tenders etc. - renders them almost totally instrumentalised. One can well understand why, therefore, at the virtual level of reality, diversity fits in with the new talk of “liberation”, “empowerment”, “can do”, and “thinking the unthinkable”, because, like those terms, it time warps to the future by holding out the promise, in reality an empty promise, of a new one to one relationship of equals. The previous central drive on equality in local government has been replaced with an ad hoc, piecemeal approach given over to “fiefdoms” sometimes pursuing one-off projects, enough to keep the secondary level legitimisation needs of the local state vis-a-vis race ticking over. The moral argument for race equality, seen by leading human resource institutes and race bodies



as leading to conflict, has been replaced by the business argument in which it is clearly stated that “diversity is good for business”. But then, as other organisational studies have shown, conflict is actually good for organisations because, amongst other benefits, it demonstrates the communicative processes therein. We have moved, therefore, from actual remedies to virtual remedies because, in the latter case, the solidaristic grounds that make it possible “for participants in a practical discourse to arrive at consensus”, have been done away with. At this level, perhaps it can be argued that legitimisation for local governance is increasingly secured via the advertising and marketing techniques which were previously the sole domain of the private sector.<sup>367</sup> For example the CRE has instituted an annual local government set of awards for innovative race equality projects. These “certificates of race equality worthiness” are widely advertised locally by local authority winners and are prized visible legitimisation bartering chips. There are similarities with the profile of the “society organised through the primacy of administrative power ...(which).. must exhaust itself in a self defeating effort to control the discursive sources of legitimisation”.<sup>368</sup> This nascent model of defining and controlling totally the organisational culture and values as a key component of directing the legitimisation of the local state, comes to be repeated at national level in the late nineties with new Labour winning control of the government.

Is there a vision, therefore, a normatively based outline, of a racially inclusive model of local governance? The answer is “yes”, but only tentatively in the positive because of the critical ontological groundings of this type of analysis in which it is only possible to specify the impartial bases for inclusive communicative discourse. This might be best dealt with in the following two sections which both meta-critiques certain aspects of Habermas’ thinking, as was done with the other two theoretical models of local governance, and tries to move the argument forward.

# Chapter 6

## The Critique of Habermas

### 6.1 Introduction

Habermassian based critical social theory has been proffered as the best epistemological framework within which to develop a racially inclusive, i.e. racially non-exploitative and dominating, concept of local governance; certainly in contradistinction to the social labour based and localist versions which have gained the status not only of orthodoxy amongst leading local government theorists in academia, but, also have an underlying resonance in the policy and operational thinking on local governance in new Labour, both at the local and national levels. This postulated superiority has been, as well, affirmed through conducting a meta-level debate with the epistemological and on tological groundings to these theories and with post modernism, and, importantly, the way in which the two areas appear to overlap. However, in upholding such critical theory as providing the better bases for inclusivity, does not mean that it cannot, and should not be critiqued. Unlike the two other ideal type versions of local governance critiqued earlier, such is the breadth and many levels of Habermas’ theory - philosophical, sociological and political - and thus the ambitious potential, even if he himself has said it is but a modest goal, it has inevitably carried in its wake the necessary targeted criticisms of other thinkers that there are substantive critiques from both supporters and opponents. Within these notions of race, and, more generally “difference”, have been both implicitly and explicitly raised. As was done with the other two theories, these can be critiqued, although in the case of Habermas using a slightly different format, as shall be explained further on, utilising the same meta-critical matrix as shown in the figure below.

	<i>Democratic will formation</i>	<i>Organisation of governance</i>	<i>Organisation of welfare</i>
<i>Meta-theoretical considerations</i>	1	3	5
<i>Agency</i>	2	4	6



Since it is the intention to use the summary and conclusion part of the section on Habermas to explore developing a more critically honed inclusive Habermasian based argument, the substantive detail of each numbered element of the matrix will be unfurled and unravelled in this section through a de- and reconstructive examination of some of the key supporting and opposing critiques of Habermas' theoretical endeavours, drawing out the necessary race and local governance implications. Key to this, and it is as well the pivotal axis around which the practical versus the principled racially inclusive emancipation struggle plays itself out, is the extent of Habermas' concessions to systems theory. My contention is that addressing questions of race substantively as a core concern, and not marginisingly, means that any concessions have to be minimal. Since it has been posed, with regard to gender, by theorists like Fraser and Cornell, it can also be asked in relation to race, whether or not Habermas' universalism is universalist enough. If the criticism from feminist theorists is that the androcentric subject<sup>369</sup> is brought unwittingly into Habermas' communicative ethics and democracy, mainly because he apparently perceives feminism as 'particularistic', then there is the same fear that lurking in his theorisation, as well, is the ethnocentric subject. The latter issue is tackled head on by sympathetic commentators, like Young, Fraser, Honneth and McCarthy. However, as I argue, both the hare and the hounds share a similar problem. This is that their over culturalised theorisation of race leads either to the re-introduction of essentialised group identities, or the intimation that there can only ever be a heterogeneous, singular subject other. In so doing they underestimate and overlook the conventionalised forces of racism and the interim collective, but contingent, subject of 'Black'. They, therefore, it can be argued, unwittingly reproduce the fault they accuse Habermas' of, i.e. 'race' becomes particularistic. There are twelve crucial areas which are discussed below.

## **6.2 The Spacing between 'Fact' and 'Norm'**

### ***6.3 Is a Discursive Rational Offensive Against the System Possible?***

This can be examined in more detail by looking at the critiques of Dryzek and McCarthy both of whom, whilst they are highly sympathetic to Habermas' project, nevertheless feel that the original overall radical thrust has been blunted of late.<sup>370</sup> Dryzek, whose work Benhabib rates as one of the best exegeses of what discursive democracy in practice would mean, begins by drawing a parallel between Habermas' bifurcating notion of communicative action as residing in the lifeworld, as opposed to instrumental reason and the systemic world, and Arendt's idea about authentic politics contrasted to the concept of "social category." Both dichotomies either directly, in the case of Arendt, or implicitly in the case of Habermas, argue for a separation of the two. Pace this, Dryzek seeks to

establish a theory of discursive rationality that “should be expanded into things “social” and “systemic” to the extent that he does not seek “to defend the lifeworld against further ‘colonisation’ by the system but to conduct a counter-offensive by taking discursive rationality to the heart of the ‘enemy’s’ domain.”<sup>371</sup> It is clear that Dryzek thinks that Habermas’ distinction between social and systemic integration, and inter alia the different types of action associated with it as having been drawn too rigidly; that despite Habermas’ insistence that it is but a categorical distinction made for heuristic purposes. However, in Habermas’ analyses in TCA, it is clear that the distinction appears to be invested with some ontological reality since at that stage Habermas seems to be pessimistic about the possibility of democratising the administrative systems of the welfare state. Thus in posing the question of whether or not discursive democracy “can..be a material force for emancipation in a hostile world”, Dryzek assesses Habermas’ theory as being too liberal insofar as his ideas have been “assimilated” by liberals. Thus, “the standards of communicative rationality advanced by Habermas”...(are used by liberals)... to justify not radical alternatives to liberalism but a liberalism of participatory dialogue, civic virtue and public responsibility...(so much so that even)...Habermas himself eventually found it hard to resist the liberal embrace.”<sup>372</sup> Dryzek’s critique picks up on my own slight apprehension at reading Habermas’ work and which is that at a first glance it can lend itself to a reality level interpretation. This is particularly so in his latest work - BFN - in which he appears to be arguing for model of constitutional democracy that is too close to the liberal model. It is little wonder then, that local governance theorists, like Stewart, can appropriate his work “inappropriately”. The core question is whether or not there is something substantively inherent in Habermas’ analyses, particularly his distinction between social and system integration, a distinction that goes to the heart of the major Western philosophical and sociological problematic by keeping alive the reconciliation leit motiv, which either lends itself to this interpretation, or, more tellingly, means that it can offer no more than that.

This, then, is the subject of McCarthy’s critique of TCA, and particularly the degree to which social and systemic integration are, as he reads TCA, theorised as almost mutually exclusive. It would be as well to detail McCarthy’s critique because it will serve to both preface Habermas’ then immediate response to it and also, to offer a critical template against which to assess the extent to which Habermas in his later, BFN, actually accepts the validity of that critique. McCarthy’s position, certainly as the producer of one of the most sympathetic and detailed pre TCA introductions to Habermas’ thinking in the English speaking world,<sup>373</sup> is not that dissimilar from Habermas’ overall position. If anything he is more daring in his emancipatory vision. He starts by drawing out Habermas’ intention in the second volume of TCA which is to re-evaluate and re-integrate Weber’s



analysis of rationalization into a Marxian framework and by so doing “develop a more adequate version of the theory of reification.”<sup>374</sup> Unlike the earlier Frankfurt school theorists of Adorno and Horkheimer, who in their later work, presaged the post modernism of Foucault by abandoning the “emancipatory potential of modern rationality, Habermas views the current sociopathologies as being due to “the peculiar nature of capitalist rationalisation....(and therefore).....treatable through transforming the capitalist relations of production. The three core aims of TCA are, as McCarthy sees it, to move away from a philosophy of consciousness, and the the notion of a historical subject, to a theory of communicative rationality, to “go beyond the action-theoretic conceptualisation of rationalisation in Weber and his Marxist heirs, back to Marx, in order to recapture the systems-theoretic dimension of his analysis of capitalist society”, and, to reconstruct a critical theory of society “which reconceptualises reification as a ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ by forces emanating from the economic and political subsystems.” It is with the latter two aims, especially the extent to which they appropriate systems theory, that McCarthy detects weak spots which detract from the declared emancipatory potential of Habermas’ theory by circumscribing the mutability of systemic action areas. In his earlier writings Habermas had been concerned to “dispel the spectre of a cybernetically self-regulated organisation of society”. In TCA, according to McCarthy, Habermas comes to terms with this ghost by negotiating a pact with it which, unfortunately, “cedes too much territory to systems theory” leaving “critical theory in an unnecessary defensive position.”<sup>375</sup> McCarthy’s tack, in criticising certain aspects of TCA, is to contrast Habermas’ position in that work with the one perceived to be emerging in TCA. On the basis of this there are two important areas of social analysis which are identified as conceding too much to systems analysis, viz. organisations and the political system. However against this unlike Habermas’ earlier view in Legitimation Crisis of the normative potential, the realistic utopia, of lifeworld agency determining systemic agency, McCarthy identifies in TCA Habermas’ insistence that “however fluid, fleeting flexible action in organisational settings may be, it always transpires ‘under the premisses of formal regulations which can be appealed to by members;” that is to say “members act communicatively only ‘with reservation...because they ‘can have recourse to formal regulations’...(and therefore)....they are not obliged to achieve consensus with communicative means.” McCarthy correctly draws on the work of organisational theorists who, from phenomenological, ethnomethodological and symbolic interactionist perspectives, have shown that “the formal aspects of social organisations - the rationally ordered systems of norms and roles, rules and regulations, programmes and positions - are only one side of the coin...(the other being the informal)....concrete norms and values, rituals and traditions, sentiments and practices that inform interpersonal relations within the organisation.”<sup>376</sup> The key question then

can be re-iterated and which is why should Habermas insist on the imperative of action being systemically co-ordinated within organisations?

Secondly similar arguments are raised by McCarthy with regard to Habermas' notion of the political system, and which in essence, is that the categorical distinctions between system and lifeworld, which Habermas himself regards as a heuristic device, is, within TCA, invested with too much of an ontological reality. For McCarthy the broad outline of Habermas' notion of the political system has six components. Firstly Habermas refers to the political system only within the context of social-welfare state mass democracies. Secondly the areas of the state administration or administrative system, are outside of this context. Thirdly, this seems to dovetail with systems theorists' narrow distinction between administration and politics. Fourthly this differentiates out a restricted notion of the political as that being associated with the elective functions, and the administration as that being associated with the appointed elements. Fifthly this ends up as a picture of the political system in which there is an "administrative bureaucracy responsible to elected officers....(standing)...in relation to other parts of society via the interchange of inputs and outputs." Sixthly the political system is substantively different to the public sphere insofar as the latter belongs to the lifeworld and is thus oriented to mutual understanding, whilst in the former "interaction is systemically integrated, formally organised and media steered". Even allowing for the circumscriptive notion of the political system which Habermas seems to favour, McCarthy is right to ask whether or not "interaction within large administrative bureaucracies (is) co-ordinated via functional effects rather than via the orientations of actors?"<sup>377</sup> Indeed Habermas himself in TCA has drawn the distinction, as a means of illuminating the difference between communicative and strategic action, between normatively authorised and simple imperatives. Thus it is reasonable to logically go on to theorise, as McCarthy does, pace Habermas' contention that organisational members act communicatively only with reservation, that there are circumstances where authority can only be exercised under conditions of co-operation and mutual understanding. The point of this part of the critique is to bring to the fore the fallibility principle of Habermas' theory which depends on real empirical investigations. Thus, again, whilst it can be conceded that economic and administrative processes and mechanisms are required in complex societies which do not require consensus, as is the requirement in some circumstances for representative democracy and allied public administrative apparatus, it cannot be concluded that the requirement for these formal organisations therefore mean a systemic imperative for the whole of these areas. In other words can it be argued that Habermas, in TCA, has taken over so much of systems theories that he runs the risk of a teleological prescription of what ought - i.e. as asked earlier - which rules out the full emancipatory potential of his own theory? McCarthy holds TCA up to the promise of LC and



elsewhere in which Habermas voices the oft declared option for some form of participatory democracy noting that “if self determination, political equality and the participation of citizens in decision making processes are the hallmarks of true democracy, then a democratic government could not be a political system in Habermas’ sense- that is a domain of action differentiated off from other parts of society and preserving its autonomy in relation to them while regulating its interchanges via delinguistified steering media like money and power.”<sup>378</sup> The key feature is not to attempt to prescribe the forms this democracy might take, but to re-emphasise Habermas’ own contention that “this is an open question that can be decided only through learning processes that test the limits of the utopian elements of our tradition.”<sup>379</sup> Thus for example on the issue of democratising the administrative planning process, as exemplified in the work of Forrester.<sup>380</sup> McCarthy indicates that even if it is less effective in an instrumental sense, one of the crucial alternatives being denied in the neo-managerialism of local governance, “it may be favoured on other grounds.” Increasing complexity of the system is not the only measure of progress, and to try to impose this must run in the opposite direction to “Habermas’ own principles....(that system complexity)...be subordinate to communicative rationalisation of life as a measure of progress.” Finally the nub of McCarthy’s critique is contained in the last two sentences of his piece.

“Habermas once criticised Marx for succumbing to the illusion of rigorous science, and he traced a number of Marxism’s historical problems with political analysis and political practice to this source. The question I want to pose here is whether in flirting with systems theory he does not run the danger of being seduced by the same illusion in more modern dress.”<sup>381</sup>

The last question echoes my own concerned question earlier about whether or not Habermas his latest work, BFN, actually constructs the gap between normative potential and liberal democracy too closely to the extent that the full range of emancipatory alternatives are effectively censored leaving us, as Dryzek thinks, with an a priori liberally shaped constitutional democracy. Does this occur, therefore, because of what McCarthy has described as the seducements of systems theories? The questions become even more pertinent when placed in the context of race and women’s equality, especially within the wider milieus of local governance and the public sector. Black people and women bring into organisations validity claims for racial and engendered justice which require redeeming within the responsibility remit of the organisation. In so doing they open up the prospect of re-enchanting and re-moralising the instrumentalisation of action. Some of these claims are anchored in the rights and obligations accruing from legislation. Some, however, are based on those organisations’ own publicly posted claims to treating their members - and here members is used loosely to refer to both employees and wider members of the public who have cause

to come into contact with that organisation - properly, i.e. non-oppressively and/or non-exploitatively. In fact it can be argued in the case of the public sector that there are inherent in the role and function of those organisations over arching ethical and moral claims, which more so than the “formal regulations”, are likely to be appealed to by both non-authoritatively framed employees and service users. However, these claims, which in reality, a reality established through empirical means, are hardly ever fully redeemed, and, as the daily struggle in the public sector over these shows, can only ever be redeemed under conditions of members acting communicatively. To subscribe, therefore, to the prognosed limitations on such actions in a systemic setting, as Habermas does, is to give veracity to those who claim that the technicised substance of policies, like equality ones, reflect the pre-ordained limits to such initiatives, i.e. as one councillor in one of the target boroughs put it, “You are not going to get anything further.” There is almost an air of Foucauldian Sisyphean pessimism about the perpetual hierarchies of power. Habermas’ then response to McCarthy’s critique can be read as disappointing, especially when he concludes that: “The normative criticism which McCarthy, Honneth and Joas make of what they presume are the conclusions to be drawn from my diagnosis of contemporary society proceed from a counter-model based in praxis philosophy....(which adheres)...to the untenable premise that it must be possible to conceive of the autonomous self steering of a complex society as self consciousness on a large scale.”<sup>382</sup> That is not the substance of McCarthy’s critique. On the other hand even in response Habermas, as McCarthy points out in his critical paper, “grants the premisses, but resists drawing the conclusions.”<sup>383</sup> Thus Habermas views the “borrowing” from systems theory as a pragmatic issue, and not as one of principle. Finally apropos McCarthy’s critique, Habermas contends that for empirical reasons alone, he does not hold out hope of the possibility of organisations, whether private or public, being solely democratically reshaped from within by means of worker self-management. But then neither was McCarthy. The thrust of TCA is not to provide a “defence of the capitalist labour market”, but to lay the framework for dealing with the core problem “of how capabilities for self-organisation can be developed to such an extent within autonomous public spheres that radical democratic processes of will formation can come to have a decisive impact on regulatory mechanisms and marginal conditions of media steered sub systems in a lifeworld oriented toward use values, towards ends in general...(to the extent that it will involve defensively)...holding the systemic imperatives of an interventionist state apparatus and those of an economic system in check.”<sup>384</sup> So, for empirical reasons the task is not to transform those systems, but to control them. However, this does not, if one runs with the normative potential of the principle, i.e. the transformation of “capitalist relations of production”, to put it crudely, as Dryzek announces he wants to, rule out seeking where empirical analyses demonstrate this to be feasible, the communicative rationalisation of those systems. What then are



these “empirical reasons”. Two main ones appear to be behind Habermas’ defensive formulation of the key tasks of critical theory in TCA. The first relates to the overall level of complexity of modern capitalist societies which makes the aim of a fully participatory democratic polity, if one then extends the notion of “workers self management” into this sphere, totally unrealistic. The other major reason relates to the stultifying effect the welfare state compromise has had on class conflict. With regards to the first one, it has already been shown that supportive critics like McCarthy do not envisage any kind of Leviathanic democratisation of the political and economic systems, but merely that the possibility of pursuing this goal where opportunities arise, should not be ruled out from the outset. With regard to the second, this compromise, which in any case has been wrenched asunder by the new right, and now new right Labour, did not necessarily include the dimension of race and gender. In fact, as I argue in the chapter on race and racism, it has fed into the anthropophagied transepochally unresolved representations of Black people. Racism, which Habermas does not mention other than in reference to the extreme neo-Nazi right, is not simply a matter of cultural disrespect. There are two related elements: one that can be labelled generally “abuse”, and that term is used loosely to include the mis-Representations of Black people from casual to extreme levels. The other is where “abuse”, consciously or unconsciously, is discriminatively related to actions which deny rights and resources, although it is recognised that the first one is a denial of the right to be treated as an equal human. The crucial point about racism, then, is that it is extremely difficult to separate out the socio-cultural aspects of action from the materiality of action, making the need, say, for example, in organisational settings, the transformation of systemic action through communicative rationalisation even more paramount. This immediacy of lifeworld and systemic clash, in Western democracies, might not be the case for class differences and exploitation, though the boundaries of the focus of class needs to shift from the national to global levels to obtain a better picture of the saliency or not, not to mention hue, of class conflict and exploitation. Thus one can understand why a more radical assessment of the possibility of transforming administrative and economic rationality slips from the horizon for empirical reasons. What is required is a re-assessment of such an empirical generated “realism” from a race and gender perspective because overlooked and incorporated in that compromise were, and are, inequalities of difference which, if systems are only to be influenced, will persist. To that extent McCarthy is right to remind Habermas about the blurred identities of seemingly triumphal systems, which, in contradistinction to the seemingly all powerful “system”, can presage as well, an actual collapse, or at least a substantial attenuation.<sup>385</sup>

It is worth examining this point in more detail, i.e. the differences, and in my view commonalties of communicative and systemic actions through the

critique of another theorist who can be described as sympathetic to Habermas. The purpose to this is not only to attempt to enhance Habermas in relation to the analyses of, and emancipatory potential for agency in local government, but more immediately to critically assess BFN in the light of these critiques and Habermas' own earlier work. Hans Joas, professor of sociology at Berlin Free University, has developed a critique of Habermas which is encapsulated in his description of TCA as "the unhappy marriage of functionalism and hermeneutics."<sup>386</sup> Joas in an exegesis of action, postulates a third model of action, over and above the predominant ones of "rational" and "normative" action, which he calls "creative action".<sup>387</sup> Creative action is seen as over-arching the former two and is "only inadequately expressed in the models of rational and normative action." Since both models appear to allocate the largest part of human action to this residual category, it is as well to simply define human action as creative. Within this context Joas, in dealing with Habermas, focuses on his trenchant critique of praxis and the production paradigm and which is based on Habermas' concept of the labour paradigm as being too limited because it cannot take into account the inter-subjective dimension of human experience. Joas identifies four main arguments which Habermas uses against the notion of praxis and the production paradigm. These are:

- ◆ that the labour idea is characterised by a romantic idealisation of artisanal activity
- ◆ that praxis philosophy rejects structural differentiations which cannot be brought into the acting subject's horizon of orientation
- ◆ that the normative postulates contained within praxis cannot be justified
- ◆ that for empirical reasons the production paradigm is outdated.<sup>388</sup>

Joas synthesises Habermas' critique into three conceptual strands: the empirical, the normative, and the action-theoretic. On the empirical side, rightly I think, Joas questions the validity of assuming the end of the production paradigm, especially if capitalism is put on a global scale. With regard to the normative aspect, Joas agrees that normative claims can only be validated discursively. However, even if the production paradigm, or "creativity" as Joas puts it, has a normative content which "cannot be brought to bear merely by establishing discourse which are justified by norms.....the lack of normative clarity in the concept of action as used in the philosophy of praxis tradition is (not) an action theoretical reason for not taking into account the definition of action on which the tradition hinges."<sup>389</sup> Finally on the action theoretic account, the differentiation between instrumental action contra objects and contra people, and between instrumental and communicative action, which Habermas makes, is not a sufficient basis upon which to make this distinction because these "do not



blur the differences between instrumental and communicative action, but instead set out to identify the characteristics common to all kinds of action, both instrumental and communicative.” There is a sense then in which Joas is asking whether or not the differentiation Habermas makes between the two types of core action as one of the main means to ensure that social differentiation is not, often, reductively simplified, does not end up, because the demarcation line is drawn too harshly, dedifferentiating types of action itself. Within the context of race and local governance where public administrative systems, their normative potential, Black lifeworlds and racially discriminatory conventionalisation coincide, this question does appear, from an emancipatory perspective, one that requires greater clarification. To do this requires that we examine the way in which Joas uses his preliminary critical insights on Habermas’ theory as a means for raising substantive queries about Habermas’ use of Luhmann’s system theory. In so doing Joas prefatorily makes a salient point, one which accords with my own unease at what appeared to be Habermas’ downplaying of the possibility of democratising the state and market in TCA, that despite the subtitling of TCA as “A Critique of Functionalist Reason”, the work in question still comes over as being too functionalist; and no more so than in Habermas’ follow up clarification where functionalist rationality which operates over and above actors’ consciousness is given some credence. In looking at Habermas adoption of some of system theory, Joas pinpoints the kernel of Habermas’ reasoning which involved being convinced by Luhman’s thinking on the limits of all sociological action theory. Thus:

“Given that the collective subject of a meaningfully constituted lifeworld, a concept borrowed from transcendental philosophy, has shown itself to be a misleading fiction, at least in the context of sociology, the concept of system provides a promising alternative. Social systems are units which can solve objectively presented problems through meta-subjective learning processes.”<sup>390</sup>

This dismissal of the collective subject tout court is perhaps too premature. Whilst in its essentialist form it is probably true that the collective subject is but a fiction, there still exist the case for using the notion of a collective subject in its critical form, as I try to delineate in the previous section with respect to the critical reconstruction of “Black”. A similar argument can be put together regarding the category and substantial content of “Woman”. One wonders, therefore, whether or not when developing his theory Habermas paid too much attention to the apparent empirical reality of the vanishing working class as a collective subject, though even here, this might not necessarily be the case as Western societies, and theorists, now grapple with the reality of global capitalism; an increasingly racialised imperialism. That aside, Habermas, according to Joas, more out of pragmatic considerations rather than principle, sought to resolve, by partially adopting systems theory, the following problematics:

- ◆ to move away from the notion of a history of a developing specied human subject
- ◆ to cope with the implications of the normative utopia which were aimed at the participatory democratization of all social processes
- ◆ to disavow the legitimation of super-subjects.<sup>391</sup>

With TCA the aim became more modest and which was to ensure that systems are under the control of the lifeworld. In so doing, whilst McCarthy has already argued that Habermas might be seen as arguing against any attempt to democratise the economy and the state, Joas, in similar vein, maintains that though Habermas has not jettisoned his “radical democratic convictions..... he confounds the general justification of the need for methods and techniques of social steering in the economic and political arena with establishing boundaries between lifeworld and the ‘monetary-bureaucratic complex.’”<sup>392</sup> Part of the reason for this is because the distinction between lifeworld and system is expected to cover so many different levels of logic: between the participant’s perspective and that of the observer, between orientation to action based social integration and consequences of action based system integration, between symbolic and material reproduction... In TCA, as Joas identifies it, Habermas works with a “critical”, as opposed to analytical, use of functionalism, and which Joas re-labels essentialist. Either way systems are seen to exist; they are endowed with ontology. The purpose of a critical use of functionalism is then, accordingly to “to express both the pathos of Marx’s critique of reification and simultaneously the radical break with a praxis conception of society which has become completely transparent to itself.”<sup>393</sup> In contradistinction to this, and noting that Habermas appears to have more in common with Giddens, Joas proposes that an analytical approach is more acceptable so that it is possible to develop “a social theory which is based on action theory..(and).. does not conflate functional analyses and causal explanations, yet contains the benefits of a controlled use of systems models.”<sup>394</sup> In other words there is implicit in what Joas conceptualises the notion that systems are more permeable, flexible and open to change than Habermas allows. This argument is substantiated by Cohen’s similar rethinking on discourse ethics and the implications for political forms.<sup>395</sup>

As shall be shown, the work done on local governance and race bears out both Joas’ and Cohen’s direct and inferred criticism of Habermas’ approach to systems and change in TCA. That is to say that the scope for transformative change within bureaucratic administrative and political, in the restricted sense that Habermas uses the latter term, systems is greater than perhaps Habermas anticipated. In running with this part of the critique of Habermas’ TCA, my own thinking, especially as it relates to race and local



governance and the relationship between those two, can be briefly delineated..

I want to propose the following, therefore, which I do not claim that Habermas does not intend, but merely that it is not clear why there should be his TCA pessimism of likely outcome given the potential of his base propositions. The proposition is supported, in part, by the solidaristic critiques of theorists like McCarthy, Joas and Cohen. The nub of this contention is that whilst one can talk of an uncoupling of system from the lifeworld, that the separation is at the categorical level, and that, thus, the actual “distance”, which Habermas’ implies grows with time, ebbs and flows critically to the extent that the everyday reality throws up an interwoven spectral range rather than two opposite poles. Beck is right, therefore, to talk about dedifferentiation as being one of the possible outcomes of capitalist modernisation which, I would further contend need not necessarily be regressive.<sup>396</sup> In other words bringing the system, or elements of it, under the control of communicative action might suffice if the differentiation levels are taken as given. On the other hand transforming the system, or elements of it, could possibly, with regard to the system, dedifferentially extend the domain of communicative action. This scenario which I think bears out the linkage between communicative and systemic action, i.e. purposive rational, attests as well to Habermas’ own contention that the system arises out of the lifeworld.

#### ***6.4 Transformative Action, or Action for Influence?***

In TCA Habermas relates the uncoupling of the lifeworld and system as being in theory unproblematic and that the problem develops because the rationalisation processes of the modern world have in actual fact led to the colonisation of the lifeworld by the system. This, as Cooke, correctly points out, Habermas regards as paradoxical because as modern societies develop so the lifeworld becomes increasingly rationalised; that is to say “the actions, practices, and interpretations of its members have become increasingly detached from established normative contexts and increasingly reliant on action oriented toward understanding.”<sup>397</sup> In summary then Cooke identifies three modes of action: communicative action which is oriented towards participative understanding and is internal to the lifeworld, strategic action which is also internal to the lifeworld and is oriented towards success insofar as participants instrumentalise each other to achieve such success, and the functional regulation of action consequences which are neutral in relation to actors values. There is a further qualitative differentiation that can be made between communicative and strategic action which relates both to their respective structural characteristics and the attitudes of the individual agents concerned. Thus whereas participants in communicative action have a performative attitude which is related to one of three possible conceived

worlds, i.e. rightness, sincerity and truthfulness, those in strategic action foreshorten these to just one; that of an objectivating attitude to an objective world which is solely concerned with the aspect of validity to do with propositional truth and efficacy. Are there any further clarificatory differentiations that can be made?

The answer is in the affirmative, especially as far as strategic action is concerned. Habermas appears to use the terms “purposive rational”, “instrumental” and “strategic” interchangeably. Within TCA the further differentiation out of functionalist reason from the broad spectrum of purposive rational action means that if, as is the intention of this part of the critique, we want to look at the transformation of such action, then it is important that a greater degree of precision is arrived at. For that purpose I propose, as Habermas and other commentators have, that purposive rational action “is important for material reproduction which takes place through the medium of goal directed interventions into the objective world.”<sup>398</sup>

Furthermore this form of action can be sub-differentiated into instrumental action, which refers to actors working on material things, as in production, and strategic action which refers to actors taking an objectivating attitude towards other actors, and by that is meant that ends determine means.

Functionalist reason refers to those conditions under which the strategic ends become the rationale for the means, i.e. it is a re-inversion of the ends-means relationship. This can only take place within the system and in one sense can be understood as heavily ossified strategic action which has been completely uncoupled from any communicative contexts. Such a refinement allows Habermas to argue, almost as if it is a re-enervation of the concept of reification, that such reason as the bases to regulating action consequences, bypasses actors consciousness.

McCarthy and Joas have criticised Habermas for being too cautious in anticipating the potential of his theories; and one can gain a sense of this in Habermas’ circumscription about action consequential co-ordination only being norm free in the last instance, a claim which belies his pessimistic assessment of radically norming such systems. Is it because Habermas bases much of his empirical observations on the situation in Germany, a country in which the bureaucracies of the national, regional and local states exhibit a high degree of stability, almost perhaps akin to the pre-crisis situation in the UK? In any event, despite Habermas’ denials, his work does imply, as Honneth as critically noted, that there is somehow an almost natural and painless transition from communicative action to strategic action systems to functional reason based co-ordination of action consequences. Honneth is correct in highlighting the absence of motivation in all of this.<sup>399</sup> For that reason I want to introduce two new types of action which both imbue the transitive sense of the word “to act” as well as the reifying sense of “being acted upon”. These are transformative action, a term used by



McClaren<sup>400</sup> in his critical assessment of Habermas and counterpointed critical support for Freire's radical pedagogy; and ossifying action, a term I've coined to try and capture the slippage and distancing of strategic action from communicative action, and functionalist co-ordination of action consequences from strategic action. If a further categorising clarification is carried out on organisational types, in a way that underpins my earlier query about the possible circumscribed nature of Habermas' underlying empirical observations, then the way is left open to outline a scenario of potential actor driven change within organisations, especially those which are directly linked to democratic processes. Pace, therefore, the current trend in public administrative studies in the UK to want to blur the distinction between public and private organisations, I want to maintain that distinction, as does the localist school. Further there are sub-distinctions which can be made within the two global private and public categories which are linked to the respective distances organisations have to the capitalist and democratic processes. On this basis we can then begin to say that capitalist multi-nationals, for example, are more likely to have action systems that are functionally co-ordinated, i.e. action systems which present and are accepted by those who are stakeholders, as norm neutral even though, in so doing, they actually mis-represent a highly technicised, instrumentalised vision of society. We can move on now to Habermas' intimation of the organisational aspect of local governance as being within the categorisation of an administrative sub-system; especially, in my view, the contentious notion that "the public opinion that is worked up into communicative power cannot 'rule' of itself, but can only point to the use of administrative power in specific directions."<sup>401</sup> My argument would be that this is too rigid a demarcation to make and that there is a continuum between administrative power and communicative power within a scenario of localised deliberative democracy, which makes it possible to talk about communicatively transforming non-communicative action. In fact there is a need to tease out fully the implications of Habermas 1987 TCA observation that "if all processes of genuinely reaching understanding were banished from the interior of organisations, formally regulated social relations could not be sustained, nor could organisational goals be realised."<sup>402</sup> This then would be to agree with Alvesson that we should analyse "organisations as structures of communication", but also add the necessary caveat that some categories of organisation have more potential to realise the "fundamental conditions of human communication,"<sup>403</sup> i.e. those which are linked to democratic processes, flawed as these might be.

This particular argument can be best illustrated by looking at the phenomenon of "institutionalised racism". A work-a-day definition, one that has probably emerged from the eighties equality era in the public sector and which in part owes some of its origins to American based work on organisations and racism, would be "those processes, practices and structures

in institutions which wittingly or unwittingly discriminate and oppress people on the grounds of race.” Whilst such a definition might do as a crude race based scanning device to use on organisations, its broad brush stroke means that it can be, and has been, held hostage to all sorts of possible solutions, the dominant one of which has been the liberal BBOS (Black-bums-on-seats) one, i.e. pack the organisation with as many Black faces as will be allowed. This quasi-essentialist definition does then provide some degree of truth for critics, such as the governmentality theorists, who attribute a metaphysical quality to it, and, counterpointedly in their insistence on empirical facts, confirm a “real politik” environment which downplays issues of race inequality in organisations. However if this is redefined in terms of communicative action, in a way that is an adjunct of my earlier definition of racism as “the maintenance of relations of force in the structures of communication through conventionalisation of biological differences or ascribed biological differences”, then it is only necessary to add “in institutions” after the word “communication” for there to be a better, and more specified definition. For example the attempts in various local government contexts to derive a more explicit and equality based recruitment and selection process were met by attempts within those organisations to justify the then current practice by an inter-related twofold naturalling argument. The first “justified” the practice as best and working, even though the evolutionary decisions governing the development of that practice could hardly ever be made explicit. The other, when it came to trying to deal with the obvious fact that the absence of Black employees meant that the system was not working, tagged on to that “justification” the racialised representations of “falling standards”, or “they don’t apply”, or “I know from a friend who is Black that Black people don’t want to do this sort of work” etc. What the first element of this “justificatory argument” shows is the extent to which in administrative systems, the structural legitimation of communicative distortions is not just, as Alvesson and Forester contend, about the “monopolistic distortion” of communicative exchange and “the ideological creation of needs”<sup>404</sup>, but also about the sedimented histories of previous communicative decisions where the ways of doing and the reasons for so doing have over time become detached from communicative processes. Likewise the second element demonstrates how communicatively unresolved trans-epochal racist conventionalisation, when allied with other forms of institutional structural communicative distortions, can “empower” those “disempowering” practices. It might be said, in other words, that the validity claims made by those practices, because they had remained unchallenged for so long, became “naturalised.” The changes brought about in the recruitment and selection processes in local government were, especially in the target local authorities under investigation, part of a wider response to the pressures brought to bear on the democratic processes by the local Black communities. If one looks at the remedial action undertaken in the R and S processes generally it can be seen that there were,



and in some cases still are, three main elements; firstly a series of explicit rights against which validity claims of equality justice can be determined, secondly key communicative fora in which it can be said there were spaces for communicative action, e.g. interviews governed by conditions of communication, appeal mechanisms etc., and finally accountability stages all the way up to committee, or political level. As Alvesson puts it, there is the attempt “to open up a space for increased communication action with regards to beliefs, consent, trust, thereby challenging and reversing the tendency of work organisations to devalue, corrode or appropriate the values of the lifeworld.” Moreover the example outlined above demonstrates, I think, the extent to which instrumental action, i.e. consequential action deliberately undertaken by an actor or actors which distorts communication and functionally co-ordinated action can be brought back into the communicative fold. In this, especially within formal democratically bounded organisations, like local government, there is a continuum of potential action from “strong” versions where the truth, legitimacy, sincerity and clarity of statements can be discursively tested to a “weak” one where it is possible to get rid of all communicative distortions, but more realistically only open up spaces for more communicative action. The motivation to seek such spaces is, I contend, stronger where the closure or lack of such spaces, is maintained solely or partially by racist conventionalisation.

What the example and sub-examples outlined above attempt to demonstrate is the way in which it is possible to talk about transforming strategic and instrumental action. In fact if one runs with the notion of organisations as structures of communication, then it can be said that administrative systems in the public sphere are structures, in many cases, of sedimented, i.e. ossified. communicative action. This is because they direct, develop and control services, very often communicative action based services, like social work, through having the monopoly of socially constructed formal and informal knowledges, in themselves, contingent arrangements of regulations, rules, expertised language, and unspoken behavioural codes. Moreover, unlike Habermas’ apparent belief, there is not so clear a boundary line, action wise, between political and administrative systems, especially in the area of local governance. In fact it is only if the two are run together as a continuum of action is it possible to talk about democratising the administrative system. In this way, perhaps, similarly to Joas’ idea of creative action, it might be possible to communicatively reframe the idea of praxis.

### ***6.5 The Constitution and the Boundaries of Social and Systemic Integrations***

A question can be posed about whether or not Habermas in upholding constitutional democracy as the social context for democracy was

unnecessarily foreshortening the critical distance and tension between facts and norms. This reveals a further meta-level question: was this but a symptom of a greater fault line in his TCA theory in which his avowed pragmatic appropriation of systems theory in fact veered too much in the direction of principle thereby foreclosing on certain types of action? The critique I have sketched out so far seems to answer the latter question in the affirmative. However, before confirming that it is necessary to re-look at Habermas' latest work, BFN, to ascertain the extent to which he, in line with the fallibilistic principle underpinning his own work, has actually taken on board some or all of the criticisms of TCA.

Firstly on the question of the idealisation of constitutional democracy Habermas is clear that "the constitution taken as a project is neither a social utopia nor a substitute for such....(but)....just the 'opposite from the utopia in which collective reason and secularised impotence are unified and institutionalised in the state: rather it implies the idea of civil society and its capacity to regulate itself in discursive processes and through clever institutionalisation."<sup>405</sup> In giving greater weight to a system of rights and the public political sphere Habermas attempts to address what he regards as the scarcest resource in complex societies which are "neither the productivity of the market economy nor the regulatory capacity of the public administration....(but)...the resources of an exhausted economy of nature and of a disintegrating social solidarity....(where in the latter)...the forces of social solidarity can be regenerated in complex societies only in the forms of communicative practices of self determination."<sup>406</sup> (A rather 'neat' encapsulation of why new Labour's strong regulatory approach to the public sector is wrong.) If a system of rights underpins the involvement of the polity, then what are the form and content of this system? Habermas criticises the welfare paradigm of law for reducing justice to distributive justice when in fact the key normative value is not well being, but autonomy. That is to say that "in a legal community no one is free as long as the freedom of one person must be purchased with another's oppression." Equally rights cannot be consumed, and can only be enjoyed "insofar as one exercises them." Rights then, are relationships not things. Thus "injustice...can express itself in discrimination that withholds from the 'oppressed' and 'subordinated' what enables them to exercise their private and public autonomy."<sup>407</sup>

What then about Habermas' previous pessimism about democratising administrative bureaucracies. In BFN, as in his previous works, he argues the normative principles whilst at the same time exhibiting a caution about extrapolating too radically in real practice. Thus, whilst he comments on the proceduralist model of law, it applies equally, I contend, to the relationship between citizens and local governance since that interfacial relationship is, in many instances, mediated consciously and unconsciously by law, so that "the



vacancies left by the private-market participant and the client of welfare bureaucracies are filled by enfranchised citizens who participate in political discourses in order to address violated interests, and by articulating new needs to collaborate in shaping standards for treating like cases alike and different cases differently.”<sup>408</sup> This calls for a democratisation of the administration. The forms this would take are, because it is “a domain so prone to interference and dependent on efficiency.....a question of the interplay of institutional imagination and cautious experimentation.”<sup>409</sup>

The question already asked before can be put again, which is where in the scheme of things are Black people?

### ***6.6 Constitutional Incorporatism?***

Modood, in a critique certain of Habermas’ thinking on constitutionalism, epitomises the institutional response to eighties anti-racism - his thinking on diversity appears to have been prompted by his brief sojourn as an equality adviser in a minor outer London borough - which is to misRepresent(ationalise), in the Hall sense of “represent”, and homogenise the actual “diversity” of anti-racist approaches in local governance, as well as deny the validity of using Black as an overarching architectonic framework in any form<sup>410</sup> Modood attacks Habermas’ use of the value “constitutional patriotism” as being the only one to which immigrants should show allegiance, as against, for example, the nostalgic, mythologised, backward looking, Tebbitised golden age patriotism through which neoconservatives seek to assimilate Black migrants. However, since Modood wrongly reads Habermas one dimensionally, he attributes to Habermas by assuming that such a value is inimical to “diversity”, the very self same skewed universalism which Habermas is actually attacking. There is, of course, the substantive issue of whether or not any one existing constitutions of Western democracies do or do not discriminate against the full inclusion of immigrants to those countries, particularly Black immigrants. But Habermas is not talking about these, other than as empirical markers in the process of establishing the fallibilism or not of his underlying thesis. There is the meta-theoretical issue, which Habermas is addressing, of whether or not constitutional democracy, as the linguistic expression of the normative potential of a political system that still has to run its course, is universal enough to ensure the emancipatively, i.e. free and equal, participation of all the citizens. To understand Habermas’ use of that term is not only to understand his developing core thesis, but also to comprehend the specific empirical context which gave rise to the use of the term “constitutional patriotism.” The context was, and is, informed twofoldedly: first by the debate with the neo-conservative historians in Germany, who, in the interregnum covering the unification gestation, put forward arguments to try and secure a homogenised conventional national

identity. By this is meant it is not a post-conventional identity where an individual can evaluate moral convictions without recourse to particularism. Secondly his argument emerges against the back drop of the rising tide of racist violence against Black people, itself partially fuelled by the re-emergence of an explicit blood and somatic definition of the true German national. When Habermas writes about the constitution he writes as well about the Western constitutional state embodying a “postconventional form of consciousness insofar as the inherent distinction between “law” and “right”...(“reality” and “norm”) mandates that all concrete legislation be evaluated in light of universal normative precepts embodied in the constitution itself”<sup>411</sup>. These precepts hold out the unredeemed validity claims that all citizens, in its broadest sense of living and/or working in that country, should be involved in the consensual formation of that norm. Constitutional democracy, or more accurately deliberatively discursive democracy, is thus also held up, as well, against those who argue not only from a religiously fundamentalist point of view which has inherent a conventional group and/or national identity, but as well from an essentialised notion of communities. I don’t think Modood argues against constitutional democracy per se, only what he mistakenly perceives to be Habermas’ unwarranted universalist assumptions, themselves, in reality, a fictitious product of Modood’s misreading. In so doing an important opportunity is missed to enquire whether or not the fallibilistic principle underpinning Habermas’ thesis that only the conditions for consensus can be specified, is actually compromised by what could be read as an over prescriptive universalisation of constitutional democracy. Or is it, on the other hand, a shortening of the critical tension distance between fact and norm which recognises, as Outhwaite has pointed out, that the radical democratic implications of Habermas’ theory have to be circumscribed by practicalities in real life? However Modood’s limited critique prefaces as well a counter proposal which is based on a constitutional recognition of a diversity of communities. There are three regressive features to this proposal. First, whilst, belatedly, tacking on a post modernist based defence of “diversity”, it at the same time ends up essentialising Black communities, epitomised by the confused categorisation of Black people in his PSI research. Secondly it merely echoes Taylor’s views that “the protection of collective identities comes into competition with the right to equal individual liberties”<sup>412</sup> and that thus there should be constitutional recognition for collective identities. Thirdly such a view of collective identities cannot help but foundationalise “communities” unnecessarily and in the process of so doing in confuses and conflates the right to equal respect, which is a legal matter, with the presumed excellence of a particular culture. What is interesting here is that the critique put forward by Modood within its assumed mantle of post modernity - and in this perhaps it can be classified as an attempt at a post modernist based public policy on race and citizenship - has already been dealt with by Habermas. Wolin is right to point out that Habermas



attempts in the eighties and early nineties to explore the interchange and linkages between neo-conservatism and post modernism, which he has described as the young conservatism.<sup>413</sup> Neo-conservatism accepts the development of the learning potentials of systemic integration, i.e. the economic and technological aspects whilst trying to suppress the development of normative learning within the sphere of social integration. In this there is thus an adherence to trying to preserve a conventional collective identity. For Habermas neo-conservatives “wish to preserve one-sidedly the economic, technical and managerial achievements of modernity at the expense of its ethical and aesthetic components....the bureaucratic colonization of the lifeworld is a positive development...popular or democratic inputs with regard to governmental decision making having their origin in the life world are perceived as an unnecessary strain on the imperatives of efficient political management.”<sup>414</sup> There is an extent to which the latter quote almost neatly encapsulates the stance to date of new Labour in government - their interventions on draconianising the supervisory state vis-a-vis uncontrollable youth, for example - whilst at the same time flagging up the likely contradictions that will flow from their rhetoric of “more democracy.” On the race front the “clean”, “objective” over instrumentalised interventions into social areas with a heavy racial sub-text can be justified via management accountancy systems as well as balanced by their espousal of recognising diversity and celebrating difference. Modood’s rewriting of Black communities into many differences also writes away the likelihood of conscious solidaristic social change for such communities. Whereas the vocabulary of the language of the eighties equality programmes had within it the word “emancipation”, even if it only bubbled sub-textually slightly below the surface, Modood’s nu-speak substitutes this with “diversity”. These “celebrations of jouissance serve as a kind of ‘releasement’ from the hyperrationalised lifeworld of late capitalism (where) such celebrations ultimately have a system stabilising effect insofar as they provide outlets for frustration while leaving the technical infra-structure of the system itself essentially untouched.”<sup>415</sup>

But what of the core concern raised earlier about whether or not Habermas brings too closely together fact and norm in upholding constitutional democracy as “the social context required for democracy.” His articulation of that position has been described as “drawing out the legal, political and institutional implications” of the Theory of Communicative Action.<sup>416</sup> These concerns are raised within the specific context of race, racism and the equal participation of Black people in the polity. Is this too conflationary an over prescription of a particular system that is now being invested with a universalistic value which, in it self, is more exclusionary than is admitted? Should these concerns be given extra weight when one looks at Habermas’ own thinking on the relationship between immigrants and democracy within the specific framework of constitutional democracy? Thus he writes that,

“democratic citizenship...regardless of the diversity of different cultural forms of life ....does require that every citizen be socialised into a common political culture..”; and further, that, “..one must expect only that immigrants willingly engage in the political culture of their new home without necessarily abandoning the cultural life specific of their country of origin immigrants (since) the political acculturation demanded of them does not extend or to the whole of their socialisation.”<sup>417</sup> Admittedly those thoughts are written against the particular backdrop of his interventions in the increasingly racist constructions then being put on the nature and substance of national identity in the unification period in Germany and thus it might be easy to read into this more fact than norm. Nevertheless the criticisms of post modernists, like Goldberg, that Habermas’ notions of universality are “incorporatist”<sup>418</sup> seem to have some validity on first reading. One could legitimately ask why this condition should be put on immigrants, especially when it is clear that the immigrants Habermas is referring to are those from outside the EC, i.e. more likely to be Black immigrants. More to the point, what about those “indigenous” citizens who reject the existing political culture? At a more substantive level is there an inherent circumscription on agency and action in Habermas’ theory which is thrown into sharp relief when it attempts to illuminate the relationship of Black people to the Western polity in a way that cannot escape the charge of logocentrism, i.e. does it stray too much into the arena of “a single dimension of validity - that of propositional truth and theoretical reason”?

But it is not only just that the logic of the performative standard - the “keep-in-the-forefront” universal moral claim that can be made - attached to communicative discourse in the legal and political elements of the polity means that Black people have to be included in the participative processes of such discourse. To keep it at this is to admit only of *ceteris paribus* as the prime motivation, and, thus, backhandedly, to affirm that there is a naturally evolved, indigenous ethical community and permeated institutions in the metropole. This seems to be implicit when Habermas refers to the American and French constitutions. I want to argue, instead, as others have done, that this particular ethical concentration, and the nature of it, is as much, if not more, the result of processes of excluding those who were not perceived to be part of the “universe”, i.e. mainly Black people. To that extent the evolution of the explicit constitutions in the USA and France; the informal constitution in the UK, and the post second World War constitution in Germany with their universalist principles and claims were shadowed by what one commentator has called the “double register”.

“The double register introduced into the heart of the new political legitimation a basic contradiction that had a brilliant future before it: a universalist system that bases the rights of individuals on the unity of the human race coexists alongside a tacit and informal system that based the rights (and duties) of certain groups,



constructed as homogenous categories, on a hierarchical evaluation of 'differences' between them."<sup>419</sup>

Varikas argues that and the negative evaluation of these differences, especially in relation to Black vis-à-vis white, once they had lost the grounds for any theological justification, came to be justified through the racialisation of science; a correspondence between Habermas' categorisation of the ontological and epistemological. The concern then is whether or not the radical inclusive potential of the inter-subjective linguistic turn, can be achieved if the exclusionary forces in the development of the 'indigenous' ethical community and allied political institutions is underplayed, or not properly understood and appreciated. Tracking the history of the Jewish people in France at about the time of the French revolution and making use of Arendt's notion of the pariah she notes that it illustrated the "tension between the universalist principle of one general law for all which founded the nation-state and emancipation, and the real discrimination encountered by Jews in European nation states."<sup>420</sup> Further the term 'pariah', with its Indian origins, had been known from the sixteenth century onwards, but only gained pertinence when the "one general law for all had discredited the logic of caste and privilege." At this point however, towards the end of the eighteenth century, "the metaphor of the 'pariah', which had been disseminated by the literature of the Enlightenment.....connoted a critique of absolutism and arbitrary power and, at the same time, astonishment, perplexity, or even resignation at how difficult it was to include certain categories of individuals (servants, Blacks, Jews, and women) within the principle of citizenship that was beginning to emerge."<sup>421</sup> The solution was not to ensure that the 1789 Declaration of Universal Rights included everyone, but, as the example of the Jewish people in France at that time shows, to confirm their emancipation through "a sequence of 'decrees, 'rulings, and particular 'decisions', most of which renewed the letters patent which, since the time of Henri II, had granted certain Jewish communities certain privileges and then gradually extended them to all Jews."<sup>422</sup> It was the beginning of what I have called the additive solution. A similar strategy, this "double register" was adopted towards Black people in the French colonies where, in May 1791, a decree put forward as emancipation did not include Black people within the scope of the Declaration, but in effect renewed the provisions of the Code Noir, i.e. ratified the rights of the mulattoes and the continuation of slavery. A similar argument can be advanced, as others have, about the origins and nature of the American Declaration of Independence, and the "disastrous and lasting repercussions of the 'primal crime' that excluded Indians and Blacks from the founding contract of the American res publica."<sup>423</sup> The general ethical framework for what Habermas has approvingly cited as an example of "constitutional patriotism" which can allow all citizens to participate, i.e. the American Constitution, has been criticised by Lazare for its suffocating consensus.<sup>424</sup>

In Germany constitutional development in the early twentieth century, in particular the 1913 nationality law, was carried out with reference to the position of the position of Germany's colonial subjects. The carry over of much pre second world war legislation, including that nationality law, and the emerging context of gast arbeiters in post Second World war Germany, means that these debates about the plural and who was to be included in the singular were there, as in the development of other constitutional democracies, from the outset. Similarly in the UK, even without the reference point of an explicit constitution or contract with its people, the debate about the extension of democracy to its colonial subjects took place within the political institutions of the polity. The result of course was the decision that those Black peoples who were colonial subjects were not yet, civilisation wise, ready for democracy. Instead they were deemed apt 'subjects' for bureaucratic colonial administration by the white 'man'. In a sense these political debates and decisions seeking to "whitewash" and justify the universalism of the Enlightenment were prefaced and presaged in the internal, intra- and contra- arguments of the Enlightenment's main philosophers. The point about highlighting and drawing to attention the fact that these debates are not new to the domain of the moral resolution of value conflicts in constitutional democracies is not so that they can be dismissed, as Habermas appears to do, as historical contingencies. Rather it will be to argue that these justifications for the maintenance of a single ethically permeated polity were constantly renewed, and are constantly being renewed, throughout the history of, to pose it at the general level, the relations between Black and white. What this has done is to establish a paradigm of technical learning strategies, as counter posed to normative learning processes that advance evolution in the Habermasian sense, designed to maintain the racialised communicative distances in the political culture and institutions of the metropole. These learning strategies within the political culture and institutions are not metaphysically or 'genetically' programmed to racially exclude Black people. Rather they are based on systemic processes which favour the singular, rather than the plural, and around which can be easily crystallised those culturally learned 'anthropophagii' which then justify and/or reinforce the suppression of the plural, i.e. an argument which will hold for the differing contours of race and sex discriminations. I am arguing then that, far from this being a recent phenomenon in Western constitutional democracies, i.e. the 'adding on' of minority cultures, this issue was there from the outset in the unfurling arguments and developments of those constitutions and political cultures. Hence my preference for the abstracted level of discursive principles because the debate about the principles, substance and form of constitutional democracies in a plural world has been effectively deferred since their inception. In the concluding section of his response to McCarthy, Habermas, on the continual question of difference and consensus, notes that because decisions must be made under time pressure "we cannot wait forever



for constructive ideas to arise....(and hence...in such normatively hopeless situations we would operate with the (generally valid) premise of 'one right answer' merely as a promissory note or bill to be paid at a later date."<sup>425</sup> I would argue that within the moral promise of inclusion which attaches to Western universalism, and particularly within that of Habermas' discursive principles, that there is a promissory note of racial inclusion in constitutional democracies the payment of which has been postponed from their inception. To that extent I would agree with McCarthy that the constitution cannot be exempt from questioning, especially where in its principles and accumulated, previous communicative decisions, it violates the discursive principles. Varikas argues, and I am sure Habermas would agree with her, that "the universality of rights can be realised only through the meanings given to them by public speech through which citizens reveal their humanity by revealing the plurality that defines them...because it is through public speech that individuals reveal, reformulate and introduce into their shared lives both their diversity, or their reality as members of the group, and their singularity."<sup>426</sup> However, from the outset, as I attempt to argue, the constitutional democracy, its universalism and attendant political culture, has for black people always had a structuring and preceding struggle which is "the right to have rights." I repeat then my contention made in the preceding paper that race is the transepochal unresolved problem the solution to which is the key to the fulfilment of modernity. Any "in the end" consensus must be fully inclusive from the outset. For it to do so, in terms of my meta-theoretical concerns, means that the inter-subjective bases of such consensus must be critically grounded, that is to say that the epistemological and ontological anchorings of such discursive practices are always being placed under critical scrutiny, but within the standards of the discursive principles. Further if, in the processes of discursively based democratic opinion and will formation, Black ethical communities do not enter into the moral arena as "within-themselves" solely evolved communities and making claims on an equitable one to one basis, but have their communicative processes mediated by unfairly structuring racially distorted communicative practices, i.e. the transitivity of not having the right to have rights, then there is the need for a counter critically, deconstructive mediating force. I have put forward the argument for a new Black social movement and a new politics of anti-racism in which Black does no more than signify the wrongs done to and does not conflatorily prescribe the solutions to ethical claims made by its constituencies. Rather it seeks to use the critical collectivity of "Black" as the mediator for ensuring that the "right to have rights", whether or not these are formally legal or political rights in the "facticity" of Black people's experiences in the polity, or implied rights of inclusion and participation that accrue from the discursive principles, and, from the universalism grounding constitutional democracy, so that ethical communities and/ or individuals from them can make their own claims without fear of misrepresentation. Varikas captures some of

what it might mean when she describes and analyses the struggles of ‘immigrants’ – read Black people in the general sense – to obtain full citizenship rights.

“By irrupting into the public space and literally ‘seizing the word’, they have broken out of the homogeneity in which the collective imaginary wrapped them; they have revealed to eyes of public opinion the diversity of the collective histories and fates that led them to seek asylum, but also the individual multiplicity of their status, needs and aspirations.....Where we once saw, or thought we saw irreducible ethnic communities, we are seeing the presence of a political collective constituted in and through the intentional and concerted actions of the multitude.”<sup>427</sup>

Habermas has described the constitutional project as not being that of a social utopia, where utopia is defined as “the ideal projection of a concrete form of life.” Rather he sees the constitution of society, following Preuss, as being that point “when it is confronted with itself in suitable institutional forms and normatively guided processes of adjustment, resistance, and self correction.”<sup>428</sup> At this general, principled level of a fallibilistic based vision of “constitution”, which to all intents and purposes is a “utopia”, not as Habermas has defined that phenomenon, but as defined in my book, there can be little quarrel. The framework is inclusive enough to include fully the realities of a multi-racial society. However it is in working out the finer details of what it means to explicitly introduce race into the processes of determining “suitable institutional forms” and “normatively guided processes” etc. that one begins to realise that the degree, rate, and scope of change might be higher than seems to be implied in Habermas’ work to date. This is certainly the case if Habermas’ contention, one which I believe is true, that the scarcest resources in the democratic processes are neither the productivity of the market nor “regulatory capacity of the public administration”, but the forces of social solidarity which, in complex societies can only be regenerated “in the forms of communicative practices of self-determination” – a good enough lead into re-introducing the notion of emancipation into the working parameters of “agency” and democratic opinion and will formation. My critique to date can be read as saying that perhaps Habermas has jumped the gun and that there are conditions of inclusion that need to be fulfilled, especially in relation to race and gender, before we can talk about “a political culture”, or “constitution”. I am not. In the complex societies we currently exist in fulfilling the participatory principles, as outlined by Habermas, and changing the structures that maintain the forces of distorted communication can be, and should be read in many instances, as part of the same process, especially in relation to those racialised forces of communication.

The question then is what does it mean for the modern multi-racial society with its still unresolved (my contention) problems of race and gender to be



constituted properly? This raises moral questions and Preuss recognises in the general sense the need for a moral dimension to constitutions at a time when progress is increasingly being measured in neo-liberal market terms, e.g. the new right Labour 'modernisation' programme. Thus:

"..progress is no longer driven by moral rhetoric but by the naked fear of becoming unable to compete in world markets. The task today is thus for freedom and progress to regain their moral dimension. Without it we must live with the latent danger that constitutional democracies will be defeated by the destructive and regressive dynamics of capitalist markets."<sup>429</sup>

This is a recognition that the contradictions and conflicts facing societies cannot be sufficiently understood in terms of "traditional liberalism, 'the individual versus the state', or in the social and economic categories of class conflict and the social question", i.e. the welfare state. These conflicts include "the relationship between sexes, between various ethnic groups..". Preuss sees this prognosis as a calling for a "morally reflexive constitutionalism" which recognises that these problems cannot be solely solved by the traditional means of the modern constitutional state, viz. power, law and money, but does allow for the productive tackling of such problems through "recalling the procedures of their treatment."<sup>430</sup> This would, unlike traditional constitutions, open up the space for "non-traditional, non-transcendental politics." Governance, under such arrangements puts a premium on institutions of unfettered communicative discourse and, as Habermas notes, these "rest on the shaky ground of the political communication of those who by using them simultaneously interpret and defend them." Combining the principle of constitution, as spelt out, with the transitive notion of governance, and bearing in mind the Fanonian turn I given to the state further on, provides us with a picture that is almost captured by Preuss when he writes the following:

"Such a constitution establishes no political centre in which society could recognise its own collective identity; it sees neither the state, the people, nor the nation as potential categories for a politically united will that could then impose itself as a homogenising force on a diverse society. This is intended neither to trivialise nor to deny the problem of political power; a reflexive understanding of a constitution still requires that processes of power be organised and that parliaments, governments and courts exist to make binding decisions. But ideally power serves not as an instrument for imposing a specific idea of the correct and progressive course of social development; rather it should create room and institutions for society to develop its moral and intellectual resources and to use them to force experiences with itself, that is, to treat itself as a kind of risky experiment. A constitution that makes this possible would take the idea of progress back to its original roots, to the idea of the 'improvement of mankind' to strengthening mankind's moral competence to govern itself."<sup>431</sup>

In the sentence lead up to the above quote I say "almost" because, whilst I think it is implicit in what Preuss says, I believe that certain things need to be

more clearly spelt out, certainly if the race dimension is to be built in from the outset. These are that the organisation of power, particularly as this relates to creating institutional space, must, in a multi-racial society, include the deontological rules for ensuring that unjust racialisation does not structure those spaces; and that the 'institutions' spoken of are not only those of the state, i.e. political, in the restrictive Marxist sense, and administrative, but also those whose 'home-turf' is the market.

## **6.7 The Hidden Context to Discursive Rationality**

Overall then, it can be said in relation to the use of systems theory by Habermas and the restrictions or not that places on agency, especially in relation to the inclusive participation of Black people, that whilst the principled framework appears to be in place, that there are still refinements that can be made. To date the critique has focussed primarily on the systemic side, in particular that of lifeworld determination of change, with the underlying criticism that perhaps the critical ontology is not critical enough. This throws up one of the fundamental questions about Habermas' discursive project which is whether or not the universalistic framework is till an extension of excluding meta-narratives. This applies not only to Habermas, but, as well, to the other deliberative democracy theorists, some of them positively critical of certain aspects of his theory, like Benhabib. The question she poses generally about democracy, viz. does it rest on a homogenising model of identity, applies equally to her theoretical variation of Habermas.<sup>432</sup> For example with regard to deliberative democracy she insists "that the practical rationality embodied in democratic institutions has a culture transcending validity claim."<sup>433</sup> Is a universalistic pragmatic testing of the truthfulness, rightness and sincerity of validity claims context transcendent?

There are three ways to begin to answer this. Firstly there are the strictures made by post structuralists that the assumption, as they think, of an autonomous single subject belies the contradictory and diverse discourses and practices that constitute the subject, and that therefore, the communicative process will simply impose a new set of disciplinary conditions. Perhaps, but then as Dews points out, "...Habermas' work does not hold up a mirror to contemporary experiences of fragmentation, loss of identity and libidinal release, in the manner which has enabled post-structuralist writing to provide the 'natural' descriptive vocabulary...but neither does it pay for its expressive adequacy and immediacy with a lack of theoretical and historical perspective."<sup>434</sup> Apart from which I think that more telling critiques have been made by those sympathetic to Habermas' project. The cardinal issue of the performative contradiction underpinning the post modernist project has been made in the previous sections.



## **6.8 From the 'Margins'**

There is, however, an allied, and yet potentially more damaging, line of critique which has been made by certain African philosophers. Here African is understood not in any biologically reductionist sense, or in the way of a representation of an imagined ethical community of Africans, but more as a philosophical interrogation of Africa and Africans in the development and critique of Western philosophy. It is not therefore a simplistic upholding of "all intellectual and discursive productions elaborated in Africa and considered philosophical", or the intellectual practices and legacies of "persons of a dispersed race", but, more circumscriptively, the thematization of philosophy through the prism of "the brutal encounter of the African world with European modernity" - though in the latter case the qualification of a specific form of modernity needs to be added. What is being sought in this particular school of philosophy is a critical, deconstructive interrogation of enlightenment philosophy, in particular the work of Immanuel Kant. Whilst the philosophical grounding of Habermas' work in Kant is notable, and, thus too the likely implications of any race based critique, it must be remembered as well that leading post modernist theorists, like Foucault and Derrida, are similarly philosophically indebted. And yet, in reading the African philosophers there is undoubtedly a coincidence of enlightenment critiques with the aforementioned post modernists. Eze thus asks how it is that the ideals of the enlightenment can be understood against the backdrop of slavery and colonialism and whether or not it is simply a matter of attempting to separate out the ideals from the reality.<sup>435</sup> This type of argument echoes that of the interrogation of Heidegger's philosophy - and inter-relatedly Derrida's appropriation of that and subsequent ill thought out defence - and his relationship with the Nazis.<sup>436</sup> Eze's view is that ideal and implementation are inextricably linked and that, therefore, "Africa's experience of the 'Age of Europe' ...(is)..the cost of Occidental modernity."<sup>437</sup> By this Eze means that within Western philosophy moment and negation are always dialectically related so that the "reason" of such philosophy is in fact a defining interlacing of human understanding and understanding of the human to the extent that "Europeans originally introduced the notion of a difference in kind between themselves and Africans as a way of justifying unspeakable exploitation and denigration of Africans."<sup>438</sup>

The essential point of Eze's critique of Kant is that this was not simply a common expression of enlightenment period philosophers' ignorance because of the poverty of knowledge and information about Africa but that there is within the structure of Kant's theories "a singular and incisive Occidental model of man" that resurfaces within modern philosophers' works, such as Heidegger and Habermas.<sup>439</sup> He cites, in support of his judgement of Habermas, "Habermas' wilful typologies of Africa and African

world view in his two-volume Theory of Communicative Action.” However, a careful examination of the latter, i.e. TCA, will show that Habermas does not make any utterances on Africa or African world views. What he does do is attempt to critically engage with other writers, such as Evans-Pritchard, Horton and Winch, who use their and others’ anthropological field research in certain parts of Africa to further the relativist-universalist debate on the notion of rationality. Within this Habermas attempts to create a non-judgemental and temporally non-linear and non-teleological societal evolutionary model in which the claims of communicative rationality are limited and subject to “by the empirical-theoretical fruitfulness of the research programmes based on it..” This does not mean, however, that Habermas’ work is exempt from the criticism of being unsympathetic to the “Other”. For example, Stephen White, an author of one of the more sympathetic secondary texts on Habermas’ work, puts forward an argument that proposes a “marriage of Habermas work with that of Heidegger who is seen as being more sympathetic to the “Other”.

Whilst there are contradictions and inconsistencies in Eze’s critique, the key question posed is the extent to which Habermas’ theory is inclusive of all voices. In other words even if the principle of Habermas’ work is denied, the actual reality and the pragmatic hope tinged implications of Habermas’ work makes it a realistic change option. I argued, for example in the previous section, that it is possible to talk about intermittent systemic penetration of the lifeworld in the Third world so that it becomes possible for those normatively framed spaces to become a refuge, even oppositional base against and from system domination. From this perspective it is thus right to ask whether or not Habermas’ notion of discursive rationality is sympathetic enough in the procedures governing reaching understanding, not so much to “Other” voices, but to the way they make themselves heard. In attempting to address this issue, then, within the structure of this critique, we move from system to the other major categorical distinction in Habermas’ work i.e. lifeworld; for it is within the latter that Habermas sites the major communicative resource which can underpin the substantive democratic project.

## ***6.9 From the ‘Centre’***

Some of the most promising engagements with this key area have come not from the post modernists who have tended to reject universalisation tout court, but from those sympathetic to Habermas; and if not that, at least attempting parallel and similar democratic projects. In one of these, a collection of contributions to the debate about democracy and difference, Benhabib points out that there is within the world today a democratising momentum which is characterised, almost contradictorily, by major assertions of national and ethnic difference both at the level of the metropole



and within the “peripheral areas.”<sup>440</sup> A major, but crude, distinction between the two politico-geographical areas latterly referred to is that the politics of difference emerging in the metropole, or liberal capitalist democracies, is marked by “negotiation, contestation and representation of difference within the public sphere of liberal democracies, the politics of ethnonationalisms seek to redefine the constituents of the body politic and aim at creating new politically sovereign bodies.....(in many cases)....by eliminating other and differences”.<sup>441</sup> This value of searching for identity, however, and this applies to both shades of difference politics, “includes differentiating oneself from what one is not.”<sup>442</sup> At another level these politics indicate, as Habermas has pointed out, a shift from “issues of distribution” to that of emphasising “the grammar of forms of life”.<sup>443</sup> With this as the backdrop context, Benhabib then poses the crucial defining question, “Does democracy rest on homogenising models of identity?”<sup>444</sup> There is, then, within this question, a faint echo of the concerns raised by Eze. This shall be referred to later in the answer to the question posed. First, it is necessary to point out that the contributors to the democracy and difference debate referred to above concentrate on two of the so far identified four models of democracy: deliberative democracy, an example of which is that outlined by Habermas, and what Benhabib refers to as the fourth model, viz. agonistic. Agonistic democracy rests on a distinction between the political and politics where, in the case of the former, it is “an expression of the idea that a free society composed of diversities can nonetheless enjoy moments of commonality through public deliberations...” and in the case of the latter it refers “to the legitimised and public contestation, primarily by organised and unequal social powers over access to the resources available to the public authorities of the collectivity.”<sup>445</sup> Thus “politics is continuous..” whereas the “political is episodic, rare.” For the purposes of this critique I shall concentrate on the deliberative model, with particular reference to Habermas and those who espouse a similar model but wish to see Habermas’ one expanded in some areas, and with a background eye to the agonistic contribution. Thus Habermas’ model envisages a decentred society in which the political system is but one of more action systems and is not the apex of society in any sense. Legitimation then is based on a “higher level inter subjectivity of communication processes that flow through both the parliamentary bodies and the informal networks of the public sphere.....(to)...constitute arenas in which a more or less rational and opinion will-formation can take place.”<sup>446</sup> Within this Habermas distinguishes between ethical discourses on collective forms of life from political discourses which involve “both moral questions of justice and instrumental questions of power and coercion.”<sup>447</sup> The core question on democracy and identity/difference can be transposed over Habermas’ model and answered by examining the contributions of Benhabib and Young, both of whom are sympathetic to Habermas’ model without necessarily accepting every aspect of it.

For Benhabib, therefore, “Habermas cuts political processes too cleanly away from cultural forms of communication”<sup>448</sup>, whilst for Young it is not necessary to build a “cordon sanitaire around political discourse such as to block off the articulation of issues of collective identity and visions of the good life..”<sup>449</sup> I want to outline Young’s argument first because Benhabib, whilst she seeks to expand Habermas notion of democratic discourse, also upholds much of his substantive argument and, in so doing, attempts to rebut the criticisms of theorists like Young. The contours of this sub-debate throw up not only the strengths and weaknesses of Habermas’ approach, and thus of a deliberative model of democracy, but, more crucially, in line with the tentative conclusions that can be gleaned from the debate around race and local governance, point to shortcomings in both Benhabib and Young’s approaches.

Young, whilst she endorses “a discussion based ideal democracy”, finds that there are two underlying assumptions which, if not confronted, might lead to an unnecessary exclusionary model being developed. These are that there is firstly the assumption “culturally biased conception of discussion” because democratic discussion is restricted narrowly to critical argument. Secondly there is the assumption that reaching understanding in discussion requires “a shared understanding or ....a common good as a goal.”<sup>450</sup> Certainly this ambivalence is there in Habermas’ solitary condition of acceptance of the political culture of the “host country” by immigrants. Young’s support for deliberative democracy over interest democracy, which is correctly seen as underpinning current liberal democratic models, is that it “promotes a concept of reason over power in politics.”<sup>451</sup> The five “rules” of procedural/discursive communicative practice, as outlined by Habermas, revolve around the key one of equality of access and treatment for participants. That is to say that participants can criticise and agree to proposals put forward on the basis of the “force of the better argument” because there is the equality of opportunity to propose and criticise as well as the guarantee that the speaking situation is free from domination. However, it is Young’s contention that the conditional guarantors of freedom and equality in the deliberative process, i.e. removing economic and political oppressive and exclusionary factors, is too limited. What is missed out is the domination that comes from “an internalised sense of the right one has to speak or not to speak, and from the devaluation of some people’s style of speech and the elevation of others.”<sup>452</sup> This hidden, exclusionary element in the main proponents of deliberative democracy models is purchased through a model of communication that socio- and politically historically specific. Its derivation from Greek and Roman philosophy and praxis means, according to Young, that “their institutional forms, rules and rhetorical and cultural styles have defined the meaning of reason itself in the modern world” to the extent that “since their Enlightenment beginnings they



have been male dominated institutions and in class and race differentiated societies they have been white and upper class dominated.”<sup>453</sup> She therefore concludes that “the norms of deliberation are culturally specific and often operate as forms of power that silence or devalue the speech of some people.” There is a resonance here with examples that can be brought forward from the empirical work on local government and race, especially with regard to the dominant language of legitimation in such institutions and the pattern of conflicts that emerged with the increase of employees with differing forms of English.<sup>454</sup> The crux of Young’s argument about the nature of deliberation, as conceived within the deliberative model, is that such deliberation is in fact competitive in which middle class ways of expression and argumentation are dominant to the detriment of speakers from other backgrounds. Normatively such forms of deliberation, apart from the competitive element, also “privilege speech that is formal and general” and “dispassionate and disembodied.”<sup>455</sup> In other words “differences of speech correlate with other differences of social privilege.” Young goes on to ground her argument in not so much empirical justification - and here no sources are quoted - so much as assertion about the differences between middle class, white male “speak” and that of women and racial minorities where the latter “tends to be more excited and embodied, more valuing the expression of emotion, the use of figurative language, modulation in tone of voice and wide gesture.”<sup>456</sup> Now, whilst one must guard against the essentialistic exoticising of certain social groups, which I think Young might do in her characterisation of racial minority speaking, there is an argument for including such forms of speech in discursive processes. On the basis of her criticisms Young goes on to propose what she designates a “communicative democracy” in which difference is seen as a resource for public reason rather than “divisions which public reason transcends”, and in which critical argument is supplemented with three further deliberative elements: greeting, story telling and rhetoric. The validity of Young’s further specification of Habermas’ universalisation is still to be tested. However, what is important for now, is that the gist of her argument is understood.

Benhabib, however, within the spirit of the debate amongst supporters of deliberative democracy, provides a model of such action which is both critically supportive of Habermas as well, in parts, a critical riposte to Young. Thus whilst she claims that her model defends that of a “decentred public sphere”, she distances herself slightly from Habermas by arguing that hers, unlike Habermas’, does not “follow...(the) sharp distinctions among ethical, political and moral discourses.”<sup>457</sup> Her model can be summarised by the following definition she proffers.

“Democracy, in my view, is best understood as a model for organising the collective and public exercise of power in the major institutions of a society

on the basis of the principle that decisions affecting the well being of a collectivity can be viewed as the outcome of a procedure of free and reasoned deliberation among individuals considered as moral and political equals.”<sup>458</sup>

This definition has sharp affinities with Habermas’ formulation; certainly insofar as they share the “assumption that the institutions of liberal democracies embody the idealised content of a form of practical reason.”<sup>459</sup> On these bases she then articulates a model which attempts to ride the tension between the universalism it lays claim to and the plurality of value systems it has to accommodate. Firstly, as we have shown earlier, Benhabib insists that “the practical rationality embodied in democratic institutions has a culture transcending validity claim” because, bearing in mind Habermas’ five principles of discursive rationality, “articulating good reasons in public forces the individual to think of what would count as a good reason for all others involved.”<sup>460</sup> This inherent procedure does not control or define the content and form of the argumentation. In other words such models of rationality are “undetermined.” Such a model thus does not rely on the argument that numbers determine majority rule, but that all affected by matters should be involved in the deliberation about the final outcome. To this Benhabib adds three more additional and important points. The first is that such a model assumes a condition of value pluralism where “agreements ..... are to be sought not at the level of substantive beliefs, but at that of the processes, procedures and practices attaining and revising beliefs.”<sup>461</sup> Secondly it assumes as well a condition of interest conflicts; but one where “the proceduralist model of democracy allows the articulation of conflicts of interests under conditions of social co-operation mutually acceptable to all.”<sup>462</sup> Finally Benhabib argues that “no modern society can organise its affairs along the fiction of a mass assembly carrying out its deliberations in public and collectively...(because).....the procedural specifications of this model privilege a plurality of modes of association in which all affected can have the right to articulate their point of view...(and thus)...it is through the interlocking net of these multiple forms of associations, networks, and organisations that an anonymous ‘public conversation’ results.”<sup>463</sup>

Within this framework of her model, as set out above, Benhabib seeks to confront critics, such as Young, who exemplify what she describes as “the feminist suspicions towards deliberative democracy.” Yet, this is in fact a partial misnomer. It is not only feminists who have criticisms of the deliberative model, as expounded by Benhabib. There is equally a critique which can be mounted from a race equality perspective; in fact a critique which also encompasses Young within its scope. This is not one, as I argue later, that subscribes to post modernist anti-foundationalist “principles”; but one that seeks, as do the aforementioned theorists, a deliberative model which is racially inclusive. Nevertheless to return to Benhabib’s criticisms of Young, she accuses her of three errors. Firstly Benhabib feels that



Young conflates the institutional with the conceptual; or, as I read it, the fact with the norm. Thus whilst Young rightly is critical of the Enlightenment version of the public sphere with its evocation of a concrete collective assembly, this, according to Benhabib, should not be read as that which deliberative democrats are advocating. To that extent the distinction between deliberative and communicative democracy which Young makes should be taken as being more apparent than real because at the end of the day Young must “be able to distinguish the kind of transformation and transcendence of partial perspectives that occurs in communicative democracy from the mutual agreements to be reached in the processes of deliberative democracy.”<sup>464</sup> To do so therefore requires “standards of fairness and impartiality in order to judge the manner in which opinions were allowed to be brought forth, groups were given chances to express their points of view etc.”<sup>465</sup> Further, Benhabib argues - and here argues contentiously, I think - that the additional communicative elements Young wishes to introduce, like story telling rhetoric etc., are “informally structured processes of everyday communication among individuals who share a cultural and historical lifeworld.” Not only, therefore, can these not be formalised, they, according to Benhabib, should not be formalised. That is to say they cannot become the public language of institutions because “to attain legitimacy, democratic institutions require the articulation of the bases of their actions and policies in discursive language that appeals to commonly shared and accepted public reasons.”<sup>466</sup> There is in this last line of reasoning an obvious echo of Habermas’ notion of the acceptance of a common political culture for, in addition, Benhabib thinks that the introduction of such linguistic practices would introduce an element of arbitrariness into the process by undermining the principle of impartiality. For example, she asks what would happen if other participants did not understand the story. Thus “what is considered impartial has to be ‘in the best interests of all’”<sup>467</sup> The solution to this lies perhaps, according to Benhabib, in Fraser’s notion of “subaltern counterpublics” which characterises a heterogenous public sphere seeking to derive opinions which can influence public policy making, thereby maintaining the required distinction between informal and formal language.

In a sense Young and Benhabib outline two related models of the way in which the lifeworld should interact with the system within the overall deliberative framework, as developed by Habermas. Whilst both attempt to flesh out what it means to articulate a universalist based notion of democracy within a context of value pluralism, both, from a race equality perspective, still require further critical clarification; in particular Benhabib who is not only wrong in her interpretation of Young, but also wrong, certainly in respect of her positive valorisation of value diversity, in her conflation of impartiality with the fact of current linguistic structures of public discourse. The problem with Benhabib’s model, more so than Young’s, is that which I

think also emerges from the way in which Habermas articulates his model in BFN. That is the critical distance between 'fact' and 'norm' needs to be rigorously maintained if the full potential of deliberative democracy is to be realised. This is especially so where there are still domains of trans-epochal unresolved problems, such as racism, as I have argued in the earlier chapter, because not to do so, i.e. maintain that critical distance, means that in detailing the universalistic based practices, like enacting the procedures for deliberative democracy, could result in an element of unintentioned incorporatism. Habermas himself in a later clarification of BFN seeks to elucidate a clearer perspective on what can be termed "idealisation". Here idealisation does not mean envisaging "a final consensus and.. assumptions regarding communication in an ideal communicative society.." but it does refer to "the idealising content of the inescapable pragmatic presuppositions of a praxis from which only the better argument is supposed to emerge."<sup>468</sup> If Habermas does use the notion of an ideal communication society it is as a "methodological" device in order "to make visible the inescapable elements of social inertia." In other words maintaining the critical distance requires adherence to the principle of discursive fallibilism, something Benhabib sometimes omits to do in her vision of a deliberatively democratic society and her defence of a public language which is of itself a particular socio-cultural and political construction. However, before looking at those latter points, there are certain elements of the main deliberative democracy argument which cut across all three theorists mentioned and which, in the light of reconciling the race dimension, need, briefly, to be re-examined.

The first of these relates to what Habermas has described as the move from the politics associated with distributive justice to that of the struggles around the grammar of forms of life. Benhabib puts it thus: "The struggles over wealth, political position and access that characterised bourgeois and working class politics throughout the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century were replaced by struggles over abortion and gay rights, over ecology and the consequences of new medical technologies, and the politics of racial, linguistic and ethnic pride....(from)..political parties ...to movement politics..<sup>469</sup> This picture of new social movement politics is not quite accurate. If there is to be the appellation of new social movement, then it is that which should be affixed to the struggles for race equality over the past two centuries, a struggle which, whilst it certainly wasn't bourgeois or working class, was, as the civil rights struggles demonstrate, about distributive and political justice. In fact the civil rights movements could be said to be the precursor for many of the new social movements in Western democracies. Notions of racial pride emerged out of the denial of distributive and political justice, and not autogenetically. In fact political and distributive justice, which in relation to race can be called racial justice, are still germane and cannot be separated from, as is implied by Benhabib's analysis, deeds of denial, discrimination and non-



recognition. In this case the politics of difference and presence cannot be simply constructed socio-culturally. But then this relates to my notion of unresolved trans-epochal problems of race which, in this case, includes still a very large, unresolved issue of access to societal resources. This maintenance of asymmetrical force in the structures of communication through racial conventionalisation means that the equality of opportunity for Black people to raise validity claims in the communicative processes of deliberative democracy are intertwined with those of distributive justice, perhaps far more so than those, say, of the gay and ecology movements. There is the extent, then, to which the heterogeneity of the Black communities, now positively acclaimed, should be cross referenced by class in order that those practices which are now being claimed to be superseded, such as collective discussions through formal assemblies, are not thrown out altogether..

But this is inter-related to the second area which needs further explication; and that is the notion advanced of the decentred state. Habermas puts forward the idea that in complex societies, the state becomes but another area of action and is not the apical be-all of political struggles. That is to say that the goal is not the “conquest and destruction of state power”, just as the idea of radical democracy is not “a form of self administering socialism.” Instead there is the idea of the public sphere, even the heterogeneous public sphere, in which political and will formation processes are plugged into the communicative channels that rub through and around the state. One can see then why Benhabib, in dismissing part of Young’s model, can talk of replacing “the general deliberative assembly found in early democratic theory.”<sup>470</sup> I take Habermas to be talking not in the sense of an ideal communication society, but in the sense of putting forward an argument drawing on the inherent potential in liberal democracies and on his empirical investigations, i.e. “idealising the inescapable pragmatic presuppositions..” It is appropriate, therefore, to flesh out slightly more the still current role of the state in Western democracies because when one brings into the frame the issue of race equality, there is an argument for an enlarged role for the state in the interim process of moving to a position of decentring. The state at the moment, particularly the local state, is still the focal point for the control of and/or access to, resources which have a material affect on people’s positions in the constellations of communicative power. That is to say, factors of social welfare, environment, housing and even the advocating, supportive role a political institution like local government can have, have a direct bearing on the equality of opportunity constituents have to participate in communicative processes, particularly black constituents, notwithstanding the increase in the numbers of students in and graduates from higher education establishments from those communities. Now, one has to differentiate between the current process of “decentring” which is based on a conscious effort to depoliticise parts of the state because of the dictates of

instrumentalised legitimation needs, i.e. costs, by removing it from discursive political practices, and that, which should be implied by Habermas, and which is the outcome of discursively informed devolution and decentralisation of state powers. If therefore, Habermas' acknowledgement that "struggles for recognition in the democratic constitution state possess legitimate strength only to the extent that groups find access to the political sphere.." <sup>471</sup> is to be realised, then apropos, particularly Black, communities, his related support for affirmative action, including quotas, as part of the action required to ensure symmetry of power in discourses, will mean an enlarged role for the state. In fact both within the administration of the state, i.e. the employ, and in the influence of the state, and in the communicative processes with the public sphere, the need, for example of collective discursive assemblies, can be seen. It is therefore slightly disingenuous of Benhabib to suggest that there will not be the need for collective assemblies. In fact even if this were the case, ultimately the different voices within the public sphere will have to talk with and to each other in the recognition that agreement over an issue that effects them will need to be reached; and, thus too, with the recognised "parliamentary" bodies in the polity. This, even though it lacks the concrete form of a fixed geographical site, is still an assembly in the most general sense of the word. Where the state, in particular the local state, can act as a guarantor for realising equality of opportunity in the communicative processes because it is a repository of remedial power through the resources at its disposal, then the need for discursive procedurally guided interface sites between the state and lifeworlds is greater, especially those lifeworlds who are most affected by the asymmetries of power in the communicative processes. Perhaps Benhabib's position arises because her model of deliberative democracy is based on that envisaged in Habermas' TCA; a model he himself has superseded.

Habermas refers to his two models as that of the "siege" model, which can be attributed to TCA, and that of the "sluice gate" model, which can be attributed to BFN. The former has in mind "the image of a 'siege' of the bureaucratic power of public administrations by citizens making use of communicative power.." <sup>472</sup> But this formulation is too defensive and defeatist because it cedes to such powers the right to apply decisions without discursive reference. Habermas thinks that today matters of regulation have to be grounded rather than applied and that, therefore, the implicit legitimation requirements includes "different forms of participation.....(because)....a part of the democratic will formation must make its way into the administration itself, and the judiciary that creates subsidiary laws must justify itself in the wider forum of a critique of law." <sup>473</sup> In other words there is an expectation in this model of a far greater degree of democratisation than in the "siege" one. What Habermas has in mind is an inversion of the centre-periphery relationship so that the communication



forms in civil society “along with the communicative stream of a vital public sphere...chiefly bear the burden of normative expectations.”<sup>474</sup> That is to say it requires the intervention of utopianly energised social movements. In interrogating Habermas, one questioner puts the core question thus: “In order for citizens to influence the centre, that is parliament, the courts and the administration, the communication of influences has to pass from the periphery through the sluices of democratic and constitutional procedures.....law (then) is the medium through which communicative power is transformed into administrative power.”<sup>475</sup> However, there are intervening structures of the state, at the regional and local levels, where the relationship between communicative lifeworlds and system can and does move from influence to change. In fact in some areas, such as race and women’s equality, new social movements span a continuum from national to local public spheres to seeking the resolution of raised validity claims within the administrative structures itself. Habermas’ intimation of the need for changes such as these in his BFN possibly comes about because of his lack of attention to the actual details of public bureaucratic administrations. Other theorists, like Alvesson and Forester, have, on the other hand, made use of Habermas’ deliberative model to demonstrate how it is possible to transform instrumental based action in the public sector into communicative action. Forester, in particular, conceives of the planning process in the public sector in terms of communicative action, rather than instrumental action. Thus “contributions to planning discourse should be comprehensible, sincere, legitimate (given the individual’s role, e.g. as a planning professional), appropriate to the context and topics under discussion, and truthful”.<sup>476</sup> On the basis of this Forester can, as Habermas suggests, use the ideal speech situation methodologically to compare existing planning practices and then reconstruct, based on the idealising presumptions of a process informed by ideal speech, a communicative based planning process. Such a process would “involve careful listening, community education about the process, the cultivation of poorly organised groups etc.”<sup>477</sup> To this could be added as well the maximisation of participation in planning decisions, the right of all affected to be heard and to deliberate before decisions are taken, the right of all sections of the communities to be heard in their own voices etc. Dryzek designates such processes “discursive designs” which “then operate as ‘worms in the brain’ of the administrative state, advancing democracy at the expense of hierarchy.”<sup>478</sup> The essential point is that, following Dryzek again, we can talk about a continuum of democratisation of the state, against the state, and despite the state, all of which will have recourse to collective assemblies either in its idealised Benhabibian public sphere communication stream assembly mode, or in its concrete collective assembly mode.

This notion of radical democratisation, but also the issue of language, political discourse and the multi-cultural society is highlighted further in

McCarthy's critique of BFN and Habermas' response to that critique McCarthy's critique seeks, to undertake a historical review of Habermas' theory of legitimacy with particular attention to the way in which Habermas has had to come to grips with the notion of a multi-cultural society. In short McCarthy's overall summary, and conclusion, whose intention I agree with, is that whilst Habermas has been criticised for apparently wanting to defend a "discourse theoretical version of the 'general will' as the key to democratic legitimacy, whatever the cost", the problems implied in such criticisms "can be addressed without surrendering the discourse approach to democratic deliberation."<sup>479</sup> Now whilst Habermas warns against constructing collective will formation as if it were the sum of individual will formation, McCarthy feels that his undifferentiated use of the pronoun "we", at that stage in his thinking, makes him come very close to that position. That is to say if moral questions are to do with the regulation of interpersonal conflicts, then the assumption of a shared life world raises the spectre of a homogenous "we". Thus whilst, as McCarthy points out, Habermas takes note of the pluralism of modern life, he writes in the singular about 'the form of life, self-understanding and collective identity of a legal-political community...'."<sup>480</sup> McCarthy's argument is that Habermas should be talking about the plural nature of the forms of life etc, and about the core problematic which is how, under such conditions, consensus on such matters can be achieved, or more fundamentally, whether or not the 'final decision', which consensus implies, is desirable in all circumstances.

Within such a context, then moral disputes, as opposed to ethical disputes which are more rooted in their own individual contexts, "requires that participants detach themselves from the interpretive perspectives of their particular groups and try to reason as members of 'a socially and spatio-temporally unlimited communication community'"."<sup>481</sup> McCarthy, as he has voiced before, sees this strict separation of political and legal justice from ethical concerns as problematic because he, McCarthy, can perceive of situations in modern multi-cultural society where it would be hard to separate out ethical considerations from moral ones. This is a point I made earlier where, in what has been categorised as "struggles for recognition" by Honneth and Habermas, the denial of the right to exist for 'minority' ethical communities is at one and the same time a breach of Habermas' communicative discourse participative principles. However my argument is that it is the act of denial, which contains in it often the false creation of ethical identities because of representation, which is important, and not the 'worth' of certain communities, which is implicit in both McCarthy's and Habermas' liberally framed usage of the terms culture and community. The reason for critically highlighting this aspect now is because the way in which both theorists thus use culture, particularly when it is used as an unspoken substitute term for Black 'minorities' in the metropole, a term which I have therefore "quotationalised" pending further discursive redemption, means



that such cultures are shorn from their socio constructive processes, and also their histories. Black cultures therefore become minority cultures and their relationship to the “majority indigenous” culture becomes additive.

McCarthy poses a valid critical question which is “why we should expect political culture in a pluralistic society to comprise a common interpretation rather than a conflict of interpretations”<sup>482</sup> because “different sub-cultures might defend different interpretations of the ‘same’ constitutionally embodied system of rights.” However, McCarthy’s proposed solution to this problematic of whether or not the common political culture based on constitutional patriotism involves an “in the end” quality which grounds consensus, is unsatisfactory because of, I suspect, his limited, liberal understanding of culture, particularly the position of Black people in relation to culture, racism and the polity. McCarthy puts forward the idea that in a multi-cultural and multi-racial democratic society disagreements in principle which do not involve consensus, is perfectly in keeping with Habermas’ own ideas on the necessary qualities of tolerance, recognition, respect etc for democratic culture.

Habermas’ response turns on elaborating his initial assessment of McCarthy’s argument which is that it has taken an “anti-universalistic” turn, and which he, Habermas, thinks is an extension of criticisms made before by both McCarthy and other commentators, viz. that the sharp analytical distinction made by Habermas between the ethical and moral spheres are in practice “two interdependent aspects of the same problem, namely ‘which norms citizens want to adopt to regulate their life together.’” In pursuit of this Habermas repeats that which he has said before, that within constitutional democracies there are two means of normatively resolving differences, or ensuring that they do not matter. These are the guarantee of an equal right of co-existence and the procedural securing of legitimation through procedures

Whilst I think that Habermas is, unfortunately, taking McCarthy’s critical points to the extreme, there are questions relating to how differences are to be judged, because it is not possible to tolerate all differences, especially where these breach the principles of communicative discourse. On the other hand the assumption of an indigenous value consensus, which is not a principled observation but one relating to the Western democracies, is fallacious, as I shall argue later. It underpins, perhaps Habermas’ earlier principled assumption of the acceptance of the constitutional state. Nevertheless Habermas proceeds to develop his counter-argument by highlighting what he regards as three areas of partial misunderstanding which have been made by McCarthy. These are that McCarthy fails adequately to distinguish between national and subnational levels of ethical integration, misunderstands the process nature of collective identity, and

overemphasises the ethical permeation of a country's legal order. Finally Habermas views McCarthy's notion of mutuality as taking for granted that which Habermas thinks is necessary for constitutional democracy in a multi-cultural society. That is to say that "the expectation of tolerance itself requires a normative justification...(which)...must satisfy the claim that the legal protections governing the peaceful coexistence and mutual integrity of forms of life are fair, i.e. are rationally acceptable to all sides."<sup>483</sup>

But there are, as shown above, arguments, which need to be taken note of, surrounding the racialised origins of key western constitutions, particularly the USA's, which Habermas illustratively uses, as well as arguments about the racialised nature of their legal systems, for example those advanced by the Critical Race theorists<sup>484</sup>, which require that these elements of Habermas' arguments should always be open to empirical fallibility testing. Related to this there is as well the argument, which I advance in the chapter following this, that legitimisation procedures, if they are to reflect the substantive reality of what being 'fair' means for a fully inclusive 'we' in a multi-racial, racist society, have to include that of 'non-closure'.

### ***6.10 The Linguistic Turn – Language or Languages?***

Finally, we can now turn our attention to the issue of whether or not the impartiality of procedures demand a common public language, and, inter-relatedly, whether or not, Habermas' requirement of a common political culture actually means this as well. Firstly, with respect to Benhabib's first criticism of Young, I do not think that Young is conflating the institution with the norm, but rather arguing that the concept of "assembly" is built into deliberative democracy at all levels, and implying, as I also think, that the validity claims of the most marginalised demand the format which links communicative action directly to achieving systemic change. Secondly, Benhabib appears to operate with an almost ahistorical, essentialist notion of public language. Such language has not remained unchanged over the years. Very often changes in the language have come about directly out of public pressure for it to be less obscurantist, and more open to use by all. Moreover within administrative systems and political systems there is both the informal and formal use of language, especially in political fora. At the local state level these can range from formal committee meetings to community based fora. What emerges from this, very often in the form of written documents, is done within the structure of formal public language. What goes into its formation, in terms of its oral origins, is very often informal language. Within the context, say of a consultative, involving forum with affected constituents this is achieved within the impartiality structures of everyone, in theory, having the right to speak. However, it is true as Young contends, that in some circumstances the expected protocol of such gatherings and the confidence of some to



exploit and use those fora, i.e. mainly white, middle class, can induce silence in others. Moreover, within the administrative set-up, the unnecessary, over rigorous insistence of a standard spoken and written public language has been, and is, used to control and oppress Black employees, as shall be shown in the empirical section. But these are shortcomings which can be overcome by defining more rigorously the rules of impartiality in debate and the rights of employees. In contradistinction to both Young and Benhabib, therefore, it can be said that the potential for polyphonic voices to be involved in deliberative communicative discourse can already be demonstrated by empirical evidence. However, even if this were not the case, and pace Benhabib, there is the principled argument, contained within the logic and spirit of Habermas' own theory, for the necessity of this. Even if we do not accept Young's communicative additions as the necessary ones, but merely as examples of forms of speech that should be included, then these are still speech utterances with the universal claims to sincerity, rightfulness and truth. What matters then is not that they are uttered in that form, but that they are understood by the participants in the speech process, and vice-versa. If we as participants need to put ourselves in the speakers position to understand her/him, then this cannot only be done on the bases of a common language or shared lifeworld, but because language and language structure is so related to lifeworld, must be done on the bases of translatability and transmutability. Benhabib's positive valorisation of plural values cannot have a cut off point at the moment of communication oriented to understanding and agreement, for to do so would be to impose an ethnocentric speech condition. Certainly what comes out of such communicative moments can be articulated in the common public language, but always recognising that such a language will change over time within the process of dialogue with other languages. Likewise it cannot be assumed that the so-called informal ways of speaking share a provincial lifeworld horizon. These, in themselves, even if it can be shown that they are limitingly constructed socio-culturally, will, in the processes of deliberative communication, change. Neither these nor public language is fixed in aspic. Habermas notes that "philosophical hermeneutics makes it clear why intercultural understanding can be achieved only under conditions of complete symmetry...(and that)....it is implicit in the concept of mutual understanding that each side must be open to learning from the other...(thus)...Europeans can also learn from Africans...."<sup>485</sup> Such conditions of symmetry, I contend, do not arise from the imposition of a common language, but the effort that needs to go into achieving *mutual translatability* and *transmutability*, where in the latter case this might well mean transfiguring public language into an emancipatory medium. Benhabib conflates unnecessarily, thus, input, i.e., what is brought to communicatively discursive instances, with output, i.e. the form in which the results of such practices are communicated. There is an analogy here with the experiences of Black bi- and sometimes multi-lingual school children,

who often act not only as interpreters for their parents, but also as griots for the latter's experiences with the educational system, and the assessment made by schools of these children as being suitable for treatment under the Section 11 programme because their language at home might not be English. There is a sense then in which the inferences of someone like Young's position that the polyglot languages that enter into discursive communication and the public language in which it comes to be expressed, requires a bi- or multi-lingual competency on the part of the participants, also requires that the asymmetries of power between public language and "native" languages be addressed, if the criticism of language/cultural relativism is to be avoided. Perhaps it can be said, and here the question of agency emerges, that what is required is in fact not an acceptance, as Benhabib recommends, of public language, but a transformation of it. Are the conditions of Habermas' public culture acceptance requirement broad enough to include such a transformation or do they circumscribe it?

We can address this issue by taking on board Habermas' observation that "Europe produced more than.. colonialism and imperialism...(but also a rationalism which)..produced the cognitive positions that allowed us to take a self critical attitude towards Eurocentrism"<sup>486</sup> and refracting it through Fanon's analysis of language in the colonial context. The time has come not only to return to Fanon, as Bhabha has claimed, but also to rescue him from the latter's, and others of similar ilk's, post modernist clutches to whose debilitating cultural particularity and difference/-ance differentiating intellectual backwaters he has over the past decade or so been consigned. In so doing it is as well a rescue from atavistic geographically inspired, at times biologically reductionist, claims of ownership, i.e. the Caribbean, or "African" diaspora etc. Apropos Bhabha and other colonial discourse post modernists, Sekyi-Otu, correctly in my view, notes that their "commitments result in the evisceration of Fanon's texts: they excise the critical normative, yes, revolutionary humanist vision which informs his account of the colonial condition and its aftermath....(and)...deprives us of the weapons with which to confront some of the urgent questions of the post independence world: questions of class, ethnicity, gender, of democracy and human rights...."<sup>487</sup> Bringing Fanon into the equation within this context, brings as well then race forcibly into the centre-periphery imagery which Habermas uses, and also provides an additional means to examine the critique of theorists like Young.

To do this I am going to rely both on Sekyi-Otu's reading of Fanon as an overall dialectical dramatic narrative and on my late '60s-early '70s notes on Fanon. With regard to the specific issue of language, what emerges is an early echoing of a person's relationship to language that parallels Habermas' own concerns about the "pathology of language" and communicative action. Sekyi-Otu refers to Fanon's "This is the Voice of Algeria" in a Dying Colonialism to illustrate how language, as an imposition of colonial



modernity, and here he is referring to the official use of French, can be interpreted as an “artifact of instrumental reason” which within the “institutions of communicative action” is “salvaged from ..(its)...original violence, made available for the constitution of an autonomous social being and citizen, and thereby compelled to undergo...a ‘dialectical transcendence’”<sup>488</sup> For Fanon, as is made clear as well in his *Black Skins, White Masks*, the imposition of the colonial “Master” tongue is a narrative about the communicative relationships between the colonizer and the colonized in which the latter’s experience of language is as well “a measure of their human status in the world....such that ‘the person who possesses a language consequently possesses the world expressed and implied by that language...’” Sekyi-Otu finds this very similar to Habermas’ formulation, viz. “through its structure autonomy and responsibility are posited for us.”<sup>489</sup> However the colonial situation creates a cognitive interactive situation that is far removed from the normative possibilities of language and which suppresses the principles of universal pragmatics hinted at by Fanon and proposed by Habermas. It is distorted communication par excellence, for, ontologically it reifies a subject-object relationship between colonizer and colonized to the extent that a subject-subject relationship is almost pushed over the horizon of possibilities. And yet Sekyi-Otu discerns in Fanon’s “This is the Voice of Algeria” that he was aware of “the inherent contradiction of language (and instrumental reason) in the colonial context, yet implicit in its language game, to the possibility of an objective truth and a common good in the face of manifest antinomy, in the face of absolute social dichotomy that divides and separates the colonizer and the colonized as knowing, speaking, judging and acting subjects.”<sup>490</sup> Further there is within Fanon’s theory a critical programme similar to Habermas’ which Sekyi-Otu refers to as “a political pragmatics of the sign”. There are four elements to this which are not so much a mirror image of Habermas’ pragmatic principles as a contextualising complement which might fulfil the requirements the types of critique someone like Young is attempting to develop. It might also begin to fill some of the theoretical lacuna in my attempt to arrive at an argument for transformative action. The first, then of these elements, is that it “identifies the specific historical conditions that render the potential virtues of the instrumental technique, the thing in itself, inaccessible”, without necessarily throwing the baby out with the bath water. The second element relates to showing that the experience of language in a colonial situation by the colonised is that of a “violent invasion” in which “the dominated society never participates in this world of signs.”<sup>491</sup> At another level it challenges the “context innocent rationalism of formal pragmatics” which Habermas says “promotes the fiction that Socratic dialogue is possible everywhere and at any time.” Thirdly Fanon’s pragmatics refutes the cultural relativist arguments which attempt to explain the refusal of the colonised to speak French by recourse theories of “counter-acculturation” -(shades of the sari as a sign of resistance argument). Thus

“cultural relativism obscures the culpable power relations which thwart the autonomy and responsibility of social agents in communicative and instrumental transactions....(and)...disallows the critique of domination...(and).....discounts the possibility of...’radical transformations in this domain’”<sup>492</sup> Fourthly Fanon thus is able to envisage “the original appropriation by post colonial humanity of a legacy which an invasive modernity has bequeathed.” For the colonised what matters is not the racial origin of the French language but that it becomes part of their experience in participating in a freely constituted linguistic community by “robbing the master of exclusive proprietorship of the work of his Word.....(in order)..’to tell a story about itself and to make itself heard.’” In so doing the language does not remain neutral in terms of its structure and usage but through the process of the relationship of a “post colonial nation’s unifying discourse to local understandings” changes. Bringing this extended analogy back to the issue of public language in discursive democratic practices and the relationship of Black participants to it, it is worth noting, as Sekyi-Otu does in relation to post independent Africa, that “a decolonization of human existence will hardly occur if the people are not autonomous agents in building them.”<sup>493</sup> Further McCarthy in a discussion on the multi-cultural dimension to the pragmatics of communicative reason agrees that a genuine new world order, as opposed to an end-of-history Fukuyama order, requires a post-imperialist “recounting of the interdependent pasts, presents and futures of Western and non-Western worlds.”<sup>494</sup> This recognises that the representations and one dimensional universalist claims exist because colonized people have been prevented from participating in the conversation on an equal footing because of powerful inequalities. Apropos this, “when previously subordinated groups can speak in their own voices, there are marked changes in the very construction of texts dealing with them....(which)....can assist in the formation of new forms of public discourse.”<sup>495</sup>

### *6.11 Autonomy, Context and the Collective Actor*

There is a further area of clarification needed, which relates to the role of collective action and the collective actor in the process of agency. Habermas’ theory pitches agency at the level of the autonomous individual. Yet there are within other deliberative democratic theorists, like Young and Fraser, intimations of collective action. In the previous section I attempted to reconstruct Black anti-racist politics in terms of signifying cognitive practices and within that the Black collective actor by reference to Eder. Pulling Fanon into the area of language helps crystallise the issue of conflict inherent in even deliberative democracy which the latter’s theorists, in the oscillation between fact and norm, i.e. the attempts to realise in everyday practice the conditions for “the idealising pragmatic presumptions of a praxis from which only the better argument” can win, unintentionally give the



impression of it being a painless transition. The questions then are what motivates people to want to enter into discursive practices, and how are these to be expressed?

To begin answering the question, it would be helpful to outline briefly the argument put forward in the last section- *Reconstructing Black and Anti-Racist Politics* -for the reconstruction and use of the Black collective actor. In this I had argued, using Eder, not for a return to the notion of an essentialised collectivity and identity, as is contained in the arguments of people like Taylor and others who argue for group rights, but for a critically defined, contingent, collectivity whose boundaries are constantly defined and redefined through signifying cognitive practices. That is to say that collective identities arise not because of any naturalised inherent characteristics lying dormant waiting only for social injustices to ignite them, though that is often the interpretation placed upon them by the regressive etnikfying tendencies, but because of social wrongs done to “imagined groups” by others. Collective wrongs provoke collective responses which can either, even when the intention is to oppose such wrongs, affirm the representational identity, as in the case of the “Afrikan”, or transform it, and in the latter by so doing, both maintain the struggle to reduce blocking powers in the structures of communication and contribute to normative learning processes. If these “struggles for recognition”, as they are now commonly termed by critical theorists, arise out of wrongs done to, and therefore they speak of motivation towards justice, the question therefore is what precisely constitutes the moral grammar of such struggles. Does it denote, as Benhabib and even Habermas, seem to imply, a move away from notions of redistributive justice to one of recognition? Does it move, therefore, beyond issues of class? If, as I do, I hold that race is one of the keystone unresolved problems of modernity, then examining race within the framework of answers to the questions posed, should provide greater clarity to the issue of motivation and the relationship between the “justices” of recognition and redistribution as well as bringing into sharper focus the initial impetus for this particular line of enquiry which is the question of why potential participants in communicative structures should be motivated to engage in discursive practices aimed at consensus.

A partial answer to this was provided earlier on in the section on Habermas and local governance, partial in the sense that it was noted that Habermas’ thinking on race is very much framed in terms of culture. Here in lies the problem, I think; a problem that seems to be echoed by those who seek to use his work in looking at issues of race and culture, like Benhabib, Fraser and Young. Habermas’ answer to whether or not the articulation of collective identities that arise out of the struggles for recognition require some form of collective rights, is that rights and identities are, just as the private and public are, complementary so that “those to whom the law is addressed.. can

understand themselves to be the authors of the laws to which they are subject as private legal persons.”<sup>496</sup> For Habermas multi-culturalism, not so much race, raises the question of the ethical neutrality of law and politics where ethics refers to conceptions of the good life and morality to that which is equally good for everyone. Critical supporters like Young argue that Habermas, and this is a criticism developed out of examining the conditions for multi-culturalism in the West, cuts too cleanly the ethical political processes from the moral political processes. For Habermas then:

“Ethical political discourses must satisfy the communicative conditions for achieving hermeneutic self-understanding on the part of collectivities. They should enable an authentic self-understanding and lead to critical revision or confirmation of a disputed identity. The consensus issuing from a successful search for collective self-understanding neither expresses a merely negotiated agreement, as in compromises nor is it a rationally motivated consensus like the consensus on facts or questions of justice. It expresses two things at once: self reflection and resolve on a form of life. For ethical political discourses this would ideally require that the conditions of systematically undistorted communication be satisfied, thereby protecting the participants from repression, yet without tearing them from their genuine contexts of experience and interests.”<sup>497</sup>

Moral discourses presuppose conditions under which “each participant can adopt the perspective all the rest.....(so that all).....must be able to assume that certain pragmatic presuppositions are sufficiently fulfilled, that is, that the practice of reaching understanding in public is universally accessible, is free of external and internal violence and permits only the rationally motivating force of the better argument.”<sup>498</sup>

There is a sense in which certain features of Habermas’ idealised description of how ethical discourse should be constituted mirror the key elements I’ve outlined in my attempt to describe the cognitive signifying practices underpinning the constitution of a contingent Black collectivity. But Habermas is not exactly talking about that. The ethical discourse he outlines corresponds to what should be the communicative lifeworld processes. Now whilst he makes these distinctions between ethics and morals heuristically and acknowledges, as he has done in response to feminist criticisms, that the two are intertwined, nevertheless there is the implication that the motivation for such discursive practices are internally generated through the soft force of socialisation and ego development. Hence, perhaps, the emphasis on culture, even if Habermas perceives culture not as a static aspic pickled phenomenon, but as one that is constantly changing either through greater individuation or through the shoal fishing of represented collective identities. Counterpointedly then Habermas’ taking into account of “minorities” struggles for recognition focuses almost exclusively on culture fuelling the Benhabian type conclusions that the grammar of claims for justice has shifted from distribution to recognition.



But is this true? Certainly with regard to race and conceptualisations of racism, the meld of moral and ethical discourses in the creation of identities, not to mention the materiality of such discourses, i.e. the issue of distributive justice cannot be so easily pushed to the backburner, means that the critical distance between those categories needs to be foreshortened. The immorality of certain moral discourses and their relation to the formation of collective identities for Black people needs to be explored further, but in a way that strengthens the case made in my second section that collective identities and actors still have a role to play in the securing and exercising of rights, without necessarily this being achieved by the establishment of group rights.

I want to explore this further via a look at the work of Honneth which will be prefatorily referenced by outlining Fraser's argument on the nature of and relationship between distributive and recognition justice, *and the critical rejoinder by Young as an end note*. Fraser encapsulates the mood, a mood she is critical of, thus:

"The 'struggle for recognition' is fast becoming the paradigmatic form of political conflict in the late twentieth century. Demands for 'recognition of difference' fuel struggles of groups mobilised under the banners nationality, ethnicity, 'race', gender, and sexuality. In these 'post socialist' conflicts, group identity supplants class interest as the chief medium of political mobilisation. Cultural domination supplants exploitation as the fundamental injustice. And cultural as the fundamental injustice. And cultural recognition displaces socio-economic redistribution as the remedy for injustice and the goal of political struggle."<sup>499</sup>

However her critical circumspection towards such an approach derives from the awareness that struggles for recognition are being played out in a world which is witnessing ever increasing levels of material inequality both within individual countries and between the West and the rest. The task then for critical theory is not to minimise the notion of recognition struggles, but to develop "a critical theory of recognition, one which identifies and defends only those versions of the cultural politics of difference that can be coherently combined with the social politics of equality."<sup>500</sup> In other words justice requires both redistribution and recognition. Fraser goes on to develop an analytical theory of redistribution and recognition justice; analytical in the senses that she deploys categories in the same way that Habermas does, i.e. they are heuristic devices. Within the context of the decentring of class and the rise of new social movements which appear to put a premium on identity claims, as opposed to those of redistribution, Fraser identifies the two key fields of injustice as that of socio-economic injustice which is rooted in the field of political economy, and cultural or symbolic injustice which is located in "social patterns of representation,

interpretation and communication.” Whilst recognising that the two are often intertwined, she constructs at the analytical level a spectrum of injustice with socio-economic at one end of the range and cultural injustice at the other. Concentrating on race, then Fraser argues that it resembles class because there is a clear racial division of labour the differences between levels and access to which is structured by and through race considerations. On the other hand it also has a “cultural-valuation dimension” which is maintained through what she identifies as Eurocentrism and cultural racism. Addressing such injustices requires action in both the redistribution and recognition spheres. However to do so risks running foul of the dilemma Fraser earlier flagged-up. Fraser’s answer is to propose that remedial action aimed at tackling the two injustices can be either “affirmative”, and these sorts of action are dilemmatic, or “transformative”, in which case such dilemmas are overcome. It follows from this that affirmative remedies are those “aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the underlying framework that generates them...(whilst)...transformative remedies ..(are)..aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework.”<sup>501</sup> There is nothing radically new in this sort of proposal. As shall be shown, in the empirical section, the race equality policies in one of the target boroughs was defined by its principal architect in terms of two levels - the first level described as “fine tuning the existing organisation” and the second as those actions aimed at fundamental restructuring once the limits of the first was reached and recognised. Whilst in Fraser’s proposal there is a sense in which it can be read an apocalyptic one - all for the revolution and nothing else -, this is not what she means, i.e. it is not a “gradual versus apocalyptic change.” In sum the potential range of remedies to such injustices is encapsulated in a change matrix which is reproduced below because even though Fraser has been critical of Habermas in the past, the key cell in this matrix is very much closer to Habermas, probably because both still have a vision of socialism as the next societal paradigm.

	<i>Affirmation</i>	<i>Transformation</i>
<b>Redistribution</b>	<i>Liberal welfare state</i> Surface reallocations of existing goods to existing groups; supports group differentiation; can generate misrecognition	<i>Socialism</i> Deep restructuring of relations of production; blurs group differentiation; can help remedy some forms of misrecognition
<b>Recognition</b>	<i>Mainstream multi-culturalism</i>	<i>Deconstruction</i> Deep restructuring of



Surface reallocations of respect to existing identities of existing groups; supports group differentiation	relations of recognition; blurs group differentiation <sup>502</sup>
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For Fraser the transformative column provides the framework to the solution because it outlines an “over-arching programmatic orientation capable of doing justice to all current struggles against injustice.”

If there is a criticism, it is that analyses of this type can lead to a pessimistic reading of what is actually potentially radical. I take Fraser to be referring to an approach which is similar to Habermas’ attempt to put forward a critically contingent notion of group and identity as the context within which struggles for recognition can be validated through the communicative actions of autonomous individuals. What, however, I think both have not done so far, i.e. Habermas and Fraser is distinguish clearly enough - that is argue through the entanglement - the imposition of a lopsided (a)(im)moral political discourse, racism, on the contexts for an ethical political discourse, culture. Only by so doing will it be possible to differentiate between collectivities and identities which have a “legitimate” role in the discursive practices against such injustices, but also the limits of such collectivities in those processes.

We can begin to sketch out the form of that differentiation within a communicative framework and by so doing begin to put more flesh on the issue of motivation which is not that fully developed in Habermas, as Honneth has pointed out and up to now in the works of Fraser and Young are implied as a general reaction to the provocation of the injustices. This might achieve, then as well, the distinctions between motivations towards discursive communicative practices, and thus towards those that advance normative learning processes, and those which, like Habermas’ fear of the fundamentalist part of the “multi-cultural” struggles for recognition, are regressive. In reading Habermas’ normative account of what ethical political discourse should be like, there is almost the sense in which collective identities are developed endogenously and critically maintained or changed in the self referential hermeneutic processes of a cultural group. This is posited almost as a prior stage before individuals from such groups make claims that require redeeming in the moral political processes and in which in the process of the communicative based testing of such claims, the implication is that these collective identities might for those individuals concerned, undergo change. I think the separation of ethical and moral political discourses helps at the categorical level, but only as a device for illustrating the two areas and contexts of communicative discourse. The reality is that they are intertwined, and the key question is whether or not it is legitimate to normativise these two as distinct possible ends. In other words

should these as distinct areas be a keep-in-the-front-of-the-mind guide to action around collective identities and actors? As indicated earlier I think not since it is far better to envisage it as a continuum of action. Fraser, as Young has summarised her, has contended that Habermas “separates cultural norms from social processes that reproduce bureaucratic...institutions”. That same danger appears to lurk in the work of Fraser because she locates recognition and misrecognition in the area of culture so that collective identities, especially transformative collective identities are given a predominantly cultural slant. Can the inference be drawn from this that logically the notion of group rights might also be inferred?

I want to approach this from another angle by examining how the distinction I made earlier between defining the problem and working on the solutions in relation to race, racism and Black collective identities is the key differentiation that should not be conflated. Whilst I have defined racism as the maintenance of relations of force in the structures of communication through conventionalisation of biological differences or ascribed biological differences, this is taken to encompass those practices of the representation of group characteristics through naturalising them thereby putting them beyond the scope of communicative discourse. There is another way to describe this process, and this is that it is the imposition of im/a/moral political discourses on ethical political discourses which are supposed to underpin collective identity formation. This conventionalisation has a dedifferentiating, homogenising, reductive blocked communicative character. In other words it has as well a collective character. This intertwining of certain moral political discourses and ethical discourses raises questions of collective identity which can never be simply framed in terms of ethical processes because they are at one and the same time those of who am I in relation to my socialising mores and who am I in relation to this imposed “malidentification” of me. It is the latter which always has active or latent a political discourse based on blocking or being able to impose blockages in the structures of communication, especially structures of communication linked to material resource allocation, which, if I can indulge in some analytical categorisation, might manifest itself sixfoldedly: a defensive exaggeration of group values and characteristics which ossifies ethical communicative political discourse, and might be the bases to fundamentalism; the total collapse of such ethical discourses, i.e. group collapse; the assumption of the imposed identity, though this is more likely to be manifested in individuals rather than groups, i.e. historically there is little evidence to show that oppressed groups took on the collective identity foisted upon them; individual psychical collapse, most memorably diagnosed in Fanon’s work; and a critical interplay between political and cultural collective identities. It is the last one that I want to concentrate on because it occupies the ground upon which theorists like Fraser can talk about transformative remedies to injustices, or those upon which it is possible to



talk about differentiating out those claims and remedies that advance normative learning processes and those which do not. This collective political identity which is imposed through “wogging” sets the framework within which those who otherwise might not have had any basis for coming together, can collectively recognise themselves as those wrongly done to collectively and thus one of the motivational possibilities is the development of what Fraser has described as transient solidarities and collective identities. In another way it runs with the proposal put forward by Eder that collective action constitutes the collective actor, and not the other way round. The evolution and use of the term “Black” as a political construct and recognition factor can be used to illustrate this further. Normatively there should be a twofold critical dynamic: between “Black” and the constituting coalition of groups and individuals, and between “Black” and the collective identity demands made for remedies. The former will reflect the communicative moral and ethical discourses, which can only be inclusive, but which underwrite the collective identity of “Black”. The latter because “Black” is at one and the same time an expression of communicative blockage through the imposition of a collective identity, i.e. being wogged, as it is a positive expression of recognition of collective wrongs done to, cannot make conflationary collective claims for all those who define themselves as Black, but can and should only make collective claims that those wrongs be undone. In other words these remedial claims are about the removal of those unjust forces in the structures of communication which impose collective ‘malidentities’ so that autonomous individuals can enter into moral political discourses in the wider society on an equal footing and with equal respect. These claims can never and should never be about the comparative worth or value of a group. These then are claims for racial justice which since race and racism are social constructs, envisage remedies in which socially constructed race will not play a part. They are about deconstructing false collectivities. Racial justice can be disaggregated into its two primary components - distributive and recognition justice - but only as a learning tool. In reality, especially since misrecognition and positively discriminated distribution of resources to the white collectivity reinforce and maintain each other, it is hard to separate the two. At this level then one is not talking about the positive recognition of cultural claims to recognition, as Fraser and Young do, and to some extent Habermas, even though Fraser and Habermas, each in their own way seek to qualify that by theorising about critical group identities and boundaries as opposed to essentialised ones, e.g. Fraser’s affirmative and transformative multi-culturalism. To put forward the recognition claim of “Black”, or “not being white” in the transitive sense, is to put forward a claim that the equality conditions governing communicative discursive practices, as Habermas sets out in BFN, are still to be satisfied. It should follow then that whilst non-distorted communicative practice is the “keep-in-the-forefront” guiding principle, the use of other forms of action to overturn those forces in the structures of communication,

provided such decisions have been arrived at discursively within the collectivity of “Black”, are also options. To attempt a more detailed, specified course of action, such as constructing a culturally oriented claim to recognition, and thus “need” under the broader architectonic collectivity of “Black” would be to confirm the criticism of the new “diversityphiles” that such a general categorisation reduces and conflates multi-faceted claims to distinctness. To return to the specific issues of collectivities and motivation, what is being argued, in a refinement of Habermas’ and Fraser’s positions, is that racism imposes on ethical political discourses “immoral” political discourses such that the achievement of Habermas’ normative vision of moral political discourse, still requires an intervening level of collective identity, action and actor, but without the need for group rights.

Does this provide sufficient insight into the area of motivation towards discursive practices, especially in relation to race? Motivation against injustices, in this case recognition and redistribution injustices, give rise to a number of possible motivations, as I argue above, not all of them oriented towards communicative practices.<sup>503</sup> One of the better and theoretically more advanced arguments around the issue of recognition and justice has been put forward by Honneth, himself a former student of Habermas. Whilst Honneth argues that Habermas has not given the issue of motivation in his communicative theory sufficient attention, his work can be read very much as a communicative based supplement to Habermas’. In his book “The Struggle for Recognition”, a summary introduction is provided by the translator thus:

“Honneth situates his project within the tradition that emphasises not the struggle for self-preservation but rather the struggle for the establishment of relations of mutual recognition as a precondition for self realisation....his approach can be understood as a continuation of the Frankfurt School’s attempts to locate the motivating insight for emancipatory critique and struggle within the domain of ordinary human experience (and where as) the Frankfurt School suffered from an exclusive focus on the domain of material production as the locus of transformative critique,...(Honneth)...proposes an alternative account situating the critical perception of injustice more generally within individuals’ negative experiences of having their broadly moral expectations violated.”<sup>504</sup>

Honneth derives his theory from a re-examination of Hegel’s early work in Jena in which Hegel proposes that “full human flourishing is dependent on the existence of well established ethical relations - in particular relations of love, law and ‘ethical life’ - which can only be established...through a struggle for recognition.”<sup>505</sup> Like Habermas, Honneth then uses Mead’s work to identify the intersubjective conditions for individual self realisation. Honneth then derives the core of his theory which is that for an individual identity formation, i.e. realising ones one’s needs and desires as an autonomous person, is dependent upon the development of self confidence,



self respect and self esteem. These means of relating practically to one self, require intersubjective processes based on being recognised by others whom one also recognises. These necessary relations of mutual recognition include not only the obvious elements of friendship etc, but as well legally institutionalised relations of respect and autonomy and networks of solidarity and shared values within which the particular worth of individual members of a community can be acknowledged. Such relationships derive from social struggles which are not interest based, and thus are moral struggles because “the feelings of outrage and indignation driving them are generated by the rejection of claims to recognition and thus imply normative judgements about the legitimacy of social arrangements...(to the extent that)...the normative ideal of a just society is empirically confirmed by historical struggles for recognition.”<sup>506</sup>

Honneth’s elaboration of the inter-subjective conditions for identity formation frame his conception of the ethical life understood as a “normative ideal of a society in which patterns of recognition would allow individuals to acquire self confidence, self respect and self esteem necessary for the full development of their identities.”<sup>507</sup> The “moral grammar” to such claims for recognition can be read off from the logic of the ethical life which envisages a greater and equal inclusion in society. In other words the internal logic of social struggles and normative theory mutually illuminate each other. There is in Honneth’s approach the assumption of a continuum between ethical political and moral political discourses as opposed to Habermas’ theory in which there is a sharper distinction between the two. To that respect, my own approach has more in common with Honneth’s. Further to that and the distinction I think should be made between recognising the problem and defining the solution, Honneth argues that “because the key forms of exclusion, insult and degradation can be seen as violating self confidence, self respect, or self esteem, the negative emotional reactions generated by these experiences provide a pre-theoretical basis for social critique....(so that when)...these experiences...(are)..shared by many others , the potential emerges for collective action aimed at actually expanding social patterns of recognition.”<sup>508</sup> The only rider I would add to this is that many forms of non-recognition can be regarded as constituting collective action because they seek to homogenise and reduce differences. Honneth is therefore right to claim that it is the doing away of such active processes of non-recognition - more “malrecognition” - which is important as the precursor to non-distorted identity claims.

In seeking to examine the relationship between motivation and discursive practices, it would help to look in more detail at Honneth’s arguments surrounding disrespect and resistance. As we have seen, Honneth regards the recognition spheres of self respect and self esteem as containing the “type of moral tension that can set social conflicts in motion....(because

they)....represent a moral context for societal conflict...(by relying)...on socially generalised criteria in order to function.”<sup>509</sup> Honneth argues that individual experiences of disrespect are read as typical for an entire group. This however needs qualifying. What is experienced as disrespect, or non/mal recognition, if one looks at racism, is the act of being “wogged”, i.e. it does not matter whether or not you are born in the West, or come from one of the Caribbean islands or are recently arrived from Bangladesh, you are essentially one wog under the skin. It is this negative moment which is intersubjectively recognised. There is, according to this formulation of disrespect and potential social conflict, a neutral perspective with regard to the “solutions” by the participants. It is “left entirely open whether social groups employ material, symbolic or passive force to articulate and demand restitution for the disrespect and violation that they experience as being typical”.<sup>510</sup> In other words it accords with my view that the “problem”, however it may be framed, cannot in that process of “framing” presume conflationarily, the “solution” as well.

Honneth, in a way that at one level parallels Frasers categorical distinction between distributive and recognition justices, but actually in a way that goes beyond it, differentiates struggles for recognition from other utilitarian explanation for social resistance and rebellion on the basis that the former “are formed in the context of moral experiences stemming from the violation of deeply rooted expectations regarding recognition.” Where such societal acts of disrespect occur the hurt feelings generated can become the bases for collective resistance only within an intersubjective framework of interpretation which can show that it is typical for a whole group. These languages, thus, “open up an interpretive perspective for identifying the social causes of individual injuries.” There is as well, according to Honneth, a secondary motivation other than recognition and which is that such acts of political collective resistance serve as well to tear out the victims of disrespect “from the passively endured humiliation and helping them .. on their way to a new positive relation to self.”<sup>511</sup> Certainly, as shall be shown, there is a theoretical resonance with the empirical details of the experiences of Black Workers groups in the target boroughs.

Returning to the earlier distinction made between moral and utilitarian causes for social confrontation, Honneth correctly argues that not all social conflicts have a moral framework formed around notions of disrespect and recognition. There are others which are interest grounded where “interests are basic goal directed orientations that accompany the economic and social circumstances of individuals if only because individuals must try to obtain the conditions for their own reproduction.”<sup>512</sup> The collective action that can stem from the common recognition of this are those that can trace the development of such “social struggles back to attempts on the part of social groups to obtain or enlarge control over certain opportunities for their



reproduction.”<sup>513</sup> However the key difference between the two types of struggle, i.e. one over scarce resources the other over the unjust denial of social recognition, should not be read as an argument that seeks to replace one with the other. Instead Honneth argues that recognition theory can extend interest based struggles. Perhaps this should be the other way around because such interest based struggles always require a moral grammar within which to sustain the solidarity required to develop collective acts. Sometimes the moral grammar of such solidarity resonates in harmony with other forms of collective solidarity, such as in the Grunwick dispute or the ‘80s miners’ strike where there were the coming together at certain points of the collectivities of class, race and gender. However, when the key source of the constitution of class collectivity is done away with, for example the closure of the mines, forms of solidarity and collective action dissipate, perhaps because it is primarily interest based collective action. On the other hand, as I have argued, race and gender have within its development the constant constitution of collective actors through forms of distorted communicative representations to the extent that societal acts of disrespect and non-recognition structure access to scarce resources far more so than in class. We begin to see why, therefore, Honneth’s distinction goes beyond Fraser’s one of distribution versus recognition, where the two categories are almost put on an equivalent basis. Using both Thompson’s and Moore’s studies as supporting evidence, Honneth goes-on to put forward the notion that in many arenas of white working class struggle, it is “the jeopardising of the possibility for collective self respect that generates broad-based political resistance and social revolts.”<sup>514</sup> If, motivationally, recognition structures interest in social struggles, then the question arises, one that Honneth feels theorists like Thompson and Moore have not properly answered, as to how such struggles are to be evaluated in the development of that society. These are no longer just motives for action, i.e. disrespect and non-recognition, but must “come to be examined with regard to the moral role that must be attributed to each of them in the development of relations of recognition.”<sup>515</sup> In other words, “in order to be able to distinguish between the progressive and the reactionary there has to be a normative standard that, in light of a hypothetical anticipation of an approximate end state, would make it possible to mark out a developmental direction.”<sup>516</sup> We begin to see here an overlap with Fraser’s other categorical differentiation between affirmative and transformative remedial action. More importantly, we begin to see the bases for the development of criteria by which such judgements can be made. They are similar to the distinction made by Eder between collective action and social movements which can retard and those which can progress communicative action. Such a formulation also ties in with my contention about race being one of the key unresolved problems of modernity the inclusive solution to which pushes back the overall moral learning processes in society. Thus, to finish with Honneth for this section, he envisages these collective forms of resistance appealing to normative

structures via a shared language of unjust treatment and which is oriented towards expanding inclusively the relationships of recognition. This expansion of the relationships of recognition is not measured simply in terms of “stages in a conflictual process of formation”, but “the significance of each particular struggle is measured in terms of the positive or negative contribution that each has been able to make to the realisation of undistorted forms of recognition.”<sup>517</sup>

Both Honneth and Fraser cover similar territory, but where Honneth is superior to Fraser’s attempt to situate recognition struggles in a critical theory, is that, without posing it in terms of an either or choice, as can be read into certain aspects of Fraser’s categorical formulation, he re-asserts the primacy of the need for a communicative based programming of recognition struggles as a framework within which to settle aspects of distribution justice. Moreover, Habermas in attempting to ride the tension between fact and norm via deliberative politics outlines a normative vision of discursive constitutional democracy, but does so without fully accounting for the reality of multi-racial Europe in his “facts”. If, anything then, theorists like Fraser and Honneth in deconstructing and reconstructing key parts of Habermas’ overall theory, so that crucial aspects of race and gender can be included, point to the need that if, as Habermas contends, all who are affected should be able to participate in the communicative processes affirming and re-affirming constitutional democracy, then there should be some indication of the interim communicative channels that are required to achieve such equality of access and participation. That is to ask, how will these struggles for recognition, which arise specifically out of the denial of such access, enter into the equation. It is within this specifying of the “interim” that the continuing relevance, and circumstances of that relevance, of the collective actor and of collective identities become apparent. After all, for Habermas the political processes are supposed to step in where the normal problem solving processes, such as “the co-ordination patterns operating through values, norms and routines for reaching understanding” are overtaxed. How then are the social problems of racial injustice put on the agenda within Habermas’ schema? Both Honneth’s and Fraser’s outlines of recognition struggles argue for a direct participation of those experiencing such injustices in both the framing and pursuit, including change pursuit, of these problems. But do these, despite their communicative based or sympathetic to, theoretical articulations square fully with Habermas’ account? Habermas, in BFN, is aware of Fraser’s criticism and does attempt to respond and incorporate some of her insights. To answer this properly, however, requires a slight detour through Habermas’ thinking on the public sphere and its relationship to the key systems, political, administrative and economic because this relationship since it defines the limits of control and/or transformation of such systems, still appears to differ to Honneth and Fraser; and its a difference - a communicative space, as Habermas would put



it - through the nexus of which race and gender might still fall. In many ways it raises yet again the sharp differentiation Habermas makes between ethical and moral discourses. On the other hand covering this now will serve critically to highlight the key relationship between the two major areas of the critique so far covered, i.e. system and lifeworld, and adds another key categorical variable to Fraser's matrix of affirmative or transformation, one which is implied in Habermas' approach, but which might not be sufficient to satisfy his own discourse principles of equality, i.e. that of "control."

### ***6.12 Context, Collective Action and the Public Sphere***

There are three critically defining questions which can be asked? What, for Habermas, is the public sphere? How does it operate? What is its relationship to the political system? In his book the "Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere" Habermas sought to show how the development of the bourgeois public sphere in the eighteenth century become corrupted away from its potential as a communicative structure which could link citizen's lifeworlds with the political system.<sup>518</sup> At that point his criticisms were not translated into an exposition of what the public sphere should be. In BFN, however, in the almost thirty year wake of TPS and numerous secondary critical commentaries, Habermas provides a more detailed outline of what the public sphere should be like. In terms of what it is then the public sphere is:

"....a communication structure rooted in the lifeworld through the associational network in civil society....(it is)..a sounding board for problems that must be processed by the political system because they cannot be solved elsewhere....(and thus)...the public sphere is a warning system with sensors..sensitive throughout society....(which can)... not only detect and identify problems but also convincingly and influentially thematize them in such a way that they are taken up and dealt with by parliamentary complexes.." <sup>519</sup>

However the public sphere is neither an institution nor organisation; not even "a framework of norms", but a "network for communication information and points of view....(where)...streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesised in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of public opinions."<sup>520</sup> All that is required is the "mastery" of a "natural language." The public sphere's communication structure is distinguished by communicative action's third feature which is that it "refers neither to the functions nor to the contents of everyday communication but to the social space generated in communicative action." That is to say that persons in a communicative encounter adopt an inclusive, open second person attitude which reciprocally attributes communicative freedom to each other - i.e., a communicative space opens which is invitationally open to other potential participants. Such spaces mirror on a smaller scale the public infrastructure

of larger assemblies. Habermas, however draws a distinction between the changes in participants opinions and preferences that can emerge from such communicative encounters, and, especially with regard to political questions, from actually putting those “dispositions into action”. He argues that “the communication structures of the public sphere relieve the public of the burden of decision making” insofar as these are (better?) made by the “institutionalised political process.”<sup>521</sup> Such public opinion is to be judged qualitatively, and not quantitatively, as survey based opinion polls do, so that what is important are “the rules of a shared practice of communication.” It is the near exhaustive rational process of information garnering and provision and accompanying reasoning which normatively determines the degree influence the public opinion has on the political system. However, as Habermas repeats, “political influence based on public opinion can be transformed into political power only through institutionalised procedures.”<sup>522</sup> Concomitantly, because the public sphere is rooted in the lifeworld experiences of participants - to wit, “problems voiced in the public sphere first become visible when they are mirrored in personal life experiences” - the public sphere cannot be ‘manufactured’ to order but can only thematize social problems “insofar as it develops out of the communication taking place among those who are potentially affected.” Logically, therefore, the development and maintenance of the public sphere is dependent upon the existence of an active, and vitalising civil society.

In this brief outline of what can be described as Habermas’ idealised version of the public sphere, and in the body of the text in BFN he states often enough to the effect that the ‘fact’ of everyday civil society and public sphere is far from this, there can be discerned three potential faultlines which are a reflection of some of the key problems outlined in the structure of this critique. However, it should be acknowledged that within this updated version of Habermas’ public sphere that it is possible to theorise where recognition struggles fit in, and to some extent it is also possible to draw theoretical inferences about racism and gender inequality, especially in relation to his observations about the life world experiential bases to the public sphere. Nevertheless, despite this, there are still three broad areas of concern with Habermas’ account of the public sphere.

The first relates to the motivational question of how the transition to his extrapolated ‘norm’ of the public sphere from the ‘facts’ of everyday practice in the West is likely to take place. Notwithstanding the non-teleological nature of his theory, and the elevation of social movements, post-conventional morality and increasing individuation as forces for the achievement of such, it is difficult to see how, within the framework of global capitalism, the idealised public sphere can be striven for if the relationship between it and the political system is cast solely in terms of “influence”. All this does is reinforce the arguments of people like



Honneth that Habermas appears to imply a painless, evolutionary transition to the 'norm', even though it is acknowledged that Habermas is not talking about some form of "end state". It leads as well into the second problematic area which is that Habermas maintains his strict categorical, even ontological, separation between the lifeworld and system with his insistence that the public sphere influences the political process and that only the political system can act. There is an action lacuna, something Joas contends, between "influence" and political "change" or political "action", which, given Habermas' fallibilistic principle, cannot really be maintained and should be subject to empirical validation. Perhaps at the heart of this is his wish to avoid the Republican trap of theorising the self constitution of an ethical community which he does not reject so much out of principle as practicality. With that in mind it should be possible to conceive of the critical interface between public sphere and political system as giving rise to areas of communicative action directed political action, i.e. participatory decision making. In other words whilst it might be desirable, on pragmatic grounds, to rule out a total participatory transformation and constitution of complex society, it severely limits, and empirically cannot be sustained, if, in so doing, all circumstances where such forms of transformational action can occur, are also excluded. Is this separation then but a symptom of the third area of concern? This is that Habermas talks about the "general public sphere", and in some cases only acknowledges a related "political public sphere". By the latter I take him to mean the public sphere most closely related to the political system and which includes the forms of parliamentary assembly. Is this realistically so? Even though he recognises the inequalities of the "fact" of the public sphere and the malstructured nature of it with manufactured public opinion etc., he does not speak about the existence, even antagonistic relationships between, numerous public spheres which are unevenly distanced from and structured to the political system, a system which in its actions perpetuates such inequalities, but, on the contrary seems almost to insist on the need for one general public sphere - no doubt because it satisfies the overall idealisation of all participating in the discursive, democratic control of the political system. Yet it is within such a scenario of multiple public spheres that one can talk more realistically about the nature of the struggles for recognition, even distribution, and the way in which these interact with the general public sphere and political system. This third critical aspect of Habermas' conception of the public sphere is one that is tackled by Fraser in her critique and reconstruction of that concept. In broad terms Fraser agrees with Habermas' contention that the public sphere is "the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs." However Habermas' idealisation of the liberal public sphere as the unfulfilled normative, or utopian, potential of the bourgeois public sphere which was never, and is not, realised in practice rested on assumptions which were not backed up by empirical realities. These assumptions, as outlined in Habermas' original work and some of which

continue in his BFN defining of the public sphere, are that the public sphere is a communicative structure for making states rationally accountable to the citizenry, that access to the public sphere is open to all, that private interests were inadmissible, that inequalities and power were to be “bracketed” such that participants were to deliberate as peers. Leaving aside, for the moment, the criteria of “private interests” which Habermas has tackled in BFN, Fraser goes on to deconstruct the other assumptions in order to show that the bourgeois public sphere was actually restrictively discriminating in terms of access and participation so much so that some critical commentators have described it as “an ideological notion that functioned to legitimate...the shift from a repressive mode of domination to a hegemonic one.”<sup>523</sup> Now, whilst Fraser does not hold necessarily to the extremity of that view, she does argue, using various sources, that the bourgeois public sphere was structured, partially through its own rules of discourse, i.e. the substantive content of Habermas’ assumptions, on the exclusion of women in Europe, and, on the exclusion of both women and Black people in the States. In part this bears on the those sections of the critique raised earlier about the nature and content of “discourse” both in the public sphere and political system. At another level it links in with Honneth’s ideas about recognition struggles for Fraser goes on to show and argue that the general public sphere contained either on the outside, or internally, a number of public spheres, many of which, given that they were excluded in some way or another, were in a relationship of conflict with the general public sphere. Fraser calls these “subaltern counterpublics in order to signal that they are parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter discourses.”<sup>524</sup> These are not separatist in the sense of wanting to dissociate from the general public sphere, which might be the reason Habermas insists on the primacy of the general public sphere, but denote the fact of their exclusion and have inbuilt in their idealisation their eventual inclusion. To that extent they function as the cutting edge to the inclusive development of the general public sphere. For Fraser then, in stratified societies, “the discursive relations among differentially empowered publics are as likely to take the form of contestation as that of deliberation.”<sup>525</sup> She goes on to argue that even in egalitarian multi-cultural societies, i.e. ones not structured by class, race or gender, that because such public spheres also enable participants to construct and express cultural identities, i.e. they are culturally specific institutions, that there will still be a need for numerous public spheres. I am not so sure. Such public spheres come about through denial of recognition, not the positive acclaim of cultural identities, which can be construed as essentialising collective identities. The ideal should be, to use a term she herself uses in the same piece of work, for a condition of “multi-cultural literacy” within a general public sphere. However this contestary “imbrication of public spheres”<sup>526</sup>, as a more appropriate description of the “fact” of the public sphere, serves to flag up my own contention that the relationship between the state and the public



sphere in the interim processes cannot only be expressed through the general public sphere which in itself might be preventing all voices from being heard. It is therefore feasible and desirable to conceive of subaltern public spheres, as was the case in some areas of local governance around the issue of race, establishing their own relationships with the political system. I have argued earlier that the state as a collective resource which can be used to secure full communicative participation must still be a consideration in the interim “factual” phase. In which case this strengthens the argument for transformational action. In other words the sharp separation between civil society and the political system cannot be maintained, as Habermas tries to do. Fraser expresses it succinctly: “any conception of the public sphere that requires a sharp separation between civil society and the state will be unable to imagine new forms of self management, interpublic co-ordination, and political accountability that are essential to a democratic and egalitarian society.”<sup>527</sup> In fact it is not so much “imagine”, as Fraser thinks, since it is possible to intellectually pre-construct those arrangements, but “create” those new discursively democratic forms of institutions. The imagining should refer then to conceptualising the agency, that is the capability to do, because it is that which I think falls through the under developed theorisation of the nature of the interface relationship between lifeworld-public sphere and system; gaps that are thrown into sharp relief when race enters into the debate.

We can return then to the question posed earlier which prompted this diversion via Habermas’ concept of the public sphere, which was to ask how the social issue of racial justice is put on the political agenda. For Habermas the public sphere is the main communicative structure which should programme the political system. It is clear that Habermas in BFN provides more detail to his original implied conceptualisation of what the “ideal” public sphere should be like; but does so within the pragmatic principled preference for constitutional democracy. Within this framework the outline of the public sphere is developed by oscillating between ‘fact’ and ‘norm’ so that the ‘norm’ becomes the detail of the shadowy potential of the ‘fact’. However because, as Fraser and Honneth imply, and as I also think, his ‘fact’ does not take account properly of the realities of multi-racial Europe, in fact the reality of the white ‘minority’ globally, the contestary and conflictual origins of, and still current nature of the public spheres, as opposed to ‘a’ public sphere, is not full appreciated. Consequently getting race on to the agenda in the interim does not only mean getting into the realm of the general public sphere. It does mean, and here the notion of recognition struggles comes into play, first tackling those forces which prevent it becoming accepted as a genuine social issue through, for example, the development of a contestary, oppositional public sphere. This might mean as well seeking to bypass the general public sphere through enlisting the remedial resources of the state using the potential of the norms implied

by the legislation, constitution and legitimation promises of political parties. Thus it is possible to imagine a continuum based relationship, even oscillation between the three constituent elements, of influence, change/transformation and programming which comprises the lifeworld/public sphere and political system interface under such conditions. This then helps unblock the distorting forces in the structures of communication preventing the acceptance of the issue in the general public sphere. Perhaps what this points to is that Habermas' strict separation of lifeworld and system, of ethical and moral discourse, leads him to downplay the transformative potential of envisaging at a general level the need for a communicative based directing of systems, by pitching this 'directing' in terms of influence and control. The key questions are twofold. Firstly does he in his outline of normative, constitutional discursive democracy prescribe too closely the parameters of constitutional democracy so that he ends up foreclosing on other forms of discursive democracy which might be more inclusive of Black people and women? And, relatedly, probably more importantly, is this because of the nature of his lifeworld-system, ethical-moral, separation so that in practice he cannot help but come out with a form of democracy which, as Dryzek points out, can be appropriated by liberals. My tentative answer is "yes"; but tentative in the sense that I think the radicalness of his overall theory can be rescued.

### 6.13 Summary

I am going to summarise the main points of the critique according to the interrogative matrix outlined on page....as a precursor to the very final section which attempts to sketch out the normative framework for a racially inclusive local governance. That is to say that, with an eye slightly skewed to the "facts" of race and local governance, the empirical details of which are contained in the next chapters, this will be a sketched hypothesis of the idealisation of those "facts" in way which seeks to ensure that the participatively inclusive radicalness of Habermas' theory does not have any unintended exclusive racial boundaries.

We can thus summarise the critique of Habermas by refracting the core issues through the critical matrix ensuring that the category of race is a constant interrogator.



#### **6.14 (1.) Democratic will formation and (2). Democratic agency**

This should have been entitled “democratic opinion and will formation” because Habermas draws a related distinction between the two, reflecting as it does not only the ways and means of opinion and political will formation, i.e. discursive democracy, but also the key need for the ‘periphery’ of opinion to be transformed into ‘political will’. It is as well Habermas’ summary statement of the old clarion call “the people shall govern”, but without the recourse to a republican constitution of an ethical community, a problem well exemplified by France’s inability to conceive of citizenship other than in terms of its revolutionary traditions. Yet, whilst there is a similarity of “oughts”, Habermas casts his question in relation to modern complex society, which is how the periphery under such conditions of complexity can programme the centre. Rehg and Mayhew, two theorists who make sympathetic use of Habermas, pose the same question thus:

“What constitutes the moral basis of co-operation? In the late twentieth century this question has taken on an immediate, indeed overpowering worldwide relevance: even as a growing plurality of national groups presses for sovereignty, networks of international exchange and interdependence continue to grow and thicken. Thus the conflicts that arise both within and between nations pose an increasingly acute problem of co-operation...(involving) human rights or questions of freedom, equality, fair treatment...”<sup>528</sup>

and

“The complexities and intricacies of modern society are disturbing and perplexing... how is cohesion possible in societies that can no longer be integrated by uniform adherence to conventional norms...as citizens we search for public policies that can effectively include diverse people with disparate interests in a single societal community....(to the extent that)... we are tempted to conclude...that the centre cannot hold.”<sup>529</sup>

To which can be added the further qualifying question, implied in the two quotes above, of how such social integration and co-operation is to be achieved whilst there are still those racialising, unequalising, forces in the structures of communication. In other words what are the conditions for ensuring that Black people are able to contribute according to Habermas’ own discursive principles, in opinion formation, and how can such opinion be transformed into will formation that programmes the centre. On tologically Habermas’ idealisation of the public sphere as that structure in which lifeworld based communicative action ensures the development of consensual opinion from the bottom up, describes the general conditions for a reflexive, critical grounding of social integrating action which is not teleologically tied travelling towards a forces of history determined utopia. On the other hand the utopia is more ‘realistically’ derived from the deontological procedures governing the development of communicative action

oriented towards genuine communication, i.e. communication without force. Habermas situates the motivation towards such communication in the view that integration in the modern complex world can only be on the basis of consensus on post conventional norms. This is a rational consensus employing dialogue in which arguments involving the proffering of good reasons are subject to validating discourse. As Rehg says it “leads to a notion of ‘rational motivation’ as explaining the force of validity claims: the speaker’s validity claim exercises a ‘motivating force’ on the hearer precisely because the claim refers the hearer to the ‘fact’ that there are good reasons for accepting the claim.”<sup>530</sup> The role of language in such argument, as Habermas emphasises, is important, no more so than in a society where there are many languages and where the ‘official language’ as in “standard English” has been used, and is used, as an inequitable differentiating force in key social processes, including political processes. As shown above, theorists such as Benhabib and Young, have adopted differing stances on this, the former insisting on the ‘unity’ of political language and culture. and the latter, on the reality and need for diverse voices and means of expressing those. My own position is that the plurality of input should not be conflated with the output, which can be ‘unilinguistic’ since what is important is that the process of argumentation should include the criteria of translatability and transmutability. Whilst Habermas has stipulated conditions of accepting the “political culture of the host country”, and in relation to the position of Black people in Germany such, in terms of acceptable race equality language, an archaic formulation is understandable at one level, it does appear to imply a common language condition as well. Such a conclusion seems to be supported by his underpinning of the public sphere as being rooted in the lifeworld experiences of the participants and thus in the consensual formation of opinion stemming from communication informed by common cultural background contexts...This should not be taken to be an argument about the supposed ability to use of standard language forms by Black people. Rather it is an argument that recognises that the impetus for the maintenance and sustenance of standard language forms in metropolitan countries have often been the symptomatic expression of wider, sometimes subtle, but ultimately nation defining, attempts to shore up a perceived crisis in the legitimating fabric underpinning the current political control of the state. This might, though not inevitably so, take the form of an ethnically pure form of defining the nation and those who qualify for inclusion. On the other hand it might be expressed, as it does under the present Labour administration, through the lens of “raising standards in education”, with the not so subtle sub-text of the ills wrought on education by the anti-racists and multi-culturalists of not so long ago days of yore. In any event the effect of both is that these processes become a punitive differentiating one against Black people. Further Black people, as in the case for example of Black children in the educational system, are very much bi- and multi-lingual both inter and intra- the standard language, a quality



seldom acknowledged. The use of standard language forms in contexts like these is often strategic in a way that supports the translatability and transmutability proposal because it requires of Black participants the ability to move from one language form to another, if not for themselves, then certainly for others in the communicative constituency, as in the case where children or other standard language exponents act as griots. Cornel West expresses well the everyday linguistic experiences of many Black people in the metropolitan countries thus:

“I am continually caught in a kind of ‘heteroglossia’, speaking a number of English languages in radically different contexts. When it comes to abstract theoretical reflection, I employ Marx, Weber, Frankfurt theorists, Foucault, and so on. When it comes to speaking with the black masses, I use Christian narratives and stories, a language meaningful to them but filtered through and informed by intellectual developments from de Tocqueville to Derrida. When it comes to the academy itself there is yet another kind of language, abstract but often atheoretical, since social theorising is mostly shunned.”<sup>531</sup>

In the light of what can only be described at this stage as the beginning of the argument about the glossolalic skills of the Black outsider, we should return to the tentative conclusion reached about Habermas’ point about the “acceptance of the political culture of the host country” which implies that there is within his theory still a dominant form of universalism, and ask whether or not it is a fair comment. There are, after all three major claims made for Habermas’ theory, either by himself or by his supporters, which are put to the test by this conclusion since it amounts to a ratification of Goldberg’s “incorporatist” criticism. Firstly language comes to play *the* coordinating role in a social integration achieved through the rationalisation of the lifeworld and thus involving consensual achievement as a result of the better argument. It is also, secondly, the grounding for hoping, in terms of the reconnection of the lifeworld and system, that this will involve a determinant role for the former over the latter, which can be taken as the principle. The pragmatic though, is expressed in Ritzer’s summary of Habermas’ theory’s aims thus:

“The hope for the future clearly lies in the resistance to the encroachments on the lifeworld and in the creation of a world in which the system and lifeworld are in harmony and serve to mutually enrich one another to a historically unprecedented degree.”<sup>532</sup>

Thirdly the above serve to reinforce Habermas’ meta-theoretical claims that inter-subjective based communicative discourse marks a philosophical paradigm shift which, unlike previous paradigms, retains a universalism, but one for which the deontological framework because it guards the rights of all to participate, is not excluding. For Habermas these paradigms, which in their development, roughly correspond to historical periods, though that does not stop them being still in force today, are ontological,

epistemological and linguistic. Habermas' linguistic turn involves nothing more than putting the on tological and epistemological under permanent critical scrutiny through deliberative communicative discourse. But, if the conclusion reached above is to retain some sense of validity then it is being argued that Habermas' theory retains residues of on tology and epistemology which effectively places Black people still on the back burner of the rationalised forces determining the societal resistance to system colonisation and to the shaping of the future. It also cancels the key discursive principle that all who are affected should have the right to participate on equal footing in such deliberations. This ties in with the point made earlier about the apparent fore-shortening of the boundaries of acceptable oppositional practice. This has to be distinguished from the neo-on tology and epistemology of, say, new Labour and its so-called "third way" in which, despite claims to wanting further democratisation, their practice in government entails requiring of people a leap of faith to believe in their programme, accompanied by a TINAsaurus approach to that programme's epistemological basis. Nor is it the same as Foucault's declared on tology, almost a WYSIWYG reality, which drives out immanence in favour of the weak resistance that derives from a regenerated ethical self. However, it raises again the substantive criticisms made by post modernist theorists against Habermas, many of whom themselves can claim to have taken the "linguistic turn", that his meta-universalism masks the incommensurable, plurality of mini- and macro-narratives-in-their-own language, and by so doing, prevents people from being heard. There can be then, not a final vocabulary of closure or reconciliation, as some believe is implied in Habermas idea of consensus, because that would still reinscribe the old relations of domination. The question that this poses, because it is there implicit in Bhabha and other similarly minded post colonialists and modernists' reading of Habermas, is whether or not Habermas' notions of communicative discourse grounded consensus in today's societies, both at the national and inter-national level contain hidden statements of linguistic assimilation, domination and imposed meanings.? On the other hand, the obverse question can be put, in anticipation of looking in more detail at what Habermas actually says, which is to what extent is Bhabha's notion of continual differential slippage between cultures another way of framing Habermas' idea, and my labelling, of contingent communicative consensus. That is to say that no communicative moment of consensus is for ever stable because the participants to the debate, and others who might be post agreement affected, can always place the issue back on the agenda, so to speak.

Dallymer, in a summary introduction to communicative or discourse ethics points out that the ethics in question is "indissolubly connected with language and communication."<sup>533</sup> Further he defines it as a "cognitive ethics of language" which "relies on insights garnered through participation



in communicative or discursive exchange....(in themselves).....social or inter-subjective exchanges.”<sup>534</sup> Wellmer takes it further and claims that Habermas’, communicative ethics “presupposes that every being capable of language is recognised as a potentially rational being..”<sup>535</sup> The question now becomes whether or not communicative ethics, which I take to be as not incorporating a vision of societal good, but laying out the behavioural principles for participation, that is it is not about grounding norms but about the “grounding of normativity itself”, contains an implicit language condition which is inimical to what Habermas has categorised as “ethnic subcultures.” Prefatorily Habermas seems to answer his critics over this issue when in BFN he writes that “..(a).. political culture in the seedbed of which constitutional principles are rooted by no means has to be based on all citizens sharing the same language or the same ethnic and cultural origins ...rather the political culture must serve as the common denominator for a constitutional patriotism which simultaneously sharpens an awareness of the multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life which coexist in a multicultural society.”<sup>536</sup> However the question still remains about whether or not this common political culture denotes an implicit single language requirement for its business of political discourse. There are two temporally connected routes to excavating this further, both of which relate to Habermas’ qualifying responses to criticisms made of his two recent major works, viz., TCA and BFN. In TCA in response to Taylor’s objection to Habermas’ explanation of communicative rationality in terms of cognitivist ethics, Habermas defines the areas in which consensus is to be sought. Thus:

“In my opinion communicative rationality precisely does not amount to the sum of its moral-practical components. Everyday communicative practice covers a wider range of validity; claims to normative correctness constitute merely one of numerous validity aspects. *It is only when conflicts of action are to be resolved with the consensus of participants in terms of this one aspect that moral issues arise.*”(My emphasis)<sup>537</sup>

For Habermas, as I shall argue later, this with reference to Black people in the metropole, it appears to mean that claims from the ethical good of their lifeworlds which clash with the national ethical good, i.e. the national culture, cross over into moral validity claims because it raises questions about normative correctness. These should be redeemed discursively. When Habermas lays conditions therefore of “acceptance of the political culture”, he can only refer to the acceptance of the cognitivist ethics, and not of the national political culture. In so doing one can, then only talk about the language of cognitivist ethics, that is, the political language. This cannot be taken at the empirical level of that which constitutes the everyday formality of political communication, but must be taken at the more abstract level both as laid out in the discursive principles and thus in the capacity of every capable language speaker to be rational. In other words the

conceptual structure of making and redeeming validity claims is not the sole preserve of the national language medium.

For sympathetic commentators like Benhabib, on the other hand, this has been interpreted, and conflated, with her requirement for the use of formal political language. But to do so would give credence to the criticism made of Habermas from some quarters that the Habermassian 'ideal speech situation' reads too much "of a multitude of academics smoking pipes around a table and arguing some point by means of undistorted communication." If what I have surmised above about Habermas' acceptance of the political culture condition not necessarily meaning one language, then it would appear that the only pragmatic issue would be that of translatability. It would not address the other requirement I outlined earlier, which I regard as essential when one comes to examine race within a Habermassian context, which is transmutability. Whilst I thus agree with much of what McCarthy has to say, and this is but an extension of his earlier foray into Habermassian theory and the multi-cultural/-racial society, both operate conceptually with what I regard as a regressive, liberal notion of "multi-culturalism" which effectively masks the unequally structured relationships between Black people and the rest. This apparent taken-for-granted quality of *ceteris paribus* leads both, but Habermas in particular, into a circular, and/or sometimes, an unnecessarily culturally conflationary argument, and/or, particularly here in McCarthy's case, into an argument that borders on irreconcilable 'ethnic' differences. There are thus, elements of Bhabha's critique of multi-culturalism and diversity in the latter two's arguments. However, whereas Bhabha appears to be arguing for the incommensurable residue of Black cultures as the bases for resistance, I want to argue for the explicit acknowledgement of unequally structured, socially constructed races, and within that cultures, which disrupts the assumption of *ceteris paribus* to the extent that if this is not dealt with in communicative discourse, then the substantive principles, as outlined by Habermas, of such discourse are violated.

My view is that the argument between McCarthy and Habermas has a slight element of the differend in it in which both are arguing about the same issue, yet both are, at key points, arguing past each other because there is, in my opinion, insufficient acknowledgement of the contribution made by black people to the development and constitution of the constitution in the West. The attempt to summarise the issue of democratic will- and opinion-formation, as refracted through race, echoes this insofar as the insufficient attention paid to the facticity of race, as opposed to culture, means that Habermas norm of consensus might still retain elements of an essentialist universalism. Thus the public sphere, crucial in the area of public opinion formation, has been reconstructed in terms of a multitude, and at times hierarchicalised, number of spheres in which Black and race equality public



spheres assume subaltern positions. The crucial osmotic fluid, which I take to be the democratic culture, that regulates and permits the creation of legitimacy through catalysing the crossover from opinion to will-formation, therefore not only has to allow for the realities of a multi-cultural and –racial society, but also the realities of inequalities which presently accompany the position of those ‘minority’ cultures. To that end I have argued that the question of language cannot be reduced to the requirement of a single formal language, but must permit many languages in the processes of communicative discourse in which consensual overlap relies on translatability and transmutability. To do other wise, as Benhabib proposes in her support of a single political language, is to push Habermas back into the epistemological category. If an interpretation of Habermas permits then of many languages, what exactly does he mean by requiring of ‘immigrants’, and here I have taken this as a clumsy shorthand for Black people in Europe, that they accept the political culture of the country they migrate to. It cannot be the acceptance of the reality of the political processes and systems of that particular country at a certain point in time, i.e. the ‘facticity’. Habermas himself, in other related contexts, talks about the principle of constitutional democracy, and about the universal moral principles, which can be redeemed, embedded in the legal and political norms of such countries. In relating the critique of, and counter-critique from, respectively, McCarthy and Habermas, the nuances of the key issues surrounding this debate have been drawn out. For McCarthy the ethical and moral are in reality so intertwined that any plural constitutional democracy must permit of mutuality, in effect a stand-off defined by ‘agreeing to disagree’, especially since the democratic state is permeated with the ethical content of the ‘indigenous’ culture’. For Habermas, permeation or no, there are still universal moral principles which can be redeemed so that any consensus is not an ‘in the end’ one, even those that are grounded in the reality of majoritarian decisions, but a consensus for the moment, thus allowing the issue to put back on the agenda. Where my contention of the ‘differend’ comes in is that whereas McCarthy, because he does not specify the how and why of the conditions which permit of mutuality, can be read, as Habermas mischievously does, as sanctioning an ‘anything goes’ scenario, i.e. Habermas’ anti-universalist point. Habermas, on the other hand, because he does not specify the how and why of the conditions under which ethical differences, especially when it comes to those from “minority” cultures, i.e. Black people, evolve into moral issues – from what is good for me to what is good for all – can be read, when he insists on consensus, even contingent consensus, as saying that the force of the better argument does not contain a neutral, deontological structure, but an epistemological one with traces of western rationalism. Whilst I actually agree with McCarthy that the ethical and moral are intertwined, as illustrated by Black people’s experiences, I also agree with Habermas that differences that speak of what is good for all, and this can be direct claims for redemption or indirect which

relate on the face of it to specific ethical communities, are moral ones. Even if, as Habermas proposes, the nature of the differences are such that it needs a greater level of abstraction, a resolution will need to be grounded in the political and/or legal processes, involving a normative standard. Now because both Habermas and McCarthy treat ethical communities and cultures in a liberal way, that is to say the issue of majority and minority becomes a quantitative and not qualitative one so that solutions become additive rather than deconstructive, an assumption can be made that all ethical differences have the potential for conflict. I want to propose, rather, that this gap can be filled by sketching out the details of the 'how' and why' as it relates to Black people in the metropole. This is done, not because it relates simply to the contingent, historical "facticity" of their experiences, but because I hold that one of the crucial unresolved problems of modernity is that of race. Thus what will be sketched out is saying that what is good for the consensual inclusion of Black people in the processes of democratic opinion and will formation in the metropole, is good for all. Let me start by saying that the performative standard for sorting the wheat from the chaff, so to speak, is contained in Habermas' own conditions and principles governing communicative discourse, and by definition thus if one or other is breached, a performative contradiction. This is to say that if all who are affected cannot participate in the legal and political discursive practices giving rise to legitimacy, then that legitimation, which will be grounded in a claim to consensus, will be invalid. It should be clear that I do not regard the bar to participating, as seems to be implied in both Habermas' and McCarthy's usage of terms such as "diversity", "culture" and "subnational ethnic groups", and in their understanding of Honneth's "struggles for recognition", as residing in the differences that accrue from their being a "foreign" ethical community in a majority "indigenous" ethical community. Moreover I do not deny that there is an "indigenous" ethical community. However, I do deny that this "indigenous" ethical community evolved, as Habermas seems to imply within some exogenous structured cordon sanitaire which was only breached once the Black colonial chickens started coming home to roost over the past four decades or so. Performatively as well Habermas use of the terms "ethical communities", especially when he talks about them in the context of consensus formation in the constitutional democratic state, seems so static that it flies in the face of his previously stated understanding of such communities and identities as not essentially fixed, but subject to constant de- and reconstruction

My point is, as I made in the earlier chapter, that this vectoring of space and time which he identifies and which impacts on people's lifeworlds, are identity shaping and changing forces which, because of racism and its history, Black people have long experienced. In other words "different socio-cultural backgrounds" are going to be affected as much, if not more, by this, no more so than when this is mediated by racism. It is not,



therefore, that the ethical framework of Black people interacts *sui generis* with the ethical framework of white people, to put it crudely, but shorthandedly, rather it is that this interaction is mediated by racism, as communicatively defined earlier. Intersecting with this are also other influencing forces of class and gender. The close intertwining of ethical and moral concerns is exemplified in the lifeworld and systemic experiences of Black people so that when “wrongs done to”, often presenting in the form of communicatively distorted representations of Black people’s “ethical communities” are challenged this not only raises moral concerns, that is what is good for all because not to deal with it means that one or more of the discursive principles is violated, but it is raised at a faster rate. Consider, for example the momentum of moral issues raised by the Stephen Lawrence case. I am trespassing slightly into the area of the organisation of the state which contextualises the category still to be summarised, the organisation of local government. However, this is necessary at this stage because if this is the “facticity” of race, political culture, and *inter-alia*, real-politik language, then within the constitutional democratic state, any discursive action aimed at consensus but which in the end, violates one or more of the discursive principles, can be opposed by those losing out. The problem, then with Habermas’ formulation to date is that minority “ethical communities” are more likely to lose out more frequently if the distorted mediating force is not dealt with as a priority; action which will require their own participation. Further, as other justice/injustice cases surrounding Black people and the various normative processes in the legal structures and polity illustrate, there is no guarantee that moral claims raised by Black people will be recognised as such. The representation forces in the structures of communication are such that these can be, and often are, rejected as simply ethical concerns of those Black communities, thereby frequently pathologising claims for justice – the “chip-on-the-shoulder” syndrome. There is then the potential of a very radical reading of Habermas which places all in the end consensus decisions which violate the discursive principles always on the agenda so that the notion of contingency and change is radicalised, accelerated and questions not the principles of the political culture, which I read in terms of Habermas’ abstracted principles of discursive communication – the deontological framework – but certainly the facticity of that culture. As to the constitutional democratic state, Habermas sees this as the best means within today’s complex world to reconcile lifeworld with system. It is a pragmatic choice which should be thus opted for pragmatically provided that in its development it does not breach those principles. Consider for example the current plight of Turkish people in Germany, and the ethnic “ethical” community which has been the main reference point for Habermas’ thinking on the multi-cultural society. Habermas has long contended that the Turkish people in Germany have to be granted citizenship and that the current racially defined nationality law should be changed. He has also broadly supported the SDP in Germany, probably, as with constitutional democracy,

on pragmatic grounds. The SDP government, as they promised to in their election manifesto, plan to grant citizenship to Turkish minorities in Germany. However, partly as a result of a right wing backlash, this implementation of an election pledge has come with conditions which find an echo in some of Habermas' own positioning around the issue of minorities and the German constitutional state. This can, on the other hand, be taken as a too literal reading of Habermas. Thus foreigners seeking German citizenship will have to take a language test, swear an oath of loyalty to the constitution, should have no criminal record and should not be living on social security. They will also face political vetting so that, as Mr. Schilly, the Interior Minister, said "Islamic fundamentalists are excluded."<sup>538</sup> One might very well ask whether or not the Christian fundamentalists will be expelled too. Whatever Habermas' intention, this cannot be the level at which his 'acceptance of the political culture' and 'constitutional patriotism' requirements can be read, not only because it breaches his won discursive principles, but because it illustrates the racist mediating nature of the interplay between the state, as currently constituted, and Black people. Further this manifestation of an exclusionary ethically, permeated state, as exemplified in the example just given, based as it is on a racist nationality law dating back to 1913, highlights as well that the evolution of the constitutional state in the west is inter-woven with the defining of who is part of that polity and who is not. In the case of the major western powers, those who are not are invariably Black. This brings to the fore again the question raised by McCarthy that it should be possible to envisage different interpretations of constitutional rights and arrangements at any one time. Habermas has criticised this, and instead placed the issue in a temporal line in which progression proceeds from one 'in the end' consensus to another. However, the constitutional democratic option is, in the end a pragmatic choice on the part of Habermas, and the questioning of it cannot simply be because there is another ethically informed variant, which is implied by McCarthy's criticism. On that basis, and here Habermas is right, religious fundamentalism, all, not just Islamic variants, can seek to claim back a previous domain. There is, however, a criterion which can be used to determine the legitimate questioning of the constitutional arrangements, both pragmatically and in principle which given the 'facticity' of Black people's existence in the metropole, is important in ensuring that Habermas' insistence on "in-the-end" consensus does not lead to new forms of exclusion. On the issue of consensus and a plurality of value views Habermas, in an earlier piece of work, as McCarthy points out, argues that "when public discussion, rather than leading to rationally motivated consensus on general interests and shared values, instead sharpens disagreements by revealing particular interests to be nongeneralisable or particular values to be neither generalisable nor consensually orderable, we can still seek agreement at higher levels of abstraction."<sup>539</sup> The question then is what is this level of higher abstraction, which I hold to include the



questioning of the constitutional democratic state. Moreover, on the particular question of political culture, Habermas, I suspect because of the pragmatic considerations of time and the need to make decisions, considers that:

“For the time being, however, the minority can live with the majority opinion as binding on their conduct insofar as the democratic process gives them the possibility of continuing or recommencing the interrupted discussion and shifting the majority by offering better arguments.”<sup>540</sup>

And,

“Every political community must rely on the integrating force of a shared political culture if it is not to disintegrate into its segments.”<sup>541</sup>

I want to argue that there is one criterion and standard which determines the level of abstraction, and which can be used in all four inter-related facets of political culture itemised above; that is the general one of inclusivity which is contained in Habermas’ own principles of discursive communication; a principle which cannot be compromised in the processes of developing and agreeing legal and political norms. When it comes to the ‘facticity’ of Black people’s experiences in the polity of the constitutional democratic state, then I am arguing further that we are already into that next level of abstraction so that it is not acceptable to argue that the minority can live with the majority decisions, especially if the making of that decision, or effect of that decision means that that inclusivity principle is violated. This abstracted moral arena, which is necessary to ensure the unconditional participation of Black people and thus, for example, the use of their languages, does not mean, as someone like E.P. Thompson believes, that it will result in a Babel like polity, something which can be glimpsed as well in Habermas’ assumption that McCarthy’s plural visions means the collapse of political legitimacy. Rather the notion of political culture and within that, political language is recast at this abstracted moral level and we therefore have to run with the idea that the key elements of discursive communication can be translated and transmuted across languages and cultures in the polity, and thus jettison the idea, which seems to be lurking in the shadow of the concept of discursive rationality, that Black socio-integrative processes have a rationality deficit that excludes them from the domain of moral conflicts.

### ***6.15 Organisation of Welfare (5) and Welfare Agency (6)***

In developing the critique of Habermas by refracting his theory through the prism of race, I am conscious that I have neglected, relatively, the interrogative category of ‘welfare’. I have however, mentioned Habermas’ procedural model of welfare law, particularly in his explication of that in relation to feminism, and noted that a similar exercise needs to be carried out

vis-à-vis race. 'Welfare' was included as a category in recognition of the history of the evolving inter-relationship between local governance and welfare generally to the extent that local government in the UK, for example, has acted as the custodial access point for large tranches of essential welfare services. The early part of this section seeks to show that the prevailing ideological models of local government, i.e. the localist and post fordist schools, are inadequate when it comes to attempting the inclusive examination of race, welfare and local government. Intersecting with these have been other attempts to examine race and welfare, but from a general welfare perspective. Some of these, like Williams, have attempted to locate the issue of race in welfare within a social labour based relations of productions theoretical framework both as a general remedying response to what Williams regards as the disinclination of social administration "to take account of the welfare experiences of Black people", and also for some social labour explanations of welfare, such as the post-Fordist model, to compound the omission by homogenising experiences as the reflex to forces of production. Latterly the response from social labour based thinkers, both the relations and forces of production variants, which, to give them their due, still attempt to critique and hold out hope of opposition to the prevailing neo-liberal and –managerialist approach to welfare, has been to tip their toe into the well of post-modernism. This has been evident certainly in some of Hogget's belated attempts to get to grips with race in his post-Fordist framework. It is evident as well in the influential Open University based development of welfare theorising. This can be summarised as a neo-Gramscian, spilling over into Foucauldian analysis, reminiscent in some respects to Laclau and Mouffe's work in the eighties.<sup>542</sup> Within this approach race is theorised as a social construction constituted by different discourses and settlements in the arena of welfare, but focussed on the way in which the racialised "body...becomes situated in systems of meanings which both reflect past and present social relations and also structure experience...and social exclusions."<sup>543</sup> Whilst I have no problem with the general notion of race as a social construct, I do have problems with a theory implies a very weak space for opposition, especially opposition from Black people, and thus an over determinist role for these various constituting welfare discourses.

By contrast Habermas' approach, which, as I indicated above, places a change premium on regenerating the forces of social solidarity in the "forms of communicative practices for self determination", offers a better framework within which to consider the full inclusive participation of Black people. That means that the nature of Habermas' linguistic turn is such that those epistemological processes structuring the forces of racist representation and, relatedly, those on tological groundings which speak of permanence for some and impermanence for others can be critically constructed and deconstructed in self determining communicative practices. I have already



raised critical areas in Habermas' theory which require further work and clarification in the area of democratic opinion and will formation if Black people are to be fully included in constructing those forces of social solidarity. These are germane as well to the area of welfare so will not be repeated, other than to indicate where in Habermas' thinking on welfare this has to be done. Four inter-linked stages in Habermas' thinking on welfare can be identified, all of which are underpinned to a lesser or greater extent by his evolving socialist remedy of regenerating social solidaristic forces. The first relates to his seventies work on crises in the capitalist societies and his argument, re-echoed, if somewhat slightly altered in his latest work, that the core crisis facing such societies is not so much economic, though that might be related, but legitimation. This in itself would reflect a profound crisis in the normative underpinnings of society, since unlike the other economic and political subsystems, it is a 'contagion' in the socio-cultural system, that value arena which develops and guides the formation of social solidarity. The state straddles these subsystems, attempting, as defined by its core Habermasian role of resolving moral differences, to compensate one or more of the subsystems in order to prevent or attenuate potential crises. For Habermas the origins and development of the welfare state represent the attempt to compromise, consensualise and encapsulate the utopian aspirations of the working class through recognising that the full inclusion of, and participation by, certain sectors of society require a measure of redistributive justice which can be institutionalised on the bases of universal access to all, even if the treatment and outcome is in some way means dependent. The welfare system helps secure legitimation for the political order, if not in the detail of its workings, where Habermas' next notion of 'juridification' comes into play, but certainly in the common sense notion of welfare universalism, accepted in everyday life, that it is there for 'us'.

Habermas' idea of juridification, which is developed in TCA, expresses the condition, with the benefit of the hindsight of BFN, that the structure and content of welfare law, because it has not involved all who are affected in its development and subsequent use, has an uneven double edged quality. Thus whilst it grounds some of the principles of redistributive justice by addressing the material needs which enable recipients and the system to reconcile some of the integration gaps, it at the same time tries to 'administer' a consensus on social integration. To this extent it contributes significantly to the colonisation of the lifeworld of welfare recipients by the administrative system. Thus "the legal and administrative means through which welfare state programs are implemented are not a passive medium with no properties of their own...(but have a )...reifying and subjectivising power ...(so that)...the deformations of a lifeworld that is regimented, dissected, controlled and watched over are more subtle than the obvious forms of material exploitation and impoverishment....(to the extent that)....social conflicts that have shifted over into the psychological and

physical domains and internalised are no less destructive for all that.”<sup>544</sup> I have argued earlier in this section that when the social category of race is explicitly introduced into the equation, then it can be seen that for Black people there is a double juridification process which throws into doubt the universalist claims of welfare and the in practice common sense universalism of the welfare system. This is expressed in the empirically verifiable unequal access of Black people to the volitionally discretionary services of welfare and the unequal, over access of Black people to those services which are underpinned by legally sanctioned compulsion, sometimes with a criminal justice element. The other commentators on the welfare state and race – those mentioned above – have tended to treat this phenomenon as a post world war two one occasioned by, in the example of the UK for instance, the large scale emigration of Black people to the metropolitan countries. Whilst the analyses of the causes for the racially discriminatory processes in the welfare set up might differ, there is broad agreement on the empirical salient features which shows the discriminatory results vis-à-vis Black users of the welfare system and vis-à-vis Black employees, or potential employees, in that system. Habermas himself, in dealing generally with the issue of the multi-cultural society, and by implication race, in his latest publications has written about the permeation of the state and laws by the indigenous ethical processes; a permeation in his view which should not obscure the potential for morally activating the universalist claims of those same processes and laws. However, there is, on Habermas’ part, an underestimation, or even non-recognition, of the extent to which the indigenous ethical framework is informed and sustained by the exclusion of racialised others in its defining moments. Within moments such as the latter, the moral enters and should trump the ethical. Neubeck’s and Cazenove’s work on what they term ‘welfare racism’ in the United states show the extent to which welfare is defined by whites through recourse to centuries old racial stereotypes. We need, briefly then, to contextualise more critically the issue of welfare, juridification and race. Habermas has, in ‘The New Conservatism’, attempted to portray the welfare state as embodying the social utopia of social labour, a utopia he now thinks outdated. The diminishing of this utopia means that “a welfare state programme that continues to be nourished by a utopia of social labour is losing power to project future possibilities for a collectively better and less endangered way of life.”<sup>545</sup> Earlier I argued that this utopia of social labour in the welfare context ignored the utopias of race and gender equality because of the logic of its productivist core. We can now actually go further and argue that the utopia of social labour in welfare and its universalist claims were, and are, sustained by the exclusion of race and gender equality utopias. Certainly it is obvious that the post second world war development of the welfare programme and structures were heavily dependent upon the use of Black labour in its maintenance; labour that was discriminately differentiated and rewarded. The system “derived their



legitimation from general elections and find their social base in autonomous labour unions and parties.” This legitimation was often crafted on explicit and implicit understandings and practices that sought to structure a racially unequal access to and treatment by welfare because, as I shall argue, the welfare system from its early twentieth century nascent inception, was built on a white racially inclusive notion of ‘us’ which is still the basis of the common sense notion of “the welfare system is for us.” In other words the welfare system post second world war, was both dependent upon Black labour to sustain it, and thus to keep alive its utopian vision, whilst at the same time it had to secure legitimation through processes which maintained its welfare identity as white. This was not some irrational, prejudicial reaction to the “sudden” presence of Black people, but the result of ethical processes built into the creation of the welfare system in the period spanning the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. Cohen, in trying to answer the question about whether or not the post second world war institutional racism of the welfare state was merely incidental or intrinsic to it, argues that, “the concepts of efficiency, eugenics, nation and empire have been constant in the debates about welfare throughout this century....(and)....the labour movement played a central role from an early date in popularising these concepts in relation to welfare.”<sup>546</sup> He shows that the early twentieth century legislation affecting immigration and the nascent legislative building blocks of the welfare state which introduced the national insurance and pension schemes both had the same exclusionary reference point, that of Jewish immigrants. Implicated in this, and in many instances, leading the push for such exclusions both from the country and access to the welfare provisions, were, as Habermas describes the welfare system’s social base, “the autonomous labour unions and labour parties.” Cohen shows, however, how both were active in the support, during that time period, in the drive to exclude Jewish immigrants from the country and specifically from the proposed welfare reform programmes, thereby helping to racialise the process from the outset. Part grounding for these beliefs were what Cohen describes as the “National Efficiency Movement” which was represented not so much in terms of formal institutions, but rather in terms of “a series of ideas taken up by a broad range of organisations.”<sup>547</sup> Efficiency, in this context, was constituted in relation to social Darwinistic concerns about the overall efficiency of the “Imperial race”, i.e. white British people. It was differentiated by gender as well by putting upon women the responsibility for breeding. Within this equation, Jewish immigrants or potential immigrants were considered to be eugenically unfit. Eugenicist utterances linking the health and fate of the ‘white’ nation to the desirability of keeping out Jewish people from the country and denying those already here were commonplace from leading socialists and founding figures of the British labour movement, such as the Webbs. These representations of welfare unworthiness received materially, substantial recognition in the racially excluding clauses that were built into the subsequent social legislation. Cohen goes on to

show how these eugenicist impulses were evident even in the continuing development of the welfare state post 1945. The continuation of this preservation of white welfare identity in the face of an increasing Black population after 1945 is well documented. The essential point of all of this is to try to give critical detail to Habermas' general notion of the ethical permeation of the state and law. This was not a general, homogenous ethical permeation, but expressed on the whole the social labour base of its prime movers. Even if in the working out of the society contained in the vision of that ethical permeation juridification came to express the instrumental management of legitimation costs by the state in attempting to socially integrate the working class, there was one aspect of that ethical permeation upon which there was general agreement. This was the extent to which the national identity formation and welfare identity formation was, dialectically almost, tied up with the keeping out of racialised others. Those that are excluded from the communicative discursive processes that guide the structuring of the norms and laws a society wishes to have as its social integrative medium, obviously cannot participate in the those areas which affect them. The point then isn't simply, as Habermas believes, that recourse can be made to the universal moral claims contained in such formations. Such recourse can be blocked if there are active processes in such ethical formations which unjustly maintain the identity, "who-I-am", at the expense of others. Earlier I argued that Habermas' notion of social learning as an evolutionary process, and here I take this to mean increasing solidaristic, communicative discursive processes in society which guide systemic imperatives, has a shadowing drag on its development. This I take to be race and racism which I regard as trans-epochal unresolved problems the solutions to which are the touchstone to the fulfilment of modernity. That is to say there is accompanying such learning processes technical, instrumentalised ones of domination. The notion of race efficiency in the development of the welfare state, is a case in point. When one tracks the emergence and development of the efficiency paradigm in the management of the welfare state today, it is clear that it developed and is used as a counterweight to the representation of equality programmes, especially race equality programmes, as inefficient. These new efficiency programmes are a palimpsest erasing race in the public sector so that there is a subtext which equates race equality, and thus Black people, with inefficiency. Equality initiatives have been depoliticised into managerial ones which can be, and are, measured against so called neutral management accounting objectives and standards. It finds its expression in the re-emergence in those previously equality oriented public sector organisations, of the white, male manager as the 'efficient' norm. At another level it is a reworking of the anthropophagii relating to less than rational, technically underdeveloped, efficiency challenged Black person. This is, in a sense, an extension of Habermas' analysis of the neo-conservative welfare state which I outlined in earlier sections of this chapter. Briefly this is that there is basic



contradiction at the heart of the welfare project which in the seventies displayed crisis proportions. This contradiction is between its goal and method, the goal being the creation of egalitarian forms of life which can nurture self realisation and spontaneity, whilst that in itself is denied by the method, viz. legal and administrative means because generating such forms of life “exceeds the capacities of the medium of power.” The response to this dilemma, which at the time of writing in the eighties Habermas differentiates between the conservative wing of the social democratic parties and the stated neo-conservatives, but which on reflection in the light of the experience of the former parties in government now, we can now conflate under one banner, is as set out in the following. Firstly the legitimacy of the welfare state is sought by the reconstructed social democratic parties in terms of “deleting from the welfare state project precisely the components it had derived from the utopian idea of a labouring society....(by renouncing)...the goal of overcoming heteronomous labour so that the status of a free citizen with equal rights extends into the sphere of production and can become the nucleus around which autonomous forms of life crystallise”<sup>548</sup>. These for Habermas, are the true conservatives because they “want to find a point of equilibrium between the development of the state and modernisation based on the market.” This is an obviously pertinent critique that can be made of new right labour in Britain, especially in its period of governance. This point is even more important as a means to distinguish Habermas’ approach from that of those who might seek to appropriate his thinking as a means of intellectually shoring up the repackaging of borrowed neo-conservative ideas as the ‘third way’. The second part of confronting this dilemma of the welfare state relates to a number of measures first introduced by the neo-conservative right, but now accepted and promoted by the social democratic parties. Capital is allowed to valorise at the expense of the poorest in society. There are definite material cuts in the level of welfare available. Finally there is for large parts of the welfare system the “transfer of normatively regulated parliamentary powers to systems that merely function, without normative regulation.....(which)...turns the state into one partner among others in negotiation.”<sup>549</sup> This deliberate strategy of reducing the costs of legitimation results in the withdrawal of “more and more social areas from a decision making process that is obliged by constitutional norms to give equal consideration to all who are concerned in any specific matter.”<sup>550</sup> Habermas is right to a certain extent, but his analysis does not go far enough. Whilst it is true that there is the ongoing programme of removing from the polity tranches of the welfare state and reconstituting what was once a political relationship of stewardship with that of a neo-corporatist, functional partnership one, there is also a parallel programme being undertaken in those segments of the welfare state still under political control of depoliticisation of the internal processes through neo-managerialist, managerial accountancy processes. In this not only is the relationship of the employee to the political

organisation being redefined, the relationship of the client is being redefined, not as that of an equal citizen, but as that of the market determined consumer and customer. These are then, “the expression of a historical consciousness that has been robbed of its utopian dimension.”<sup>551</sup> For Habermas, and at the general idealised level I agree with him, the pragmatic steps normally associated with adhering to the principles of social redistributive justice in the welfare set up, such as full employment, is not revolutionary enough. The relationship between the three resources modern society has at its disposal for steering the welfare state, money, power, and solidarity, has to be recast so that solidarity, that area from which the lifeworld, and inter—alia, political opinion and will formation draw their primary strength, is determinant. In terms of the potential form this would take, Habermas sees this being ‘directed’ through autonomous public spheres which would have to “achieve a combination of power and intelligent self-restraint that could make the self-regulating mechanisms of the state and economy sufficiently sensitive to the goal oriented results of radical democratic will formation.”<sup>552</sup> To achieve this would require that the mass political parties relinquish their mass loyalty generating function, that is their own legitimacy. This puts into stark relief the claims by new right Labour that they are trying, especially at the local government level, to reconstitute the relationship between the local populace and local governance on the grounds of active citizenship. To achieve that requires giving up the future right to govern. Such initiatives are likely, thus, to present themselves eventually in terms of what Beck has described as “facadism”. We are now at the point at which the issues raised in the previous section in relation to race and political opinion and will formation come into play in relation to reconstructing the welfare state. There are, however, additional areas which can be highlighted, and which in relation to race lead both into Habermas’ notion of procedurally based welfare and into the next section on the organisation of local government.

The first relates to that of work in the welfare state and the prospects and potential for radical change. Habermas in his concluding section on the welfare state written in the late eighties, believes that when the welfare state becomes reflective, that is moves into the ‘ought’ of solidarity based control or prime influence, “takes leave of the utopian idea of a labouring society.” This is because workers’ subcultures have for the most part disintegrated and it is “doubtful whether their power to create solidarity can be regenerated in the workplace.”<sup>553</sup> But, as Honneth and Joas have pointed out, the fact that social labour is no longer the prime locus for societal change and the working class are not therefore recognised as the historical subjects of such change, does not mean that we should abandon attempts to critically de- and reconstruct the area of ‘work’.<sup>554</sup> If, anything, as shall be shown in the empirical section, the issues and categories of race and gender resurrect the need for such change, but from a different perspective. Certainly the pursuit



of race equality within local governance and its welfare responsibilities, cut across those utopias of labour and gender, which in reality meant transgressing traditional institutional and practice boundaries in the attempt to reconstruct new ones that kept at bay the racialised forces in the structures of communication. Within this could be caught the glimmer of new relationships between employee, the citizen and the polity, prompted in many case by the reality that many Black employees, for example, were employees, trade union members, local community members, members of local community groups, welfare recipients, even members of local political parties, all at the same time; certainly far more so than white employees. In other words when the issues of race and women were entered as explicit variables into the equation, it became clear that the two areas of social and systemic integration cut across the area of work in ways that reconfigured and made critical again that which had been the emancipatory domain previously of the utopia of social labour, i.e. liberation from alienated labour. One can see how the argument can, and will be, developed about the claims made by mass political parties concerning the “need” to reduce the financial and legitimating costs, as evidenced in the latter case by Labour’s explicit rejection of “loony leftism”, which figured as one of the prime motivating forces for what I have previously described as the process of re-whitewashing the town halls, whilst at the same time maintaining the depoliticised façade of equalities as a means of assuaging the “ethnic” voter. In terms of the resources which Habermas identifies the welfare state can call upon to steer it, it is clear that both the Conservative and new Labour have opted for redefining and strengthening the media of money and administration at the expense of solidarity; a situation likely to lead to the increasing colonisation of the lifeworld.

What does it mean to regenerate the solidaristic resources so that the current dominant steering media of money and administrative power can be attenuated, properly influenced and/or transformed? Habermas does not see this as rejecting any kind of utopia. Rather the “utopian content of a society based on communication is limited to the formal aspects of an undamaged intersubjectivity.” This does not suggest a concrete form of life, but only the normative outlines of “the necessary but general conditions for the communicative practice of everyday life and for a procedure of discursive will formation that would put participants themselves in a position to realise concrete possibilities for a better and less threatened life, on their own initiative and in accordance with their own needs and insights.”<sup>555</sup> There can be little disagreement of this at this abstract level. Habermas has been criticised for his idealisation of potential social formations because it appears to ignore the realities of structures of power that might actually inhibit the achievement of such idealisations. For example, Foster, via a sympathetic reading of Honneth’s criticisms of Habermas writes that because “discourse ethics ..presupposes a freedom from all forms of institutional and

cultural coercion, and an equal access to social information and cultural traditions of education....(it)..fails to gain access to the moral claims of underprivileged groups (because)..it unwittingly de-moralises the normative claims of the oppressed by identifying moral claims with universal validity claims raised in public discourse....(and through)...the restriction of intuitively mastered rules of language..(which)..is too far removed from how subjects understand and experience injuries to their moral intuitions to be able to guide theoretically experiences of injustices felt by lifeworld actors.”

<sup>556</sup> In a sense this has a resonance with the criticisms I have made, not so much of Habermas, as of the readings made by some of his supporters and of the implications that can be read from some of his work. At another level, however, it is a misreading of Habermas because it reads too literally what should be a “keep-in-the-forefront” type of idealisation. The last quote above by Habermas is a good example of that which should be striven for and which, in line with Habermas’ own theory of fallibilism, is subject to empirical validation. Thus the question is not whether or not it can be expected of the oppressed to be able to master the intuitive rules of language – that is too patronising since if they communicate with each other they obviously have – but whether or not the public sphere is open to languages. In other words is it right to read Habermas as saying that there can only be one language form in the public sphere? Or should we read him as saying, as I do, that, in terms of fulfilling the conditions of the utopia of an undamaged subjectivity based communication, if the empirical conditions of a multi-racial society, including the unequal power relationships, demand languages, as opposed to language, then that is fine. To do otherwise is to say that the conditions for achieving a solidaristic steering of a multi-racial society, and within that the multi-racial welfare system, are such that they negate the “general conditions for the communicative practice of everyday life and for a procedure of discursive will formation that would put participants themselves in a position to realise concrete possibilities for a better and less threatened life, on their own initiative and in accordance with their own needs and insights.” This cannot be right.

We come now to the last, but probably latest, stage in Habermas’ thinking on welfare which relates to his proceduralist paradigm of welfare law which he claims is better than the two currently dominant in complex societies: bourgeois formal law and the welfare-state model. Applying the interrogative category of social justice, the former model relied on the negative legal status of institutionalising private law in a context of market participants so that since all could now participate equally, social justice could be attained. The image of society contained within such a legal system assumed certain things about the fairness and equilibrating qualities of the market. However the self evident adverse effects of such a society led to the development of the welfare reform model which relied not “on a change in the normative premises, but only a more abstract version of them.”



Whilst the image of society changed, the basic system of rights did not. In addition to the negative rights it was found necessary to introduce “new categories of basic rights grounding claims to a more just distribution of socially produced wealth and a more effective protection from socially produced dangers.”<sup>557</sup> Taking account of the changing dynamics of the welfare state Habermas argues further that the vision of the welfare society envisaged could be twofold – dependent upon the extent to which it is deemed necessary for the state to intervene. In essence rather like the old UK welfare state and the new “modernised” vision of new right Labour. However both, according to Habermas, “assume a competition between two agents, the state and those subject to it, who dispute each other’s scope for action.” It is acknowledged that the welfare state, in whichever version, whilst it grants to each person the “material basis for a humanly dignified existence”, also at the same time, “tends to impose supposedly normal patterns of behaviour on its clients...(thereby)...running the risk of impairing individual autonomy...”<sup>558</sup> It is clear that Habermas is attempting to define a type of dependency within the welfare system which is substantively different to the types of dependencies governments are seeking to tackle. In the latter, as evinced by new Labour’s forays into welfare reform, a dependency upon the material benefits of welfare is detected; a dependency which it is believed dulls clients aptitude and attitudes towards economic self sufficiency. The prescribed new versions of welfare reform, i.e. restricting the access to welfare as a ‘positive’ inducement to seeking work, come with an explicit pronounced vision of cultural values and expected forms of life. I have commented earlier about the racist visions and counter visions that these have as a sub-text. At another level it is a reworking of “arbeit macht frei.” Self esteem, one of the components of respect identified by Honneth, is to be achieved solely through a combination of hard work and cultural re-orientation. Habermas, on the other hand, is concerned with the type of dependency that reduces and vitiates the resources of solidarity. To achieve this Habermas proposes the proceduralist understanding of law. This discursive ethical account of law does not disavow a materialist conception of justice, as Foster claims, but rather projects the following vision.

“According to this view (the proceduralist), the legal order is structured neither by the measure of individual legal protection for private autonomous market participants nor by the measure of comprehensive social security for the clients of welfare state bureaucracies. Although it is supposed to provide the guarantee of both of these, they do not form the paradigmatic cases. In the proceduralist paradigm of law, the vacant places of the economic ‘man’ or welfare client are occupied by a public of citizens who participate in political communication in order to articulate their wants and needs, and to give voice to their violated interests, and, above all, to clarify and settle the contested standards and criteria according to which equals are treated equally and unequals unequally.”<sup>559</sup>

For Habermas such a vision of society is different to the liberal and welfare state models because both of these share a “productivist image of a capitalist industrial society”. In the proceduralist society the “public sphere and civil society are the centrepiece of the new image....(in which)..the burden of normative expectations shifts....to the forms of communication in which an informal and non-institutionalised opinion and will-formation can develop and interact with the institutionalised deliberation and decision making inside the political system.”<sup>560</sup> At this point we are back again at the criticisms and questions I raised about how race equality issues are to be built into those of the “forms of communication” in opinion and will formation. Nevertheless, for Habermas, this self organising legal community is legitimate “to the extent to which that it equally secures the co-original private and political autonomy of its citizens..(and at the same time)...it owes it legitimacy to the forms of communication in which civic autonomy alone can express and prove itself.”<sup>561</sup> In terms of welfare, this project then has to be continued not along the same lines, but at “a higher level of reflection.” The aim of this ‘reflection’, to quote Habermas again, is “to tame the capitalist economic system, that is “restructure” it socially and ecologically in such a way that the deployment of administrative power can be simultaneously brought under control....(involving)...training the administration to employ mild forms of indirect steering....(and)...linking the administration to communicative power and immunizing it better against illegitimate power.”<sup>562</sup> Earlier, in the critique, I had agreed with those like Dryzek, Fraser and McCarthy who felt that Habermas should be talking not so much about ‘taming’, or ‘training’ or simple ‘linking’, but about transforming the system. A more radical perspective is required, it is felt, especially when the issue of race is considered and held up against the inclusive principles of discursive ethics. This does not mean regressing into the epistemological era and notions of consciousness, but does mean rethinking the issue of praxis from a communicative point of view. In terms of the public sector, pursuing the aim of bringing the administration under closer communicative influence will mean in certain concrete areas of the administration dissolving the boundaries between the institution, employee and community member; and this is especially pertinent where in terms of race and gender, those roles coalesce around the same people. Habermas’ linkage of public and private autonomy in the proceduralist paradigm derives from his analysis of the relationship between actual and legal equality under the welfare model. In this it is recognised that the material remedial effects of welfare can help in overcoming the discriminating, differential access to the law. However this comes with a price because often “statutory regulations on work and family life force employees or family members to conform their behaviour to a ‘normal’ work relation or a standard pattern of socialisation...(or)...recipients of other compensations pay for these with dependencies on normalising intrusions by employment, welfare agencies, and housing authorities...”<sup>563</sup> Habermas



uses the issue of how women are confronted by this assimilationist pressure in the welfare system and how the proceduralist paradigm provides a better answer. Feminists, as Habermas points out, have rejected both the liberal and welfare paradigms of law because of their assumption "that equal entitlements of the sexes can be achieved within the existing institutional framework and within a culture dominated and defined by men."<sup>564</sup> Now a similar argument can be advanced in relation to race and the position of Black people within institutions. As will be shown in the empirical section any attempt to take the argument beyond the parameters of the liberal and welfare model was met with the abandonment and dismembering of the race equality commitments and structures in many public institutions in the UK. These gender differences then are judged in terms of a male standard giving rise to the stereotyping of women in captured institutional categories, and are not seen as equally problematic requiring the interrogation of the relationship between the two. What is required is an inter-subjective concept of rights: "public discussions conducted inside the arenas of those who are immediately affected must first clarify the aspects and criteria under which differences between the experiences and living conditions of (specific groups of) women and men become relevant for an equal opportunity to take advantage of individual liberties."<sup>565</sup> Broadening this argument to include other areas of group oppression - and here race can be seen to enter, as I have tried to demonstrate with reference to Honneth - and in the need to relate private to public autonomy, Habermas cites Honneth's work which shows that "experiences of insults to human dignity are what must be articulated in order to attest to those aspects and criteria under which equals should be treated equally...(and therefore) cannot be delegated to judges and officials, not even to political legislators." I interpret this as arguing for the "building-up-from-the-bottom" approach to regenerating solidaristic resources, a process which, if one looks closely at the implications of Habermas' words, must mean de- and reconstructing the welfare administrative steering media.

Finally what, in layperson's terms, does the 'linguistic turn' mean in relation to welfare and emancipation? Leornard, a welfare specialist, who has attempted a reconstructive profile from a perspective broadly sympathetic to Habermas summarises as follows:

"If a new emancipatory project of welfare is to be developed it must be based upon a moral critique of modernity from within. This internal criticism directs its attention to the side of Enlightenment implicated in domination and contrasts this with the emancipatory potential remaining in those critical discourses of modernity expressed in the revolutionary ideals of liberty, justice and equality.....It is a form of welfare in which the subject is not seen as homogenous....(but)....as a resistant moral agent....Whether the state can play a decisive role in the promotion of welfare as an emancipatory project depends...on the extent to which its personnel, institutions and practices can be

induced to change in the direction of a more critical view of modernity. This would involve an abandonment of the urge to control and homogenise populations “in their own interests” and instead return to those values which form the critical, emancipatory side of modernity; a belief in equality and justice. It is because such a shift in the discourse which drives the state apparatus is a precondition of welfare as emancipation that achieving power over that apparatus is necessary.”<sup>566</sup>



### **6.16 Organisation of Governance (3) and Agency (4)**

The critique of Habermasian based social theory has been undertaken so that the promise held up at the beginning of it being the best epistemological framework within which to develop a racially inclusive concept of local governance, can be properly realised. In so doing the key nodal points of the “organising governance” column of the interrogative matrix have emerged in the development of the argument requiring thus now the process of ‘joining-up’ the dots. However before attempting that it is necessary to clarify an unwarranted assumption which can be read from the use of the term “governance”, which is that this should not be taken as being synonymous with the state. Governance encompasses the state and the state overlaps with governance, but they are not equivalent. The Collins dictionary defines governance as the “action, manner, or system of governing”, and “govern” as meaning “to direct and control the actions, affairs, policies, functions of a political unit”.<sup>567</sup> In raising the issue of race and governance, especially within the context of substantive inclusiveness, two further questions arise which are “what exactly falls within the provenance of ‘governance?’”, and “who directs and controls such governance?” The development of a connective answer between these two interrogative points which considers race explicitly will flesh out the organisational framework against which Habermas’ vision of the organisation of governance can be summarised.

Governance can be either “done by” or “done to”, or about the relationship between the two properties. That is to say it can refer to, what I have classified as ‘ossified action’, or more transitively action that is ongoing, without at this point specifying the nature of the action, e.g. discursive communicative action. The third relational alternative refers to a critical, reflexive, understanding which will be enlarged upon later. In terms of the basic ‘either-or’ characterisation posed above, it can be said that governance is about the balance which affords priority to either system or process. In terms of re-examining this through the prism of race my argument has been, and is, that Black people have been subject to the system, only ever contingently part of the system, and thus involved in a process which is systemically determined. The remedial converse of this is not so much that the process is all, because that would be a re-constitution of the Republican model, and thus subject to an ethical ‘whitewash’, but that the system should be programmed by the process, and not the other way around, and further that this ‘programming’ should not in its development, implementation or effects, exclude Black people. Above all this ‘programming’ recognises the feedback loop that develops between the system and the process, and in reconciling and resolving the keystone problem of race, that this loop

changes the structure of the system. In tracking and sketching Habermas' conception of governance, we have agreed with other sympathetic critics that he has acceded too much to systems theories to the extent that the relationship between lifeworld and system becomes one in which influence, and not change, becomes the dominant goal. As such for Habermas the complexity of the modern capitalist society gives rise to increasing differentiation which is reflected in the evolution of systems, rather than 'system'. He thus differentiates between the administrative and political systems, designating the latter as the only one which can act "politically". In this he does, as McCarthy points out, re-affirm the classical Marxist perception of the political system. The influence of the lifeworld comes to bear through the process of the public sphere acting as the discursive medium which allows consensus to evolve over normative issues, and the gathering momentum of which allows it to spill over and through the floodgates of will formation located at key points in the political system. My argument is that, whilst Habermas' theory attempts to move beyond the epistemological level into that of language, and thus into the realisation of a critically contingent socialism, his theory, despite belated expansions to accommodate race and gender, still contains residues of a western ethical framework. This begins to give it an ontological and epistemological grounding which does not fully include Black people. However my contention is that this is not a foundationalist flaw, but one that arises out of his not wanting to realise fully the radical implications of his own theory. Inserting race into the considerations, especially within the framework of the argued contention that race is one of the key trans-epochal problems carried over into modernity the resolution of which is a crucial part of the touchstone to the completion of modernity, provides a means of re-radicalising Habermas, without necessarily recreating any historical change subjects. Bearing that in mind, we can return to the criticism made by McCarthy, and with which I have agreed, that Habermas' implication that the administrative system is almost beyond lifeworld redemption, is done so to the peril of not fully allowing the widest range of possible outcomes to his own theory. Furthermore this categorical distinction which Habermas makes between the political and administrative systems becomes ontologically grounded once he allows only the political system to act, and, contrary to empirical studies, thus underplays the relationship between the administrative system and political system thereby not acknowledging the extent to which the administrative system itself 'acts'. For example the British political system at the national level is characterised as one in which the executive has enormous powers, especially in the policy initiation area. Within this arrangement the parliament is seen and treated as a policy rubber stamping forum. Additionally, whilst in BFN Habermas acknowledges that more has to be done to make the administrative system more democratic in its practices, it is left at this level of a general plea to his readership. However not only McCarthy, but others as well, such as Alvesson and Willmott, have



outlined the extent to which Habermas' own work can be used as an analytically de- and reconstructive tool in organisational and management studies, the very substance of administrative systems. To which I would add that the pursuit of race equality within public administrative systems exposes those communicative fault lines around which democratising initiatives can cluster. If this is the case then it is clear that, pace Habermas, I regard the administrative system as part of the political system, and thus, part of the sphere of governance. This contention is given even greater weight when considered from the point of view of Habermas' acknowledgement that political, administrative, and within those, the legal, systems are imbued with a dominant ethical framework; one which can be held accountable to the universal claims contained in the moral vision. My qualifying subsidiary critique of this is that the identitarian outcomes of such an ethically imbued framework are the result of a debate postponed by centuries, and that it is not so much the presence of this framework, as those challenge points where the denial of counterpoints are part and parcel of maintaining that ethical framework. This framework then forms the taken-for-granted consensual back-cloth to the everyday processes of the administrative system, and, becomes, as I have argued earlier, the fecund seed bed for institutional racism. More than that this ethical background runs across administrative sub-systems and frames the responses to counter validity claims raised by other ethical and moral constituencies, such as Black people, who enter into and seek equal footing and space in these administrative systems. Thus even if, within these differentiated systems, there are differing responses because of specific 'discourse histories', where that latter appellation designates no more than surface borrowing from post structuralism, the architectonic support of the racially differentiating denial is basically the same across the system. Earlier in this critique, I, following Habermas and Cooke, had contrasted the three elements of a validity claim contained in discursive communicative action which need to be addressed, with that of only one of those elements contained in a claim which is resolved strategically. It is within these validity shortfalls that the de-democratising and the unjust hierarchical power of systems lie. Furthermore it is the overt and also unconscious reliance on that ethical framework as the taken-for-granted consensual background which, within the context of strategic action, helps elide the three elements into one. These communicative blockages can be racialised easily when Black people entering such systems raise claims which, following the logic of Habermas' argument, can only be resolved with their full and equal involvement. Such claims can be denied, i.e. the claim for communicative discourse is distorted, through evoking the homogenising, symbiotic, relationship that exists between the essentialised exaggeration of the dominant ethical framework as a counterpoint to the failing homogenised 'other'. For example the recent figures showing that a disproportionately low number of Black Afro-Caribbean applicants to medical schools obtained places compared with

white applicants, was excused by the executive officer of the Council of Heads of Medical Schools because, in his opinion, such students “mature late” and “fail to display many of the characteristics” needed to make good doctors.<sup>568</sup> The claims then of Black people do not only predicate the enactment of rights which are embedded in the implied moral order, but also those that of recognition. Honneth’s notion of recognition through the satisfaction of three inter-related moments, i.e. self respect, self esteem and self confidence, can be seen, in the parlance of managerial orthodoxy now pervading the public sector, as the one of the key ‘outcomes’ from such validity claims being discursively properly resolved. That is to say a process in which there was participation that satisfied the five principles of Habermas’ discursive communication, as well as my critical interpretation of the language(s) requirement. Race then runs across historically contingent boundaries in systems to the extent that the dominant ethical framework is sought to be maintained in that position. On the other hand systemic inter and intra boundaries can be, and are, dissolved in responding to this form of racialisation when such issues are properly discursively, communicatively resolved. That is to say that attempts can be, and are made, to ‘resolve’ these validity claims strategically. To that end I have argued earlier that there is a new form of racism which nods in the direction of formal race equality but denies its substantive achievement through the de-politicisation, hence de-democratisation, of equality processes. This managerialisation of ‘equality’ gives rise to race equality resurfacing in the guise of ‘diversity’, a response which oscillates between individualising the problem and re-essentialising cultural groups, as is evident in much American literature on ‘diversity’, and thereby denies the collective nature of racism, and thus seeks to block the solidaristic bases of Black responses to it. It is in fact the formal recognition of certain rights, but without allowing the ability to realise and exercise such rights. These rights are not group ones, but those which have evolved through the period of establishing a positive ‘race equality regime’, and thus refer to the right not to have collective wrongs imposed, i.e. not to be “wogged”. Without this right not be forcibly collectivised, rights are effectively reduced again to the level of the liberal model. I have argued as well that one of the important solidaristic responses to this should be the signifying Black collectivity, which betokens no more than an acknowledgement that the homogenising nature of racialised wrongs ‘done-to’ certain groups is the bases for a constituency in which solutions can be discursively pursued. The pursuit of solutions thus can be a force for democratising administrative systems, and thus for de-differentiation, especially where wrongs done-to covers inter- and intra-faces with the dominant ethical framework in such systems, e.g. Black employees and Black service users. This trajectory has to be contrasted with that currently being pursued by new right Labour in which transforming the system has been jettisoned in favour of rigorous ‘modernising’ fine tuning of the system through a highly specified management financial accounting process of



accountability. In another sense it can be argued that to abandon the system as beyond redemptive action, as Habermas sometimes implies, is to leave it to the mercy of those who forego any hope of emancipatory change, such as new right Labour who prefer to make it 'work' with maximum strategic efficiency, or post structuralists whose deconstructing discourse analyses contain only a faint hope of resistance spaces, and by default, therefore end up 'Mynah Birding' liberal solutions. This trajectory contains as well a vision of the state and of governance which, (1) draws from Habermas the notion of the state as the means through which problems are resolved which are beyond the forces of social integration, (2) enlarges the political sphere of the state to include the administrative system, as implied by McCarthy's criticisms, and (3) cross tabulates it with the notion of the progressive decolonizing nation state, as envisaged by Fanon, which "brings the future of capitalism radically into question." What this then releases is not the vanguardist notion of truth or progress, which might include a strong ethically framed nation defining process, as is contained in Fanon's vision, but rather the change from the bottom-up via the deontological state, so to speak, which guarantees that the voices of the 'dispossessed' can enter into discursive communication around normative issues which effect them. It is in this sense then that Habermas' solidaristic aims of bringing the system under the determining influence of the margins can, in terms of race, be given more critical teeth. It moves away then – and this not so unexpected given that I invest the state with greater deontological guardianship – from Habermas' view that the state becomes one of many action systems. It means as well that in the area of discursive opinion and will formation the organisation of governance must allow for the maximum degree of, and act, under certain circumstances, as guarantor for, autonomy. This is not the subject centred autonomy of the philosophy of consciousness variant, but the inter-subjective autonomy that characterises the linguistic turn in Habermas. But this brings to bear all the critical issues I have raised above about language, race and discursive communication, particularly in the polity. Here 'minority ethical frameworks' struggle to be heard on an equal basis, and this raises a moral issue about the norms of inclusion, as well as those of the struggle to have their moral issues, which arise from those ethical frameworks, from being given proper consideration, for example those women who wish to cast aside the ethically framed patriarchal constraints of certain communities. Allowing the maximum degree of inter-subjective autonomy must mean as well taking at prima facie level the authenticity of those lived experiences which are brought to bear. However I have re-asserted the communicative paradigm by drawing out the distinction that the lack of harmonization is because of "wrongs done to" rather than a value intrinsic clash between the dominant and minority ethical framework. This is what Honneth does in his theory of recognition and disrespect in which the attack on a people's autonomy is done through the inscription of an inauthentic palimpsest which attempts to rewrite their lived experiences.

To that extent autonomy and authenticity are inter-related to the degree that upholding the principles of communicative discourse means that the moral discourse of the former is ‘authenticated’ by the degree to which the ethical discourses of the latter are free to enter into and leave inviolably, such moral considerations. Such inviolability betokens not the essentialised recognition of ethical discourses, but the principle of being heard without any intrusive forces of distorted communication.

In BFN Habermas’ espouses constitutional democracy, not as some form of social utopia, but more pragmatically, as the best way forward for complex societies; in a sense a “sub-domain of practical reasoning”. Habermas’ (in)famous requirements of new entrants to those societies of “constitutional patriotism” I have read as, both because of the grounding inclusive principles governing communicative discourse, and because of my own contention about race being one of the key unresolved problems impeding the completion of modernity, only ever being able to be sustained at the level of accepting the principle of constitutionality, and not the concrete forms those constitutions might take. In this sense the principle of constitutional democracy can be seen as the governance of governance; which is to say, at another level, the extent to which governance, if it is governance by those involved, is authenticated. Preuss, whom Habermas’ uses approvingly in BFN, is clear that the constitution does not of itself give rise to some magical, moral, universalism because “religious and moral particularism, the proneness to error....egotism and greed...(are channelled)... within a constitution.”<sup>569</sup> Rather constitutions “create such institutional-conditions as are suited to exert a beneficial pressure on society to rationalise and improve itself...by providing an operational framework, or more exactly, by creating a state or condition of ‘being constituted’ in the broad sense of ‘being a group organised on certain principles’...(so that)...a society is constituted when it must confront itself in suitable institutional forms and in normatively directed processes of adjustment, resistance and self correction”.<sup>570</sup> To get a clearer picture of what Preuss is talking about, requires spelling out, in a negative, benchmarking way, what not being constituted means. This then “is a condition of a society which can deal only imperfectly with its destructive tendencies, its power structure, its total inequalities – in short, its institutionally underdeveloped potential for a successful confrontation of its normative foundations with real conditions”. In a way then that ties in with my argument about governance, autonomy and authenticity, Preuss notes that “repression in the political and psychoanalytical sense are the two alternative strategies that form the opposite of being constituted”.<sup>571</sup>

The next chapter, then, attempts to fleetingly outline the framework to what it might mean for local governance to be constituted on racially inclusive grounds.



## Chapter 7

### Positively Racialised Local Governance – controlling the Enlightenment’s hidden dimmer switch

#### 7.1 Introduction

I agree with Habermas’ caution regarding any attempt to use his work as the bases for some utopian blue print, with the attendant, threat therefore, of authoritarian, distorted communicative processes being touted as the means of achieving that future status. The latter version can be associated with the dystopian vision incorporated into New right Labour’s modernising agenda for local government in which the techno-managerial claims of strategic planning are raised above those who are the real participants in local governance because at the end of the day, such ‘strategising’ will better meet the legitimation needs of national government. Habermas has thus been very clear that, notwithstanding his espousal of constitutional democracy, his utopia is limited to the deontological conditions which make it possible for people to engage in communicative discourse free from distorting force, so that they can decide the future. It is, in another sense, a critically grounded re-working of making history “as-we-go”, and thus the progressive, counter blast to the neo-conservative’s premature triumphalist ‘hurrah’ for capitalism, as evidenced by Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ claim.<sup>572</sup> This particular notion of utopia accords with the one I set out in chapters 1 and 2 which talks about “periodising utopia” because it both allows for a “practical critical idealism which rejects the new realist, absolutist implying, perjorativising of utopia” whilst at the same time “permits discussion to take place without inhibitors about action oriented towards change for a better future..”

The key issue then, given the above circumscriptions about mapping the future, is whether or not it is possible to sketch out the ‘ideal type’ form of local governance which is not race oppressive or exploitative so that the main objectives of this can be the “ideal type markers” against which local governance as was –( the bases of the research)- can be measured. In attempting to reconstruct racism and anti-racist politics, I developed a “keep-in-the-forefront” framework oriented towards certain ideal-type goals. These were that the analysis should not be particularistic, not teleological, should be reflexive, should provide the means for policy and practice interventions linked to substantive issues of democratic opinion and will formation, and, finally, should provide the means for pursuing the deracialising of race. At another level this attempts to uphold the principles of critical research which

are encapsulated in Horkheimer's criteria, i.e. "it must be explanatory, practical and normative at the same time."<sup>573</sup> A similar framework can be developed for what I have in the title to this section called "positively racialised local governance." That is to say that racism and derived notions of race as social constructions which exert distorting forces in the structures of communication in the sphere of local governance, are deconstructed, and deracinated.. Developing this framework requires, as a prefatory exercise not only re-stating and re-emphasising the urgent observation made in the paper on racism and anti-racist politics, that "the situation is worsening for Black people here, in Europe, and world wide"<sup>574</sup>, but also sketching out the wider context to race and local governance locally, nationally and internationally as a bases for reconnecting the two parts of this prefatory exercise.

Quintessentially this notion of 'reconnection' prefigures my substantive contention that the relationship between the very short period of race explicit local government, that from the late seventies to the late eighties, and the parallel evolving and subsequent de-democratising changes to local governance in the UK, has been greatly under-estimated by commentators and 'experts' in the field of local government. In part this is not so surprising since my critique of two influential "progressive" schools, post-Fordist and localist, reveal the extent to which race is marginalised there in, with the concomitant conclusions that if they can marginalise, it is even more likely that the moderate to conservative variants will do so even more. What seems to inure in such analyses though, even with the benefit of hindsight, is the view, and their failure to countenance any form of relationship confirms this, that race initiatives were but marginal anyway to the problems facing local government. It's a point of view captured by one of the target council's political leaders who, in attempting to win on side a Black councillor over a vote which would have negative effects on resources for Black people, offered the view that, "...it (i.e. racism) would always be around...".<sup>575</sup> The implication being that to direct energies and resources in that direction was pointless. Nevertheless it remains to be explained why in one of the only two periods in the history of dominating contact between the UK and Black peoples when it could be said that the state, or parts of it, was overtly racialised, no substantive connection is made to the subsequent changes to that date, especially if this entailed the neutralising a positive racialisation.

## **7.2 Colonisation, De-Colonisation and Re-Colonisation**

I equate the first period of the racialisation of the European state, in particular the UK with that which saw the growing contact between Europe and Black people grow into what has been analysed as colonialism. Osterhammel's provocative study of colonialism releases two definitions



which I want to make use of because they are germane to my argument. These draw a distinction between ‘colony’, a particular type of socio-political organisation and ‘colonialism’ a system of domination”. Thus:

“A colony is a new political organisation created by invasion (conquest and/or settlement colonisation) but built on pre-colonial conditions. Its alien rulers are in sustained dependence on a geographically remote ‘mother country’ or imperial centre which claims exclusive rights of ‘possession’ of the colony.”<sup>576</sup>

And:

“Colonialism is a relationship of domination between an indigenous (or forcibly imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders. The fundamental decisions affecting the lives of the colonised people are made and implemented by the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis. Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonised population, the colonisers are convinced of their own superiority and their ordained mandate to rule”.<sup>577</sup>

Issue of colonial state where degree of settler autonomy created, either through delegation of authority to rule administratively and/or through limited, qualified franchise.

Between the sixteenth century and the middle of the twentieth century, this system of colonisation, this “process of territorial acquisition”, had resulted in a world system which saw “approximately half of the mainland earth ... covered with colonies...(to the extent that) about two fifths of the earth’s population stood under colonial rule: 400 million in Asia, 120 million in Africa, 60 million in Oceania, and 14 million in America”.<sup>578</sup> Over that four century period apropos the state, leaving aside the details of the periodisation of colonialism and the multi-faceted details therein, it can be said that the evolution of the modern European state with its attendant continuously refined and defined political freedoms went hand in hand with the evolution of a system of domination and exploitation of “others” whose differentiation from, and separation out of, those freedoms was defined by colour. The shelving of colonialism’s details is not simply because, post-coloniality wise, we can only talk about the “histories of individual colonialisms”, but because there is the realisation that over time such colonies, and their metropolises, were not hermetically sealed from each other. Osterhammel quotes Furnavell thus: “Modern colonisation is an affair of capital and not of men, and capital knows no country.”<sup>579</sup> He also, quite rightly points to the commonality of the colonial experience for the colonised, especially where, within historical periods, there was a change of colonial power. This he describes as the ‘constant’ of the “colonial situation”, the unchanging complex of rule, exploitation and cultural conflict in ethnically heterogeneous political structures that had been created by

influence from without.” The state in such colonising powers becomes racialised then through directing the domination of the colonies through the executive structures established in such colonies guided by, and over time in the relationship, self confirmed by, the ‘anthropophagied’ notions of superiority. In essence, as Osterhammel claims: “The notion that non-Europeans differ utterly and essentially from Europeans was a cornerstone of colonialist thought...(and)..the inferior mental and physical abilities imputed to non-Europeans would render them incapable of the large scale cultural accomplishments and heroic deeds that only modern Europe could achieve.”

<sup>580</sup> There is a sense then in which it is possible to talk about this very nearly world wide system as the first period of globalisation, a very racialised globalisation in which the relationship between the centre and periphery was not just one way, i.e. from top to bottom so to speak. There was an evolution and growth, as Habermas argues, in both normative learning processes as well as technical ones so that, I contend, modernity came into being with a shadow whose profile was not simply that of the one sided rationalising forces in modern Europe, but the extended one of Europe and its colonial appendages. In fact I would go further and argue that the impetus for much of the technical learning processes of domination, particularly that of political domination, those forces holding back the fulfilment of modernity, which is Habermas’ aim, came from the relationship of domination between Europe and that euphemistically defined as “non-European.” Hannah Arendt’s still seminally relevant analysis of the origins of totalitarianism, points to two new inter-related “devices for political organisation over foreign peoples”, by which she means Black people, being discovered in the first decades of imperialism. Leaving aside her periodisation which I think is too late, she identifies these ‘devices as “race as a principle of the body politic, and ....bureaucracy as a principle of foreign domination.”<sup>581</sup> She notes that whilst in the end “racism and bureaucracy proved to be inter-related in many ways, they were discovered and developed independently”, yet in their combination there was “a range of potentialities of power accumulation and destruction.”<sup>582</sup> Osterhammel, who does not make use of Arendt in his analysis, comes to a similar conclusion. Whilst he acknowledges the differing socio-political formations that were imposed in the different colonies according to the origins of the colonisers, he does draw out the similarities that came to be found in the colonial state which he periodises as developing from the late eighteenth century onwards. Whilst Osterhammel views the colonial state as a “political form in and of itself” and not an extension of the metropolitan state, nevertheless I would contend that they were inter-related. I would use the centre-periphery model to describe the relationship, one that resurfaces in the depiction of the relationship between local and national government in the UK, and even within the spatial and organisational arrangements of local governance itself. In a sense it can be said that the colonial state, even if it was not formally regarded as part of the national



territory, as say France did with some of its colonial possessions, was the local arm of the metropolitan state; it was, at the end of the day, “subordinate to the political authority of the mother country”. It was a form of local governance on a global scale. What is interesting, because it echoes current developments in local governance, and I shall argue later for its direct relational relevance, is the way in which Osterhammel characterises the colonial state. It had two, core functional values: “to secure control over the subjugate peoples and to create a framework for the economic utilisation of the colony.”<sup>583</sup> But there was another way in which the colonial state was unique. Osterhammel describes its vistas of autocratic opportunity as resembling the “immediate aftermath of a victorious revolution, offering enormous leeway for political and social upheavals ‘from above’”<sup>584</sup>. Ferro, in broad agreement with this, describes the colonial situation as being the experimental test bed for modernity.<sup>585</sup> To which I would add the qualification that it was the experimentation in advancing the technical learning processes of domination that occurred. It is therefore true that “colonial expansion appeared to open up new avenues for an ‘enlightened absolutism’ of a sort scarcely possible in Europe at that time”.<sup>586</sup> The most obvious of these was that the colonial state was a bureaucratic state which, despite financial woes, because such states were expected to be largely self financing, had to work effectively and efficiently. Its bureaucratic development was such that Osterhammel speculates that “the advancement of bureaucratisation in Europe received significant stimuli from the periphery”.<sup>587</sup> This is something with which Arendt in her analysis, is in agreement. In Britain, thus, “there was no bureaucratic apparatus until the structuring of the welfare state after 1945 that could have measured up to the administration of India, the Indian Civil Service (ICS), in both size and professionalism....(it)..was the model for all nineteenth and twentieth century colonial bureaucracies...(and)...the purest expression of the colonial state as a proconsular autocracy, and bureaucratic absolutism”.<sup>588</sup> Moreover it was when bureaucracy was combined with race, especially the “civilising mission” colonialism espoused as the reason for acquiring territories, that one particular aspect of this experimentation in the shadow of modernity springs to attention. This is that the Europeans’ belief that they “had uncovered ‘chaos’ on to which they had to impose order” gave rise to a “colonialist utopia of an administration free of politics”.<sup>589</sup> The need for order meant that the colonial state could not display any weakness for fear that this “would encourage trouble makers to provoke a ‘Black rebellion’”. Apropos this, as an example, Osterhammel notes that Lord Cromer, described by others as great European proconsul in Egypt, was deemed so to be because he had a tendency “to de-politicise politics and reduce all human affairs to questions of proper administration.”<sup>590</sup> Bureaucratic rule does not mean the rule of law. Rather, as Arendt points out, it is the rule by decree which does not require the legitimation of

accountability back to assemblies of people, or of justification, but simply the expediency of applicability.

“In governments by bureaucracy decrees appear in their naked purity as though they were no longer issued by powerful men, but were the incarnation of power itself and the administrator only its accidental agent. There are no general principles which simple reason can understand behind the decree, but ever changing circumstances which only an expert can know in detail.”<sup>591</sup>

The evolution of these learning processes of instrumental reason focusing on the governance of ‘foreign others’ takes place within and informs the reservoir of political knowledge upon which the political processes of the metropolitan state can draw. It must be remembered that the apogee of the bureaucratic colonial state was as short a time ago as the fifties, and not some period in the last century. The process of formal decolonisation is one that is still going on. To that extent it is quite feasible to argue, as I do, that the political ‘lessons’ from colonialism, especially those derived from the colonial state, are integral to the body of possible political responses the state can draw upon in responding to situations where there is the perceived threat of trouble makers fomenting a “Black rebellion”.

If then this first period of the racialised state went up to the nineteen fifties, it also overlapped with the period after the second world war when the emergence of a nascent system of global governance and associated norms made racism formally unacceptable. The trope of the superior, civilised West had over the past four hundred years assumed differing perceptible forms from the initial self belief in the racial hierarchy of black over white to the fear of the racial backlash from those dominated. Furedi in an interesting analyses of the “evolution of the Western racial imagination” argues that by the end of the First World war the issue of race had become a source of anxiety for the west, so much so that he characterises this as a change from “racial confidence to racial fear.”<sup>592</sup> The period of the thirties saw, in intellectual circles, the beginning of the diminution in the belief in the scientific bases to the racial hierarchy and the beginning of the growth in the school of race relations. For the West the racial contradictions of the Second World War expressed through the need to use Black troops on an equal basis with whites, the post war ramifications for the accepted racial order both in the States and colonies, the racialised nature of the war against Japan, not to mention the use of the moral high ground against Nazi Germany’s genocidal practices, simply increased this sense of anxiety voiced in terms of the potential threat to the post war international order. Race relations then “evolved in an attempt to minimise the danger of racial conflict”. Furedi sees these early initiatives in race relations as attempting to create for white society a form of self censorship against allowing the more extreme forms of racism so that racial conflict could be avoided. He uses Tinker’s observation to illustrate this that “the ‘race



problem' ...was the problem of the non-white who would not accept the leadership of the white."<sup>593</sup> However it is the implied communicative slant put on this era of race relations by Furedi which is important. He quite rightly observes that this attempt to silence the issue of race resulted in the paradox that those who felt race relations to be a problem also felt reluctant to tackle it openly, so much so that "it became all too easy to overlook the significance of race in the conduct of international affairs."<sup>594</sup> I would add as well that this applied equally to the way in which such affairs were addressed within the boundaries of the metropolitan state. In that respect I want to re-interpret Furedi's analysis in terms of drawing out what I consider to be the details of some of the important distorting forces in the structures of communication surrounding race in the metropolitan, especially as this relates to the way in which race enters, or does not enter, the arena of opinion and will formation. Furedi points to a number of ways in which, what I have regard as technical learning processes of domination, racism, its causes, and lines of accountability, were deflected and displaced. As early as the twenties, a British Foreign Office memorandum 'Racial Discrimination and Immigration' stated, "Great Britain, the Dominions and the United States are all equally interested in avoiding discussion of this subject."<sup>595</sup> In the forties and fifties the argument was put forward, one that, as I pointed out in my earlier example regarding a councillor's comments, still occurs, to the effect that racism was an age old irresolvable problem which because of "the emotionalism which surrounds the whole question of race and prejudice made rational discussion impossible."<sup>596</sup> There were other 'takes' on this process of silencing, such as arguing that discussion of the subject would make Black people more conscious of their differences with white people; or pursuit of the problem is likely to simply result in anti-white racism (see the first to be prosecuted under the incitement clauses of the Race Discrimination Act); or blaming the eruption of anti-racist opinions on the fomenting politics of the racially classic agent provocateur, the rootless, disaffected 'marginal man', the mulatto syndrome; or neutralising the issue by insisting it is other than race; or simply not allowing public discussion of the issue. Apropos the latter Furedi quotes one Whitehall official who feels that public discussion "would merely exacerbate racial feelings." There is one other facet of this era of race relations which sought to disguise the true nature of the racialised state, and, which also resurfaces in the way in which race is being addressed by the state today. This is the way in which the ideal of race equality was attacked. Furedi makes the point that this was rarely undermined by asserting the superiority of the white race. Rather it was attacked by asserting the right to be different, including the right to be unequal. Hence the state "felt far more comfortable with conceding the right to be different than the right to be equal....(because)..the right to equality demanded far greater changes to the prevailing racial etiquette than the right to be different."<sup>597</sup>

“Throughout the twentieth century ideas about race relations have reflected hesitancy, bitterness, scepticism, bad faith and above all the desire to slow things down. The development of racial pragmatism in the inter-war period strikingly confirmed this tendency. It indicated that the conceptualisation of a distinct subject of race relations had as its problematisation the reaction to racism. Indeed until the 1960s most of the insights, theories and concepts associated with race relations were oriented towards the explanation and containment of this reaction to racism.”<sup>598</sup>

The transitional episode to what I have described as the first period of the overt racialisation of the metropolitan state saw then a change in the technical content of the learning processes of racial domination from the self confidence of racial superiority to that of the implicit, ‘lets-not-rock-the-boat’ form of silencing of the issue. Both created enormous forced blockages in the structures of communication. These were challenged, in the metropole, by what one commentator has described as the Third world in the first city. That is to say by the reality of the previous colonising power having to deal with the reality of colonial migrants in the metropole. Throughout the sixties, and seventies the state has had to try to come to terms with the demands of Black people for justice. The second phase of the overt racialisation of the state is marked by those moves which see the attempt to formally involve the state in resolving those problems of social integration which have proved irresolvable without its intervention. The various race relations acts are testament to this, as are the race specific interventions in urban management. However it is in one particular part of the state, that which overlaps with the arena of local governance, that in the late seventies to late eighties, is seen in many inner city local government the attempt to open up those communicative blockages on race. Across the range of local government responsibilities, employment services, political representation and participation, initiatives can be seen which aim to achieve the positive racialisation of this particular part of the state. The recognition given to this second phase by theorists have for the most part concentrated on the pragmatic considerations to taking on board the issue of race in local governance. These will be covered in the next major section looking at the empirical details. For the most part the causal and historical context to these sorts of analysis have remained at the level of the post Second World war state coming to terms with increasing numbers of Black people living in this society. They have had extreme difficulty, therefore, trying to deal with the situation now which has seen the virtual elimination of many of the race equality initiatives in these political institutions, treating this reversal as the unfortunate by product of national government inspired cuts, the electability expediency of new Right labour and/or, as one prominent race industry person has speciously put forward, the over zealous beastliness of race advisors. Attempts to move beyond this to a higher level of abstraction have broadly been threefold. The first, Gilroy’s attempts to theorise the changes in the local state, I have already criticised as being



empirically challenged, and because he locates the locus of change within the cultural sphere, ends up effectively abandoning the local state as being unimportant to Black people. There are issues as well as about his privileging of one particular set of experiences in the history of white over Black racial dominance which militate against drawing out the solidaristic networks that link black people's experiences. However, to give him his due, he does not try to switch off the enlightenment, but, in his own way, tries, representatively, "to formulate *our* (my emphasis) own big narratives precisely as narratives of redemption and emancipation."<sup>599</sup> The other attempts can be situated within the realms of what I, following Habermas, have previously described as 'posties'. That is to say the de-narrativising theorisation of race and the state. Inter-connectedly, but separately, there are two variants: those belonging to the post-modern school and those to the post colonial school. Of these, the post colonial is the more important. I want to summarise this as a lead up to detailing a contention, which is implied in my assertion about the underestimation of the degree of race thinking in the changes that have affected local government, that the 'whitewashing' of the second phase, positive racialisation of the local state occurred not as some form of collateral damage accruing from substantive changes in other spheres, but from a high degree of racialised thinking that is directly linked to the knowledge base of the first phase. Whilst then I am highly critical of the hopelessness of emancipatory change which emerges from much of the de-narrativising 'postie' type analyses, nevertheless I do acknowledge that their point of departure is similar to mine, and that, therefore, there are overlaps in their deconstructive details with mine, even if their reconstructive aims are weaker and more modest.

As an example of the genre I shall refer to "Edge of Empire; Post-Colonialism and the City", by Jacobs. The "post-colonial" has, I suppose the *prima facie* advantage of having the imperial and colonial past as a constant nomenclatured reference point in the name it calls itself. Jacobs work then, like much in the re-workings of geography through critical lenses, offers a lot on the continuing presence of colonialism and imperialism in the urban spatialities of the 'first world', but little on the relationship between political structures, whether national, regional or local, and those spaces. Nevertheless it is possible to read off the inferred relationship. For Jacobs, then, the spheres of colonial discourse analysis and post-colonialism alter radically the understanding of imperialism, nation and race, especially in the way they have introduced the notion of space into these analyses. However, the major fault line is that such theories have functioned at the metaphorical level, and it is necessary for them to return to 'real' geographies. This does beg the question of whether or not they ever did function other than at the metaphorical level. Where I do agree with her is at the general appreciation of the influence of imperialism on the present when she writes that "relations of power and difference established through

nineteenth century British imperialism linger on and are frequently reactivated in many contemporary First World cities.”<sup>600</sup> For Jacobs the focus of the post-colonial in the metropole is that of Black people who have either emigrated there, or are long term subject populations. These are the sources for an identarian politics which is not “simply built around the structures of power internal to the city...(but)....is also a politics constituted by a broader history and geography of colonial inheritances, imperialist presents and post-colonial possibilities.”<sup>601</sup> I am not so sure that the colonial remembrances are so firmly embedded in Black populations a few generations down the line from those who first immigrated. I have argued before that it is the here and now which are more important for identity claims, rather than pseudo-histories. However, it is more likely, as I shall detail later, that it is within the arena of the technical learning processes that there remains a residuum of knowledge concerning the domination and governance of Black people which can be re-activated. First, however, it is necessary to detail what exactly is meant by the term “post-colonial”, and more importantly, “post-colonial possibilities.” The post colonial critique provides a new conceptual framework, according to Jacobs, which whilst not denying the structures of domination, also points to the contingent nature the Self/other relationship; so much so that these “demonstrate the vulnerability of imperialist and colonialist power..(and)...highlight the way these cultures of power and domination never fully realise themselves.”<sup>602</sup> There is then, in such theories, a greater sensitivity to the culture of imperialism. The contingency refers as well not only to the resistance generated, but also to the complicity and collaboration with such powers of domination. Where these accounts differ from economistic world systems’ theories, such as Wallerstein’s, is that culture is analysed as more than just an adjunct, but as the seed bed for “numerous desires and needs” which activated imperialism. Whilst the post-colonial, then is signified by the formal independence of former colonies after the Second World War, it attests as well to the continuing “force of neo-colonial formations and lives shaped by the ideologies of domination and the practices of prejudice established by imperialism.”<sup>603</sup> Post-colonialism, then contains a hope for liberation which puts it beyond the “limits of existing power relations.” There is then a diversity of perspectives within the overall category of ‘post-colonial’. However, despite this, they “all share a common political project....which is counter-colonial”. In terms of the First World city, Jacobs, whilst disagreeing with King’s neo-Marxist based world system theory, agrees with his observations that “urbanism and urbanisation in the metropole cannot be understood separately from development in the colonial periphery.”<sup>604</sup> To that extent then post war migration of Black people to the metropolises of the metropole have, in Jacob’s eyes, brought the “edge of empire into the heart” for Britain, whilst her new international alignments do not signal the end of empire, but the “conditions for revised imperial articulations.” These give rise to new forms of exploitation and domination. However, given the



importance given to the possibility of 'pure' post-colonialism which is captured in the theorisation of contingency, there is, then, the expectation that this should give rise to strong emancipatory counter-drive. What emerges, however, is something altogether weaker. The reasons for this have already been analysed in the critique put forward of the post structuralist position in which the subject becomes the 'subject-effect' of various constituting forces. Thus agency towards the post-colonial resides in "the disruptive power of hybridity....(which)...as a key signifier of post-coloniality...(exposes)...the inevitable vulnerability of colonial structures of power...(so that)...imperialism undoes itself, against itself."<sup>605</sup>

At the general level there is much to commend the parameters for investigation of the post colonial vision: the emphasis on the continuing influence of the colonial and imperial past, the recognition of the two way relationship between metropole and colony, and the notion of contingency. However, the point can be made again that it is not necessary for a 'post' type theoretical framework to garner such insights. Apart from which the contradiction between the emphasis placed upon subject-effect within such contingency, and the achievement of the liberatory possibilities of 'post-coloniality' is exemplified in the almost teleological construction of waiting for imperialism to undo itself. It is here, then, at this juncture between 'real' world change and the deconstructive trail of a post colonial analysis that the problem occurs. How, other than at the general level already outlined, can such theories assist in determining the reasons for the sorts of changes I've indicated happened to the second period of the overt racialisation of the state? The metaphorical construction of coloniality has, after all, laid such theorising open to the charge of being no more than the writings about the experiences of 'first generation diasporic intellectuals'. Possibly by reference to the notion of "governmentality", that is how culture comes to 'govern' in the overall general sense "through the pragmatic deployment of social constructs. Even if the post-colonial were to be conjoined with that of 'governmentality' it is hard to see how an adequate theory of the local state within an emancipatory framework could be brought forth, let alone that which seeks to look at the reasons for the disappearance of race as an overt, positive priority, from such institutions. In the final analysis, to coin a phrase, the post-colonial critique of imperialism, race and the nation does not adequately acknowledge that notions of universalistic rights and participation can be used against the excluding practices and inequalities which the 'posties' claim are inherent in those processes.

Osterhammel's final sentence in his short work on colonialism summarises the reality of the legacy of colonialism and imperialism in a way that emphasises the connection with the real world: "The post-colonial world has retained forms of manipulation, exploitation and cultural expropriation, even if colonialism itself belongs to the past."<sup>606</sup> It is clear that his use of the

term “post-colonial” eschews the metaphorical realm and anchors itself firmly in the historical period relating to the formal granting and attaining of political independence. The culturalist use of the term “post-colonial” suffers because it both conflates, and by its own logic, celebrates, four aspects of the prefix ‘post’. These are the signifying reference to formal political independence, the, in my view premature, giving notice of a closure of one period, the mainly cultural continuance of imperialism, and the possibility of a future ‘pure’ form of post-coloniality, i.e. no more colonialism. My argument would be, in line with the Habermassian contention, that modernity still has to run its course, that it is too early to close the door, however, circumscribed, on colonialism both systemically and in terms of social integration, where in the latter the application of the theory of lifeworld colonisation is still appropriate. To that end the persistence of colonialism, even if today its articulation differs, but is not substantively different, from its previous incarnation, requires terms which are more precise. I want to use two new ones – (I am not aware of it having been used by others) – which refer to two distinct, though related stages. The first is that of ‘re-colonialism’ which refers to the recursive nature of coloniality and the way in which certain aspects of such patterns of domination and exploitation can be reproduced in the metropole. These are built around erecting or resurrecting distorting forces in the structures of communication with Black people which are derivatively similar to those which evolved in the colonies. The second term is that of ‘trans-coloniality’ which refers to those struggles and social processes which seek to challenge and extirpate such colonialist forces. It is only thereafter that the current arrogance of the ‘post’ can come into play.

However, it is in the framing of the race distancing process in terms of coloniality, that the dominating quality of the changes experienced by local governance can be exposed. Earlier I had, in an aside, pondered whether or not it was time to disinter Blauner’s theory of internal colonialism. Osterhammel also makes mention of the concept of internal colonialism in relation to the position of cultural minorities in the metropolitan states, such as the Welsh. Whilst, I am not attempting to argue that the colonial state was transported back through time and imposed on the inner cities, I am going to argue that the reservoir of knowledge called upon by the new right, and unquestioningly carried on by new right labour, included that of the technical learning processes associated with the political state domination of Black people. I am going to argue that the growing perception and description of the positive race equality local state in terms of mess, chaos, lawlessness etc., shows a similar pattern to those arguments which in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were put forward to justify colonialism. I shall also argue that the notion of ‘racial fear’ as a motivation for these interventions in areas of local governance characterised by large numbers of Black people is one that can be made. The definition



of colonialism referred to acquisition of territory. I shall argue that these changes can be seen as spearheading the re-acquisition of territorial units which were perceived as being out of control, subject to malign 'race' influences. Even if the intention of these changes was universal, i.e. they applied to all local authorities, one of the major impetuses was that of trying to manage centrally the explicit equality priority that was seen to exist in many inner city ones. It is, thus, an inversion of the basis of the operational principle which puts race equality as the leading cutting edge for other progressive changes. In this case it was the cutting edge for oppressive changes. But this is not new for often in the past the leading edge practices of domination in the colonies were brought 'home' to be applied to the working classes. I shall argue as well, that the effects of these changes mirror in many instances the main characteristics of colonial rule. There is the de-democratisation of large sections of local governance under Conservative rule, and now continued under Labour. Even Labour's attempts at renewing local democracy, will, in effect, shrink the democratic entry points for the local populace and concentrate the major decisions in a few hands, allowing the rest, including the populace, only the role of post decision scrutiny. At another level 'renewing local democracy', as outlined by new right Labour, is contradicted by the highly centralised performance management accountability system within which the accompanying 'modernisation' programme is framed; framed in such a way that the balance of accountability systems and processes is structured more towards national government than local populace. Another characteristic is that of the depoliticisation of local governance, the utopia of non-politics, through the administration and managerialisation of issues previously within the political sphere. The case of equalities is a good example. Earlier in this section on local governance I had also argued that the "metaphor of colonialism and...imperialism" was a good way of descriptively framing the "importation of second hand ideological technologies into the public sector" because it "is similar to the inequalities that inhere in the knowledge relationships between the first and third worlds." It is more than just importation because it is as well an imposition which does not take account, or want to take account, of 'local' needs or aspirations. The trope of imposing order on chaos<sup>607</sup> is one that emerges again and again in the justification for many of the changes being pursued in local government, usually trailed under the efficiency, economy and effectiveness banner. This 'order on chaos' theme derives from the justification of colonialism reservoir of technical learning processes and knowledge. Further the elevation of 'leaders' in local governance, both in the formal political sphere, as in the case of elected Mayors, and in the administrative sphere, as in the case of heavily 'PR'd' managers whose rule is marked by decrees satisfies another colonial characteristic. All of these mark a process which re-institutes distorting forces in the structures of communication because they in sum diminish, and remove, the overall prospects for local people to satisfy their

validity claims, especially Black people. It is by these indices, as well as those released by the experiences of Black people within the changing contexts of local governance, that I felt justified to use the term 're-colonisation'. These indices actually move the usage of the term 'colonial', and its associates, beyond that of metaphorical and into the real world. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the use of coloniality, in terms of communicative action, is rhetorical in that it seeks at this juncture to influence. A brief word of explication is necessary because, whilst I have earlier in this section referred to Habermas' depiction of the relationship between opinion and political will formation as that of 'influence', Habermas himself has sought in TCA to distance himself from a notion of influence, that of the Parsonian version. Briefly "generalised symbolic media which perform co-ordinative functions that operate automatically through equilibrating forces that are beyond the ken of individual participants...cannot resolve issues that require direct communication."<sup>608</sup> As Mayhew points out this view is clarified further in BFN in which influence, following Parsons, is seen as a "generalised form of communication based on a trust in beliefs that have not yet been tested in discourse."<sup>609</sup> However he is careful to qualify this by insisting that the importance of influence must "ultimately rest on the resonance and indeed the approval of a lay public whose composition is egalitarian."<sup>610</sup> Mayhew's view of Habermas' argument that "only non-strategic action can achieve agreements within the lifeworlds of actors who live in a world shaped by reason" is that this then excludes not only the realm of influence, but that of the role of rhetoric there in. For Habermas, rhetoric is a form of indirect force. Mayhew, on the other hand, who is sympathetic to Habermas, views rhetoric as "the ..(cultural)..means of creating and activating influence", employing "systems of linguistic and visual meaning to evoke solidary attachments."<sup>611</sup> I think this needs to be refined, a task which can be achieved by cross-tabulating Habermas with Mayhew. To that extent then it can be said that in inegalitarian societies, a case can be made for rhetoric if it refers to obvious conditions which militate against the equal participation of all concerned. They, whilst they evoke solidary attachments which might be partial, as in the case I am making for describing the conditions of local governance as that of "re-colonisation" since it is more likely that this will have a resonance with Black people, are statements predicated upon the temporary postponement of discursive redemption, and at the same time influence the creation of such space which will allow for communicative discourse for all concerned. That is to say that in the interim, under conditions which do not favour communicative discourse, rhetoric can propel influence into creating space so that such issues can be discursively redeemed. This, in terms of a concrete example, can be seen in the way in which certain race equality initiatives were pursued in local government.



### 7.3 Transcoloniality

In outlining the above I have attempted to structure a case for increasing the weight of influence the issue of race had, and has, in the changes being forced through the provenance of local governance. This is to enable the problem to be properly defined so that the solution is correctly identified. This is, in effect, a solution to the question posed at the end of the section outlining a Habermassian type analysis of UK local governance which was: “Is there a vision,... a normatively based outline of a racially inclusive model of local governance?” I want to begin answering this question through the cipher of “trans-coloniality”, resurrecting the principle, as I do so, of race as the touchstone to enlightenment’s fulfilment in order that the context to the answers can be seen to apply to all concerned. To that extent, within the purviews of local governance, coloniality is a condition not only experienced by Black people. I want to begin this by prefatory reference to Magnusson’s work on municipalities because it captures and overlaps with the raw generalities of what I am attempting.<sup>612</sup>

Magnusson, on the bases of an international comparative analysis of municipalities, attempts to resituate the local government space and level of polity, as that very important and critical interface between local people and the state.. Key amongst these is the need to invert the statist emphasis of importance so that the ‘local state’ becomes the prime political reference point for local populaces. His argument is that “systems of local government which had developed hand in hand with institutions of representative democracy were actually designed to contain democracy....(to the extent that).....the municipality was obviously a part of the state’s local administration.”<sup>613</sup> With regard to local governance he broadly characterises the developments therein as presenting a façade of being local when in effect such developments are largely state controlled and focussed, with the two major development schools being either state or market led. For Magnusson real, or substantive, politics emerges “when other forms of government fail.” He therefore puts a heavy premium on social movements, as do other theorists like Melucci, Touraine and Habermas, as having the critical potentiality for alternative politics, to current orthodoxies, one that because it is not state centred effectively decentres the state. Up to this point there is, in Magnusson, an overlap with Habermas’ concerns, though this is not expressed in the theoretical detail that Habermas does. Habermas for example, in upholding the constitutional discursive democratic state as the pragmatic option, overlooks the detail of how those at the margins are solidaristically going to emphatically change and influence democratic opinion and will formation. Habermas reads sometimes as if he envisages this groundswell of discursive opinion gathering momentum and rolling over the state, flooding through the sluice gates, to use his own imagery. Magnusson, on the other hand, focuses, rightly in my opinion,

on local government as that part of the state which should have a local resonance for people. He does this by pointing to the potential that exists for the local state to become the fulcrum for enabling a different spatial and time configuration to that of the centralising, hierarchicalising sovereign state, a configuration that allows the real concerns of local people to enter and displace the orthodoxies of the sovereign. Earlier in this part of the section I had argued that the ‘whitewashing’ of the second phase positive racialisation of the state should be viewed as a form of re-colonisation. Colonisation is very much about closing down the spaces and controlling the time parameters of Black people’s lives. This particular vectoring is very much also about re-asserting the primacy of the national state’s legitimation concerns. How then does this square with Habermas’ notion and emphasis on the constituted discursive democratic state? We can do this by referring back to Habermas’ idea that the state arose to resolve those differences within the sphere of social integration which could not be resolved otherwise. This begins to give the state a moral role, one that in my opinion, not necessarily Habermas’, has to be continually resurrected. Combined with Magnusson’s notion of politics which is outlined above and which he re-iterates in terms of the view that “the timeful spaces are not just there in a re-assuring grid, but instead must be created by ongoing human action”<sup>614</sup>, then we arrive at a situation where the state, if it is to be about the way local people organise their affairs, must be continually recreated. Magnusson stresses the importance, therefore, of the potential of the local state for achieving that in a way that can accord more closely with the image of self organising political institutions. As a circumscriptive note to what might be deemed a free for all – after all, at the level of a *prima facie* reading, this scenario, as set out, would logically have to accommodate extreme right politics – my contention is that there is a residual moral duty of the state to ensure that all who can participate are allowed to do so under circumstances that are communicatively non oppressive. These deontological rules, which are encapsulated in Habermas’ five principles of participation, are self referentially regulative. That is to say that violation of one or more of these disqualifies the violator from participating, or self definingly, contradicts any declared consensus. If the state has to be ‘strong’, then it has to have strength in this area. It is this potential then, this potential for being local government to be part of the process of trans-coloniality, that needs to be outlined. Magnusson refers to this political space as being ambiguous, or liminal. I see this as attempting to define the similar space which is captured by Preuss’ notion of the morally reflexive constitution, or my idea of the deontological state. At the local level such institutions of local governance do not attempt to impose space and time limits on people or issues which arise through social movements, but act as “a juncture between localities and movements.” If colonialism is marked by the acquisition or re-acquisition of territories, then deterritorialisation should be a sign of trans-colonial-modernity. Whilst then the local state is



territorially a collection of localities, if its contingent, junctural role is realised, especially if this is cast deontologically in terms of ensuring that all who can participate, do, “points localities and (social) movements beyond themselves to the world outside.” It returns us to the by now clichéd, ironical ambiguity of the statement, “there is no place like home.”

We arrive, therefore, at the situation where the normative, racially inclusive model of local governance is described in terms of a de-territorialised trans-coloniality. What exactly does this mean?.....In outline it actually dovetails with the critical details released through the interrogative matrix applied to my interpretation of Habermas’ theory of local governance with that of the implied antithesis of the characteristics of the re-colonisation of local government. Within this place, space and time can be constantly redefined to resist and recreate the attempts to maintain the ethically framed territorialisation of the locale, including of course within this the local state. Above all, it means, as well, therefore, disrupting the attempts to silence ‘race’ at the local government level, which are evidenced in strategies, such as the administrative managerialisation of equality. This disruption focuses on, and tries to break the state centred notion of politics which, as Magnusson notes is characterised by enclosure, i.e. bounded, and in terms of action, as Walzer comments, by closure, i.e. communicative discourse is instrumentally truncated. It brings into the fold something akin to the politics of social movements whose traits Magnusson has attempted to capture by describing them as being pluralistic, impermanent, inchoate, inclusive and unbounded and in so being “are the antithesis of enclosures....(because)...they lack fixity, boundaries and determinacy.”<sup>615</sup> Contra thus to Mile’s contention that the theorisation of race in the metropolis is still too beholden to notions of the ‘colonial’, I wish to re-incorporate the colonial because it still has a valency in analysing the changing profile of race equality in the political system. However this is also an attempt to move beyond the limitations of post-colonial theorising the essence of which is captured in Epstein’s summary of Dirlik’s acerbic view, viz., “‘post-colonialism’ is the moment when intellectuals from nations of what would until recently have been called the Third World arrive in universities and begin to speak in the vocabulary of post-structuralism, celebrating diversity and rejecting categories of capitalism and class.”<sup>616</sup> He goes on to link multinational capital with the resurrection of multiculturalism to the effect that the intellectual elites who now celebrate diversity are allowed to do so provided “they do not point to the global capitalist order that has created their privileged status...”<sup>617</sup> One does not have to accept the implied economic determinism of such a point of view to realise that the issue of inequality, especially those which are collective, has to be addressed in the normative vision of a racially inclusive local governance. The issues surrounding this were addressed earlier in looking at the changing grammar of political language. The conclusion there,

particularly in relation to race, was that it was not so much distribution versus recognition struggles, as, following Honneth, the reality that moral struggles, which include recognition ones, always frame interest based claims. Following on from this, therefore, racism immorally gives rise to collectivising wrongs done against groups; wrongs which share similar characteristics. This is separate from identarian claims such groups might make. The latter, if recognised, would result in Taylor type group rights. This is not what is being recommended. In the previous section I critically upheld Preuss' notion of a morally reflexive constitution with the qualification that "the organisation of power, particularly as this relates to creating institutional space, must, in a multi-racial society, include the deontological rules for ensuring that unjust racialisation does not structure those spaces". These rules do not constitute rights for Black people, because those would be group rights, but, on the other hand, do provide the communicative structure in which societal universal rights can be properly realised. That is to say that it is more than the formal declaration in constitutions to the right to non-discrimination. Such a clear provision of rights is, for example, contained in the new South African constitution. But the formal statement of such rights is no guarantor that the target beneficiaries can exercise those rights. Thus, in response to a critical analysis of the state of township dwellers levels of inequality five years on from the end of white state rule, an ANC MP could counter this by pointing to the manifold rights township dwellers now had, particularly those non-discriminatory rights.<sup>618</sup> At face value what this appears to do is confirm those post structuralist based critiques of rights, such as the critical legal school and post colonialists like Dhaliwal, that those championing democratic based rights ignore the historical reality that the attainment of one group's rights at the expense of the others is a strategy often marking attempts to obtain rights."<sup>619</sup> Epstein, on the other hand, as a Marxist, and for that matter critical race theorists, who whilst inhabiting the same intellectual terrain as the critical legal theorists oppose their attempts to devalue rights, sees the culturally radical retreat into the arena of discourse as dangerous because its attempts to deconstruct the concept of rights does nothing, in fact it contributes, to the erosion of hard fought rights. Her conclusion that these rights should be "defended and extended" is one that I support.<sup>620</sup> However it is a notion of rights whose extension has to be spelt out in terms of procedures which, in relation to race, guarantee that there are no negative group rights being enacted in the shadow of positive individual rights. In terms of a racially inclusive model of local governance it is this part of the morally reflexive constitutional framing which needs to be first spelt out. Kavoulakos, in a critical but sympathetic interrogation of BFN draws attention to the issue of equality/inequality via the criticism made by other commentators that the procedural approach in their view does not adequately deal with the inequalities of democratic governance.<sup>621</sup> However, Rosenfeld's explication of Habermas' proceduralist paradigm, one



which I broadly support, puts a premium on a radically flexible interpretation in which new ways of procedurally pursuing justice are highlighted. He, interpreting Habermas, notes that the “principal task of the strangers who relate to each other as equal consociates under the law is to reconcile the requirements of legal equality with those of factual equality....( so that in essence)...it allows all identities and differences to be considered while weeding out strategic uses of them; and second it requires subjecting all of the identities and differences to every one of the perspectives represented by participants in communicative action.”<sup>622</sup> The conundrum of equality and difference is framed by Rosenfeld in terms of a dialectic that helix like spirally develops between equality/inequality and identity/difference. In trying to metaphorically capture the problem Rosenfeld, in a way that neatly dovetails with my own concerns, also makes use of the master-slave and coloniser-colonised scenarios. In the latter he argues that difference is used as a means of domination and thus equality of identity becomes a tool of liberation. In the former, equality is on offer providing that the colonised gives up their religion, culture, language etc. My view is that with the substantive inequality of racism the two areas of difference and identity cannot be so neatly separated and categorised as an either-or position. Rather the key problem is how to deal with the inequality of wogging, which at one and the same time attempts to both exploit oppressive differentiation and oppressively promote certain identities. With that as the key focus, we can then turn to Rosenfeld’s attempt to answer the question of how Habermas’ proceduralism can produce justice amongst different perspectives. Firstly he is correct in thinking that the development of common ground for justice amongst different perspectives “depends on the nature of procedural devices involved in communicative action as well as on the existence of material conditions making it plausible for reversal perspectives to generate fruitful consensus or compromises.” Those two conditions, procedural devices and material conditions, determine the equality of opportunity for participants in communicative action to present claims. In terms, then, of achieving justice for unjustly racialised participants within the overall context of trans-coloniality, I want to try to specify the first procedural device which takes account of the material conditions of such participants as well, and which will substantively contribute to the notion of a racially inclusive local governance. This device I see as being legally rooted in the constitutional framework. In Habermas theory the law is not synonymous with the moral framework. If Habermas’ principle of popular sovereignty “which entails that every political power should emanate from the citizens’ communicative power” is to be realised in an unjustly racialised multi-racial society, then there needs to be more than the normal rights of non-discrimination which are legislatively enshrined. I am speaking here of the right not to be unjustly collectivised in oppressive differences of misidentifications. It is thus about justice for collectivities and not group rights. Constitutionally and legally

the procedural device I am talking about is that of *non closure* which will uphold two principles. The first is that people unjustly racialised will be brought into the communicative processes on issues that effect them. The second is that such communicative processes cannot close if the outcome disadvantages those participants in question and contributes at that or some future point to the breaching of the principles of communicative discourse. It can be construed that the achievement of this device will be caught up in some form of circular “chicken and egg” process if it is taken at face value that “the only legitimate normative regulations under Habermas’ proceduralist paradigm would be those which have been assented to by all the participants in rational discourses which might affected.” However, Habermas argues that in the case of legal norms, as opposed to moral norms, “assent could be based on bargaining and compromise, as well as consensus.” It can also be held, as I have argued earlier, and, as I believe, should be applied in this circumstance, as a rhetorical device pending future validity redemption. A device like this is not that much at odds with Habermas’ latest thinking on that which is necessary to include fully the marginalised groups in modern society. Thus:

“Class structures have been replaced by the less conspicuous segmentation of marginalised groups that have become superfluous, and by the crumbling infrastructure in cities and entire regions. Perhaps this, too, should have consequences at a normative level. These could take the form of *veto rights and special minority rights*, (my emphasis) as well as advocacy agencies for those, who pushed even further from established public spheres, have increasingly fewer opportunities to better their situation on their own and thus raise their voices.”<sup>623</sup>

If the substantive principle of non-closure is to be upheld as the foregrounding for detailing the possible normative framework to a racially inclusive local governance, then the difference between Habermas’ version of the organisation of governance and mine is that democracy, as the unfinished project of modernity, has attendant trans-epochal unresolved problems of race and gender which need to be made explicit in the process of finishing, not because they are recent phenomena, but because though they were there from the beginning of the modern constitutional state; they were unjustly left off the agenda. My version then is that a racially inclusive democracy is the unfinished project for a trans-colonial modernity. This difference can be seen as well in the way in which Habermas unfurls his description and associated vision of society in BFN. I have already noted my ambivalence to that piece of work, particularly with regard to the extent to which it still aspires to radical democracy.

However, Honneth’s argument about the moral claims underpinning the process of mutual social recognition is a better communicative motivational framework to my contention that the moral in issues of racism cannot be



categorically abstracted from discursive practices of democracy and law making. Hence although Habermas has tended to presume that issues such as sexism and racism are left overs from lurking traditions best dealt with through an appeal to modernity's universalism, contemporary political events demonstrate the close connection between these forms of oppression and contemporary society. The procedural device of non-closure, which attempts to secure the moral justice claims integral to the discursive claims of Black people in a racist society, means then that the implicit acceptance of the market economy and bureaucratic administration contained in Habermas' accounting for social complexity and subsequent descriptive analysis, has to be questioned. The needs of a trans-colonial modernity coincide with the sentiments of Kavoulakos' conclusion that the "Habermassian approach undermines the possibility of a truly autonomous civil society that would demand an authentic democratisation against the power elites of the state and capital...(because)...the idea of enhancing civil society without changing anything in the institutional framework is not a feasible political programme but wishful thinking."<sup>624</sup> If I am arguing thus that on matters of race the moral has to be brought directly into the process of discursive will and opinion formation to the extent that that distinction in practice is blurred, then this differs from Habermas' ideas on counter steering. Habermas, as Bohman quotes, has argued that "public opinion ...(does not).. by itself rule, but rather points administrative power in specific directions".<sup>625</sup> In other words it does not 'steer' so much as 'counter-steer'. My argument, thus, is that in the trans-colonial modernity on matters of race, not as the exception, but as the marker for wider inclusive practices, where Habermas' own principles of discursive practice are to be upheld, the administrative power has to be steered, and not just counter steered. The achievement of this, i.e. a position of 'steering', returns us again to the principle of non-closure, which is apt because such a principle is the lynchpin for three other substantive normative areas which are particularly germane for the development of a racially inclusive form of local governance.

These three areas are the relationship between the national sovereign state and decentred sites of governance, such as local government, the form and content of democracy, and the form of institutional mediation. The normative potential for a solidaristically steered, radicalised, racially inclusive, local governance is outlined not as a blue print, but, following Jean Cohen, as a both a tentative indicator of what might be possible in the democratic fulfilment of modernity, particularly a trans-colonial modernity, and a confirmation of her and Habermas' belief that the concrete details can only be worked out by participants in discursive communicative processes. This seeks as well to chisel a space in the prevailing neo-liberal and neo-conservative globalising orthodoxy on local government in which it might be possible to bring back into the fold the consideration of alternatives with , dare one say it, utopian yearnings.

## 7.4 Local Governance-State Relationship

I have argued earlier that in the UK the relationship between the national state and local government has been characterised by a growing centralisation over the past twenty years to the extent that the content of the prefix “local” has almost lost all meaning. I have also argued that an increasing factor in the reasons for this centralisation has been the perceived need to ‘manage’ race in the overall calculation of legitimation costs for national political parties. To that extent decreasing the profile of, and disestablishing race equality at the local government level has been seen as necessary collateral damage to the achievement of national electoral success and the maintenance of, in this case, new right Labour’s legitimation equilibrium with the electorate. Increasingly this has taken the form of a highly prescriptive, government directed form of mediation often backed by accompanying legislation. This has extended as well to the promotion and prescription of managerial processes within local government and to the form and content of the local democratic process. The net result is that local government is now expected to perform to a highly specified script which is drafted centrally and over which local government has some control of only the punctuation. Further, in this section, I have developed the argument that this centrally directed re-orientation of local government can be conceptualised as a re-colonisation of local governance space and time. I want, thus, to begin de- and reconstructing this centralised relationship in order that the normative bases for a racially inclusive solidaristic steering of local government can be asserted. I shall do this by drawing together and inter-linking three strands.

Firstly, whilst Habermas has not written specifically about local government, one gets the impression that his thoughts are aimed primarily at the national state. Often thus, whilst he talks about the decentred state, the thrust of his argument resurrects the image of the central, constitutional state. This taken together with his ideas on social complexity leaves one to surmise that he might regard local government as part of the necessity for mediating institutions in complex societies. Even if he does not, then that interpretation could be drawn, or an argument cast for the need for stable, mediating institutions. Habermas, on the basis of his descriptive analysis of social complexity in Western democracies, has advanced the argument that such complexity has done away with the two common proposed forms of radical democracy. These are (1) “that it is possible for the sovereign will of the people and the decision making power to constitute the whole of society”, and (2) “that a society formed out of purely communicative association is possible.”<sup>626</sup> Instead the fact of such complexity requires that discursive democracy be mediated by political and legal institutions with their own rules. These institutions and rules compensate for “the cognitive



indeterminacy, motivational insecurity and the limited co-ordinating power of moral norms and informal norms of action in general.”<sup>627</sup> Bohman’s interpretation of this is that radical democrats can no longer critique democratic institutions and ideals on the basis of a “direct contrast of the ideals of communicative association with the reality of complex society.”<sup>628</sup> I think that that is far too conservative an interpretation of Habermas, not least of which, is the implication that BFN removes the immanence from Habermas’ overall perspective. I have already argued that race brings the contrast of communicative association with reality back into discursive processes. Further, apart from Habermas’ diminished view of the facts of race under such conditions of complexity, an interpretation like this stands in contrast to Habermas’ view that complex societies are polycentric. By this I understand him to mean that the locus of political power in complex societies is differentiated. Secondly Habermas has argued that the discursive democratisation of such societies should be met halfway by the increasing rationalisation of the populace. I have understood such rationalisation to mean the removal of force in the structures of communication. Thirdly I have argued that in multi-racial, but still racist, societies that this rationalisation means in effect the recognition of many languages in communicative processes which are both translatable and transmutable. If, thus the aim of Habermas’ discursive democracy is to shift the steering balance from the centre to the periphery, then the institutions of local democracy, i.e. local government, should be closer to Magnusson’s attempt to “reclaim the municipality as a space of political freedom” because it is “at the boundary between the state and civil society, the centre and the locality, social disciplines and everyday life.”<sup>629</sup> This is a re-orientation which accords with Magnusson’s wish to see municipalities as “paradigmatic”, that is municipalities as “states writ large”. Bohman argues that Habermas’ notion of complexity means that the democratic principle and its criteria of public agreement cannot be applied directly to political institutions. However, I would contend that complexity is unevenly developed in society and that there are parts of the political system where it is empirically feasible to pursue such principles and criteria, especially where the communicative distance between participants and the system is not that great, as is the potential case with local government. This would mean that local government cannot be thought of as simply part of the mediating institutions for that would still maintain the top-down approach. Rather it should be conceptualised in terms of the liminal local state where not only the pitfalls of the ethical sovereign state are held in check, but the potential for local people to steer systems which still have a profound effect on their everyday lives, can be realised. We are not therefore talking about the decentralisation of complexity, which is implied in Habermas use of mediation, but the possibility of the dissolution of complexity and dedifferentiation at the local level. Empirically, in the UK where Black people have related to the state, it has been at the local level.

In fact race has drawn out and characterised the potential for the junctural role local government can and should play “between localities and social movements.” This will be enlarged upon in the following sections. Suffice, for the purposes of this part, to say that any such role would require the re-and deconstruction of the current relationship. We are looking thus at a relationship which places the emphasis on developing and maintaining the liminal role of local government because that would meet the discursive communicative solidaristic needs of local communities in a context where there is the attempt, at the minimum, to counter steer systems, whilst in terms of race it would provide the means to actually steer systems at the local level. However, such a relationship cannot be presented as a *carte blanche* for that could give rise to situations at the local level which are racially exclusively based. Formally defining a relationship like this, that is one that does not in terms of nation state interventions pre-empt the detail of the form and content of local governance, has to be done so within the framework of the participatory principles and procedural device, as outlined earlier, which should be anchored in the constitution. With these guarantors of racial inclusion in place, the junctural role of local government can unfold, develop, and, according to need, dare one use the term, diversify.

## **7.5 Form and Content of Democracy**

Identifying a racially inclusive democracy as the unfinished project of a trans-colonial modernity, begs the question about what exactly the form and content of such a democracy is, especially within the framework of my contention that race is the lynchpin, trans-epochal, unresolved problem of the enlightenment. Part of my answer lies in my conclusion that such a democracy should bring back into the fold the moral in the discursive communicative consensus seeking validation of racial claims for justice; a practice which, unlike Habermas’ argument, cannot be abstracted from everyday reality because such questions are so closely intertwined in Black people’s life experiences. To this extent it diverges from Habermas’ analyses of the democratic needs of the constitutional democratic state, as outlined in BFN. Bohman thus is nearer the mark when he describes Habermas’ latest version of democracy thus:

“Habermas’ thinking about democracy also shows a similar development from a radical, participatory conception of democracy to one that is more indirect and procedural, mediated through legal and political institutions, and limited in scope by macro-conditions of complexity.....His most recent work now entirely separates democracy from his utopian legacy of holistic critical theory.”<sup>630</sup>

In terms of race, however, the unresolved historical schism between Black and white, or between which ever groups there is the unjust racialisation of the communicative structures, holds out the utopian hope of resolution and



reconciliation, especially within the context of a communicative discourse theory of society. This is an anticipation of holism, even if it is a faint one, which isn't necessarily expressed in national societal terms, but, because it is there in the everyday experiential relationships between Black and white, cuts across, and, at times deconstructs, the taken-for-granted institutions and processes of society; a taken-for-grantedness which there even in Habermas' descriptive analyses. I have therefore argued for a form of, and content to, democratic discourse which is multi-lingual, taking into account thus the need for translatability and transmutability; for a discourse which in terms of race is moral and thus dissolves the categorical boundaries erected by Habermas between, for example, the public sphere and the administrative and political systems; for a discourse which is motivated by the injustice of non-recognition and false, imposed recognitions, and thus acknowledges the reality of power in race and discourse, part of the solution to which is expressed in the notion of subaltern public spheres. This differs from Habermas' espousal of representative democracy, albeit under the counter-steering influence, of an active citizenship within the context of a dynamic civil society and public sphere. Kavaloukas has drawn attention to the motivation deficit in such an analyses for the main political institutions to develop or respond properly to such forms of influence. Additionally he points to the fact that "the political system itself undermines both the actual abilities and predispositions of citizens to intervene in the political processes."<sup>631</sup> The fact of the matter is that no matter that the normative potential for an active citizenship is embedded in the democratic culture of society, it will not be activated by the mass political parties and media coming to realise that that is what they should be doing, as implied in Habermas' descriptive analyses and substantive justification. On the other hand processes of recognition claims, particularly those linked to material injustices as well, and/or involved in wider social movements, offer a better moral and motivational framework. Such a framework is built around the normative deficit between the claims of universality societal rights of political participation are supposed to bestow, and the actual discriminating, differentiating reality of the racially marginalised. Habermas presents his view as the only realistic one for contemporary complex societies, a realism that seems to be premised upon relieving the public from the burden of decision making. However, as Kavaloukas is right to point out, this leaves uncritically questioned the political institution of representation. This is not a point of principle, but one of an empirical option if one agrees with Habermas' view of modern complex societies. Kavaloukas' criticisms of the myth of the actual "pseudo-representative institutions of the 'democratic constitutional state'" are given extra weight and substance when the issue of race is brought into the examination. This pseudo-representation is brought into sharp relief when focused through the experiences and outcomes of the long fight Black people have had to secure the political rights of Western liberal democracies; both in the case of those who have

long internal histories, as in the case of the United States, or those, who having been denied such rights in the colonial polity, had to migrate to the West. It is clear that the acquisition of such rights has not improved their lot either in relation to their socio-economic or socio-political circumstances. Dhaliwal's post-modernist critique of representative democracy, the sort that Habermas argues can be counter-steered, is correct in some ways when she writes that the exclusions of racialised subjects in such political systems "are implicated not as mere absences but rather as constitutive of, perhaps even necessary for, the formation of liberal democracies." She makes use of and quotes Guinier's work in the United States to show that "voting alone does not signal fairness....; majority rule is not a reliable instrument in a racially divided society...; majority rule may be perceived as majority tyranny...; there is nothing inherent in democracy that requires majority rule...; (majority rule remains) unquestioned as long as the majority admitted a fair number of blacks to its decision making council."<sup>632</sup> The latter point, which 'represents' to day the acme of thinking on race equality and liberal democracies, is problematic because "whilst black people may vote they do not govern (so that)..when the minority votes, it does not mean their interests will get represented."<sup>633</sup> Even where, under the current system, there are representatives who are Black, their primary representative allegiance is often the mass political party; an allegiance which on numerous practical occasions has over-ridden any additional claims they might have made to being Black representatives. As I argued in an earlier section this politics of racial representation manifests itself very often in the undemocratic assumption of spokes-person roles by such representatives for essentialised 'etnik' groups who then have thrust upon them unasked for collective identities which often fall over into ones that are 'wogged'.. On the other hand the theorists of radical democracy, the solution sought by the left, - and here Habermas regards his deliberative model as radical - , according to Dhaliwal, who, like Mouffe about whom she is particularly critical, "do not specify with any concreteness how radical democracy would deal with these social relations (of racial hierarchy) better than non-radical democracy has a history of doing, do not engage the racial history of democracy in sufficient history and detail." Dhaliwal is right to draw attention to the deficit, Habermas included, evident in the way radical democratic theorists have failed to address the substantive issue of race, the solution to which lies not so much in the history as in the working out of the practice of democratising in multi-racial societies. However, the point is that Habermas' upholding of representative democracy, even within the context of it being counter-steered through the influence of the opinion formation flooding through the sluice gates of the institutions of will formation, still does not address the issue of race properly. My arguments about the multi-contents multi-places of democratic discourse go some way to filling in the specification blank spaces, Dhaliwal flags up at the general level, without necessarily calling



into question the whole democratic project which her anti-essentialist stance implies.

Voting in current constitutional democracies has become an end in itself; a corrupt end because of the forces, such as the mass media and large political parties, 'mal'-structuring the democratic communicative processes. This is part, as well, of Habermas' critique of capitalist politics. This democratic deficit has been recognised by some political parties and attempts to attenuate this by strategies to renew democracy through talk of developing an active citizenship bear, at first sight, an overlap with Habermas' concerns. However these attempts, as in the case with local government in the UK, have been marked by an absence any attempt to explicitly address the issue of race. Further these attempts are still rooted in the tinkering with the system of representative democracy and not changing it. If anything the changes being pursued at the local level are likely to result in less democracy and not more. For example democratic access points have been reduced to just one, whilst any form of scrutiny by the local populace is limited to that of a post agenda setting and decision making one. These bear the hallmarks of what Beck has described as 'facadism', that is engaging in providing a new coat of paint in order to hide major structural cracks in the democratic processes of the political system. The state's concern with regenerating civil society, as exemplified in new right Labour's attempts in this area, are, unfortunately, inextricably intertwined with their apostate embrace of the market. Within civil society autonomy is often now redefined, as Kavaloukas points out, "by the fact that among the 'alternative projects' of the so-called 'third sector', the state has supported those which can offer 'flexible' and cheap social services – contributing to the reduction of social services."<sup>634</sup> One wonders then whether or not Habermas' proposals for democratic renewal, limited as they are to that of counter steering, notwithstanding his claim that they are the most realistic ones, will, in the end, amount to the same. Certainly in terms of race, and I hold this as the normative yardstick by which to judge the inclusiveness of his theories' immanence, if he holds to that line, there is that distinct danger. Part of the problem is that whilst Habermas has argued for the periphery to control the centre, he has concentrated on the political centre in his analysis to the extent that he has paid insufficient attention to the descriptive details of the political institutions at the periphery and the potential that exists therein for developing that close interface between civil society, the public sphere and forms of governance. Addressing the 'democratic deficit' then from the bottom up through the mediation of local governance means addressing the primary cause of this which is the passivity of the citizens. Whilst there is, under the current system, a "widespread feeling that political participation is futile", this is exacerbated where issues of racial justice are ignored or not dealt with properly. Where, in addition, such issues are 'facaded' through a process which purports to be deliberative, as in the case of the pre-

Macpherson Report procedure, but the recommendations are subsequently attenuated or forgotten, then that futility, even anger, is increased. What this points to is the need to go beyond the current form and content of democracy, a task better achieved at the local level. I want to, propose therefore, within the context of the liminal local state, that the form and content of a radical democratic practice, one in which, as the normative aim, there is the potential for a racially, inclusive, discursively arrived at, consensus, is possible. This does not do away with the 'vote'. Rather it situates the vote as one of many possible ways to register such consensus; and, further, where the vote is used, it is the outcome of a communicative discursive, inclusive process, and not that which conflationarily assumes discussion. Further, it does not do away with political representation, but ties such representation to new forms of communicative discursive accountability processes which in themselves might 'wrench asunder' mass political parties' claims to represent the people. Implicit in this is my contention that the uniform democratic practice and system which exists and which Habermas upholds as necessary for complex societies, is not the norm, but an aberration. Such a notion fits in better, I think, with my view that there is an uneven development of democratic practice and Habermas' assertion concerning the politically decentred society with the attendant argument about the necessity for rationalisation from the bottom up to half way meet initiatives from the top.

It is implicit in the notion of the liminal local state that the contours of the form and content of democracy cannot be over specified because it will, ultimately, assume the shape of the discursive practices people adopt. Nevertheless, following Habermas in trying to specify the 'only real alternatives to a complex capitalist society' does depend on the 'reality' of the descriptive analyses used. My contention is that his underplays the reality of current, distorted colonial reality, and thus does not properly theorise the discursive democratic practices necessary for a trans-colonial modernity. To that end I argue that, on issues of racial justice, it is necessary to bring into the reality of such practices, moral considerations requiring thus the need for consensus for those validity claims. Further it is necessary for the discursive participatory principles to be embedded in the constitution and, in relation the needs of a multi-racial society, to be underpinned by the procedural device of non-closure. This is a qualitative step up from Habermas' argument that in everyday democratic practice agreement, and compromise are acceptable because it should always be possible to put any issue back on to the agenda. Such an argument fails to appreciate fully that within the architecture of the principles of his own argument, that there cannot be compromise and/or agreement which in effect continues racially exclusive practices. These principled and constitutionally framed considerations, which include that of liminality for local governance, frame, then the development of discursive democracy



locally. Taken together, they begin to address, as well, the vectoring of space, time and place, an oppressive process which is acutely felt by Black people. This is a dimension of emancipation which Habermas, because he cedes so much to system, and thus societal, complexity, overlooks. Further, because the state is invested now with a greater responsibility in everyday practice for upholding moral norms of racial justice, the rationalisation implications of this means that there has to a greater solidaristic grounding of the consensual validation of these. This will give greater emphasis to the transformative dimension and avoid "the way power works within social institutions to subvert, deflect or undermine emancipatory claims raised in social struggle." Whilst his latter point starts taking us into the next realm of institutional mediation, it does raise the important issue of the nature of the demarcation between democratic discursive practices and the political institutions. It should be clear from my arguments and from the previous section on the organisation of governance that I envisage a more fluid and fuzzy boundary line between the political system, in which political will is enacted, and opinion formation, especially on the issue of racial justice. This, under the conditions outlined above, is given greater emphasis at the level of local governance. Thus we can anticipate that unlike the current new right Labour modernisation programme with its clear boundary demarcation between the political system, the administration and the citizenship, that the liminal local state, within the principled context and constitution, will focus on the democratic form and content arrangements necessary to address the issues at hand. The only institutional requirement which can be prescriptively identified is that of the assembly. The form this will take cannot be over specified, e.g. will it be necessary for it to be physically sited and located? However the reasons for an assembly at the local level are, for the moment, pragmatic, given the logic of political decentring which figures not only in Habermas' work, but also, I think draws genetic memory from Marx's notion of the withering away of the state.. At the time of the priority given to equality in certain local authorities, the key responsibilities of local government were often defined in terms of employment, services and an area of activity which could best be described as enlightened stewardship. This covered the grey areas of consultation, participation, involvement by local communities and as well the voicing and championing of issues on their behalf. However, under the current modernisation programme being put forward by the Labour government the focus is very much on services with accountability being structured in terms of financial management accounting systems coupled with a centralisation of representative democratic political powers in the hope, I contend, that legitimation for mass political parties at both the national and local levels, can be more easily managed/controlled. My idea and reasons for an assembly are linked more to focusing on, reviving, deconstructing and reconstructing that notion of stewardship in terms of a communicative discursive democracy so that participation and

involvement discursively become intertwined more directly with legitimation. With the constitutionally embedded equality of participation principles and non-closure procedural device as the structural keystone, the assembly should be fully inclusive of Black people, where because 'Black' signifies no more than wrongs done to, the possibility exists for additional claims to cultural authenticity to be involved in a process in "which oppositional identities are themselves transfigured through the overcoming of the derogatory recognitions which constituted them as excluded." What we have written within this process as well will be the critical re-appraisal of the concept of, and practice of, 'representation' not only in its political form, and thus the nature of its legitimating content, but also in relation to the claims for group recognition and identities. One of the key responsibilities the assembly discursively discharges then for the local liminal state is that of maintaining a critically high standard of racial justice within that particular sphere of local governance; both in relation to its internal 'business' and its external relations. The assembly becomes the discursive democratic body which 'decides' the local state's programme and/or priorities. This does not necessarily do away with institutional mediation which is necessary in complex societies. However the notion of an assembly, as outlined above, does not presume the form and content of such a mediation. There is, for example, no reason why some now commonplace, accepted orthodoxies in public service arenas, such as 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness' cannot be referred to the assembly for both local defining and change more in line with inclusive discursive principles. What matters is that the extent to which the local populace wishes to bring into the discursive fold via the assembly the provenance of institutional mediation, even if this does lead to an "over burdening of public deliberation", cannot be prescriptively pre-judged. Further the notion of an assembly does not do away with the differentiation of political decision making which Habermas sees as part of and necessary for complex societies. There is no reason why the local liminal state cannot have multiple sites of deliberative democracy. These, for example can be geographically and demographically organised, as was attempted by Walsall Council. The latter effectively did away with the bureaucracy and devolved responsibilities to ward and neighbourhood committees. On the other hand it could be organised by service categories, which would be discursive upgrading of the turn of the century form of local control of areas such as education. In both the relationship between the 'administration' and the local populace is effectively rewritten. Foster in his work on attempting to apply Habermas' principles to public service organisations shows how it is possible to develop the principle and practice of consensually seeking the redemption of validity claims between those who work for the local state and those who are service recipients so that accountability becomes to be discursively defined. This begins to mark out a potentially new arena of discursive democratic deliberation which lies within, and inter-plays between, the 'fuzzy logic' boundaries that exist between the administrative,



political and populace sites in and around the liminal state. In sum then the diagrammatic depiction in the previous section of the organisation of governance provided a categorical differentiation between the various elements constituting the processes of opinion and will formation. It should be clear from my attempts to outline the form and content of democracy at the level of the liminal local state that in reality there is likely to be an inter-meshing of these elements dependent upon the issue at hand. For example the subaltern public sphere will include at the local level the Black populace, Black employees and will also link into national, even international, networks. This might be deployed as an influencer on the local assembly; or as an influencer and participant in the assembly; or at the level of a participatory/action forum in a service area. At this level the 'people' is not a fiction, as Bohman claims, but a reality. Under conditions of translatability and transmutability, there is not a singular ethical formation of the will in the Rousseau sense, which Habermas distances himself from, but a transformative practice which keeps under inclusive solidaristic direction the emancipative use of resources effecting the ability of people to engage in discursive communication. A reader's letter in the Guardian, on the issue of poverty alleviation measures, quintessentially focuses on the substantive issue and provides a salient lead into the next section on institutional mediation.

"As a divorced mother, I have lived with long term poverty and seen how it has limited the life chances of my children....What is missing in the Poverty Audit (a government initiative) is the 'third way' of treating it: the setting up of a mechanism for the participation of people with direct experience of poverty in the formulation, monitoring and evaluation of any anti-poverty strategies. Until this is in place, all solutions will be imposed, as they have always been."<sup>635</sup>

But then, this is as it should be: the pursuit of unredeemed validity claims, stemming from unresolved trans-epochal problems of racism, in furtherance of realising a trans-colonial modernity, stands at the apical, sharp cutting edge to wider societal fault lines affecting other oppressed sectors of the community.

## **7.6 Institutional mediation**

The importance of institutional mediation is everywhere, even if it is not represented precisely in those terms. It covers those action areas sandwiched between the forms of governance society has and the life-worlds of its constituents. It effectively manages the time, space, and for those unfortunate enough, the place parameters of the interregnum periodising the way in which such societies express their general consensus over the form and content of their own governance, even if this is in the limited shape of

the vote. Whilst its necessity in the development of a socially complex society is not questioned, the role and content of institutional mediation, particularly that of the public sector, has assumed ever greater importance over the past twenty years plus through a developing process of redefining critical interrogations and interventions on the part of the state. Epistemologically, whilst I am aware that juxtaposes at some points, and at others fuses a confluence, of academic disciplines – organisational studies, administration, management etc. – under the greater umbrella of post second world war welfare, I am going to speak generally and across boundaries about institutional mediation. This ‘generality’ has to be distinguished from the new right and new Labour attempt to logocentrically centralise, control, conflate and define, such institutions through the colonising imposition of a neo-managerialist discourse, if I might, (smacking my hand repentantly), borrow that term from the Foucauldians. One of the pivotal interrogations has been thus, in my contention, that of attempting to define explicitly, and in the process of that definition affixing the determinant source of, a normative framework for the public sector. Normative, even if one adopts Habermas’ differentiated schema of the moral and democracy, implies that there is some form of discursive process which realises the expectations against which, in this case the institutions, should be measured. The traditional frame of reference, against which even local government was judged, was that of the impartial, fair bureaucracy, exemplified in reality by the workings of the civil service. There was an implied normative framework which affixed the value horizons of what can be called the traditional administration. In the case of local government this was very much the case up to the late seventies. One can see this mirrored in the orthodoxies that informed the thinking and texts of academic public administrative studies. Where there was divergence from this view it came from Marxist studies which either dismissed the public administrative system as a tainted reflex of the capitalist economic system, and thus a capitalist class agent, or, where there was an attempt to engage with the detailed intricacies of administration, did so around the analytical axis of the worker-capital split. The ‘radical social work’ theorising and analyses of the seventies are a good example of this. However, this is not to dismiss the importance of such theoretical strands for it helped form the bases of a broad spectrum of thinking which envisaged, albeit an inchoate vision, a radicalisation of the public sector, especially at the level of local governance. This push for change, acutely witnessed in some inner city local authorities, included the recognised need for change in the spheres of race and women’s equality. The importance of bringing substantive subjects like race equality into the deliberations about what public institutions should be doing, lies in the wide ranging scope its critical impact had, and has. Because race demands - just as the civil rights movement was the precursor to modern social movements, so too new Labour has unacknowledgedly borrowed, but diluted, race equality’s critical thrust – ‘joined up writing’, it brought into the



spot light the normativisation of the administrative institutions. It was at the same time the explicit politicisation, with a small 'p', of the administration. Now, my argument has been that new Labour, in an attempt to control the legitimisation costs of local governance for achieving and holding on to national governance, embarked on a strategy of de-politicising the public administrative system, especially that of local governance, whilst at the same time explicitly normativising it. This normativisation accords to the public administrative institutions a number of similar values held together by a neo-managerialist ethos, usually expressed in terms of 'performance management', whilst, crucially re-defining and re-enforcing at the same time the old orthodoxies that the administrative institutions are politically neutral and programmed by the political system; more over orthodoxies which re-inscribe the unjust hierarchicalisation of power. The move to cabinet style local government structures is indicative of this. In this then, there is an unfortunate overlap with one interpretation which can be placed on Habermas 'realistic analysis'. It can be argued that Habermas' idea of focusing opinion formation on the processes of will formation, that is on the political institutions of representative democracy, bearing in mind his contention that only the political system can act, effectively cedes the administrative institutions to being beyond discursive redemption. In so doing it appears to sail very close to the Blairite model. The question is then whether or not it is possible "to ground a normative framework for critique" of the mediating administrative institutions where the derivation of those norms comes in part from those institutions themselves, and are not simply defined for them by the political system.

My argument, however, and here it is foreshadowed in the previous section where I have argued for the fuzzy boundaries between administration and the political system, is that such a sharp distinction which seeks to mark out the mediating institutions as, in terms of political action and agency, a 'no-persons' land, is counter-productive to the achievement of a trans-colonial modernity. Perhaps this arises in Habermas because, as Honneth has critically argued against, he has reduced the sphere of work to instrumental action. Foster notes that Habermas, apart from his earlier theoretically substantive distinction between "instrumental action characteristic of productive activity" and the "communicative action of social praxis....has had very little to say about the potential structurings of the work process to promote or suffocate autonomy, or to render work meaningful or monotonous."<sup>636</sup> This failure to address properly this area, a failure which is represented as well in the lack of detailed attention paid to how the administrative system can be made more democratic, effectively wipes out as meaningful the struggles by Black people and women in these institutions to have their moral claims for racial and gender justice to be redeemed. To that extent there is a qualified agreement with Foster's summary and

approval of Honneth's position which is that "we can make an internal differentiation within instrumental action according to whether the work process enables independent activity, initiative and a minimal degree of external control...(to) ...allow for the theorising of the potential for moral conflict within the work process itself."<sup>637</sup> This qualification in part links back to my earlier arguments about the need to differentiate between instrumental and strategic action, the location of these forms of action within organisations which should be thought of as structures of communication, and transformative action which denotes the actor induced agency giving rise to "communicatively transforming non-communicative action." The other part of the qualification refers to the insertion of moral claims for racial justice into the processes of such institutions, processes which, within public sector institutions are more than just work related ones. The redemption of these claims, because they are boundary disruptive, will span a continuum of action with the possibility of "democratising the administrative system." This is slightly different to Habermas' BFN model where the procedures of administrative activity are brought under the "control of public procedures on the output side", although that as one of a consideration of many options, close as it is to the current new right Labour version of output accountability, is not ruled out. Rather it is to put back on the agenda Habermas' TCA notion of "self regulation by those concerned ...(which)...in part could take the place of both administrative regulation and deregulation." This self regulation within the context of liminal local governance, and the constitutional arrangements favouring non-closure, seeks to achieve that which is immanently contained within Habermas' theories, viz. the attenuation and/or prevention of the colonisation of the lifeworld by the system through processes like juridification. That is to say that we seek a form of institutional mediation which keeps open the necessary two way communicative channels between the life world and the polity of that society. Arato, in support of the BFN model, is both right and wrong to conclude that the "conception of the civil public sphere is central to contemporary prospects of democratisation, yet it helps to avoid such politically irrelevant illusions as the conversion of state policy making into a fully deliberative process, or the radical democratisation of all spheres of life."<sup>638</sup> He is right insofar as those seeking more radical democratisation, like myself, are not seeking the full transformation of the state. However he is wrong in seeking to impose artificial limits on the extent of that radicalisation, particularly if, as I have commented above, that treats as 'irrelevant' the struggles of Black people in such institutions for justice. So long as the hope exists in principle for more democratisation, and that hope is contained in Habermas' thinking, then the achievement of that principle should be determined in a practice which is properly informed inclusively by all of the relevant empirical details, which in this case must include race. Habermas' turn away from seeking a more deliberative administrative system is one taken on pragmatic grounds because of his realistic analysis;



an analysis I have already questioned in terms of race equality. To that extent I want now to return to the pursuit of an in situ deliberately derived normative framework for public sector mediating institutions, especially those of local governance, through borrowing and using slightly differently the research term 'triangulation' to position the three agency spheres involved in the normativisation of mediating institutions: elected political representatives, the employees in the institutions, and the relevant constituencies. For Habermas the solidaristic norms of society are anchored in laws, provided they have been consensually agreed to on the part of those directly affected. Such laws, however, straddle the nexus critically between facts and norms. That is to say that the exclusionary facts, or those excluded, provide the thrust for changing the law more in line with the norm. In reality both law and norm are 'triangulated' through the apex of rights which, as Habermas, correctly observes, expresses a relationship and not an objective thing. In the public sector institution it is not just the laws and associated norms affecting employment, as Foster implies, which mediate the relationship between employee and the organisation. Rather institutions like these are actually the confluence of a number of laws, and thus normative frameworks both expressing what exists and containing immanently what could be. Laws affecting employment, services, democratic arrangements, and the relationships between those spheres and the content of those spheres now run through and cross over in, the public sector institutions in the UK. Overlaying all of these are not only the anti-discriminatory legislation, but also the implied norms and rights of full and communicatively non-distorted inclusion. If one runs the two triangles together, that is the one outlined earlier which refers to the spheres involved in the normativisation of the mediating institutions, and that of law, norms and rights, then it should be clear that the latter acts as the more abstract one through which to consider the former. On this basis then the rights that emanate from a trans-colonial modernity include, as I argue above, the right not to be unjustly collectivised. The pursuit of this right within the mediating institutions will mean not just monitoring the output, as Habermas implies, but ensuring that it inures in the processes of those institutions. To achieve this requires de- and re-constructing those institutions so that the relationship underlying those rights can be secured deliberately. This brings into the fold those three spheres identified, but does not, as the current facts of the arrangements do, prescribe the form this will take. These have to be the outcome of the pragmatic considerations affecting a particular set of circumstances. We want to overcome that which befell the working class in the UK in the nineteenth century, and which appears to be affecting the claims for racial justice made by Black people. Mark Neocleous argues that during that period "when the working class gained legal recognition in the nineteenth century as a 'subject of rights', it was simultaneously constituted as an 'object of administration'". Through this "the state was able to develop a 'law-and-administration continuum', by means of which

the emancipatory claims raised in working class struggle were transformed into regulated and administered disputes through which class antagonism could, in effect, be domesticated and controlled.”<sup>639</sup> There are glimmerings of a similar argument which could be raised with respect to the fate of race equality struggles for justice in the local state in which the struggles of Black people both within and without of the state have become and are now regulated and administered. The liminal notion of the local state ties in with my liminal notion of the term ‘Black’ using it to denote not only the experience of collective racialised wrongs done to, but also as the discursive signifier which invites further communicative discourse. The move away from that within the spheres of local governance and wider public sector institutions is captured in the now highly controlled, administered and circumscribed race equality initiatives within those institutions and in the differentiation of ‘Black’ into biological reductionist splitting off of those deemed to be ‘Asian’; the latter usually further disaggregated into a number of idealised ethnic groups. This bears out Deetz’s observation that “the politics of identity representation may be the deepest and most suppressed struggle in the work place and hence the ‘site’ where domination and responsive agency are most difficult to unravel.”<sup>640</sup> Expanding the normative deliberative communicative spaces in these mediating institutions in order to enhance rather than objectify the proposal that these are in the end structures of communication, means being able to provide the framework and content within which race, whilst a critical factor, is not an exclusionary and dominating one.

In effect then this ‘triangulation’ envisages the spaces for deliberative discourse shifting and taking shape in between the interstices of the three spheres mentioned above and guided by validity claim issues at hand over which it is necessary to obtain consensus. This does not replace the representative democratic arrangements, but expands them so that the provenance of political legitimacy seeps out of the hands of the dominant, dominating large political parties into those who are directly affected. This both adds to the decentring of the local state as well as contributes to redefining and reshaping the ‘assembly’. Further the ideological gel which holds such institutions together, currently in the form of private sector based neo-managerialism, is brought under critical discursive scrutiny by those who are directly affected, viz. employees, the citizenised public and political representatives. This begins to provide the space within which it is possible to develop alternatives which are more applicable to Zanetti’s<sup>641</sup> call for a transformative practice of public administration and to Cooke’s analysis that slavery contributed to the development of management and thus has roots in racism.<sup>642</sup> His recommendation for “a post-colonialist deconstruction of management in which the role of empire and colonialism in its creation” can be revealed, edifying as that might be, needs to be changed to that of a trans-colonial reconstruction of management; one which




accords with Alvesson and Willmott's de and reconstruction of management as a colonising process thus:


“Colonization describes the way that one set of practices and understandings which are strongly associated with instrumental reason that is dominant in the organisation and management of complex systems comes to dominate and exclude other practices and discourses that are present within the everyday cultural media of the lifeworld where human beings develop their basic sense of being purposive, wilful subjects with distinctive social identities.”<sup>643</sup>

## **7.7 Comparisons**

Finally, the difference between an idealised extrapolation of a Habermassian counter factuality of local governance, and mine, can be illustrated diagrammatically below.









In terms of the organisation of governance, my diagrammatic outline obviously envisages a greater role for the state, captured here by the political and administrative system categories, within the context of a morally reflexive constitution, which seeks to minimise the colonising powers of the market and administrative system because of the greater influence/change processes that occur in the public sphere/civil society-state interface. In my schema of things then, the political and administrative system adds up to the Political System. I have also “HTML’d” the potential relationship of the signifying Black collectivity, which “collectivises” on the bases of wrongs done to, and not conflated identity claims, to Black public spheres and life-worlds and to that of the state. Both diagrams point to a situation which could be, and not what is.



**SECTION II**

**Bridging Theory and Empirical Research**

# Chapter 8

## Prelude to Empirical Details – On Methodology

### 8.1 Introduction

In one sense the theoretical gestations of the previous sections which have been conducted at the meta- and meso-theoretical levels around the conceptual inter-play and/or antinomies amongst Habermassian critical theory, “postie” theorising, and what might previously have been labelled “bourgeois ideology”, but now can be called liberal philosophising, as the meta-framework for considering the meso-level of race and local governance, can be considered as the necessary prefix to structuring the micro-level empirical details. These details relate to the examination of why and how over a certain, but short, period a local authority initiated and undertook a programme of race equality, a process described in the last section as the positive racialisation of the local state, and then set about effectively disestablishing that programme. It is about the priority given to the need for the local authority to oppose and overcome racism and racial discrimination, and about the subsequent deprioritisation of that need. In structuring the empirical details by situating them at the micro-level of an inter-related three tier conceptual analysis, it is clear that these details cannot be realised by a simple retelling of events as a basis for an empirical theory. There are plenty of race and public sector studies which are structured at this level having thus a contextual salience soon undermined by the temporal lag. It raises as well methodological questions which are one and the same time about how the empirical data was arrived at, its relationship to the other two levels, viz. the meso- and meta-theoretical levels, and the criteria by which the strength and/or weakness of this purported relationship is established. For example questions about how the data was arrived at and used bring in my role as the primary researcher. But then the marker must be put up that this activity was not undertaken within the formal structure and context orthodoxly associated with the term “researcher”, since I actually worked through and experienced the changes being examined. It can be argued thus that such a role spans at times separately and at other times conflationarily a number of research methodologies, for example case study, action research and ethnographic research, employing various means of analysis, such as narrative and metaphor. However to do so would be to treat the necessary methodological overview at the meso-level. Just as my argument about the need to treat race at the meta-theoretical level is linked to my contentions about race being trans-epochal problems the resolution of which is the touchstone to the proper completion of modernity, so my



contention will be that orthodox methodological arguments, for example the perennial qualitative versus quantitative one, if left at that status, allow race to slip through the conceptual gaps. I want to briefly outline thus a critical social research methodological framework which informs the way the data was accessed and organised. This is not one which has been developed with the benefit of theoretical hindsight and retrospection. That is to say a detailed look back at events and attempting to allocate those to a suitable theoretical pigeon-hole, what one critical organisational researcher has deemed, “fairytale methodology”<sup>644</sup>. Rather the principal researcher entered into a work experience of race and local governance as someone who was, and still is, heavily influenced and informed by critical theory, in particular the work of Jurgen Habermas. As a prefix thus to the next section’s necessary digression on critical social research methodology, it can be said that an approach so informed meant that there was and is a commitment to relevant background reading and research at all three levels, a methodological activity which, I shall argue and expand on later, is one of the key components of a critical research project. In a broader sense this critical research project, outlined by Habermas in TCA II, included from my perspective, and from him the as yet unacknowledged, area of racism, which I and other Black people thought, conjoined with that of certain local Labour parties. This is a critical theory which is inclusive of an explicit anti-racist approach, seeking, as with the other emancipative strands, a fundamental transformation of society. As opposed to the limits of orthodox political thought, there is a sceptical, reasoned rejection of existing patterns of authority and power coupled with an active attempt to include, substantively, i.e. the application of the three ‘Rs’- respect, recognition and rights, those previously dominantly oppressed, exploited and marginalised.

This allowed for a normative template to be overlaid on the range of actions within this particular race and local governance experience, a range which was inclusive of myself and those other relevant actors caught up in the inter-play between appurtenant socio- and systemic integrative processes. This was the normativity of that which was necessary for the achievement of race equality in the sphere of local governance. Everyday practice within such a work context which was focussed primarily on the development of race equality within local government included, because of the ongoing background reading inquiries and normative framework, a research agenda informed by a critical, as in the sense of critical theory, scepticism towards the taken-for-grantedness of local government orthodoxies both then current and developing, not to mention race change orthodoxies. Underlying this scepticism as the symptomatic expression of the attempt both to resist the colonising tendencies of a racially structured world and at the same time transformatively make sense of that world, is the experience of the researcher as a Black person being brought up, educated and working in three societal variations of a racially hierarchicalised society – the



‘racialarchy’ of apartheid South Africa, the racial taken-for-grantedness of a neighbouring British colony, and the liberal racism of seventies, eighties and nineties UK. This is more than just the iteration of the experiential framework influencing and underlying the research for it points as well to substantive issue raised in the paper on reconstructing race and racism which is that the experiences of the racially marginalised are often portents of that which will affect the rest. In this particular instance it can be argued that the unsettling and migratory effects of a globalised system of racial dominance produced experiences which are only recently being felt and appreciated by white people in Europe. Globalising systems have been with us for far longer than recent popular and serious accounts of ‘globalisation’ would have us believe. It depends, in this case, not so much on who is experiencing it, but on who is experiencing it and has the power to relate the tale. But there is as well a serious methodological aspect which comes out of this which is that the temporal disjuncture which characterises Black experiences vis-à-vis white society can be seen as an inversion of what I have previously referred to as “playing catch up.” Where as my earlier use focussed on Black people being put in the position of trying to chase after race equality in societal institutional settings, the inversion points to the process whereby Black people are in the position of waiting for the rest of society to catch up. In that temporal nexus various inverted methodological catch up practices can be identified: the pseudo-scientific ‘value-free’ objectivism of empiricism which requires nomothetic validation of Black people’s expressed experiences of racism or the mediation of the idiographic accounting of Black peoples’ experiences by white institutions. For example in one of the sub-target boroughs used in this research, it will be argued that the development of an explicit race equality programme allowed, fleetingly, for temporal synchronicity between the expressed claims of racial injustice by Black people and the appropriate institutional response because there were substantive avenues of influence and participation by Black people. In the intervening years the dis-establishment of that programme – the re-whitewashing of the Town halls, as I describe the process - has seen a situation develop in which an outside academic institution was called in to research and validate, or not, Black employees claims that they were being unfairly singled out for disciplinary action.<sup>645</sup> The research, as it so happens, backed up these claims. Whilst this points to the way in which social research methodologies, and the contexts of power in which they are exercised, have, and still, fail to grasp the reality of Black peoples experiences, so it also highlights, just as the development of feminist research perspectives have in relation to women, the core problem which is about the forces in the communicative structures of social research which prevent these experiences from being authentically captured and autonomously validated. In so far, thus, as the research purports to show how and why race equality was removed from the agenda of a local authority, and to derive from this, the normative outline of a racially



inclusive form of local governance which is based on the discursive democratic inclusion of Black people, so also the methodological framework outlined below purports to demonstrate how it better meets the objective of racial inclusivity. That is to say that the methodology supports the thesis of the communicative social construction of race, and for that matter local governance, within a validity paradigm that allows comparison between states of oppression, such as domination and exploitation, and corollary states of emancipation. Further it does so not on the foundationalist assumption that the racial bi-polar change relationship just mentioned grounds the life-world experiences of those who are on the recognised receiving end of such racism, and thus in terms of normative supporting agency it is simply a matter of tapping into conditioned, or awakening residual levels of consciousness. Rather it does so on the more modest basis of communicative fallibility which seeks to ground only the procedures guaranteeing the inclusive participation of all in the analyses of the problems and defining of solutions. Bohman, in contrast to what he sees as the overly theoretical heritage of German idealism which influences one of two interpretations of critical theory and results in the fallacy of an “overly ambitious goal of a comprehensive social theory which can unify all the diverse methods and practical purposes of social enquiry”, opts for, instead, taking critical theory in a pragmatic direction.”<sup>646</sup> This is better suited to a democratic social organisation of knowledge in which “co-operative enquiry allows for the division of critical labour where the overall legitimacy of institutions and policies can be tested by a variety of participants from different perspectives and with different social knowledge....(where the derived)...social scientific knowledge is a resource that may be socially diffused and shared by everyone...(thus enabling)....entrenched asymmetries of information and power...(to be)..transformed by the practical consequences of organised critical enquiry.”<sup>647</sup> In the previous chapters I have already argued that, in order for race to be properly accounted for, this requires a transformative interpretation and extension of Habermas’ theory. Scheuerman, in an analysis which mirrors my own ambivalence towards what he describes as the ambiguity in Habermas’ BFN, identifies two competing, but, in his view, incompatible, interpretations of deliberative democracy. The first points to an “ambitious, radical democratic polity based on far reaching social equality and equipped with wide ranging capacities for over seeing bureaucratic and market mechanisms”. The second “suggests a defensive model of deliberative democracy in which democratic institutions exercise at best an attenuated check on market and administrative processes, and where the deliberative publics most of the time tend to remain, as Habermas himself describes it, ‘in dormancy’”<sup>648</sup>. Whilst my contention is that the first is necessary to meet the full communicative resolution of racism, it is also that the forms of critical enquiry require as well this radical orientation. To that extent the way in which the excavation of race within administrative and political contexts is done and



the results from this will support the need to retain the radical option. Scheuerman notes that Habermas does not fully develop the radical option evident in BFN, and that, for example, on the relevant issue of the interface between communicative power and administrative power, notwithstanding the mutual incompatibility of the derivative theories underpinning these two concepts, he does not develop an adequate “analysis of how deliberative processes can effectively ‘steer’ and ‘bind’ decisions within the administration itself.”<sup>649</sup> The empirical data from this research then not only contributes to the support of that radical option and such analyses, but also underpins the core argument that if race is to be fully and inclusively resolved within a communicatively structured theory of modernity, then a radical interpretation of that ambiguity must be pursued. Further it will be shown that the defensive option mirrors key aspects of the conservative turn taken by Labour at the local level and that this contributes to the above mentioned recursive continuation of racial oppression, in itself a disqualifier of participation in communicative discourses. It supports then Scheuerman’s contention that the “second model risks abandoning the critical impulses that have motivated Habermas’ intellectual work throughout his...career.”<sup>650</sup>

## 8.2 Social Reality Correlates

However, in pursuit of the re-invigoration of Habermas’ critical strand, especially in relation to the perceived absence of any substantive race references within the construct of that theory, a re-interpretation and confluence is sought between Habermas and Honneth’s moral grounding of recognition struggles. Briefly to re-iterate, so as to draw out the key, critical methodological concerns, Honneth argues that Habermas’ understanding of the communicative rationalisation of the lifeworld, i.e. “the process whereby ever more validity claims come to require explicit consensual resolution”, underestimates the extent to which this occurs behind the backs of social subjects, and, thus, is not experienced as “an enhanced moral sensibility.”<sup>651</sup> For Honneth subjects experience restrictions to their moral point of view not through intuitively mastered rules of language, “but as a violation of identity claims acquired through socialisation”.<sup>652</sup> His communicative paradigm then does not do away with language as the main referent, but includes it in a wider notion of recognition and its violation. Honneth writes that critical theory “must be confident of identifying empirical experiences and attitudes which already indicate at a pre-theoretical level that its normative standpoints are not without basis in social reality.”<sup>653</sup> Habermas’ use of universal pragmatics means that he equates the normative potential of social interaction with the linguistic conditions for reaching understanding free from domination. But if the process of communicative rationalisation is a “behind the backs of subjects” process then “a correlate cannot be found within social reality for the pre-theoretical resource to which the normative



perspective of Habermas' theory refers reflexively; his conception is not aimed in the same way as Horkheimer's...at the idea of helping to give expression to an existing social injustice."<sup>654</sup> If Honneth's social reality correlates are to be found in the violations of recognition, and this brings back into the fold in a reconstructive way the notion of labour, what are they if, as Honneth holds, "the normative presupposition of all communicative action is to be found in the acquisition of social recognition."<sup>655</sup> The correlates relate, then to the "pathologies of recognition", which "for 'our' society ....would require studies of socialisation practices,...familial forms...relations of friendship,...forms of application of positive law,...patterns of social esteem."<sup>656</sup> My critique of this, as I argue in the previous chapter, is that it assumes a differentiation of cultures without being able to account properly for the violation of certain cultures. To pursue the research paradigm of Honneth runs the risk of pathologising those who make claims about recognition violation. Thus it is not the lack of recognition which is so important as the mis-recognition which needs to be addressed. For example I have attempted to define racism within a communicative paradigm at the meta-theoretical level in terms of it being the maintenance of relations of force in the structures of communication through the conventionalisation of biological or ascribed biological differences. The definition of this key form of mis-recognition cannot be directly equated with Honneth's elaboration of his concept of recognition violation because the latter appears to apply only to what I would call "expressive racism". That is to say the open process of 'denigration', in its metaphorical and non-PC etymological sense. There are other phases to the recursive nature of racism, such as effective racism which is the end product not so much of mis-recognition, as the transitive process of non-recognition, especially where non-recognition ties into the valorisation of group identities formed at the expense of others. Under certain circumstances, as evidenced in apartheid South Africa, expressive and effective racisms are directly related. Where the relationship is ostensibly tenuous, for example because prevailing social norms, inclusive of legal ones, prohibit expressive racism, as is the case in some European countries, such as France, effective racism presents itself as the dominant phase. However, attempts at remedial action to tackle these forms of racism, in the shape of legislation and associated social integrative stabilising interventions by the state, can give rise to a discourse of equality, in this case race equality, which becomes shorn of discursive communicative processes so that discourse becomes 'discourse/diskourse'. Within the context of a study of racism and genocide, 'discourse', is defined as, "a discussion structured by a stable framework with widely accepted reference points, images and explicit elaborations".<sup>657</sup> My preferred neologistic differentiation of 'diskourse', a label for representational discourse as opposed to dialogical discourse, means then that those experiencing mis- and non-recognition no longer become equal, or even actual, participants to the discursive communicative processes effecting



equality, i.e. they are removed from the discussion. This gives rise to another phase in the recursive development of racism which I have, in earlier sections, called equal opportunities' racism. Perhaps a better term would be "facadic racism" because it occurs under the umbrella of an equal opportunities framework. Its corollary is virtual reality equality and virtual reality recognition. This 'diskourse' of equality allows for the instrumentalised legitimation of political parties who can claim to be doing something on the issue, say, of racial justice, whilst also providing the rationale and language to challenge and disrupt Black people's experiences and claims of racial injustice. Such racism accepts as collateral damage, that its action will, in its oppressive wake, drag in a few white people, as evidenced by the restructurings which since the eighties have seen many Black employees ejected from what were once upfront equality local government institutions. These have been reality correlated as well in the resultant manifold claims of racial discrimination fought and won through the Employment tribunal system. Perhaps we should also think in terms of 'third way racism' in the sense that Fairclough's critical discourse analysis of new Labour's nu-speak language of the 'third way' does.<sup>658</sup> That is to say that the substantive interpretation and analysis of the critical process of creating the transformative inter-face between subjectivism and objectivism, relativism/particularism and universalism etc., which is how some theorists have used the term 'third way', is instead depoliticised and replaced by an anodyne shopping list of alternatives linked by conjunctions like, "not only" X, "but also" Y, or, A "and" B. Thus, for example, "not only valuing diversity", but also "racialising and welfare pathologising Gypsy beggars a la Barbara Roche".<sup>659</sup> Because Black people are no longer a proper participative part of the discursive processes of the discourse, conventionalisation occurs and 'diskourse' emerges which helps shape the acceptable face of the political organisation and helps contain and structure the Black experience. This leads us back to Habermas because, as my analysis of racism shows, such mis-, non- and 'VR'-recognitions are constructed through conventionalising forces in the structures of communication so that social interaction for Black people is directed rather than equally enacted. Thus the social reality correlates have to be found for the acts not only of mis-recognition but also those of non- and 'VR'-recognition which might not, in the first instance present themselves in terms of intuitively mastered rules of language. Nevertheless their resolution will need to be structured in a way that allows for the formation of consensus free from domination; a communicatively based social interactive process conducted through the medium of language. Thus because Honneth holds that "moral experiences are not triggered by the restriction of linguistic competences...(but)...are shaped by the violation of identity claims acquired in socialisation", he concludes that, contra Habermas' notion of the normative potential of social interaction residing in the linguistic conditions of reaching understanding free from domination, "the normative



presupposition of all communicative action is to be found in the acquisition of social recognition.”<sup>660</sup> However, recognition acquisition devolves upon linguistically based communicative processes. In expanding the idea of communication away from the singularity of language, Honneth is right to draw attention to the way in which mis-recognition is not experienced solely linguistically, as Habermas implies. He is also right to point out that that feelings of disrespect are not valuable in themselves. That is to say there are no transcendental, overhead, emancipatory tramlines to which mis-recognised subjects are automatically connected. Rather, mis-recognition, and, in my view, non- and VR-recognition, are an ambivalent “source of motivation for social protest and resistance”, as the history of resistance to racism by Black people shows. In other words it illustrates the point I have made in earlier sections that the experience of the problem cannot be conflated with the solution. Empirically then the research will seek to present and structure the findings which, in relation to racial domination, can identify the relevant social reality correlates which can contribute to answering not only the general question relating to a ‘solution’ asked by Honneth, “the question of how a moral culture could be so constituted as to give those harmed by disrespect and ostracisation the individual strength to articulate their experiences in the democratic public sphere....”,<sup>661</sup> but also its implicit problem corollary of what constitutes the nature of that disrespect.

We need to explore further, however, before we move on to the empirical details, Honneth’s notion of social reality correlates (SRC), and its importance to not only the structure of the findings’ presentation, but also its crucial relationship to the methodological implications for a critical theory which purports to address real world issues; and this one, in the sense of my interpretation, does make such a claim. Honneth examines both Horkheimer’s and Habermas’ versions of critical theory and the extent to which it is possible in each case to “rediscover an element of its own critical viewpoint within social reality.” In Horkheimer’s case, in line with his theory’s Left Hegelian legacy, and remember here that Honneth derives his own theoretical version of communicative critical theory from the young Hegel, this requires that his societal theory should excavate a “degree of immanent, intramundane transcendence.”<sup>662</sup> In Horkheimer’s own words critical theory was unique because it is the “intellectual side of emancipation.” The theory can only achieve this if it is able to both reflect on its “emergence in pre-theoretical experience and on its application in a future praxis”. In the real world this means being able to provide an account of the “emancipatory readiness of the populace.” The failure of the Frankfurt Institute to realise this research goal are, as Honneth, and Habermas elsewhere, correctly identify, because Horkheimer still remained tied to the Marxist notion of a pre-theoretical interest linked to the social emancipation of one class. Horkheimer’s reliance on a form of Marxist



functionalism meant that his analysis of capitalism as a “self enclosed cycle of domination and cultural manipulation” provided no room for the emergence of a “practical-moral critique in social reality.” For Honneth then “the key to updating critical social research...(is)..the task of disclosing social reality categorically in such a way that an element of intramundane transcendence will again become visible in it.”<sup>663</sup> In pursuit of this Honneth rejects post structuralism, correctly in my opinion, because its negativist critique means that “attempting to locate itself within social reality must be considered impossible , since this reality is no longer constituted in such a way that social anomalies, even emancipatory interests or attitudes, can be found in it.”<sup>664</sup>

For Honneth, because Habermas’ paradigm of communicative action situates the conditions for social progress in social interaction and not social labour, it has “re-established access to an emancipatory sphere of action”; and in so doing has renewed the tradition of critical theory. However, Honneth sets a qualifying test which must be met before he is ready to accept fully that Habermas’ theory does not suffer from similar empirical problems as that of Horkheimer’s. That is that “Critical Theory must be confident of identifying empirical experiences and attitudes which already indicate at a pre-theoretical level that its normative standpoints are not without basis in social reality.”<sup>665</sup> In Habermas’ case applying this test reveals, as far as Honneth is concerned, that “the foothold in reality for his normative perspective has to be the social process which develops the role of linguistic rules for reaching understanding.”<sup>666</sup> As shown above, Honneth doubts that this will become visible in some form of social reality correlate because the communicative rationalisation of the lifeworld, which is a historical process, occurs in reality ‘behind the backs of subjects’ and is not directly experienced. In other words “moral experiences are not triggered by the restriction of linguistic competences...(but)...by the violation of identity claims acquired in socialisation.”<sup>667</sup> In pursuit of this Honneth advances his argument with reference to the pathologies of capitalist society, an endeavour which is a necessary corollary to understanding the emancipatory potential of such a society. On this point Habermas’ social critique measures social pathology in terms of the “stage attained by the development of human rationality”. As such because social critique is narrowed to a theory of rationality, forms of social pathology which cannot be linked to rationality cannot come to light. To supplement this shortfall Honneth argues that the rational conditions for reaching domination free understanding can no longer be the criterion for the pathological development of social life. Instead “the criterion is now provided by the inter-subjective presuppositions of human identity development....found in the social forms of communication in which the individual grows up, acquires a social identity and ultimately has to learn to conceive of him- or herself as an equal, and at the same time, unique member of society.” The



conclusion then is that “the basic concepts of an analysis of society have to be constructed in such a way that they can grasp the distortions or deficiencies of the social framework of recognition, while the process of societal rationalisation loses its central position.”<sup>668</sup> However, in terms of race I am not so sure that this provides the relevant framework within which to excavate the relevant social reality correlates. Firstly I have already argued that it is the areas of mis-, non-, and VR-recognitions which are germane to race, and not recognition in itself. Further this betokens that it is not so much an either-or questions as one of keeping a categorical distinction between the two intertwined processes of societal rationalisation and social recognition because irrationality/irrationalization, as Habermas himself has defined it, are “those forces that are inconspicuously set in the very structures of communication and prevent conscious settlement of conflicts by means of intra-psychic as well as interpersonal communicative barriers.”<sup>669</sup> One of these barriers is contained in the assumptions Honneth makes about the substances of ‘social lower classes’ communicative processes, and by implication therefore, those of Black people as well. In talking about the active resistances engaged in by such classes, he argues that “because members of these classes have no special cultural expertise in articulating moral experiences, we perceive in their utterances - prior to all philosophical or academic influences, as it were – what normative expectations are oriented towards in everyday social life...(and these)....social protests of the lower classes are not motivationally guided by positively formulated principles, but by the violation of intuitive notions of justice.. the normative core..(of which)...turns out to consist of expectations connected with respect for one’s own dignity, honour or integrity.”<sup>670</sup> At one level this reads like a version of the Rousseau noble savage replete with guttural speech supporting gestures to communicate ‘his’ dignity etc. This argument of Honneth can only hold if one accepts the untenable supposition that moral arguments can only be put forward in ‘academic speak’. Underlying this is perhaps an interpretation of Habermas’ notion of rationality which sees it dependent, as Benhabib proposes, on there being one form of political language, the middle class standard notion of language. My argument, outlined in the previous chapter, is that there has to be languages both intra- and inter-society which can speak on equal basis if Habermas’ notion of rationality is to be upheld in multi-racial and racialised societies. In other words the lower classes, dispossessed and other marginalised collectivities are quite capable of voicing their mis-recognition claims in moral terms. It depends on whether or not the hearer is capable of interpreting those claims competently. What we can say then is that built into the pathologies of mis-, non- and VR-recognitions is the normative expectation, from those who experience this form of oppression and domination, that people will be able to reach understanding on how to move forward. Thus it can be said that these forms of mal-recognition can be taken as evidence of the maintenance of force in the structures of communication, irrationality if you like, and



therefore made visible as social reality correlates. On the other hand the struggle against this can be taken as that which ultimately seeks the free from domination communicative means to resolve this, thereby providing the discernible normative framework read also as a social reality correlate. Social reality correlates, (SRCs), are more than just markers and signs about the communicative preparedness of society. They are the reflection of a substantive process of empirical research, without entertaining presumptions or assumptions about the methodological content of such research, which test, and in some cases maintain as well, as with action research, the critical boundaries between social reality and that “immanent, intramundane transcendence”. In this case a communicative based solidaristic socially interactive integration determining, or at the very least, programmatically influencing systemic integration. In the area of race, recognition and communication the identification of relevant SRCs takes on an added importance in the light of one of the central theses of this research that race is a trans-epochal unresolved problem the resolution of which is one of the key touchstones to the fulfilment of modernity. As shown, thus, in the previous section where an outline of a likely normative model of a racially dominance free form of local governance is attempted, such SRCs have to include exercises in radical “institutional fantasy”, and not just, as Habermas counsels, a careful brand of fantasising; in any event a quality which, as Scheuerman notes, is absent from his BFN.

At this stage an argument can be seen emerging which says that SRCs can be likened to the amniotic fluid discursively feeding, and being fed, by micro- and meso-level theorising, but from which meta-level theory can only sometimes draw sustenance. That is to say at another level that whilst Habermas is extremely reluctant to directly relate his theory of domination free communicative discourse to everyday reality in any kind of a priori sense, preferring to see it as an idealised keep-in-the-forefront-of-your-head type of argument, I, in acknowledging the fundamental importance of race blockages in communication, am not so cautious about wanting to not only realise the everyday correlates, but also to engage with them.

Methodologically, then, there are two inter-related areas which are that of a critical theory of research methodology – the meta-level – and that of the relevant ‘methodologies’. In pursuit then of the structuring and detailing of the empirical data, it can also be said that this frames the two remaining questions that require answering: what is a critical theory of research methodology and what is the outline not so much of the relevant SRCs, because these will emerge in the course of the structuring of the empirical details, but of the key contextualising theoretical areas to each SRC. The former is answered below, the latter in the structuring and detailing of the empirical details.



### 8.3 Critical Theory of Social Research Methodology

In outlining the framework to a critical social research methodology (CSRM), I do so not on the basis of identifying the ‘best’ methods, or attempting a recipe book of ways of undertaking race related research, but on the basis of taking the necessary one step further removed by seeking to explore the philosophy and principles of CSRM compared to the philosophical grounding of other methodologies. In so doing the question is asked from the outset which methodological approach is better suited to helping to frame the answers to the questions posed about racial justice. But then this is no more than has been attempted in the structuring of the introduction to the previous sections on local governance. Notice was given there that because “local governance studies have tended to languish in epistemologically boundaried discourses”, and that even those, such as Marxist ones, which have attempted trans-discourse analyses, or those, such as post-modernist ones, which have tried de-narrativising these discourses, have all resulted in a form of “ontological naïve realism which sanctions a WYSIWYG approach to research issues”, then, if the capacity for emancipatory practice in local government is to be developed, recourse to a meta-theoretical level is necessary. This in turn is related to the first section on race which seeks to situate race “within a modernist meta-theoretical approach (so that race is treated)...not as incidental to conceptual structuring, but as an explicit categorical element internally related to other considerations.” This return thus to methodological considerations attempts to flesh out the distinctive characteristics of CSRM, showing why and how it better deals with the empirical realities of race.

In undertaking this reference is made to a number of key texts which specifically deal with the issues of CSRM.<sup>671</sup> Two of these, Morrow and Brunkhorst, derive their primary source, as I do, from consideration of the original and ‘heirs to’ Frankfurt School critical theorists. The other, Harvey, appears to have derived a similar outlook to CSRM from sources which are mainly Marxist and neo-Marxist.<sup>672</sup> Of these only Harvey tries to demonstrate how CSRM is best suited to understanding race based oppression and emancipation. I want to start then with Harvey’s attempt to derive a CSRM, but bearing in mind Morrow’s assessment. Morrow explicitly acknowledges that Harvey broadly covers the same area as he does, but does not do so at any developed meta-theoretical level which Morrow argues is crucial to understanding the uniqueness of CSRM. Harvey, nevertheless, is important not only because he attempts to situate race and racism within CSRM, but because his meso-level approach, the ‘sociological’, as Honneth describes it, accords at another level, with the everyday critical stance I adopted whilst engaged/working in and through the research. It outlines, as a prefatory summary then, an activist research approach to CSRM, which, however, in support of Morrow’s qualified



approval, still requires a more theoretically honed overview; a requirement Harvey himself sees as necessary for CSRM.

Harvey briefly distinguishes between Critical Social Research (CSR), positivistic based research, and phenomenologically based research whereby CSR is “distinguished by a critical-dialectical perspective which attempts to dig beneath the surface of historically specific, oppressive, social structures”<sup>673</sup>, positivistic research by “concerns to discover factors that cause observed phenomena or to build grand theoretical edifices”, whilst the phenomenological inquiry “attempts to interpret the meanings of social actors or close analysis of symbolic processes.”<sup>674</sup> Within these contrasting approaches ‘method’ is no more than the way in which empirical data are collected, acknowledging that no method inherently belongs to any of the three perspectives. ‘Methodology’ then, as Harvey perceives it, is “the point at which method, theory and epistemology coalesce in an overt way in the process of directly investigating instances in the social world.” On the bases of these definitions Harvey concludes, a conclusion supported by other CSRM theorists like Morrow, that there is no simple “methodic recipe for doing critical social research”. This inferred call for a plurality of methods is supported through his development of his argument for the specificity of CSRM, especially if CSR “grounded in both gender and race oppression offer unique perspectives on critical analyses.” In pursuit of this Harvey develops a growing definition of CSR which, in some ways shows how the need, identified by Honneth for there to be illuminative SRCs for theories with an “immanent, intramundane transcendence”, can be achieved methodologically. Thus:

“Critical social research does not take the apparent social structure, social processes or accepted history for granted..(but)..tries to dig beneath the surface of appearances..(asking)...how social systems really work, how ideology or history conceals the processes which oppress and control people....In its engagement with oppressive structures it questions the very nature of prevailing knowledge and directs attention to the processes and institutions which legitimate knowledge....Conversely, critical social research is an evolving process. As it engages dominant ideological constructs and presuppositions about the nature of knowledge it is necessarily dynamic in the evolution of its critique. So, what may be radical critique at one moment, may, in later context, appear superficial....Essentially critical social research asks substantive questions about existent social processes.”<sup>675</sup>

Within this framework then ‘methods’ as opposed to a pre-given ‘method’ are important because the data released “are meaningful only in terms of their theoretical context, reliability and validity are functions of the context and the epistemological presuppositions that the researcher brings to the enquiry.”<sup>676</sup> If what is emerging appears to be closely related to neo-Marxist type framework, then that is perhaps because Harvey takes on board, via Bauman, before his apostate post modernist turn, Habermas’ early notion



of emancipatory reason. Emancipatory reason views information as “partial, historically specific, inconclusive and the ‘reflection of a mutilated, maimed, truncated existence.’” Critical social research requires us then to go below the surface of given reality, such as ‘common sense’, and to locate “social phenomena in their specific historical context.” Such analyses then are inclusive of “an overt political struggle against oppressive social structures...”, and can be ideal typed according to all or a number of the following features, which can be combined in what Harvey summationally describes as a “dialectical deconstructive-reconstructive process.”<sup>677</sup> These are:

- ◆ Abstraction in which CSR “starts with abstract generalisations and investigates them.”
- ◆ Totality which refers to the argument that “social phenomena are inter-related and form a total whole.”
- ◆ Essence which captures the “fundamental element of an analytic process.”
- ◆ Praxis, which whilst it refers to practical reflective activity, also means that CSR must acknowledge that “changes in social formations are the result of praxis.”
- ◆ Ideology which is either positive or negative referring in the first instance, for example, to a world view, or in the second instance, for example to the view that ideology serves not only to distort reality but is also related dialectically to the nature of social relations.
- ◆ Structure which in CSR sees ‘structure’ holistically as a complex set of inter-related inter-dependent elements.
- ◆ History in which the CSR approach “involves two essential elements, the grounding of a generalised theory in material history and the exposure of the essential nature of structural relations which manifest themselves historically....(thereby locating)... events in their social and political contexts..”
- ◆ Deconstruction and reconstruction which can be summed up as “a process of focussing on the structural totality or historical moment and critically reflecting on its essential nature.”

There is at one and the same time both a general overlap with the critical research concerns of the Frankfurt school, including Habermas, and, when examining in detail, a sharp divergence as well from the latter’s work. For example there are still residues of historical materialism and the social labour paradigm in Harvey’s work which put a question mark over the extent to which CSR directed at race would seek incorporatist solutions to those sorts of problems. This is implied strongly in his notion of totality, with its Lukacian overtones, and his therefore strongly inter-related and inter-



dependent version of social structure, which in both would mean, for example, that 'race' might be subjected to other forms of over-arching epistemological frameworks, inclusive of research epistemologies. For example in the previous Chapter on local governance I pointed out that Habermas' de- and reconstruction of key parts of Marx's theory was because he detected within the body of such theory a latent positivism. Further Harvey's use of Habermas' notion of emancipatory interests, which is reflected in his notion of 'essence', might be said to be problematic because of the inherent foundationalism within such Kantian derived anthropologically constant knowledge interests which are not open to empirical verification; a problem highlighted in Honneth's proposal for the need for SRCs. These shortcomings can be pursued further if we look at Harvey's treatment of 'race', which, to give him his due, he alone pursues as an explicit acknowledged emancipatory interest subject.

He does this by reference to a number of what he regards as CSR based research studies countering the pathological treatment of Black people. These treat Black people as the problem, rather than seeing the issue as structural racism. For Harvey, and here there is agreement with him, CSR means that race is a social construction. Within this brief summation of his perspective, I want to concentrate on one of his examples he uses, which is that of Ben-Tovim et al's research<sup>678</sup> into the politics of race equality within the sphere of local governance. This, borrowing from Gilroy, Harvey categorises as an approach which focuses on social policy issues, an approach which "supposes that radical theorists of race and racism should produce critiques of official race policy and formulation of alternatives." The success of this depends on two assumptions: the idea of racism as divorced from class and a positive evaluation of the capacity of state institutions. Ben Tovim et al's action research examined the political processes at work causing and maintaining racial inequalities within the sphere of local governance in the late seventies and early eighties. It focussed on the political forces which could produce and reinforce racial inequality as well as those which could reduce such inequalities. Its approach was very much that committed action research in which it is explicitly acknowledged that all social research is to lesser or greater extent politicised, thus is not politically neutral, and particularly in the area of racism, "the tendency to divorce research from its would be political context and to abstain from research based interventions has only served the political status quo and in some instances no doubt to actually exacerbate inequalities themselves."<sup>679</sup> As such the authors are concerned that "the sociology of race should be overtly politicised and reflect the ethical commitment condemning racism."<sup>680</sup> Related to this is their conceptualisation of the local state as involving three inter-related areas: a set of electorally accountable institutions, a relationship with those outside of the institutions, and, as a site of struggle to change those institutions. Within this context



the action researcher has a three element framework for intervention based on identifying the problem, analysing the political means by which the problem is created or maintained and undertaking a political challenge to overcome the problem. To do so means, however, that “the efficacy of research material is linked directly to an understanding of policy constraints, administrative machinations and political processes.” In terms of the theoretical overview, their approach is Marxist, not in terms of economic determinism, but in terms of granting ‘autonomy’ to the political system.

The criticisms made previously about the incorporatist tendencies of the Marxist social labour paradigm can still be made of the above despite the authors disavowal of the economic determinist linkage. This is because the epistemological and ontological limitations of social labour as an explanatory device are still present in their conceptualisation of the political process, a deficit reflected in the partially inclusionary/exclusionary determination of not only what is acceptable politics, but also who are tolerable participants. Thus Harvey says that the action researchers in this case “avoided charges of extremism” by building broad alliances and overcoming resistance through processes of negotiation and representation. It is to be questioned whether or not this common sense political pragmatism, insofar as it mirrors orthodox political processes, and presumably, because it is an action research project, inures the research itself, is theoretically refined enough to pose the race question more fundamentally. In a sense the answer lies in the benefit-of-hindsight retrospective look at what the research achieved in that particular local authority fifteen years after it was undertaken. The answer is a race equality infra-structure much weaker than most, and a local Black community still largely excluded from the local council; not to mention Ben Tovim as the year 2000 Labour leader of the council publicly calling for and backing the introduction of American style Mayors. The undemocratic nature of the latter political institution together with the history of race marginalisation in the States through political offices like these, whilst it confirms the limitations of the axiology of such political projects, also casts doubt on the ability of so structured critical research to include and pick up on substantively, Black experiences, other than through hand picked ‘representatives’. It is, in other words, too conservative a fantasy of what a racially inclusive form of local governance is about; conservative in my view because it is a ‘utopia’ which makes no reference to meta-theoretical concerns, either literally or metaphorically.

In the introduction to the last section on local governance, I argued for a meta-theoretical approach to de- and reconstructing theories of local governance, where ‘meta-theory’ “looks at the presuppositions underlying theories” and “deals explicitly with those philosophical rationales with which we, often unconsciously, ground our actions.” The reason for this is to



generate a core elements' framework to enable the creation of a "critical discourse on local governance with explicit categorisation of, and internal linkage to, race/racism..." because it is necessary to deal with race explicitly at this level, since, whilst race existed autochtonally within the origins of such philosophical endeavours it is in effect 'palimpsested' by a skewed universalism. For example, Scheurich, writing, from within a perspective that can be said to be straddling the critical –post modern continuum, specifically about research methodology asks whether or not it can be said that research methodologies are racially biased.<sup>681</sup> In dealing with this question,. Scheurich, like myself, does not leave the question of racism at the meso-level, but argues the necessity for examining it at the meta-level. Scheurich unravels his argument within the context of the notion of "civilizational racism", which refers to the civilizational assumptions unconscious to most members, but which nevertheless construct the nature of their world and their experience therein. Thus, following on from research theorists, like Stansfield who have explored in depth the issue of race/racism and methodology, it can be said that "the white race, what Stansfield has called 'a privileged subset of the population' has unquestionably dominated Western civilization during all the modernist period...(to the extent that the)....ways of the dominant group (its epistemologies, on tologies and axiologies) not only become the dominant ways of that civilisation, but also these ways become so deeply embedded that they typically are seen as 'natural' or appropriate norms rather than as historically evolved social constructions."<sup>682</sup> Such 'ways' are "not outside history or sociology...(but are)...deeply interwoven within the social histories of particular civilisations and within particular groups within those civilisations."<sup>683</sup> Concentrating then on epistemology because research methodologies are precisely about that, i.e. the creation of knowledge, though acknowledging the inter-dependentness of epistemology, on tology and axiology, Scheurich puts forward the idea of 'epistemological racism' which means that "the current range of research epistemologies - positivism to post –modernism – arise out of the social history and culture of the dominant race, that these epistemologies logically reflect and reinforce that social history and that racial group (while excluding the epistemologies of other race/cultures), and that this has negative results for people of colour in general and scholars of colour in particular." In effect it means that Black scholars have not only to become proficient in epistemologies that have been, and are, hostile to their being and experience, but also in some cases, not all, because it has to be accepted that many Black scholars are happier naturalling these methodologies, constantly negotiating the critical interface between using them to survive and, at the same time, deriving more appropriate, emancipatory epistemologies. Scheurich describes this process as scholars of colour having to become "epistemologically bi-cultural", because he conceives the solution, in line with his more post modernist leanings, as being within the realm of developing 'alternative race based



epistemologies.”<sup>684</sup> However, because Scheurich appears to commit the same mistake in constructing culture almost as if it were autogenetic, the impression is given that he is talking about parallel social contexts which are not inter-linked; let alone inter-linked through relations of racialising power which, in part, structure those very self same cultures. This conflation again of wrongs done to and remedying action means that, unfortunately, Scheurich ends up uncritically citing such biologically reductionist Afro-centric theories, like that of Molefe Asante, as one of the alternative race based epistemologies. My view is that it is not the quality of being bi-, or multi-cultural which is so important in relation to research, as that of being epistemologically anti-racist, by which is meant being able to de- and reconstruct those epistemological processes which underpin and support the wrongs done to in racism.

Methodologically Charles Mills’ concept of the ‘racial contract’, similar to, but different from Pateman’s work on the Sexual Contract, provides a better framework.<sup>685</sup> For Mills the Racial Contract underwrites the social contract where the social contract in its most general sense is taken as that agreement between human beings emerging from a “state of nature” who agree to establish civil society and government, and that government, i.e. government by popular consent. The Racial Contract is seen as a bridging concept between the mainstream world of white philosophy and ethics and the real world of Black people – that of oppression, exploitation, imperialism, colonialism etc. The use of ‘white’ and ‘whiteness’ is not as a colour but as a “set of power relations.” Within this briefly summarised context, the Racial Contract is defined as:

“...that set of formal or informal agreements or meta-agreements...between the members of one subset of humans, henceforth designated by (shifting) ‘racial’ (phenotypically/genealogical/cultural) criteria....as ‘white’ and coextensive (making due allowance for gender) with the class of full persons, to categorise the remaining subset of humans as ‘non-white’ and of a different and inferior moral status, sub-persons, so that they have a subordinate civil standing in the white or white ruled polities the whites either already inhabit or establish in transactions as aliens with those polities, and the moral and juridical rules normally regulating the behaviour of whites in their dealings with one another either do not apply at all in dealings with non-whites or apply only in a qualified form...but in any case the general purpose of the contract is always the differential privileging of the whites as a group with respect to the non-whites as a group, the exploitation of their bodies, land, resources, and the denial of equal socio-economic opportunities to them.”<sup>686</sup>

Mills’ use of the notion of ‘contract’ is very much in line with Kant’s, and to some extent Habermas’. That is to say there is both a descriptive analysis of fact, as well as normative element from which judgements about social justice can be made. Whilst the idea of a Racial Contract at a metaphorical



level, is useful as an explanatory device to deal with the historical pattern of white over Black, for the purposes of this section, what is important is the analysis Mills makes of the meta-theoretical elements of the general corps of Western philosophical thought. Here he accords with my attempt in the section on local governance to generate the notion of exclusionary ontologies and epistemologies. Thus Mills argues that natural freedom and equality is restricted to white men resulting in a “partitioned social ontology...between persons and racial....Untermenschen”<sup>687</sup> Further the Racial Contract derives its own epistemology, “its norms and procedures for determining what counts as moral and factual knowledge of the world.”<sup>688</sup> This results in a bifurcated epistemology in which one branch is in effect a licence to ‘misinterpret the world’, an ignorance of racism, which is validated by what Mills refers to as ‘white epistemic authority.’ The other derives from and is inter-related to the experiences of Black people. The key question then, from a methodological point of view, is how such experiences can come to be known and accepted equally in the social and political realm; a state of affairs promised in the universalism of the political philosophies grounding Western societies.

We come again, then, to the question of validity. Scheurich, in a post modernist inspired ‘deconstructive investigation’ of validity, raises some key questions, though noting in terms of a summary core, that the numerous constructions of validity deriving from the multiplicity of research positions, in fact mask “a singularity of purpose or function.” Validity in social research is that “warrant of trustworthiness.” Good research has a ‘validity’, bad research did not. Scheurich concludes that ‘validity’ “is but a mask for a boundary or policing function across both conventional approaches and more radical versions of post positivism”.<sup>689</sup> To support this he draws on Spivak who argues that by “explaining (through valid research), we exclude the possibility of the radically heterogeneous (the Other)”, Levinas’ position of ‘ontological imperialism.” Now there is an instinctive sympathy for arguments like these because they ‘validate’ those often invisible hurdles over which Black people have to haul their experiences and claims for justice. For example one of the target boroughs, twenty years after the start of their explicit race equality programme, but now strongly into the throes of new Labour managerialism and what I have earlier termed ‘third way’ racism, commissioned a piece of research to look into the claims of Black employees that they were being disproportionately disciplined. Under the aegis of the previous race equality programme such an investigation would have been undertaken by the in-house race equality staff backed up by the extensive employment functions’ monitoring system. With the dismantling of those structures, the research went out to an organisation priding themselves on being non-political. Whilst there was statistical evidence to support the contention that Black employees were being disproportionately disciplined, the researchers, all white, concluded



that this might be due to the fact that either the organisations were acting in a racist manner, or due to the fact that the Black employees concerned were in effect incompetent.<sup>690</sup> Once again it can be seen that Black people's claims for racial justice are in effect policed through being subjected to a validity process involving orthodox research; a highly politicised validity process which says that *prima facie* acceptance of Black people's claims, in the sense of there being communicative space for equality grounded argumentation, are no longer acceptable. Tempting, at one level, as it is to indulge Scheurich's solution which is for there to be a "Bakhtian dialogic carnival, a loud clamour of polyphonic, open, tumultuous, subversive conversation on validity as the wild uncontrollable play of difference",<sup>691</sup> - and there might be some mileage here for this as a disruptive tactic - this does not begin to address the problem in the here and now, or inter-mediate to long term future. Rather I have stronger sympathy for Mill's argument that post modernism is "an epistemological and theoretical dead end.....symptomatic of rather than diagnostic of the problems of the globe", and that we should seek reconstructive solutions "in the spirit of a racially informed Ideologiekritik....(which is).....pro-Enlightenment (Jurgen Habermas' radical and to-be-completed Enlightenment, that is – though Habermas' Eurocentric, deraced, and de-imperialised vision of modernity itself stands in need of critique) and anti-post-modernist."<sup>692</sup> The only caveat, one which even Habermas and radical post modernists would admit, is that the boundary line between post modernist theorising and the theoretical and praxitic process of creating, oxymoronic style, an "anti-foundationalist universalism", is not as clearly demarcated as Mills thinks. Methodologically then, the problem is to outline a research paradigm, a critical social research one, I would contend, in which questions of validity and race, a socially constructed relationship in which the resolution of its core problematic goes to the heart of social research methodologies, are not abandoned because of hyper pluralised notions of incorporative policing, or reduced to instrumentalised, technical ones of science, but are contested communicatively discursively.

I am going to outline, briefly then, such a methodology, linking it at key relevant places with the methodological practice underlying this piece of research. To do so requires that I borrow key categories of Morrow's and Brown's work on critical theory and methodology because their broad conceptualisation of the issue encapsulates my own thinking on the subject. It takes us beyond the theorisation of Harvey whose work on critical theory and methodology, whilst its explicit inclusion of 'race' made it initially attractive, still presents meta-theoretical problems over that very same issue. Further Morrow and Brown's conceptual schemata ties in with my attempts in sections...and..... to outline race and local governance meta-theoretically, non particularistically, non-teleologically, and reflexively. Further it was hoped that it would provide the means to deracialise race. Briefly then we



can look at a critical theoretical social research methodology in terms of three areas which can be said to be ‘organically’ linked ; critical theory’s meta theory, non- empirical methods and empirical methods. The description ‘organic’ refers to the argument contained in such a theorisation that decisions about methods are not technical ones, but are linked to the underlying premises of the researchers.

In terms of meta-theory then, critical theorisation of social research attempts to take us beyond the dualism of the characteristic categories within which the theories of research methodologies have become imprisoned. This includes as well the post modernisation of certain research thinking where any attempt to reconcile the two broad categories is abandoned in favour of a non-universalistic relativism resulting in either hyper-plurality or hyper egalitarianism. Thus CSR tries to argue beyond the antinomic conceptualisations of, for example, objectivism and relativism, or, more prosaically, quantitative and qualitative methodologies. It argues, instead for, dare one use this term, ‘a third way’ between the two core oppositions. In advancing this, Morrow, builds his argument via a main reference to Habermas’ conceptualisation of the epistemology of critical theory. As outlined before, Habermas’ early argument on the epistemological bases to critical theory is developed Janus style with one eye critically de- and reconstructing social labour based Marxism, which Habermas views as having a latent potential for positivism, and the other eye doing likewise to positivism. Habermas’ answer is that of knowledge constitutive interests which, unlike positivism, disavows the claim that knowledge can be identified by a single interest. Instead Habermas proposes three basic categories of knowledge interest: empirical - analytical, hermeneutic – historical, and critical-emancipatory.<sup>693</sup> These interests have the quality of being quasi-transcendental; that is to say that such structures are not empirical, but “rather are deep structures of the human mind that we have to assume in order to have the conditions of possibility for what we in fact do know.”<sup>694</sup> Whilst Habermas came to reconstruct this conceptualisation, because of its still too foundationalist qualities, in terms of universal pragmatics, i.e. “to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible understanding, hence of communicative action”<sup>695</sup>, he nevertheless retains the notion of critical-emancipatory interest, even if it is recast communicatively. This goes to the heart of critical theory’s core assumption which is that “every form of social order entails some form of domination and that critical-emancipatory interest underlies the struggles to change those relations of domination-subordination.”<sup>696</sup> Morrow points to the way in which the critical-emancipatory interest moves from empirical to normative theorising. Thus empirically “power relations engender forms of distorted communication that result in self-deception on the parts of agents with respect to their interests, needs, and perceptions of social reality....(which have).....implicit normative claims, that is the necessary



assumption of an ideal speech situation where falsifying consciousness would be reduced because communication would assume the form of authentic dialogue not based on asymmetrical relations of power.”<sup>697</sup> The shift from knowledge interests to universal pragmatics has to be seen as a continuum of emphases, rather than a juxtaposition of new and abandoned conceptualisations. Habermas’ emphasis in universal pragmatics is on the most general conditions for inter-subjective communication; an emphasis based on the argument that communication and interpretation are grounded and made possible by four implicit “validity claims of comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness, and rightness” which can only be properly redeemed discursively. Whilst Morrow thus sees a change in emphasis in knowledge interests on the origins of distorted communication to that in universal pragmatics of the conditions for inter-subjective communication, my perspective, through the prism of race, is that these two emphases are fundamentally inter-connected. It ties in with Honneth’s attempts to reconfigure the bases to moral experiences in terms of the non-recognition of identity claims as a more feasible context within which to generate critical theory social reality correlates. That is to say that these are part of the oppressive, dominating conditions of distorted communication; the antinomic correlates of the general conditions for inter-subjective communication. To that extent my earlier arguments about the need for communication in the polity to be translatable, and transformative figure here. Morrow goes on to indicate that the status of knowledge that arises from critical work supporting the questions thrown up by universal pragmatics is not the same as that of empirically based direct observations. Nor is it strictly philosophical. Rather it is reconstructive in attempting to substantively thread its way in between the empirical and transcendental. An example of this is Habermas’ use of Kohlberg’s theory of the development of moral competences. These ‘universal development features of the species’, (on togenetic), are seen to be a “universalistic basis for linking the on tological stages of development with the moral imperative of realising those possibilities...(and because)...universal pragmatic structures of human competence presuppose and imply idealised possibilities...(the extent to which)...societies fail to cultivate those potentials, they are subject to forms of criticism that are not arbitrary or culturally relative.”<sup>698</sup> Further the communicative ethics which flow from this means that it is possible to link ‘is’ with ‘ought’ so that the empirical reality of certain people not reaching a level of cognitive developmental competence can be related to the normative claim that such restrictions of potential are unjust. However, within the context of the multi-racial, racist metropole, judgements about ‘cognitive competences’ can only be made if the deconstructive processes doing away with the forces distorting communication are, as I have argued earlier, thorough enough to ensure that all can speak equally. Otherwise we run the risk of ending up with what I detect in Honneth’s argument regarding the ability of the ‘lower classes’ to articulate the moral



argument, which is an implicit restatement of the inarticulate noble savage trope; or, in the case of Habermas a confirmation of the criticism that those linguistically competent in the dominant language are top of the on togenetic tree. To that extent the deconstruction, the problem, is intimately related to the reconstruction, the solution. Methodologically, thus, as an example, this, from a race perspective, might, as has been argued from a gender perspective, call for a radical overhaul of Kohlberg's theory.

This, however, does not go beyond the potential of Habermas' theorisation, one which, with respect to knowledge, Morrow has termed interpretive structuralism. This is because there is no knowledge certainty, which is implied by the notion of consciousness, rather the "basis of knowledge is language, the means through which we have to represent reality." In so doing we also include causal processes in social life which are represented as "structural mechanisms that constrain or enable social possibilities."

Distorted communication as mis-recognition and the corollary of recognition struggles, are obvious examples here. On tologically, therefore,

Habermas' theory displays what Morrow has termed a 'critical realism'.

That is to say it eschews a correspondence notion of truth found in traditional realism, but one that holds "that the identification of deeper causal

mechanisms does presuppose a view of reality outside discourse even if it can only be known fallibly through it."<sup>699</sup> What then of the dual on tology

which Mills highlights which appears still to be Black people's lot. The

unquestioned, even unconscious, assumption of being is the 'reality' of the ubermenschen. In terms of Habermas distinction between work and

symbolic interaction, Black people because they have been, and are, seen to be part of 'nature' are known through work in so far as nature is worked on.

Further social world structures are constructed by human agents; natural world ones are not. This introduces a qualitative difference between the on

tologies of the natural and social worlds. In terms of race, recasting this

dualism as a communicative structure not only brings 'being in-itself' into

the discursive realm, and the need for fully inclusive interpretations of

knowledge, but also, methodologically, demands that those being researched

are fully included in the communicative processes of that research. In other

words race demonstrates, as I have argued in the previous section about the

prospective form and content of the racially, fully inclusive sphere of local

governance, but also derivative of my core contention regarding race and

modernity's fulfilment, that methodologically we should talk not so much

about on tology, as deon tology.

Epistemologically Morrow argues that the interpretive structuralism of critical theory is pragmatist and constructivist with regard to epistemology and methodology. That is to say that it is pluralist in regard to these because it recognises that "science ultimately is based on a social consensus mediated through language....(and that)...the ultimate basis of scientific discourse is



not formal logic or factual verifications; rather it is a process of argumentation.”<sup>700</sup> However, as I have argued earlier, such discursive, communicative, argumentative practices have to, bearing in mind my linkage of race and fulfilling modernity, uphold explicitly the principle of non-closure, with its attendant communicative principles of translatability and transmutability. These seek to address the keep-in-the-forefront wariness of transgressing into the area of what Scheurich has categorised as epistemological or civilisational racism. Methods flow from the argument thus, and are not simply ones chosen from a methodological melange. To that extent then Morrow is correct to argue that Habermas’ critical theory moves beyond the empiricist analysis of surface type phenomena to a structural one involving generalisations about “deeper causal mechanisms and structural rules that operate historically.”<sup>701</sup>

If then the form of social transformative knowledge, the critical emancipatory knowledge interest which I take to be the leitmotiv of Habermas’ work, is a critique of domination that involves inter-subjective reflection, and not self reflection with its philosophy of history consciousness raising implications, as Morrow argues, then these “epistemological commitments call forth an explicit account of human agency and social action.” I have already used a meta-theoretical interrogative matrix involving the categories of epistemology, ontology and agency to frame my interpretive structuralist arguments regarding the context to local governance. Whilst this, and other arguments regarding race and positively racialised critical theory, will be validatorily highlighted through the empirical data organised with reference to identified key social reality correlates, I have already argued that in taking into account fully the race dimension, the nature and need for such agency has to be both de- and reconstructive. De- and reconstructive agency expresses a relationship rather than a pair of discrete activities. At another level this seeks as well to generalise the communicative linkage of Honneth’s arguments to Habermas’ and by so doing bring into the argumentative fold the agency areas related to recognition in the contexts of political and work organisations. These seek to bridge Habermas’ implied unbridgeable nexus between communicative and purposive rational actions. I have codified the nature of this relationship through the use of the prefix ‘trans-..’. This has given rise to the identification of a number of pivotal agency moments germane to the critical interrogation of race and local governance. In sum these have been identified as translatability, transmutability, transformation and transcoloniality. Morrow’s assessment of Habermas’ meta-theoretical categorical distinction between communicative and purposive rational action as being concerned more with the “fundamental questions about pragmatic universals of human communication....(and with)....reconstructing various human competences with crucial normative implications”<sup>702</sup>, rather than with more empirically oriented questions, echoes Honneth’s concerns. My



argument is that in considering race, and for that matter gender, explicitly within the overall ambit of Habermas' theory, then matters of empirical interest have to be built into the testing and evaluation of those theoretical propositions. Key to this empirical linkage are those moments of 'trans-..' agency and social action together with the conditions that inhibit such changes occurring. Race, both within the theoretical and social institutionalisation contexts, acts then as a barium meal exposing those cross overs and leakages which do not occur behind the backs of actors, but can be accessed through relevant social reality correlates.

What then are the methodological mediations between the meta-theoretical concerns of critical theory and lifeworld experiences of people, and how are these refined or changed by the explicit, inclusive consideration of race? This is a question germane to this particular piece of research. We have already said that this goes beyond the orthodox construction of such methodological problems in terms of quantitative versus qualitative methods. On the other hand whilst it is acknowledged that there is no basis for an a priori rejection of particular methods, this implied eclecticism is qualified by the realisation that there is a need for a "critical pluralism in that it directs attention not only to how the type of theoretical problems shapes the choice of methods but also to the political and ideological contexts of methodological choices as part of the process of non-empirical argumentation."<sup>703</sup> This process of research takes place against a backdrop of a model of societal reproduction, Habermas', which is open ended, and in which the "reproduction of a given order is...(viewed)...as a highly historically contingent process."<sup>704</sup> To Habermas' two investigative concerns, that of the phenomena of social and system integrations, Morrow adds a third – that of socio-cultural mediation. This "bridges the social psychological analysis of individual actors...and the macro-structural analysis of social systems..."<sup>705</sup>, and critically includes, thus, Habermas' systemic-lifeworld relations. Social cultural mediation is important because I take it to include those confirming or transforming processes of race. Thus, in terms of race, what is important are those mediations giving rise to processes of colonisation, the creation of race subjects, and those of de-colonisation, the undertakings of actors, and the 'trans-..'based relationships between the two. Therein lie the concerns and answers to the bases to racially inclusive solidaristic action which can change and programme the system.

## 8.4 Reflexivity

If then critical theory can be said to be "eclectic with respect to methodological techniques", then this eclecticism is argumentatively contextualised to the extent that critical theory has two methodological moments: that associated with non-empirical methods and that with



empirical methods. Morrow categorises the non-empirical part of the spectrum in terms of it being reflexive and dialectical. Inter-relatedly reflexivity “involves meta-theoretical reflection that is a form of inquiry in its own right” as well as it being “an applied practice that, while drawing on general meta-theoretical categories is involve integrally....in the overall process through which research is produced.”<sup>706</sup> It is dialectical because, as Habermas argues, such thinking “obstinately sticks to these rules (of formal logic); it applies these rules even to think about logic itself, instead of breaking off their application at this crucial point.”<sup>707</sup> Complementarily Morrow argues that its dialectical character derives from its presupposition of “an on tology of social reality that recognises peculiar properties of social phenomena that are largely ignored by naturalistic on tologies.”<sup>708</sup> Race then pushes these qualities of reflexivity and dialectics to the limit, because, by their own argumentative processes, such interrogations bring over the intellectual horizon the question of civilisational racism. In terms of reflexivity Morrow identifies four argumentational strategies, ones I broadly agree with. These, and here in terms of race lie its important saliency, “involve forms of cognition (which also involve emotional responses) that go beyond research techniques narrowly understood as merely a process of matching concepts and data.”<sup>709</sup> The four strategies are then meta-theoretical arguments, deconstructive and historicist argumentation involving contextualisation and discursive reading, self reflexivity involving existential argumentation, and normative argumentation. The case for meta-theoretical argumentation comes with the territory of race because its inclusion should critically question both the formal and informal logics-in-use. This has already been argued above. In terms of historical reflexivity it is argued that “historical grounding is one of the defining characteristics of critical theory”. Whilst by itself it does not provide sufficient to justify establishing the validity of theories, it does provide one of the key reference points for deliberating the comparative merits of different theories. This is evident in the arguments so far surrounding not only competing forms of local governance, but also within the history of race and racism, and with a comparative eye on South Africa, the inclusiveness of universalist theories, like Habermas’. Deconstructive reflexivity Morrow traces back to Derrida’s post structural theories which are concerned with critiquing naïve realism, or logocentrism, “as a means of understanding how we represent ‘reality’”. This sort of analysis of how language mediates people’s understanding, whilst it can be used, as post modernists do, to support the argument that all is ultimately interpretation and representation, does, in relation to critical theory, provide a methodological resource of deconstructive techniques. My argument, however, which is not that dissimilar from Morrow’s, except that he puzzlingly does not appear to link the two, is that deconstruction, which I take literally to mean the ‘taking apart’, within the context of critical theories of race, needs to include other interrogative areas, like discourse analysis and narrative. These are dealt



with under empirical methods. In relation to insider knowledge or existential reflexivity, Morrow neatly encapsulates the one dimension which appears to be over powered in orthodox research based race studies, when he writes that “all scientific knowledge is grounded in the lifeworld, common sense and everyday life.” Women and Black people have thus questioned the validity of research which has absented the dimension of ‘experience’ because it gives rise to an ontological disjuncture resulting in a ‘reality’ they do not recognise and which then comes to be imposed. This is reflected as well in the various institutional policy areas, such as complaints procedures, where the according of priority to ‘experience’ in the areas of racism and sexism, has ebbed and waned with changing political legitimating strategies. It remains to be seen thus, for example, how long the experiential prioritised classification of ‘racial violence’ which emerged from the Macpherson Report, will remain as part of police practice. Nevertheless it is required of ‘experience’, if it is not to fall victim to the ‘hermeneutic circle’ paradox involving endless interpretation, that it enters into discursive communicative processes to resolve the issue, not so much of the correct interpretation, as that of validity, contingently grounded. In this particular piece of research the experiences of the principal researcher played out and intertwined within and between both the identitarian socio-cultural, intellectual and political discursive processes surrounding the use and/or ownership of “Black”, with a common reference point only ever being the transitive one of ‘not being white’, and also his different, multi-roles in and around the positive racialising of local governance, are thus crucial. Finally, in relation to non-empirical methods, normative argumentation, far from involving ‘irrational’ notions of value judgements, as orthodox research would argue, is rationally and inherently involved in the questions about the good and better life. In terms of critical theory such explicit judgements, which are implicit in other knowledge based studies, are complemented by analyses of relevant theoretical discourses. This particular piece of research can be seen as an attempt to situate race normatively within the sphere of local governance. But the questions raised by normative argumentation also bring into the fold the very nature of the research, because its inherent comparative quality means that it is not only ‘research about’ which is the extent of the normal parameters of social science research, but also research ‘about what is better’. This moves it into the realm of evaluative research, the defining profile of which is very similar to that of critical research. My argument is that the pursuit of race equality in the area of local governance involved evaluative research processes, both explicit and implicit, which are ultimately linked to the meta-theoretical arguments about modernity and race, and the inclusive place, or not, of the latter therein; the ‘test’ of such inclusiveness being, as I argued in the section on reconstructing race and racism, the deracialising of race. This notion of the contingent, time limited nature of ‘race’ was built into some local governance anti-racist initiatives because they had as a core operational principle the argued assumption that



pursuit of race equality was the sharp end of wider required organisational and political good practice. Further, as House and Howe argue, good practice in evaluative research requires a deliberative democratic solution reflexively both within the structure and conduct of the methodology, but also in relation to the desired institutional and societal context to the programme under evaluation.<sup>710</sup> In sum then the table below, which is heuristically categorical, both closes this section on non-empirical methods, and also introduces the section on empirical methods.

## 8.5 Evaluative Paradigms<sup>711</sup>

<b>Meta-theoretical Framework</b>	<b>Values</b>	<b>Legitimizing Methods</b>	<b>Evaluation users and needs</b>
<i>Post-positivism</i>	Fact-value dichotomy Transcendental reality, but only reality approximation Systems teleology	Quantitative based experimentation, cost benefit analysis	High level policy and decision makers in need of 'scientific', 'de-politicised' rationale.
<i>Managerialism</i>	Selective fact-value dichotomy 'Divine right of managers to manage' Control/direction/leadership/stewardship of public resources Utilitarian	Management accounting systems Management interviews Linked internally generated information systems Surveys Quantitative 'scientifically, impartial' research projects Focus groups Consultative panels	Politicians Senior to middle managers as part of process of recasting political programme issues as administrative issues
<i>Radical constructivism</i>	Fact-value relativism Understanding and meaning Inter-subjectivity as all Hyper-egalitarianism	Participative case studies, interviews, observations, document reviews	Social type services' reviews where views of all stakeholders are everything, but because of non-judgemental basis, are also nothing.
<i>Post modernism</i>	Fact-value relativism Subject less Hyper-plurality	Transgressive methodology Deconstruction Archaeological	Academic and allied research stressing difference is all Retrospective

	Post democratic	Narration	intellectual justification for diversity contra equality programmes
<i>Critical Theory</i>	Fact-value continuum Emancipatory, empowering social change referenced to race, gender, class processes of inequality Normative, deliberative democratising in pursuit of social justice	De- and reconstructive Deliberative participation of stakeholders – inclusion, dialogue, deliberation throughout evaluation Controlling power based inequalities to allow subaltern voices to speak Multi-methodic argumentatively contextualised analyses Influencing and participating marginalised reference groups Alternative networking	Those pursuing democratic based social justice in public institutions

## 8.6 Critical Empirical Procedures

Before highlighting some of the key individual critical research methods used in this particular piece of research, it would be appropriate to prefatorily contextualise these by adumbrating the research design. In one sense the section on reflexivity already covers the aspect of in depth reading and comparative argumentation identified as one of the tracers for critical social research. At another level, however, this has to be fleshed out by reference to the particular details pertaining to this piece of research. The research itself focuses on a particular London local authority's attempts to develop a race equality programme in the nineteen eighties, and on its subsequent jettisoning of that programme by the early nineties. The key problematic was, and is, how to account for those changes interpreted as those from potentially emancipatory to de-emancipatory. The principal researcher, who was at the heart of the initiation and development of that programme, did not turn to critical theory as a result of those experiences. Rather, critical theory, primarily through the works of Habermas was brought into that



particular context of local governance since it had been an informing intellectual meta-theoretical context to a series of work, including this one, and academic interventions. Inter-relatedly were, and are, the experiential, and interpretations thereof, counter interventions in the theoretical context by a Black person, the principal researcher, the identity of whom is forming through three main racially dominant socio-cultural and -political contexts. These were, and are, an interrogative grid against which were played out a number of phenomena germane to this specific research project. These were at the meta-theoretical level the rise and wane of structural Marxism, and its post modernist spin offs; at the meso-theoretical level the experiences, changes and intellectual configurations surrounding 'race' in the 70's and 80's UK, and in the late 80's changing South Africa; and, at the micro-level the researcher's experiences in and around local governance mediated through a number of differing roles, such as local government employee, trade union activist and voluntary sector organisations' stakeholder. Built into this was a research programme both implicit and explicit. It was implicit because the pursuit of race equality has an inherent underpinning of normative argumentation which is lodged firmly in the moral pantheon of social justice. It was explicit because the pursuit of race equality within the sphere of local governance through its relevant institutions and processes entailed the development, in many cases, of an explicit monitoring and evaluation research programme in order that progress towards the overall goal could be properly accounted for. Whilst it would, therefore, be easy to conflate this 'fact' goal with the interrogative 'norm' of this research, to do so would be to ignore my other argument that paralleling this normative impulse is the 'un-normative' underside, which can be seen to emerge in the struggles and battles fought to achieve that 'ought'. It can be said, by way of metaphorical illustration, that for very 'is' there are two general oughts; that of the fulfilment of enlightenment, and that of its shadow, namely barbarous failure. The de-establishment and destruction of the race equality programme in this particular local authority, and others, came with prognosticative warnings about what was likely to happen to the state of race and racism both within the councils and elsewhere. The period, thus, after the formal de-prioritising of race offers information on the accuracy, veracity and validity of those warnings, as well as contributing to the social reality correlates of key conceptual structures.

Morrow defines a research design, via Yin, as, "the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study's initial research questions, and ultimately to its conclusions."<sup>712</sup> There are two general types of research designs; those which are extensive, i.e. they require a large number of cases, as in a representative sample, and, intensive research design based on one or a few number of cases. In relation to critical social research Morrow goes further to proclaim "that the case study is at the heart of a number of research strategies that have been central to critical theory".<sup>713</sup> In this particular



piece of research, whilst the main focus is an intensive examination of one particular London local authority, comparisons are also made with a limited number of other London authorities at relevant junctures in their race equality programme development. It can be said, thus, as Morrow does in trying to 'third way' a traditional research antinomy, that "the complementarity of individual explication (an ostensibly idiographic exercise) and comparative generalisation (a weakly nomothetic activity) lies in their mutual necessity – one cannot even begin to describe a 'case' without a sense of 'types' of cases".<sup>714</sup> Morrow identifies four case study based research strategies as being important for critical research: historical and comparative sociology, ethnography and participant observation, participatory action research, and discourse analysis. Whilst all of these can be identified with this piece of research, at some point or another, I want to permutate the notion of critical research methods, particularly those identified above, by race to release variations of these and some other ones which have been used in this research, and which, I also contend, are germane to race studies.

Firstly to invoke the explicit consideration of race and racism in a study is to invite a historical and comparative dimension. This is because, as I argued in earlier sections, the mere notion of races presupposes the differentiation of space and time, the two key parameters controlling presence and place. For Black people, and others who are subject to racism, place and presence always run the risk of being disrupted because space and time is structured for them, very seldom by them, thereby potentially bringing into the discursive process nation interrogating differing histories and the intra- and inter-comparisons such differences evoke. There is then an acceptance of Morrow's central contention at the general level which is that "case study methods coupled with non-statistical comparative case studies are most compatible with the research problems identified by critical theory and its concern with intensive research designs."<sup>715</sup> In this research piece not only is there a comparison at the meso-level between one local authority and others in the UK, but, there is also one at the meta-level because race 'internationalises' the core issue and thus tests the main theoretical explanatory framework, i.e. Habermas' theory, both at the 'real' level of global application, and, given its universalist principles, the 'norm' level. A comparison is thus made with a local authority in South Africa. Given the spatial and temporal disjunctures wrought by racism, there is obviously not a time synchronicity in the comparisons made between the two different national spheres of local governance. Rather a comparison is made according to the similarities in types of change being pursued in different societies, in this case that of race equality change at the local government level. Thus whilst the UK case study concentrates on the eighties, that of South Africa focuses on the nineties. In this period can be seen the emergence of the identification of a similar set of problems confronting local



governance in South Africa and the development of a similar solution framework. The bases for this comparison ties in with my arguments concerning racism as a trans-epochal problem which touch stones modernity's completion, and its unresolved status giving it a recursive quality. Thus whilst there is an uneven development of racism and its concomitant solutions in the real world, the latter in the normative sense can be tied into Habermas' model of societal evolution. This can be done, as I have attempted in the section on reconstructing anti-racist politics, on the basis that so long as the 'modern' post conventional society still ties that state of affairs to the racist conventionalisation of other members of that society, then comparisons can be made contra the traditional time related notions of progress. In terms of race then, this means that liberal Western democracies, like the UK, which are the factual, empirical seedbeds for Habermas' theory, can be compared with so called 'developing' in a way that does not evoke teleologically foundationalist notions of progress in which, "coincidentally", the West just happens to be the most "advanced" and "progressive", but on the bases of the progress towards a deracialised post conventionalisation.

Within the context of the above intensive research design, no particular individual method was dominant. Instead there was a constant multi-methodic approach to data gathering which can be categorised two-foldedly; firstly in relation to the system-social integrative heuristic split which is socio-culturally mediated, and, secondly, in relation to the requirements of evaluative research which draws upon both quantitative and qualitative sources. For example on the quantitative side, which at another level can be argued to being analogous to system integration markers, the formalisation of politically legal institutional equality programmes were, in terms of necessary information, embedded in supporting race monitoring and evaluation systems. These generated comparative type information relating to defined groups of equality priorities and concomitant unfairly privileged groups, e.g. Black and white, or female and male etc. On the other hand the interpretation and supporting validity processes for that sort of information, some of them stemming from discursively communicatively solidaristic groupings of Black people both inter- and intra- the institution, can be seen to derive from the sorts of qualitative methods Morrow identifies and which I wish to racially permute.

Morrow runs together ethnography, particularly critical ethnography, and participant observation whereby the 'critical' derives valency and value because "cultural description is carried out from the perspective of critical hermeneutics".<sup>716</sup> This moves it beyond the traditional concerns with *prima facie* description and explanation and into the realms of what Morrow identifies cultural critique as ideology critique. This can certainly be identified as one of the methodic strategies adopted in this research. Now,



whilst Morrow is cautious about those defenders of critical ethnography and participant observation who make “ideology critique and praxis the defining moment” because, following Habermas “its hermeneutic dialogical approach ...requires ‘discipline’ and autonomy...that is not adequately addressed by ‘action research’ oriented toward immediate enlightenment”,<sup>717</sup> this, when it comes to race, just as when it applies to feminist studies, cannot be so apodictically applied. That is to say that, as this research’s empirical details reveal, critical participant observation, especially when it involves an existential reflexive dimension, involves both autonomy as well as “focusing on political practice and breaking down the gap between researcher and object of research”.<sup>718</sup> At this particular point the boundary line between a categorically identified method, critical participant observation, and that of another, participatory action research, becomes blurred. However, there is another dimension to critical participant observation which comes into focus, particularly when the issue of race and racism is under study, that is the dimension of non-participant observation. For example it is quite easy to see that the formal role of a principal equality worker in the local authority under main focus involved a high degree of participant observation in which the development of race equality in different milieus within that context of local governance could be observed from an ‘autonomous’ and ‘disciplined’ viewpoint. On the other hand there were many instances where, in the general role of Black employees, or just in the role of Black person, participation was not possible because of the trope of ‘invisibility’. That is to say that Black people were not even noticed in certain social contexts. This was particularly pertinent for information gleaned from Black employees in the lower rungs of the organisation who, unnoticed or underestimated, were in positions to observe, but not participate. It could be said that the organisation unwittingly crossed the threshold, rather than the researcher being faced with the dilemma of how to access the knowledge. Elsewhere I have called this shadowing observation the nomenclature of which takes its cue from Bresson: “to be there watching and unknown, and quick, disappear....to capture that moment.” This particular strategy has also been prevalent in that part of the research which has occurred after the principal researcher left the employ of the primary local authority and had to try and access information as an outsider.

However, in terms of the many roles and associated research functions, the principal researcher occupied in the course of this study, and in terms of the overall research programme of critical theory, both implied and explicit, there is one method which can be said to be dominant, that of participatory action research. Morrow argues that engaged participatory action research becomes a legitimate possibility because critical theory is concerned with “the dynamics of power and exploitation in ways that potentially are linked to practical interventions and transformations.”<sup>719</sup> This is true of this research just as much is Morrow’s linking of participatory action research



with that of standpoint methodologies in which “the researchers may be studying themselves, or at least others in a similar situation,” and thus there is “an intimate relationship between the critical emancipatory knowledge interest and individual development as mediated by collective awareness.”<sup>720</sup> One of the critically emancipatory qualities of participatory action research/standpoint research, one that, I contend can be empirically linked to Habermas’ arguments concerning the anti-democratic ‘expertisation’ of administrative systems, is that this method involves the erosion of the expert-subject distinction “coupled with a moral obligation to participate, given awareness of the lived experience of specific dominated groups.” The use and usefulness of this method will become evident in the ordering of the empirical data relating to the crossovers between the principal researcher as, within the organisation, employee, Black person, trade union activist, and, outside of that institution, as research outsider.

Finally in relation to discourse analysis as a critical research method, Morrow is correct in quoting Meinhof to the effect that it is a widely and confusingly used term in the social sciences without a discernible, single unifying definition or concept. Earlier in this section I had defined ‘discourse’ as “a discussion structured by a stable framework with widely accepted reference points, images and explicit elaborations”. Morrow identifies two forms of discourse analysis which have been drawn upon by critical theory: that “sensitised to detecting forms of distorted communication linked to power and strategic forms of forms of interaction”, and that in which “discourses ...are recontextualised with reference to the historical social relations through which they are constituted.”<sup>721</sup> Both of these forms of analysis have been used in the course of the actual development of a race equality programme, with its associated evaluative research dimension, in the main focus local authority, as well as in the interpretations used in this study. However, the normative vision of ‘discourse’ contained in the above forms of analysis are that it should be free from distorting forces in the communicative structures and within a process of ‘history-being-made’. What is important then is the nature of the discussion which comes to constitute the ‘discourse’. I have therefore differentiated between a dialogical discourse, borrowed from Bakhtin’s anticipation of Habermas’ theory of distorted communication, in which communicative discursive practices are the bases of the discussion, and representational discourse, or ‘diskourse’, in which discussion is strategically structured through unaccountable power configurations, like those giving rise to ‘expertisation’, or racism. Within the overall context of race and the particular focus of this study, the development of a dialogical discourse, which I take to anticipate an emancipatory discourse, is in conflict with the ‘diskourse’ which seeks to maintain irrational forces in the structures of communication. The latter refers then not only to the prevailing and newly developing orthodoxies which sought, and seek, to legitimate the



depoliticised management of local government sans any substantive race quality dimension, but also to the attempts to ‘etnikfy’ the emancipatory thrust. Within the attritional interface between dialogical discourse and representational discourse can be located the struggles for social agency, and interpretations thereof, within the ‘everyday’, where the latter is defined by Roberts “as a utopian and culturally discontinuous space through which the struggles over social agency are fought out.” In the case of this study we are talking about the ‘everyday’ for participants in and around the structured milieus of race and local governance. Accessing this through the mediation of a discourse analysis means bringing into consideration, as will be done, theorists like Lefebvre, Vanegem, de Certeau etc. For example Roberts’ critique of de Certeau’s theory of the everyday that it parcels out politics “to multifarious cultural acts of resistance; a politics of feints, dodges and ludic subversions”, can equally be applied to Gilroy’s over valorisation of “cultural questions as a way of thinking about social power.”<sup>722</sup> Or, as I have described it earlier, “the politics of keeping one step ahead of ‘whitey’”. On the other hand Vanegem’s attempt to relate the ‘lived immediacy’ with a critique of exchange value echoes the trade union ‘vanguardist’ elements’ approach to the ‘everyday’ and employees in local government in the ‘pre-math’ to the “demands of women’s and post colonial liberation movements.”

## 8.7 Conclusion

Lastly, I want to close this section on critical social research methodology, and the methodology of this particular study, by briefly looking at the issue of ‘validity’ via a summary review of Johnson’s attempt to ‘do critical organisation research’, because it is in and around a conceptualisation of ‘validity’ that this study will be judged.<sup>723</sup> In a sense as well, this study’s focus on local governance overlays the more specific study area of ‘organisations’. However, where as , I have attempted to ‘avoid’ the cook book approach to methodology, arguing for its contextualisation within the meta-theoretical framework of critical theory, Johnson, who draws as well from Habermas and other critical theorists, adopts an inductive approach in seeking to generalise from one particular piece of research. The end result, at the general level, is not that different from Morrow’s definition, and my adoption of that, of critical social research methodology. Hence:

“As a research programme ultimately linked to critical emancipatory knowledge interest, critical theory is distinguished clearly by a distinctive approach to methodology as a set of meta-theoretical assumptions and privileged research design strategies , a core set of substantive commitments related to the analysis of crisis tendencies in advanced capitalism, and an explicit approach to normative theory and its relation to critique of ideologies.”<sup>724</sup>



The question, though, is how research of this nature is to be validated. Earlier I had argued that critical social research has to be validated communicatively discursively, as opposed to an instrumentalised technical process of validation, or the abandonment of validity itself because of notions of it being no more than a policing function over people's experiences. Johnson, borrowing from Lather's feminist research methodology, outlines four research validating strategies. These are germane to this study, and offer a basis for the development of considerations pertaining specifically to race related research oriented towards emancipatory questions. The strategies are triangulation of data, construct validity, face validity, and catalytic validity. Johnson opts for what appears to be a rather orthodox conceptualisation of triangulation involving a multi-methodic approach in order to allow researchers to capture a more complete, contextualised picture. There is no disagreement with this as a methodic approach. However, in order that race is properly contextualised, I would contend that triangulation needs to shift to another theoretical level. This would be that of examining it in terms of systemic and social integrative processes and the way in which their intersections are mediated through socio-cultural and socio-political practices. Further such a conceptualisation gains more saliency when the focus is on work and the organisational context to such work because it is a prime activity in which can be observed the intersection, in many cases dominance, of system and lifeworld. Place that within an organisational context that is formally political, as well as a formal employer and is bounded closely by local civil society, then the notion of triangular validity gains new dimensions, especially where, running through all of those considerations is the question of race.

Construct validity refers to the rigour and logic of the argumentation within the tradition of the theoretical approach(es) being adopted, especially if that tradition is being extended or revised. In this case the focus is very much that of the Frankfurt school, particularly Habermas, and its relevance, or not, to issues of race. The communicative discursive argumentative practices surrounding this aspect of validity, unfortunately, seem only to take place within the rarefied environs of academia; or in the case of this particular approach, await such debates. But this potential for debate elsewhere locks into the third aspect of validity, that of face validity. By this Johnson means going "back to the subjects with tentative results" and refining them "in the light of the subjects' reactions". The extent to which this directly participative aspect of the validity process was built into this study will be seen in the empirical details relating to what I have referred to as the evaluative aspect of the research conducted whilst the principal researcher was in the employ of the local authority in focus. Subsequent to that period of employ, contact was, and is maintained, between the researcher and, by now dwindling, group of Black employees.

Finally catalytic validity refers to the extent to which the research is emancipatory. Bearing in mind the circumscription and caution Morrow and Habermas exhibit with regard to the phenomenon of ‘instant enlightenment’, it will be shown that the development of the race equality programme in that local authority, and the concomitant development of what could be termed critical emancipatory knowledge, did result in what Johnson regards as one of the success criteria for this component of validity. That is the programme resulted in Black and white individuals “ending oppressive acts in their work environments.” This, if it sounds too crude, can be re-conceptualised in Alvesson and Willmott’s terms whereby emancipation “necessarily involves an active process (or struggle) for individual and collective self-transformation”<sup>725</sup> which in turn can be ‘measured’ according to whether or not they are questioning, incremental, or utopian. Given the relationship I have conceptualised between race and modernity’s completion, it can be said that this study involves all three.



## **SECTION III**

### **Race and Local Governance – Two case Studies**

# Chapter 9

## Context to UK Race and Local Governance Details

### 9.1 Introduction

Just as the previous chapter attempted to develop the critical social research methodology which contextualises and informs the way in which the data for this project was arrived at, so this chapter should be seen as its complement because it organises that data in line with the methodological principles. The research data focuses, in the main, on the context to, and details of, the development of a race equality programme in an inner city London borough – referred to in this study as “Borough X” - during the period of the eighties, with a prospective and retrospective examination of the nineties aftermath of that programme’s attenuation and destruction. Supporting this primary case study will be references, at key theoretical contextualising and factual junctures, to the development of similar programmes in other UK inner city, but mainly London, local authorities. It can be said that many of these other London local authorities’ race equality programmes have either experienced a similar fate, even if the details of the determining processes and synchronicity of those are different, or, the effect of the changes to those programmes are, in fact, similar. That is to say they have, in the main, become transmogrified into ‘diversity’<sup>726</sup> programmes. Whilst, therefore, the analyses and conclusions of this study obviously have wider institutional implications than just the primary target borough, the contextualisation of this study within a critical theory framework, something which has not been done before, means as well that an attempt is being made to address the nucleic philosophical underpinnings to local governance and the question of racial inclusion in the UK; in the terminology of the previous chapter, a critical realist ontology of race and local governance..

In the previous chapter I had argued that, following on from my theoretical contention that shadowing societal normative learning are those of technical learning processes for domination, the social reality correlates which can illuminate those important elements of intramundane transcendence can best be expressed through the instances of mal-, non- and VR recognition because within those can be gleaned as well that which is being suppressed contrary to the normative potential of society. The data, and organisation thereof, thus seeks to support a critical, multi-level epistemological frame of reference which can be expressed in the sense of outwardly flowing concentric circles covering the following categories: race, local governance, race and local governance, the state and multi-racial society, the meta-



theoretical considerations to these mediated through Habermas and the arguments with post-modernism, and finally, Habermas and race. The question can now be asked to what extent the empirical source of local governance is sufficient to act as an interrogative notifier of a theory which is constructed on a broader, grander scale, and on a visionary canvass strongly implicit of being global in application. The answer can be put forward in five parts. Firstly in relation to the critical social research methodology outlined previously it can be said that the study's methodology is derived "according to complex concepts of system, communication, discourse and power."<sup>727</sup> Secondly, therefore, the "factum brutum" of the empirical 'facts' of local governance is counter-factually played out against the facticity of validity claims which can only be redeemed through communicative discourse. Thirdly these principles accord with the way in which local governance is theorised in this study as a mediating systemic interface with the lifeworld which has the potential to be a communicatively discursive force for deracialising racial inclusion or systemic colonisation. For example, in a recent national study in the UK of Black Asian women forced into marriage, the Chair of working party overseeing the study advised caution and warned against alienating 'community leaders'. Against that a local NGO, the Southall Black Sisters, put forward the view that such 'leaders' did not represent the views of women and that "enough is enough – we look to the state to uphold women's rights." (Guardian 6<sup>th</sup> June, 2000)<sup>728</sup> These are rights which very often are enforced through local institutions in communicative working, and which can be materially enacted through the proper provision of local governance services; a proper provision which entails the discursive working through of race, rights and participation. Fourthly the Habermas' sociological sketch of the normative promise of the margins programming and influencing the centre can easily be templated over the promise of local governance vis-à-vis the centre, just as the 'fact' of marginalised 'races, can be metaphorically used to interrogate the core suppositions of his own thesis. Fifthly, as shall be shown, the spurning of the race and women's equality utopias by local governance because of a perceived need to make legitimacy claims to the white electorate, and the related espousal of technicised modernisation solutions which entrenches functional reasoning and thus systemic based mechanisms of power and exchange, is a strategy which is adopted nationally. Thus not only are there many new Labour MPs who have their political origins in new model labour local authorities, but many of the 'modernising' strategies being put in place for the wider public sector, have had their 'dry run', guinea-pig, bases in local authorities, such as the target research one, which from the mid eighties onwards adopted a proto-Blairite solution to the management of legitimation problems. Overall then, just as, will be shown, the everyday normative frame for a racially inclusive local government was anchored in the operational principle in the race equality programme that if local government was not meeting the needs of the Black



communities, then it was likely that it was not meeting the needs of the wider community, so it can be said that if the sphere of local governance is collapsing then national governance is failing as well. It is the communicative inter-actionist antithesis of Blair's functionalist rationalisation of systemic modernisation, to wit, "I do not want to see as happened in the eighties, Tory MPs in areas like this because the local council couldn't get its act together."<sup>729</sup>

In terms of structuring the data, consideration has been given to a number of possibilities, for example, a chronological retelling of the 'story', a meta-theoretical system/social integrative split, a reference to a normative template etc. Each one of these is in one sense or another valid, but, in terms of fully accounting for the race considerations, none, by themselves alone, is. The framework will, therefore, attempt to incorporate most of the critical concerns generated by those previous considerations by being structured as follows: an outline of the theoretical complements to key social reality correlates, a schematic overview of the informing context to the initiation and development of the race equality programme in the target local authority, inclusive of a time frame, and in-depth interrogations of important social reality correlation illuminating processes within that overview played out as a contestation of discourses.

## **9.2 Theoretical Complements to Key Social Reality Correlates**

This section will, in effect, summarise the main theoretical contentions which arise out of the critical interrogation of Habermas conducted in previous chapters/sections through the examination of a de-and reconstructive approach to race/racism and local governance. These, it is argued, and an attempt will be made to demonstrate this through the organisation of the empirical data, find their social reality correlates very often in the unfolding of the normative learning shadow processes of learning to dominate. Honneth's theory of recognition struggles includes such an approach for the articulation of a struggle for recognition, which is a moral struggle, arises out of the brute facts of misrecognition. Social reality correlates cannot be read off at the *prima facie* level with an attempt to then lock it directly into an evidential relationship with the relevant parts of the theory. Rather, as outlined in the previous section, they need to be argumentatively contextualised. Part of this contextualisation draws from my two tier categorisation of legitimation processes with regard to local governance. That is to say there are secondary, which can be associated with the meso-level, and primary, which can be associated with the meta-level, ranges of correlates. There is no automatic transfer from one level to the other. The following then are the pivotal theoretical contentions so far into which the empirical data has to argumentatively interwoven..



### 9.3 Race

I have argued for race and racism as a social construction, an edifice built out of the misinterpretation and transmogrification of somatic features, or the falsely attributable 'natural' characteristics of defined 'others'. In one sense the argument for race as a social construct is not new. Within the post modernist genre, race and racism fall within the purviews of a particular construction of discourse formation which in itself is not a way of describing the world, but a form of social power, the origins of which are difficult to trace. However, more importantly, it is difficult to escape, what one critic has described as a process tantamount to cultural doping, and to envisage, let alone, enact, any alternative, other than weak resistance. The social construction of race then appears to be the perpetual process of constituting and being constituted by this discourse to the extent that even those who oppose racism can be seen to become enmeshed and contributing to that which they are trying to eradicate. At the general level this finds some critical overlap with others who have attempted to pursue a universalist agenda which avoids the pitfalls of a reductionist social labour based theory or that of the race and racism as an irrational blip constructions of liberal humanism. In this perspective a categorical distinction is made between cruder, antediluvian racism which is explicit about falsely 'naturalling' differences, and its modern counterpart where references to such differences are replaced by what has been termed 'cultural racism'. Within this perspective attempts by some to counter racism, as in the case of Afro-centrism, are seen in fact to reproduce a mirror image of the older forms of racism. Moving out of racism thus entails an end to 'race' as a viable epistemological category and into the purported primary domain of 'culture'. Both approaches, united in their motivation by a rejection of social labour grounded theories of racism, even if the development of their subsequent theoretical trajectory appears to be mutually exclusive, result in a similar approach to understanding race and racism. In sum this is that one can only talk about 'racisms', and not 'racism', a multi-causal plurality in which theoretical lacunae can be filled either by reference to a never ending relativism or that stop gap of contingency, the 'autonomous'.

My approach, on the other hand, is to try and put forward a social constructivist argument about race and racism which is communicatively, and thus, evolutionarily, framed. To that extent it is possible to talk about two forms of discourse: that which is oppressively and dominantly framed, or 'diskourse', and that which is emancipatorily and, thus, discursively framed, or 'discourse'. I see the roots of racism as being epochally prior to that normally taken as the advent of racism, i.e. the take off of industrial society; though it is acknowledged that the systemic domination of the



communicative lifeworld, which is the capitalist system, over presents racism as the differently hued outcome of a racialised process and discourse of material inequality. This derives from the argument that the groundwork for the move from one societal learning process to another can be found in the preceding one; an argument I hold which applies equally to the processes of learning to dominate. Within the unfolding of the history of racism, there are therefore trans-epochal unresolved problems which provide the distorted communicative framework for the catalysis and development of modern racism. This is identified in my definition of racism which is the maintenance of relations of force in the structures of communication, through conventionalisation of biological differences or ascribed biological differences. Conventionalisation refers to the process of maintaining for certain peoples the distancing relationship of 'he', 'she', 'they' or 'it' thereby denying them the right to be part of the societal cultural and political processes that go into defining 'we'. This is reflected both at one and the same time, in the relations of domination expressed through colonisation and imperialism and the formal defining of, and constituting, of the constitutions of the major western nation states. The trans-epochal status of racism defines as well its recursive nature. That is to say that its recurrence can be tracked back to its roots. Thus, for example, even the manifestation of what has been described as 'cultural racism', can be seen to involve the same distantiation process and at the same time to be based on assumptions which 'natural' and unjustly hierarchicalise perceived or imagined differences. The core of much racism is recursive, involving a re-telling of stories of 'racial difference' where these differences are refitted in modern communicative means, including allowing those, who are historically the subject of these fables, to self proclaim, as is evident in the 'etnikfikation' of collective identities. In developing the argument about racism primary reference has been made to the exemplar of the divide between Black and white where those two categories are not invested with any Manichean ontological characteristics, but are used as heuristic signifying categories. The definition of racism can be equally used for other situations of race. The argument about race and racism is then firmly tied into the conditions for the fulfilment of modernity, as put forward by Habermas. That is to say that if post conventional identity formation and learning is to characterise the fulfilling process of modernity, then the distorting forces in the structures of communication, those which maintain processes of conventionalisation, have to be eradicated. To this extent it is argued that the resolution of these trans-epochal problems of racism is the touchstone to the fulfilment of modernity because without such a resolution democratisation, which Habermas identifies as the key, will be fundamentally flawed. Deracialisation and democratisation are therefore inextricably linked. What then are the contours of this linkage?



My arguments delineating this linkage are as follows. The first is tied to attempting to unravel the details of what it means to uphold Habermas' linguistic philosophical turn by examining the implications of trying to meet the conditions for domination free communication in an unjustly racialised, multi-racial society. These conditions are tied to those involved in redeeming the validity claims of speech acts, which are at the heart of Habermas' substantive, deliberative democratising practices taken as the core process in the fulfilment of modernity. My argument is, unlike Benhabib, and Habermas' seeming ambivalence, exemplified in his use of the term "constitutional patriotism", which can be interpreted, as Modood does, as quasi-assimilationist, that in order to fulfil this in the unjustly racialised, multi-racial society, then one can only talk about languages, and not a single language, as the linguistic medium. Taking the linguistic plurality into account means then engaging with my ideas on translatability, transmutability and transformation. As Dryzek has similarly argued, this is the argument for democracy across difference, but without eliminating difference. These conceptions, related through the prefix 'trans', refer to the contention, in what I think is a necessary extension to Habermas' and some of his supportive critics, like McCarthy's, liberal notion of culture. That is to argue that ethical communities do not communicate with each other on a basis of *ceteris paribus*, but often, as in the case with Black communities, through a hierarchicalising discourse/diskourse of racism, which means that issues of normative correctness, which Habermas identifies as the one instance in which consensus should be achieved, are explicitly there at the communicative interface. It is within this context that I can therefore contend that race and racism bring back into the fold of politics the 'moral' in a way that requires validity claim consensus in the here and now. This being the case, its resolution, keeping in the forefront as well the link to modernity's fulfilment, because it is thus inextricably associated with both the conditions for speech validity redemption and Habermas' principles of democratic participation, cannot be relegated to the arena of compromise. Instead the moral resolution is the minimum baseline for moving on. Relationally this normative impulse is the necessary counter-point to the vectoring effect racism has on Black people's lifeworlds whereby space, time, and thus place, are put beyond their control. These interstices of space and time anchor the stability necessary for the development of respect, and the inter-relationship between self and collective identity in the process of recognition; all three being crucially necessary for ensuring substantively inclusive democratising practices. But this is not to attempt to portray Black people as victims. Rather, as modernity unfolds, this shadowing trans-epochal unresolved problems of non-recognition and disrespect increases the systemic pressure on Black lifeworlds, far more so than on white lifeworlds, to the extent that primary level legitimation and motivational crises are more apparent in Black communities. There is no teleological correspondence in this phenomenon which places Black people



as the new subjects of history. The outcome of this increased systemic pressure cannot be predicted. I have argued thus that increased 'etnikfication', neologising the emergence of ersatz manufactured identity claims, as in the case of Afro-centrism, is just as likely as are those seeking a post conventional politics of rights and recognition. (recognition and rights versus the communitarian responsibilities and rights) At another level this is in line with Habermas' arguments that the growth in manifold identity claims, far from being a confirming set of phenomena for post-modernism, is part of modernity's unfinished project. In extrapolating the normative impulses generated by the Black and anti-racist movements, I have argued for the need for a Black social movement where the term 'Black' is used in a signifying, cognitive sense to denote those who experience the socio-cultural reductionist force of racism. That is, there is a commonality in the identification of the problem. But this, unlike those who seek exclusionarily to conflate biological differences, i.e. somatic features, with cultural claims, thereby ending up with racist mirror image identity pronouncements, or those who mask a naturalling and etnikfying tendency in the use of the suffix 'descent', as in of African and Asian descent, has to be taken as an invitation to discursive communicative practices for those seeking consensus on identity claims and solutions. The 'signifying 'Black' is the core for my argument concerning the reconstructed Black and anti-racist politics which, within the context of an unjustly racialised, multi-racial society, sees the need for a collective actor and identity, but yet within which individual identities do not necessarily correspond because their individual describing, a political activity, is tied into discursive communicative practices associated with actions oriented towards solutions. In the context of the over colonised Black life world, this is also the construction of a communicative space which enables supporting solidaristic actions to be generated. This social movement, co-ordinated through the contingent, fallible 'Black' is the means to focus a change momentum seeking the eradication of collective wrongs done to, so that the possibility of people being able to individually redeem their validity claims, can be done so without the distorting force of racism. This is the deracialising of race. In, other words, to sum up this section, racism creates those conditions within which can be glimpsed modernity fulfilling democratisation from the margins over the centre, as well as the nightmare scenario should such communicative blockages be maintained in place.

## **9.4 Local Governance**

The section on local governance attempts, because orthodox local governance studies are seen to languish in epistemologically boundaried discourses of public policy, to develop a meta-theoretical inquisitorial matrix which can not only interrogate dominant local governance paradigms, but



also generate a critical emancipatory theory which is substantively inclusive of race. That is to say race is an explicit, inter-linked, consideration from the outset.. Within the overall consideration of present day and forwards utopias, the matrix provides the context within which to critique and reject two dominant, self avowedly, progressive theories of local governance, post-Fordism and localism. Instead, using a Habermassian framework, a critical emancipatory analysis is developed of local governance in the UK as a precursor to the examination of what a racially inclusive form of local governance would entail. Running through both sections is a running, evolving critique of the gaps, silences and conflation in Habermas' theory in and around the issue of race and racism. Local government is situated as an integral part of the state which in turn is examined within Habermas' argument that the state originally differentiates out to sort out consensually problems of social integration. This role under modern circumstances is put under severe strain because the evolved differentiation out of steering media tied to decision which occur behind actors backs, in this case systemic mechanisms of power and exchange, are, under capitalism, far more powerful and invasive than those of solidaristic action. The result is that the state has to undertake action which seeks consensus societally. This however can turn out to be a double edged sword. Social welfare is a case in point where mass social welfare post second world war sought to achieve the attenuated utopia of social labour by attempting to assuage harm from capitalist class divisions. This however entailed increasing costs to society both financially as well as through juridifying colonisation of welfare clients' lifeworlds. The new right's agenda of rolling back the welfare state through privatisation and depoliticisation of the public sector, and new right Labour's acceptance of that, simply recast the configuration of consensus formation by calculating that the marginalised could be excluded without much damage to the government's acceptance. I have argued that this issue, that of legitimation, which is the problem of how the political system, particularly the state is to be consensually grounded, is especially germane to local government. I have, in order to clarify the argument, differentiated between primary level legitimation, which is to do with a crisis level questioning of societal values, and thus equivalent to his notion of a motivational crisis, and secondary level legitimation which relates to questions about everyday political choices and decisions, which in turn may lead to primary level legitimation problems. Secondary level legitimation problems are unevenly developed in society and are linked to the organisation of the polity. Thus it is argued that the evolving dissensus between national and local government since the second world war and accelerated by new right Thatcherism saw from the late seventies onwards secondary level legitimation struggles being fought out in both the local and national political arenas; struggles in which the 'management' of race was very much a large part. There is thus, another aspect to the argument about a rationality crisis which is overlooked by Habermas. His articulation is



done in terms of the relationship between the economic and administrative systems. My argument brings into the field of argumentation the contention that since the national state relies on the assumption and promotion of a homogenous set of socio-cultural values, something Habermas implies, any attempt to rewrite these heterogeneously, as in the case of a multi-racial, racist society, will result in legitimisation strategies, on the part of the state, being counter written racially. It is at this juncture that it can be said that issues of race go straight to that of the value bases of society, resulting in some cases, in Black people being more likely to experience and voice a motivational crisis. The strategy then, one which is continuing, was to create a forced consensus between local and national governments through a twin track, but related, approach of increasing centralisation and depoliticisation of large parts of local government. The latter is to be achieved by recasting the relationship between local people and local government from that of citizen to that of consumer and a large scale programme of centrally linked, management accounting based neo-managerialism, now legislatively enshrined in new right Labour's modernisation programme. The aim of this strategy is to ensure that the legitimisation costs of local governance, costs which accrue to the political party in power in terms of their electability, is brought under the control of central government, and thus in effect transferred to that part of government. Local government then becomes local in all but name. I argue that in pursuit of substantive racial inclusion, the utopia of racial justice, the normative potential for local governance can be re-energised and is threefold. Firstly there is the potential for contributing substantially at the local level to the social consensus delimiter of racism. Secondly thus, there is the potential to develop solidaristic resources at the local level which can influence, programme or change the local state. Thirdly the potential for using this groundswell of solidaristic resources to flow through to the centre, a programming from the margins, exists as well. These potentials are brought into stark relief through analysing the conditions which need to pertain for a racially inclusive form of local governance.

However in pursuit of this vision, using a Habermassian framework, does require that key components of Habermas' theory are rethought if the conceptual paradigm of race and racism, as outlined, is to be an explicit, inter-linked consideration. The main points of my argument are as follows. Firstly, along with Dryzek, McCarthy and Scheuerman<sup>730</sup>, I think that Habermas' ambivalence towards pursuing the radical implications contained in the potential of his theory is damaging, not least of which to the marginalised in Western societies. Secondly in pursuit of this radical vision I argue, like Joas and Honneth, that there is an action lacuna in his theory which appears to rule out transforming the world of work, or inter-alia, from purposively rational action to communicative action. In terms of race and gender considerations, this apparent dichotomy is not true and the use of a



continuum concept of action is more appropriate. The notion of ossified communicative action and transformative action is therefore introduced. Thirdly, and associatedly, Habermas' notion that only the political system can act, where the political system appears to be defined in the limited sense of classical Marxism, does not fit with the reality and range of political action that does occur. To that extent it is argued that the administrative system can be seen to part of a political action spectrum which needs to be included. Thus the boundary between the public sphere and the political system can be fuzzy, allowing for the prospect of political action and not just that of influence. Fourthly political language in terms of that which is used within the political system and that which is used within the polity, cannot be confined to one language, but has to be a heteroglossia in which the communicative interface of consensus formation is governed by the inclusive principles of translatability and transmutability. Fifthly, because of my argument that racism brings into the actors horizon field the moral and the logic of Habermas' own principles of equality of opportunity in political participation, I introduce the principle of non-closure in any instances of dialogical considerations of racism in the polity. Sixthly, in terms of the constitution, and especially Habermas' use of the term 'constitutional patriotism', I argue that this can only be taken at the level of meaning acceptance of constitutionalism as a principle, pointing out the way in which Western political constitutions, like that of the USA and France, have from the outset consciously bracketed out any consideration of people, other than white, male people. This unresolved, trans-epochal problem at the heart of existing formal constitutions means that, in terms of race, patriotism cannot be expected towards an existing constitution, but only to the principle of constitutions. Lastly, in terms of critique, the public sphere is not immune from systemic colonisation, resulting thus in a hierarchical situation in which, following Fraser, it is possible to talk about subaltern public spheres. Within the later can be located what I have termed the 'Black public sphere' which because it is concerned with collective 'wrongs done to' that distort communication, can bypass the general public sphere, in order to seek appropriate remedial change. There is agreement then with Scheuerman's assessment that Habermas' BFN appears not to allow for too radical a fantasy of the alternative. Further, Dryzek has argued recently that BFN marks a too serious accommodation with liberal constitutionalism, even if it is the deliberative democratic wing of liberal constitutionalism, as exemplified in Amy Gutman's work, and thus Habermas' over concerns with modern capitalist society's complexity renders his latest work almost 'uncritical'.<sup>731</sup> In contra-distinction to this, and I am in agreement with him, he both argues for a need to espouse and develop a radical, insurgent theory of a process of democracy, as opposed to a 'model' of democracy, implying as that does an end point. To this he reserves the appellation 'discursive democracy' to distinguish it from non-critical notions of deliberative democracy. The above critical points are seen as necessary if a



radical fantasy of an alternative, in this case a racially inclusive form of local governance, is to be realised.

This alternative vision is thus sketched out, not as some form of blue print, but as an outline of what could be possible. This possibility is based on an analysis which argues that the centralising changes in local governance since the eighties have much to do with the management of race at the local level. This has given rise to a number of depoliticising initiatives which can be read, drawing on the UK's domination learning processes of colonisation, as a form of re-colonisation. Thus, rather than talk about the fulfilment of modernity, one should talk about the fulfilment of a trans-colonial modernity. A racially inclusive form of local governance would, thus, positively draw on three potential features. These are, firstly, the development of the relationship between national and local governance in the form of the local liminal state because that would meet the discursive communicative solidaristic needs of local communities in a context where there is the attempt, at the minimum, to counter steer systems, whilst in terms of race it would provide the means to actually steer systems at the local level, i.e. a deontologically framed autonomy. Secondly democratic discourse should be multi-lingual and moral, and be realised in a number of democratic practices, not just that of representative democracy. Thirdly the nature of institutional mediation between the institutions of local government and local life worlds has to be seen as fuzzy allowing for an indeterminacy in which transformative action can occur. In this respect Bohman's notion of a 'reflexive administration', which is reflexive because it is surrounded by a public sphere, is close to my thinking on this.<sup>732</sup> Thus within a context like this, "processes of public input must be created so that deliberators within the framework of administrative institutions are compelled to take diverse perspectives into account as they constantly revise their basic framework for decision making."<sup>733</sup>

These are the main points of the theory against which the empirical data will be organised to throw up the relevant social reality correlates.



# **Chapter 10**

## **Overview to UK Race and Local Governance**

### **10.1 Introduction**

The first part of the overview attempts to situate the start and development of race equality initiatives both in the target local authority and other relevant authorities, through examining three inter-linked contexts in the mid to late seventies. These are local governance, race, and race and local governance. The key factors that emerge from these are germane to the emergence of positive race explicit strategies in a number of London local authorities at that time, even if the permutation of these differed from borough to borough. Tracking back serves other purposes as well. Firstly it uncovers a number of residual concerns about local governance which still persist today. Secondly it revisits social labour based variants of arguments about the state, local state and their inter-relationship, or not, which were important in providing the political context to the inclusion of race; arguments which in the evaluative aftermath of the eighties have not really been revised. Thirdly it begins the process of re-evaluating and theorising this important period in terms of a communicative framework in which, unlike those social labour based theories, race is an explicit and substantively inclusive consideration. Fourthly it encapsulates the intellectual resources the primary researcher brought to bear in beginning the development of a race equality programme in the core borough. Finally it lays the foundation for the contention that the period of what I have described as a positive racialisation in local governance, contained the achievable potential for the development of a racially inclusive form of local government. The failure to achieve that, and the reasons for that, are explored in the in depth interrogations of key processes.

My communicative based theoretical re-siting of local governance starts with the argument that the ebb and flow of local government change since the second world war in the UK is primarily the outcome of secondary level legitimisation struggles of the state, the 'local state' and their relationship. Inserting into that legitimisation scenario the consideration of race which involved, as the unfolding of the race equality programme in many boroughs shows, the moral political demands for non-negotiable inclusion, propelled primary level legitimisation problems into the reckoning locally and nationally. Dunleavy's summation of one of the important strands of Habermas' legitimisation argument thus holds true for this. "To prevent formal democracy threatening to become substantive democracy Habermas



argues that the public realm has to be structurally depoliticised.”<sup>734</sup>

Depoliticisation is key both to it testifying to one of the residual themes I mentioned earlier, but also to the way in which those from the social labour based critiques of orthodox local governance, and thus proponents of more inclusive based change, came to use that tactic as a means to manage ‘race’.

## 10.2 Orthodoxies

Highlighting within the sphere of local governance in the late seventies the important areas within the legitimation framework means concentrating on three domains: orthodox concerns about local governance, radical social labour based theories of the state, and reformist social labour based theories about the state. This begins to fill out the details underpinning the opening statement of the chapter on local governance which pointed to the trend for local government studies either to be imprisoned in limited boundaried discourses, or to traverse those under the aegis of Marxism.

Orthodox discourses about local government and also orthodox concerns about those discourses in the period of the seventies reflect what can be said to be the orthodox dissensus of that period. There was a period of a decade and a half after the second world war when there was a consensus of sorts about local government which was essentially that they were ‘fit for purpose’. The purpose in this case being the political institution responsible for, and through which large tranches of, welfare services would be channelled. There was an unprecedented expansion of services with direct welfare impact, such as personal social services, housing, education, as well as an expansion in services which could be said to effect the well being infra-structure of local communities. The latter include areas like leisure, refuse collection, and services underpinning the emerging role of consumers, e.g. environmental health. The beginnings of the dissensus, from the mid fifties onwards, revolved around questioning how local government could be made more ‘fit for purpose’. Informing this debate, amongst a small relevant constituency of politicians, civil servants and academics, were a number of orthodoxies, which because of the nature of orthodoxy, simply seemed to beget more orthodoxies. What then is meant by ‘orthodoxy’. Dearlove, in a prescient examination of local government reorganisation in the seventies, comes up with a three factor definition.<sup>735</sup> This is that orthodoxy in local governance is characterised by views that are “widely shared and long established”, rarely substantively questioned, where substantive refers to a deconstructive critique, and, put forward as explanatory statements without any form of supporting research.<sup>736</sup> Resituating this within a communicative framework, it can be argued that orthodoxy, in the above sense, can be seen to be part of what I have described as representational discourse, or ‘diskourse’, in which discussion is strategically configured through unaccountable power configurations



which prevent dialogue. There is an overlap here as well with my notion of action 'ossification'. It is also part of the continuum spanning the range of systemic learning and which includes my arguments about learning processes for domination. Apropos this, Dearlove reflects that the "reluctance to theorise about the institutions of local government and the poor quality of much research are both effects and causes of the existence and survival of orthodoxies".<sup>737</sup> Unresolved problems, in the sense of not subject to communicative discursive practices, provide for representational local governance, in the same vein that trans-epochal unresolved problems of race maintain relations of force in the structures of communication between white and Black. Further we need to come back to the way in which this process of 'orthodoxifying' recurs in the diagnoses of problems supposedly effecting local government in the eighties and nineties, and in the proffered solutions to those problems. Certainly it can be seen that the main orthodoxies, and some of the details there in, of the sixties and seventies, echo on into the nineties. The difference, as I shall argue later, is that they re-echo through a racialisation of the problems.

A brief outline of those orthodoxies, which are to be found as well in the various government commissions and legislation effecting local government up to the late seventies, covers the following areas - the issue of local government democracy, the issue of local government efficiency, the issue of the quality of councillors, and the issue of management/calibre of officers.<sup>738</sup> In terms of democracy the shibboleth then was, and still is, that local democracy is good, and certainly better than national level democracy because politicians within the sphere of local governance are closer to the people. However, Dearlove argues that the orthodoxy of democracy "presents the ideology of representation and responsible government as the essential local politics....(which)...is not an adequate description and explanation...(serving)...to mystify and even conceal the more fundamental reality of government power as it focuses on processes and so ignores what governments actually do and who they benefit."<sup>739</sup> This mystification involves, for example, ignoring in the sixties and seventies the role of political parties in local government because prevailing orthodoxy saw little room for politics in local government. Thus the Committee on the Management of Local Government, in 1967, argued that "local authorities are not concerned with 'principles' because these are thought out by the government of the day....(and that).....much that local authorities do has no political content"<sup>740</sup>. Local government was seen very much as being concerned with administration, not politics, by some, mainly those within the purviews of the broader civil service. The counter, evolving orthodoxy, again put forward without any real research, proclaimed that, presumably on the basis that parties were in reality involved and there was no going back, such involvement, "renders responsibility for the general level of council achievement visible to the public, facilitates judgement at the polls, and



through the ups and downs of party fortunes at successive elections brings shifts in public feeling forcibly to the council's notice."<sup>741</sup> Either way, however, the legitimisation fortunes of local government are, in effect, tied to the political fortunes of national political parties and/or government.

At one level, it is true as Dearlove notes, that a common sense acceptance of the local government democracy as being in a good state, has led to the focus shifting to that of efficiency. However, it is probably more true to say that legitimacy problems that accrue from the spending on, or the efficacy of, welfare services, are likely to be picked up at national level, rather than local level. Concern about efficiency manifested itself very much in terms of the best size for local authorities in order to maximise such efficiency.

Underlying this was the assumption, especially with local government being made responsible for more services and larger budgets, that small size local authorities would be inefficient. The logic of this could be seen in the commissions and attendant legislation in the early sixties and seventies which respectively gave rise to the creation of the London boroughs and metropolitan councils, each created out of the amalgamation of smaller local government political units. The apparent contradiction between smaller units and better democracy, and larger units and more efficiency, could be bridged by the other elements of orthodoxy.

The first of these was the preoccupation with the quality of councillors. Dearlove deconstructs this 'worry' and tracks it back to the disappearance of the qualified franchise, the emergence of universal franchise and thus enfranchisement of the working class. This trope of some not being fit enough to govern, as opposed to those who were, often, in the latter case, realised in the form of the landed gentry, continues into the second world war aftermath of local government. This is particularly so with both the expansion of services, increases in national government expenditure on local governance and the creation of larger, seemingly more complex, units of local government. It comes to be expressed – and here it echoes today as well – in the elitist based lament that because not enough professional and business people are involved in local government that there is something lacking in the calibre of councillors, and thus in the decisions taken. But, as I shall argue later, it also comes with a shadowing, at that time as yet unvoiced, unarticulated, sub-conscious differentiation, that those best able to take political decisions at the local level should not only be professional and from private sector business managerial classes, but also white and male. This growing preoccupation with addressing a created orthodoxy of efficiency via other evolving orthodoxies continues with the perceived need to improve the calibre of people working for local government, primarily through what I would describe as the introduction of a private sector managerial discourse, because, in a linked logic to the solutions sought to



improve the quality of councillors, local government should be looked at, as some people felt, as a business.

Thus in both the Herbert Commission, the government's prelude to legislatively establishing the GLC and London boroughs, and the Redcliffe-Maude Commission, the prelude to the 1974 local government legislation, the linked issues of local government efficiency and better management were raised. But these were raised, as Dearlove points out, against the orthodoxy of local governance's traditional administration. By this was meant a view of getting things done in local government whereby "...existing activities have to be carried on and that the only choice the local authority faces is whether or not the activities should grow....(on the)....assumption that existing activities should continue to be carried .....in the manner in which they have been traditionally...." <sup>742</sup> It was backed up by a view of structures and processes which saw the basic personnel being elected members and officers, multiple committees, because members did not have enough time to consider all matters of the council, and a policy process whereby policy initiatives stemmed from service departments and were ratified two-foldly via their respective service committees and the full council. Overall the role of the local council was seen narrowly as that of administering a collection of services. Against this prevailing orthodoxy was raised another two element orthodoxy. The first part of this was concerned with the perceived need to managerialise local government. By this I mean that management was to be seen and used as a manipulable discourse requiring those who have such responsibilities to be conscious of, and implement that which is deemed to be a good manager. Dearlove confesses his own bewilderment at the range of management theories, all derived from the private sector, thrown at local government, and what exactly they entailed. ..In the space, therefore, of the seventies decade he itemises the rise, and sometimes fall of planning, programming, budgeting system (PPBS), performance budgeting, output budgeting, management by objectives, corporate management, corporate planning, inter-corporate planning, resource planning, community planning, social planning, long range planning, connective planning, network analysis, area management, work study, operational research, cost benefit analysis..... <sup>743</sup>. The dominant form of explicit management programme for the seventies, and this might be because it came to be linked to the second part of the remedial orthodoxy involving proffered structural changes, was corporate management and planning. These envisioned structural changes, as set out by the Maud Committee on management in local government, based partly on Maud's abhorrence of party politics at the local level, favouring an administrative solution, involved a reduction in committees and allied meetings together with the creation of a Management Board comprising five to nine members who would "lead and co-ordinate the work of the authority". These proposals resound again in the nineties in the cabinet



style executive committees being established in local authorities. The rationale for Maud's proposals, a rationale that can be read as justifying the changes in the nineties local government, is, as Dearlove spells it out, quite simple. "Local government is a big business; local government should, therefore, be organised like a business; and local government should be managed by businessmen – by men of calibre who will provide 'vigorous leadership' and 'think about big things'"<sup>744</sup>. What then is this management, in particular corporate management? Again it is worth quoting Dearlove because he encapsulates neatly the intention of such management strategies and techniques, and objectives of their proposers.

"No matter what particular system you study, they all embody an attack upon incrementalism; muddling through; satisficing; fragmentation; specialist management; professionalism; vagueness of objectives and the failure to make policies explicit; the limited analysis of alternatives; short term planning; the absence of monitoring and review of performance, and so on and so on. Moreover, to a greater or lesser degree, they all seek to implement, that is, a system of general management which starts with the overt formulation of objectives; moves through the careful evaluation of alternative means to the attainment of these objectives before implementing particular policies; finishing up with a careful review of the effectiveness of the chosen policies in meeting the initial objectives, so re-starting the whole cycle of policy making."<sup>745</sup>

### **10.3 Lambeth's Orthodoxies**

The extent to which local authorities in the seventies came to embrace such managerial changes, is uneven. Certainly a few local authorities proved to be pathfinder ones managerially, especially in relation to corporate management, including the London borough of Lambeth. It is worth examining Lambeth in a little more detail because, in relation to this piece of research, it was one of the first in the country to introduce and develop a systemic race equality infra-structure, and is thus one of the sub-target boroughs. Additionally the principal researcher worked there in a formal research capacity and as an equality worker. This has to be contrasted with the target borough where, by the late seventies, the development of an explicit managerial approach was relatively inchoate. Whilst there appears to be a relationship between the introduction of race equality structures and processes and the sophistication or not of managerial systems, this is not the point of this particular mini excursus. Rather it is to try and show that orthodoxies, taken as communicative closures, often ride on the backs of others and also engender others. Dearlove's recitation of what the supposed attributes of management theories at that time are implies another orthodoxy which is to do with the essential assumptions of management; assumptions which are prevalent today in local government. Further the acceptance of such orthodoxies not only limits the options for discursive communicative practices, but also provides some with a strategic short cut



when faced with a choice that could lead to better communicative changes. Lambeth, by the late seventies, had a very sophisticated managerial and information infra-structure, contrary to the misrepresentation of late seventies and eighties Lambeth as 'chaotic'. The only change, which could be the basis for such a derogatory judgement is the introduction of an 'equalities' programme. But therein lies another deconstructive tale which will be addressed later. Cockburn's social labour, and thus class, based critique of Lambeth, described as the 'local state', contains some useful insights into the development of corporate management in that borough.<sup>746</sup> There are three elements of that I want to concentrate on. The actual structure and detailed development of that management strategy I'll tackle when I outline the way in which race equality considerations were introduced into that authority. The first of these then is that, in the wake of the Maud Committee, the impetus for the introduction of corporate style management techniques came from the 1968 Conservative administration in the borough effected through the use of private sector consultants and INLOGOV at Birmingham University. Apropos the latter, Dearlove in his analysis is extremely critical of INLOGOV and some of its leading acolytes, like Stewart, who, Dearlove contends, are acting as if they are limply the "servants of power".<sup>747</sup> Pointing a critical finger at INLOGOV, SAUS and the Corporate Planning Unit of the Management Centre at Bradford University, he goes on to accuse them of engaging in a kind of research that is "objectively deficient and ideological" because it has a "practical and relevant orientation to those in power".<sup>748</sup> Further these academics and institutions have been involved in selling systems of corporate planning through providing training courses on the arrogant presumption that these rational changes are best for local communities. I have already pointed to this issue of the conflation and conflict of interests that appears to have developed between certain local government institutions in academia and Labour Party changes at that political level, particularly those associated with the localist and post-Fordist schools of thought, respectively deriving from INLOGOV and SAUS. Secondly these changes in Lambeth were not undone by successive Labour administrations, including that which has become associated with the late seventies radical left take over of the borough. Thirdly the nature of corporate management, in fact most managerial theories, is such that it was essentially a senior management experiential activity of ownership whose effects were, on the whole, non-participatively felt by other employees. These three characteristics of corporate management in Lambeth in effect mask two orthodoxies which were accepted in the late seventies, and which some of the equality programmes of the eighties attempted to deconstruct. Suffice to say that these continue today in local government.

The first of these is to do with the nature of management. Both Dearlove and Cockburn try to get to grips with this, but, in my estimation, flounder



because of the limitations of their social labour based critiques, particularly in the case of Cockburn, where management comes to be no more than the hand servant of capital. Alvesson and Willmott provide a better framework within which to outline the orthodoxy of management.<sup>749</sup> Starting with the observation that whilst in everyday life in societies, people are involved complex and demanding business of organising their lives through the management of routines, yet this everyday process has, in today's society, become the preserve of experts, like managers. In belated answer to Dearlove's confusion about what exactly management is, A and W note that management is regarded as universal and comprises a number of technical functions. There is an assumption that these exist in a social and historical vacuum. For example on numerous occasions in both Lambeth and the target borough, the principal researcher had to question managers' and council members' ready use of one part of the orthodoxy that 'managers had to manage', especially where this 'right to manage' involved breaching the council's own race equality commitments, by pointing out that they did not have a divine right to manage, but did so under certain social and historical conditions which could be changed. More over, where management is presented as a technical activity, especially in a political organisation like local government, then problems which are "fundamentally social and political come to be interpreted as amenable to technical solutions."<sup>750</sup> Managers then, through the training and inculcation that accompanies such 'expertisation' are never presented with perspectives that highlight the politics of management, rather the "claims of technical, instrumental reason" are privileged. This 'technicisation' of management then creates the illusion of neutrality. Within the context of the organisation whenever changes are put forward "on the rational grounds that they are more effective and efficient, they implicitly endorse and legitimise a society in which it is acceptable to treat human beings as a means rather than ends.....(so that)....the authority ascribed to managerial techniques and skills operates ideologically to legitimise the treatment of individuals as objects of managerial decision making who are excluded from participating fully in decisions that directly or indirectly affect their working lives."<sup>751</sup> Management practices invariably promote certain values and 'punish the pursuit of competing agendas'. For example performance related strategies and techniques give higher value to individual, competitive and egoistic forms of behaviour which "deflects attention from moral-practical concerns about how individuals might co-operate to develop organisations, societies and a world system that is more rational in terms of collective husbanding and allocation of scarce resources..<sup>752</sup> Managerial best practice, within the orthodoxy, is never evaluated in terms of "its contribution to the realisation of the progressive objectives of autonomy, responsibility, democracy and ecologically sustainable development." Finally three other elements of the orthodoxy need to be mentioned, elements which do not 'measure up' to the reality. The first is the claim that management



knowledge is a science, thereby legitimising social differentiating practices, like the replacement of ‘amateurs’ by ‘professionals’ in organisations very often through the ostensible rationale that such ‘experts’ are more likely to provide technically higher grade and ‘value free’ output. This is a trope, as shall be shown, which recurs in the arguments launched against the work of equality workers. Management makes use of techniques and exhortations, which in reality are rhetorical in content because they mask the ultimate aim of management, i.e. the “continuous moral political struggle to establish, build and sustain the ‘credibility’ and ‘authority’ that underpins the ‘prerogative’ to manage.”<sup>753</sup> Thirdly the orthodoxy of management’s ‘technicisation’ is part of the commodification of other spheres to the extent that politics is reduced to “the technically oriented task of ‘keeping the machine running’”<sup>754</sup>.

The last point provides the way to introduce the second veiled and screened orthodoxy. This relates to the way in which local politicians and their parent political parties came to view and effect the running of local government in the seventies. In sum these were not radically different to what went before, nor for that matter did they show any type of radical departure from what I contend is the orthodox norm, in the so called ‘loony left’ eighties. All periods showed an acceptance both of the orthodoxy of representative democracy at the local level and an acceptance of the orthodoxies of management. Neither of these two spheres of activity was seriously examined with a view to de- and reconstruct alternatives which might have been better suited to the normative potential of the espoused political programme. Certainly in the seventies, in Lambeth, for example, the successive Labour administrations, right through the ‘radical’ eighties, did nothing to tackle the issue of management, and more particularly, what sort of management should an avowedly socialist council be pursuing. If anything orthodoxy was strengthened. From the early seventies onwards, in advance of most councils then and even now, Lambeth established what was called a Directorate of Management Services. This housed several key management functions, like human resourcing, training, organisational development, work study, job evaluation, employee relations. It also had direct functional and in some cases managerial, links with smaller relevant service areas in other Directorates. It was in many ways the managerial systems and information power house of the council. Whether through expediency, genuine acceptance of the managerial ethos, or simply not being able to visualise alternatives, local Labour politicians’ approach was to use it as a means of getting things done and controlling the organisation. It also provided, informally, a nodal link in a three way network comprised of relevant senior managers, local trade union officials, particularly manual worker unions, and senior local politicians, that effectively influenced, and in many cases, took important decisions on the everyday running of the council.<sup>755</sup> In part the latter derived from the then still continuing view



and practice, that the Labour Party belongs to, and vice versa, the trade unions, i.e. the Labour Party is the political voice of the trade unions. At another level it could be theorised that all this demonstrated was the extent to which the local state served the interests of capital by replicating the collusion of dominant interests and classes in the organisation. On the other hand, given the broad socialist umbrella under which the politics of these boroughs could be placed, and the arguments in favour of such political action that they were, after all in the interests of the working class, it could attest to Dunleavy's argument that within Marx and Marxism there is the expressed and implied ethics of 'it is good if it furthers the proletarian cause', i.e. ends justifying means.<sup>756</sup> Whether or not one can attribute actions like these to the determining power of capital, in the final analysis, is doubtful. Rather what can be said is that these action were taken within a context of power, and in furtherance of those conditions of power. A more sustainable argument would be that of Habermas' theorisation of system integration's steering media affinity to purposive rational action. Thus whilst the acting subject can fall back on his/her lifeworld, under conditions of systemic integration, an instrumentalised stance can only be retained through a functional form of reason involving an inversion of ends set and means chosen. My additional argument to this is that it is more realistic to talk about a spectrum of action since, as far as the political system is concerned, actors therein, do sometimes chose, as in the case of the boroughs concerned, objectivating action over the option of consensual forming communicative action. In the target borough, this relationship between the Labour party, especially its local government hierarchy, and the manual trade unions, proved a real impediment to the development of equality programmes. In the seventies, as well, the Leader of the Labour Party group running the target council, some one credited with beginning the process of opening up the council to the influence of local Black communities, though this claim is disputable, worked for Shell UK in their organisational development department. Whatever that experience might have been, there is nothing to show that any political demands were placed on the managerial or organisational development dimensions of the council. The then organisational sclerosis in the council, either in terms of adopting more 'progressive' technical managerial strategies, or, more progressive radical ones, was evident, as shall be shown, by the lack of systems or processes the equality programmes could use to facilitate their introduction. In both there was an orthodoxy associated with the way in which politicians 'got things done' which, as Dearlove argues, does not display any kind of normative vision. It is the antithesis to the normative vision contained in the following quote, a vision that could be realised from the potential of those politicians own political programmes.

"At the centre of this process (of social movements) is the understanding that a free, democratic society is not the same as a society that boasts nominally



democratic political institutions. Rather, a democratic society is properly known by ... its members' everyday commitments to , and the upholding of, democratic values in all its institutions, including its corporations where goods and services are produced and distributed..... 'workplace democracy is a moral political issue, not one of greater productivity and satisfaction...The moral foundation for democracy is in the daily practices of communication...The recovery of democracy must start in these practices.'"<sup>757</sup>

There was, in effect, an action lacuna caused by the elision of key communicative actions areas within the sphere of local governance from consideration. This begins to illustrate the arguments I have raised in previous chapters, about the way in which potential communicative action areas within administrative systems can become ossified, and the potential that exists for transforming these. The extent to which these were also omitted from the alternatives to these local government orthodoxies, which were being developed during the seventies, will be outlined in the following sections.

#### **10.4 Against orthodoxy**

There are two levels to the theorisation of arguments, and subsequent arguments against, the orthodoxies of local governance in the seventies. The first of these was contained in the then evolving debate amongst Marxists about the state in capitalist society. Whilst this was for the most part conducted amongst university based academics in the UK, Europe and America, it had links to left wing political groups and parties, as well as a growing number of post '68 university educated 'rank and file' working in the growing public sector, seen as the lesser of two evils when compared with the private sector. In one sense it could be argued that through various publications and political activities in the polity and world of work, that this constituted a developing sub public sphere in and around the nature of the capitalist state and the possible change alternatives. I am not going to go into too much detail about the intricacies of the differing varieties of Marxist arguments about the state, because the nub of my critique of one variant, post-Fordism, still holds for the other strands. This is that generally the state is seen as being ultimately derived from and/or serving capital, and more, specifically in terms of the post-Fordist variant, it is ultimately a structuralist functionalist account of the state. Dunleavy and O'Leary's analytical, threefold categorisation of the theorisation of the state within Marx's and Engel's primary works, is useful. That is that there is an instrumental/orthodox model in which the state is but "a committee for managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie" with little to no autonomy; an arbiter model which allowed the state to behave more autonomously from the control of capitalists; and a functional model in which the state is governed by an "impersonal logic which drives government in a capitalist society to develop the economic base and coercively maintain social



stability.”<sup>758</sup> Within this threefold broad categorisation, it is possible to provide a brief overview of Marxist theories of the state in the seventies; an activity necessary because these presage the evolution of several Marxist based studies and attempts at a theorisation of local governance. Given the critique made of orthodox and neo-Marxist analyses, from a Habermassian perspective, and, within that context, my contention that these types of analyses are epistemologically and ontologically incorporative of race, I will argue that these fault lines were carried over into both the subsequent local governance theories and the praxis variant that was influenced by this, known as ‘local socialism’. Thus the instrumentalist version of the state is based on the argument, underpinned by the assumption that the state is, in the last resort, a unified organisation, that those running the country through the state, bureaucrats and political leaders, have a common social origin with the capitalists. This provides the basis for a cohesive group. Parliaments, and similar legislatures, are but ‘talking shops’ with the real power being concentrated in the executive branch. A variation of this is the state monopoly capitalist thesis which postulates that the large monopoly corporations and the state fuse into one instrument of economic and political domination and exploitation. Fine and Harris provide a subtle version of this argument. The modern arbiter model sees the state having a greater degree of autonomy which allows it “to impose stabilising policies which were not controllable by capital”.<sup>759</sup> Poulantzas many writings about the state, especially his arguments that it “acts as a condensation of class struggle, mirroring in a distorted and class biased way the balance of class forces in the broader society”, is an example of this.<sup>760</sup> A case of a relative autonomous sphere of the state is the legal system which through quasi-deontological procedures, wards off direct control by capitalists, thereby allowing for the working class to secure some victories which can be used in the wider sphere of class struggle based action. However autonomy is always subject to the last instance determination of capital. Modern Marxist based state theories of the functionalist persuasion, as was shown in the critique of post Fordism, argue that “changes in the economic base of society determine shifts in the political and legal superstructure.” In its more sophisticated guise the argument is that the bureaucracy’s behaviour “is largely predetermined by structural forces in line with the functional imperatives of the capitalist mode of production...(so that)....the state’s organisation at any time is assumed to be optimally organised for the needs of capital at that time.”<sup>761</sup> Whilst there is within the general understanding of functionalism no overall theorist or theory of the state, there are theorists who have used this form of argumentation in part of their reasoning. O’Connor’s arguments in the Fiscal Crisis of the State exemplify this.<sup>762</sup> There are however variants on the general functionalist model which do attempt to provide an overall theory. The structuralist Marxism of Althusser is a case in point in which he tries to provide “a theory of the functional autonomy of the state from responding directly to the economic imperatives of



capitalism...(so that it)...functions to organise the dominant class and to disorganise the subordinate classes through the use of either repressive or ideological apparatuses.”<sup>763</sup>

Taking this as the rough heuristic framework, it can be said that these were the dominant Marxist epistemological schemas within which the intra and inter debates about the state were conducted. Two salient characteristics stand out—none sought to theorise local government or race. Both of these considerations were, in their own distinctive ways, assumed, either through a conscious incorporationist train of thought, or, an unconscious failure to even think about these dimensions, to be an indistinguishable part of the theoretical whole. By the mid-seventies Dearlove notes that Bennington could observe that although “there are a number of theoretical studies of the role of the state in advanced capitalist societies....there seems to have been much less critical study of the functions and operations of local government as an entity within the state apparatus.”<sup>764</sup> Yet, ironically, Bennington’s intervention in the debate itself attests to the fact that there were the beginnings of a critical alternative to the orthodoxy on local government. Further the trace of Bennington’s career over time since the mid seventies also serves, at this point, to highlight the fault lines I mentioned earlier. This is the same Bennington who entered the debate via the seventies CDP experience, ended up heading the policy unit in the ‘socialist republic of Sheffield’, under Blunkett, and, now heads the local government centre in the business school at Warwick University, neck high in government modernisation contracts. Relatedly, he has also been involved in trying to ‘sell’ the idea of a ‘quality’ organised local government structure to key South African authorities in the early nineties, a time when local governance change in that country was very much open to debate, not to mention dubious outside interventions.<sup>765</sup> Through this time leap to the nineties, by way of premature further illustration, I am implying that the depoliticised, managerialisation local governance, particularly of equalities, which has occurred today within the arena of local governance, has some of its seeds in the actual critical developments of the seventies which were antithetically fostered to then prevailing orthodoxies. I have referred to these problems as fault lines, locating them in the latent positivism and instrumentalism of Marx’s theory which results in the invisible making incorporation of race into the dynamics of social labour. These could be readily discerned, as well, in the first tranche of critical local government studies. These lend themselves, as well, to the three level categorisation of Marxist theories of the state used earlier.

Thus some of the early CDP studies were, in the seventies, extremely critical of local government’s willingness to be influenced and directed by businesses to the extent that some of the studies’ commentators viewed local government as an agent of business. This instrumentalised approach is seen



even more in Cockburn's study of Lambeth in which she argues that just as the state serves capital so too local government is but part of that larger state structure and are thus, "local agencies of the state."<sup>766</sup> It achieves its goals by undertaking two key tasks – "the physical reproduction of the labour force and an ideological role aimed at ensuring social harmony."<sup>767</sup> Dearlove's position can be placed within that of the arbiter model, for he argues that the autonomy of the local state from the short term interests of capital are always under a condition of tension caused by the needs of the national state to control accumulation and legitimation; a tension expressed in terms of that between capitalism and democracy. A variation of the arbiter model, but one that crosses over, in parts into the functional model, is that of Saunders dual state thesis. This was developed in part in response to what he regarded as Cockburn's simplistic and 'crass' analysis. Whilst the work was being developed into the eighties, its primary thrust was established by the late seventies,<sup>768</sup> This proposes that there are two main functions of the state which devolve upon those of social investment and social consumption. Social investment policies support the profitability of private firms through the provision of the necessary infra-structure, e.g. raw materials, energy sources, transport networks, and financial support. Social consumption policies are aimed at meeting the needs of different groups of people who cannot have these met through the market. These needs are primarily met through the services which are within the remit of local government. At this level social consumption politics involve a wider range of competing and diverse interests in processes of representational democracy, the effects of which are real. .... Politics, at this level, is not, unlike Cockburn's view, based on class, but on the differing alliances over service consumption.

Whilst what is emerging is a spectrum of analyses in which agency appears to range from that of being a reflex of capital to certain degrees of autonomy at the local level, there are still certain features common to all. The most obvious is the still thralldom to capital. Within this the autonomy of the state, and therein for agency, is, as Dunleavy summarises either relatively autonomous from capitalists or from the capitalist mode of production. Meaningful change can only, thus, be pitched at the level of the total overthrow of the state giving rise to a negative stance towards attempts at change at the everyday level. In part this argument harks back to the Second International schism between those who viewed the state as no more than the executive of the bourgeoisie and those, forerunners of the social democratic parties in Western Europe, who argued for using and extending the benefits of liberal democratic regimes. Dunleavy criticises these approaches, as well, for being 'utopian'. This isn't the problem, however. If anything the problem is with the particular form of utopianism. The deleterious consequences of a lack of 'utopia' in the orthodoxy of today's local governance politics is quite obvious. By the late seventies a view was emerging from those involved in the sphere of local governance in



diverse capacities that existing theories of local government were inadequate, both at the orthodox and radical levels. A further contextualisation of this 'involvement' shows a confluence of a number of related socio-economic, -political and-cultural strands at that temporal juncture which together enhance the need for changes to not only thinking about local government, but also, and this marks an important shift, doing something about 'it'. At the socio-economic level, throughout the seventies, a process which started well before that period, there was a sharp decline in the traditional industrial base of many inner city local authorities, especially those of London. There was an increasing demographic shift because of the growth of local Black populations, not so much through immigration, though that was a factor, but because those populations being on average younger in profile, were larger. Coming through then were second, and even, third generation Black people in the UK. In other words the conventional working class constituency base of many traditional Labour run boroughs had, by the late seventies, undergone profound changes, many of them seemingly irreversible. At the same time the employee profile both within formal local government as well as within the immediate symbiotic organisations within the local civil society, was changing with a growth in the number of graduates and with an increase in the number of what can be called 'activists' with local backgrounds in the workforces. Local civil society demands on local government, channelled primarily through local voluntary organisations, many of them funded via differing levels of government agencies 'conducted' through local government, or, more importantly, seeking funding, both increased and were different in nature encompassing now a range of constituencies previously effectively silenced by the old, traditional labourist networks. By the end of 1979 the true intent of Thatcherism had been spelt out with the threat of rolling back the state accompanied by swingeing financial cuts being formally implemented through national government processes. This was a culminating occurrence in the then growing feeling, fuelled not only by the old style politics and failures of the previous Labour government, but also by the seemingly negative theoretical and agency cul-de-sac radical left wing parties and theories were in, that 'something had to be done'. For many 'doing something' meant joining the Labour Party so that by the end of the seventies the membership content of many inner city Labour Party branches, particularly those of London, had changed.<sup>769</sup> It could be said that for the Labour party running various inner city local authorities, especially in London, that a nascent local public sphere, an important arena for opinion formation and changing will formation, comprising the overlapping constituencies of the wider local Labour party, local trade unions, particularly those in local government, and local civil society organisations, was beginning to form. But 'doing something' also meant trying to theoretically re-articulate both the experiences of those within the sphere of local governance, as well as, provide an argumentation for further agency.



I want to, therefore, briefly outline one of the most influential texts at that period, one that is an advance on what had gone before, in relation to radically theorising local government, even if it is still constrained by its core social labour framework. This, in the evaluative aftermath of the eighties, has been described, by one academic, as providing the rationale for 'gesture' politics.<sup>770</sup> However, as indicative of the selective amnesia affecting certain academics in the still continuing 'new realism' in local government studies, Stoker, for it is he, who was approached by the principal researcher to ascertain why there was in his studies very little reference to equalities, especially race equality, could do no more than refer him to another academic doing research on the urban programmes. Because the legitimisation 'embarrassment' of so called 'gesture' politics, like race, has, it seems, worked its way through to how that period is historically defined by influential academics, an influence which exists, I contend, because of the boundary conflating funding-party political policy syndrome Dearlove identifies, it is even more important that the main thrust of the text mentioned above is re-examined.

"In and Against the State" marked an important difference from previous attempts at radical theorisation of the state.<sup>771</sup> In one respect it, perhaps, was not that different because of its Marxist orientation and because the state the title refers to is in fact the local state. However it was written by self avowed socialists working for the state who believed that the struggle for socialism involved as well a struggle against the state. Some of the authors are women who argued that the struggle to change relations within society is not just against capitalism, but also against capitalism. For the authors the state is not neutral, but provides services etc. in order to maintain the capitalist society. However capitalism is not just about being an economic system. It is also, more importantly, a set of social relations, determining the way people see each other, treat each other, and, in some cases, controls people. Within this complex set of social relations the state obfuscates the issue by hiding the fact that "it is the capital relation" which is the root of the problem. The state establishes a hierarchy of power and decision making which, in fact, is one of class, inclusive of the subordination of women and race. Working for the state, therefore, means finding ways to oppose it from within as part of the daily activity by breaking out of the social relations of the state and creating alternative forms of organisation. Both the trade unions and political parties, which, by this, is probably meant the Labour Party, have not properly considered how "a state worker's hours of employment can be directed against capitalism and towards a transition to socialism".<sup>772</sup> Through exploring the question of 'how', the authors come up with a series of four crucial points, which, given my arguments to date about the relationship between transformation and a racially inclusive form of local governance, bear repeating. These are that socialist practice has to be rooted in people's own experience; socialism has to have a vision of



what is possible; people's whole lives are subject to capitalism; and, that socialism is about transforming power relations, not capturing it. Even though the argument is cast in a social labour mould, there is a discernible overlap at the general level with the overall intention of Habermas' argument – the attention to experience/language as the core amniotic fluid for interaction, to vision/utopia, to capitalist/systemic domination and to transformation.

The reason for citing this text is not because any attempt is going to be made to claim it as a definitive blueprint for the sweep of changes made in certain inner city local governments in the late seventies and eighties. Rather it is brought forward as exemplifying and capturing the intellectual feel and atmosphere of left thinking in and around the labour Party at the local governance level. It encapsulates and marks out the key difference from previous Labour attempts to use local government as a vehicle for social reform. During the seventies the expansion of local government in urban areas, coupled with the near monopoly rule in key city areas of Labour gave rise to what Gyford has described as 'municipal labourism' characterised by a representative democratic process shorn of real competition and, inter alia, a high degree, in many cases, of administrative corruption.<sup>773</sup> The Dan Smith and Poulson cases of the seventies, stand out as key examples of this. Labourism was very much about the instrumentalised seizure of local state power and using the incumbent administrative machinery to achieve the stated political objectives. This form of local governance has to be counter-pointed to that of what has been described as the Labour new left, the ideas of which I have used from the above text as a summarising and symbolising framework. This movement of the new left at the local government level has been described as 'local socialism'.<sup>774</sup> This is very much a historical description arrived at with a retrospective glance. At the time of formation in the seventies it was not in use as one of self description or activity designation. Nevertheless it is one I am going to use in order to provide a collective term for the markedly left wing shift in political complexion of many inner city councils and London boroughs in the late seventies and early eighties, all of which can be characterised as indicating an intention, either explicit or implicit, to bring on to the agenda, not, just the capturing of local government power, but, also, the transformation of local governance power relations. This intention to transform held out the promise, as well, to involve participatively the local communities. In other words there could be seen within this the nascent outline of an emancipatory claim that needed to be redeemed. Gyford traces the emergence of local socialism back to the late sixties when the dramatic losses experienced by Labour in the local elections started the process of a radical rethink by some.<sup>775</sup> Throughout the seventies the many factors cited elsewhere above, - municipal Labourism, changing inner city areas, changing left wing thinking on the state, changing membership of the labour



party etc. – are all seen as contributing to the rise of local socialism. For Gyford, and he is probably right on this, local socialism denoted not so much a formal political movement as a syndrome for associated ideas held by a loose network of people in and around the sphere of local governance, particularly the Labour party. By the late seventies it was only just beginning to be articulated. For example it took the 1983 general election loss by the Labour party for the London Labour Co-ordinating Committee to voice a desire to see a new vision of socialism; one not based on ‘the past paternalism of right wing Labourism’s welfare state’, but on one that recognised the need for ‘real decentralisation of decision making in all spheres.’ During the late seventies, the time frame for this contextualisation, what could be gleaned are the main areas comprising this new vision. These were roughly, the local economy, race, women and policing. There was implicit, as well, a new role envisaged for local government, which was till, then, to be worked out. At that stage, then, taking on the new areas had the promise of transformation, though the assumption of these new priorities did not necessarily mean a transformative rethink on local governance. It should be remembered that there was still a heavy investment by the local Labour party in ‘capturing’ power at the local government political level. There was at the heart of this strategy by the new left, the promise of a Rubicon crossing that once was undertaken, effectively meant a dissipation of the power of the Labour party’s representative democratically elected members. However, there is a real question about why and how, contradictorily, the new left in certain councils came to rely more and more on the political expediency of simply using the orthodox machinery of government. An outline of the emergence and assumption of power of the new left in Lambeth, one of the sub-target boroughs in this research, will serve to illustrate this.

Lansley’s account of the rise and fall of the municipal left is a useful starting point.<sup>776</sup> Lansley was, up to the 1982 local government elections in London, a Labour councillor in Lambeth. Chair of the influential Community Affairs Committee which had, within its remit, the area of race relations, he was seen in many circles as Ted Knight’s number two.. He recounts that in the mid seventies, two left wing councillors, Ted Knight and Ken Livingstone, worked together to build a left wing base in the local party, with an intention to assume leadership of the Labour Group of Lambeth Councillors. This left wing base, to judge by Lansley’s general descriptions of the changing membership profile of inner city Labour Party parties, comprised those groups I have identified above who, disillusioned by the politics of other leftwing parties and/or those non-aligned left wingers who felt that something had to be done. As in other borough labour parties, a single issue was used as a rallying fulcrum across which leverage could be exerted to change the leadership. In this case it was the attitude towards the Housing Finance Act 1972. Livingstone describes a Left caucus of about a



dozen councillors operating as a 'disciplined group.' By 1978 Ted Knight had become Leader of the council. Lansley concludes that this early period of Knight's leadership was characterised by a commitment to high spending. What's interesting about this description of the assumption of certain powers by the new left in Lambeth is the marked absence of any reference to going beyond what appears to be a very orthodox, incestuous political in-fight within the Lambeth Labour party, even though, for example, Lansley quotes the 'In and Against the State' text as one of the influential intellectual rethinks on local governance. The different agenda thus seems to have been generated, not through any kind of communicative discursive processes involving local communities, but through the agendas brought in for consideration by new Labour party members. Even then these considerations, especially given that Lansley describes how various left wings groups, including the International Marxist Group, later Socialist Action, actually had a late seventies policy of Labour party entryism, were bound by Marxist notions of class in which race is subsumed under the reserve army of labour thesis. This included, certainly in Lambeth, strong ties between the political leadership and the leadership of the manual trade unions. This was a relationship forged in the image of the established white, male, working class solidarity; acts of which could be witnessed in the mythologies of sexual derring-do surrounding Lambeth's Directorate of Construction Services' Christmas parties, and the 'muscle' provided to persuade apostate Labour councillors that switching to 'independent' simply will not do.<sup>777</sup> Whilst, therefore, at a general level, the intention might have been, on the part of the new left, to deconstruct the stifling orthodoxy of municipal Labourism and, in so doing, provide a praxis dimension, inclusive of substantive democratisation, to left theories of the state, the indications are that the developing start of these programmes showed little evidence of this. If one jumps ahead to Lansley's attempts to show how new left policies affecting such taken for granted areas within orthodoxies, such as the bureaucracy, one finds that what he outlines is not so much substantively radical, as gestural. 'Shaking up the bureaucracy' as he describes it, seems to devolve upon giving councillor backbenchers more say in committee and in pre-committee meetings, getting rid of a few senior managers unsympathetic to the new policies, and bringing in more employees of similar political ilk to the policies being expounded. Important as these are, they are not, as he rightly observes, a root and branch re-organisation of management and bureaucracy in the council, which, at the end of the day, is what would have been required. Yet, if one examines the power relationships in Lambeth during the tenure of the new left, a re-organisation like that was well within their power to do so, if they wished. The fact of the matter is that such issues were subordinate to the sway of left wing politics being enacted between the council, the government, and the national Labour party. The new left in governance of local government were not prepared to share power, even with those for whom they had made promises



of participation and release from bureaucratic paternalism, unless this 'sharing' was on the bases of the skewed universalism of the new Left's agenda. This agenda involved the acceptance of much of the orthodox ways of doing things. For example on numerous occasions the Race Equality advisers in Lambeth were 'hailed over the coals' by the political leadership for doing what amounted to their job. In one instance the Principal Race Relations Adviser, Herman Ouseley, was made to apologise by Ted Knight to the Director of Construction Services, a Directorate and manager notorious for sexism and racism, because of a criticism he had made of that Directorate.<sup>778</sup> At stake here for the political Leadership, in this particular issue, was the relationship between DCS and the manual and craft unions, a priority deemed higher than that of race equality. On another occasion, the principal researcher then working as a race equality adviser in Lambeth with responsibility for management and employment services, co-signed a letter with other advisers to the political leadership pointing out that if they undertook a certain course of action that that would be reneging on their race equality commitment to the local people. A star chamber like court of inquisition was convened in which Ted Knight and the Chief Executive attempted to get the advisers to withdraw the letter and to identify the main author so that he/she could be dealt with. A revealing comment as to the real reason for the ire, and, at the same time, the embeddedness of the status quo, was when Ted Knight, jerking a thumb at the Chief Executive, said, "Even he cannot write to me like that." In other words, despite Lansley's retrospective attempt to portray the new left administration in Lambeth as wanting to engage with the inherited orthodoxies of bureaucracy and management, the everyday practice of the political Leadership was very much that of preferring to reinforce the traditional communicative distancing "me member, you officer" divide. During the political stewardship of Ted Knight in Lambeth, the Directorate of Management Services, the Council's management and systems engine house, actually grew in strength. Apart from the work of the small race equality section, numbering two posts, which was the originator of all of the council's then race equality employment policies and changes, none of the other sections of that Directorate, nor the senior management, were either engaged in, or proffered, in terms of their intended work programme, a radical rethink of the internal structural relationships of the bureaucracy. When it comes to the clutch of people appointed to sensitive or senior posts because they were sympathetic to the political programme of the council, it became clear that 'sympathy' to the programme meant in fact membership of the Labour party. In one discussion with a senior Black Labour Councillor in another borough, he maintained that broad alliance to, or empathy with, a socialist vision of local government was not enough, when it came to appointments.<sup>779</sup> As far as he was concerned, and this stance, he was sure, applied to other councillors in other boroughs, the key defining criterion was whether or not that person was a member of the Labour party. In Lambeth,



using the early race structures as an example, all of those appointed to the first tranche of vacancies were members of the Labour Party. In two cases, the Principal Race Relations Advisor post and the Social Services Race Relations Adviser post, the appointees were key activists in their respective Labour constituency parties. When the Principal's post became vacant in 1982 because the incumbent had moved on to head the GLC's Ethnic Minority's Unit, his successor, much to the consternation of certain people who thought that there were better candidates, was a Black Labour councillor from another London borough. As has been pointed out before, Ted Knight's praise of his first principal Advisor had been that "he brought in the Black vote." It would appear, thus, that even in Lambeth, long held up as the pioneer of both local government race equality initiatives and as one of the first local socialist boroughs, progress and socialism had a conflationary affinity with the Labour Party in contra distinction to the promise of more open, participatory, democratic forms of political governance contained in the vision of local socialism. The question then is, if by the late seventies there was a promise of a more radical agenda for local government in some of the London boroughs, including those being examined in this piece of research, as well as indications of tendencies to short circuited orthodox practices which would frustrate the achievement of those aims, how can this be adequately theorised? This is a question which is even more important because it also begs the supplementary one of how this tendency influenced as well the establishment and treatment of the race equality programmes.

Orthodox liberal theorists of government and politics would treat this as the passing kaleidoscope of individual actions by individual politicians within an overly pragmatic world devoid of immanence. One gets that impression as well from those who have attempted a retrospective examination of local governance from a nineties position. For example Stoker, despite his attempt at a quasi-sociological heuristic categorisation of local governance theories and practices covering the seventies and eighties, arrives at a prognostic position on local government which is determined solely by the prospective plans of the Conservative and Labour parties; an example, perhaps, of 'apparatchik' reasoning.<sup>780</sup> There are shades of this limited reasoning in Lansley's review of local socialism in which the political programme, using the latter word loosely, comes almost to be seen as the outcome almost solely of councillors' actions. For example, apropos his section on race equality, which is sensationalist revisionist, he concludes that whatever the criticism of Labour's approach from those within the race equality field, Labour councillors were really committed, implying counter-posedly, as do some of his erstwhile Labour colleagues, that the 'failure' of that programme was, in some large part, down to the individual activities of race equality workers. Whatever criticisms there are, including my own, of Marxist attempts at theorising the state, or local state, there is at least an



endeavour to situate action within an intellectual framework that allows for both an internally logical review of such action as well as projection remedial action within a coherent vision. Whilst there appears not to be any reviews of local governance in the nineties by those who theorised local governance within a Marxist framework in the seventies, it is clear that if there were, then analyses of this type might err on the side of being too mechanistic. For example the instrumentalist version might argue that this is symptomatic of the collusion of interests between the petit bourgeois or bourgeois interests of the party leadership, senior managers and trade unions in what is no more than the local executive committee of the bourgeoisie. Consequently they are bound to act in that manner. Those within the arbiter model would argue that is proof of the “in the final analysis” undermining of autonomy by capital. On the other hand, within the purviews of the arbiter argument, those of the Trotskyist persuasion, and this was Ted Knight’s political background prior to formal membership of the Labour party, could reasonably argue that ‘anything goes’ in advance of the working class. Even a more sophisticated version of the post Fordist argument, undertaken in the nineties, which attempts to site, and cite, race and gender struggles as symptomatic of the forces undermining the Fordist project, and in so doing moves the post Fordist theory along the continuum into the arbiter camp, still under writes the determining logic through the language of capital.<sup>781</sup> All of these, as explanatory frameworks, are unacceptable because within them human action comes to be situated within contexts that can be seen to be no more than various shades of positivistic behaviourism. By the end of the seventies and beginning of the eighties, how then is one to theorise the situation of what has been termed ‘new left’ Labour councils and the relationships between the party, councillors and the polity? The answer to this question has particular pertinence for the introduction and development of what I have termed the positive racialisation of local governance, a process begun in many of the above termed London councils in the late seventies and early eighties.

### **10.5 Critical Unorthodoxy**

The answer lies within the framework of the communicative power model of politics outlined by Habermas and contained in his notions of politics as opinion and will-formation. This is in contrast to politics as administration in which political power is exercised through administrative power. With this as the back cloth it is possible to point out that the normative potential of the new left Labour ‘programme’ of the late seventies and early eighties held out the promise of greater democratisation of local government. There was a window of opportunity which would have allowed for a path to counter the pessimistic assessment of politics made in the early nineties which was that the “space for deliberative politics is shrinking”. However, it is clear as well, that the realisation of the political situation affording a greater degree



of communicative power was dependent on the Labour party, in particular, being able to overcome what I have described as 'being suckered by the system'. This refers to the process whereby politicians, especially those of radical intent, and, as I shall argue in later sections, this pertained particularly to Black politicians, end up not as representatives of the people but as managers of power, including their own petty political ambitions. Further elaboration of the key problem faced by the new left in local government power in the late seventies and early eighties, is provided by Habermas' answer to a particular question. The question, in three parts, asked to what extent parliaments and political parties could be regarded as opinion and will formation institutions; to what extent could the party dominated political class be controlled in line with the principle of radical democracy; and, is it thus not necessary to democratise the political system to create more space for communicative power?<sup>782</sup> I take this to summarise the conundrum faced by the new left proponents of 'local socialism' with their promise, particularly that to Black people and women, of greater participation in the processes of local governance. In some of the examples cited above it is clear that in the working out of this programme new left politicians had difficulty in, if not down right little intention of, transforming orthodox, or administrative, power. Habermas' answer to the question posed points this tendency out, as well as articulating the normative counter point. Thus:

"Insofar as political parties have been governmentalised in the interim – insofar as their democratic substance has been internally exhausted – they are acting from the point of view of the administrative system within which they have established positions of power that they want to keep.....in a democracy the symbolic place of politics should remain unoccupied; but it remains vacant only if democratic party leaders are regarded as people's representatives and not as office holders or as potential administrative chiefs. This requires institutional imagination. The institutional measures that help increase the political parties 'participation' in the formation of the political will, and keep them from acting as organs of the state would have to be in place at all levels..."<sup>783</sup>(BR –JH)

Re-articulating the problem in the language of communicative power and its instrumentalised antithesis, administrative power, allows us to reconstruct the ambivalent potential for transforming local governance that existed at this period. This, in my contention, is one that could have allowed for the development of a racially inclusive form of local governance, or, as events unfortunately turned out, a de-democratising strengthening of administrative power with its attendant political parties' secondary level legitimisation machinations entering the public sphere "as invaders from outside". According to Lansley after the 1982 local elections the new left in London had taken over, or made sizeable inroads, into seven councils, including the key target ones in this piece of research. How, why and in what form did



race come to be on the agenda of such councils at this period is covered in the next section.

## **10.6 Race and Local Governance in the Late Seventies and Early Eighties**

The title of this section is a reminder of my previous argument that one can view the racialisation of the state in the UK through a periodisation which sees the first period as arising out the experience of colonialism and imperialism. This, borrowing Furedi's term, is one marked by an attitude of racial confidence in the 'reality' of the racial hierarchy. The second period, differentiated out during the late thirties, is that characterised by racial fear in which the racial certainties are re-articulated in terms of culture, ethnicity and a reluctance in official circles to debate and discuss the issue for 'fear' of provoking trouble. From the thirties onwards it is difficult to attribute to the state, and the two major parties which have administered it, any overall, planned strategy in relation to race in the UK. Its approach has been, or so it appears, piece-meal, ad hoc, knee-jerk and on the hoof responses to focus group impetuses, to bring it up to date on what seems to be current government policy motivators. Nevertheless I have argued that the racialisation of the state began with the onset of dominating contact with Black peoples over the centuries to the extent that the modern political enlightenment, and some of its key concrete manifestations, such as the revolutionary inspired western constitutions, are shadowed and built upon, learning processes of domination. These learning processes, in the absence of communicative based deconstruction and transformation, are recursive and inform the responses of the state to problems of race based social integration. At one level this complements Omi and Winant's argument, based on their analysis of the US state, that the state is inherently racial.<sup>784</sup> An example of both the racial inherence and the recursive nature of such racism, can be seen in the current government's response to asylum seekers and refugees which has clear echoes of the approach of the state to similar displaced persons, particularly Jewish refugees, prior to and immediately after the Second World War. There is, however, a question, not so much about the theorisation of the state and race, but about the appropriateness of such theories, where appropriateness is tied into providing an adequate empirical dimension. This is especially so for theories, which in order to take account of epochly changing race scenarios across a temporal spectrum, make claims that racism is always changing. For example Solomos criticises neo-Marxist approaches to this issue, like Hall's and Winant's, and their derivatives, like Gilroy's, for being too theoretical and not closely enough tied into empirical sources.<sup>785</sup> In contrast his own approach to the specific question of how political structures in the UK "function in relation to race and in what ways ...they produce and reproduce or help overcome racism"<sup>786</sup> comes across as a manipulation and



regurgitation of a very extensive empirical database with insufficient attention to developing an appropriate theorisation. Within the two scenarios briefly sketched out above lies the problem of the interpretation of the state and race in the UK not only up to the early eighties, but up to the present as well. This is that there is either a surfeit of socio-political and – historical data with a modicum of analytical structure, or a grand theorisation sans suitable degree of empirical sources. In this regard mention has already been made of Gilroy's empirically challenged analysis of the eighties period of anti-racism and the local state.<sup>787</sup> Where, in the seventies, attempts were made to derive empirically based theories not so much of race and the state, as the state of race in the UK at that time, the derived studies tended to be overly sociological without sufficient attention being paid to the way in which racism both structures and is structured. Rex and Tomlinson's studies of inner city race problems is symptomatic of this, ending up with conclusions that bordered on the stereotypical, i.e. Asian responses to race discrimination were to seek "comfort" in capital accumulation, whilst Afro-Caribbean reactions were defensively "stropky"; a regilding, perhaps, of the 'chip-on-the-shoulder' syndrome.<sup>788</sup> On the other hand they captured the essence of what was then, and still is, an influential paradigm with regard to race, both within academic circles and the sphere of governance, which was that of 'race relations'. My argument up to now has been that whilst biologically there is only one human race, 'races', as in differences between groups of people on supposed biological grounds, especially those that are predicated on maintaining a hierarchy of domination, is a social construct which is communicatively structured. To that extent it too deals with relations between 'races', albeit socially constructed races. There is, however, an important difference between arguments, such as mine, and the race relations paradigm I refer to above. My analyses seeks the transformation of the forces in the structures of communication which maintain the unjust racialisation of communication. It is about the de-racialisation of 'race' and thus echoes at a general level, albeit from a differing perspective, David Goldberg's post modernist inspired call for not only the transformation of race, but also the language through which that transformation is sought. By the seventies and early eighties the transformative strand of 'race relations' was to be found in the Marxist inspired analyses of race in the UK. In this de-racialisation was tied to the overall struggle relating to the overcoming of capital. For example Sivanandan and the Institute of Race Relations during this period launched a series of scathing attacks on the orthodox notion of race relations, as exemplified in the legislation and associated parastatal 'race bureaucrats', because they were a "symbolic political act which gave the impression that something was being done while in practice achieving very little."<sup>789</sup> But this sounded like no more than the race dimension to the instrumentalist Marxist paradigm of the state. A variation on the Marxist transformation model of race relations is that of Miles in which race is an "ideological



effect, a mask which hides real economic relationships". In Britain this ideological work is enacted through the state, in the main, "as a means of crisis management and results in racialising fragments of the working class."<sup>790</sup> The examples of what I have termed transformative models of race relations are put forward so as to provide the outline of that which they are critiquing, viz. the orthodox model. The orthodox model does not seek an immanent critique of 'race', such as that conducted by Miles social labour based immanence. Instead it is enough that 'race' is used as a basis for social interaction, the end product of which, often termed 'harmonious race relations' is to be achieved through measures in which Black people are accommodated with and within existing structures and processes. Even if those structures and processes themselves unjustly differentiate on the bases of 'race', the nature of the accommodation is such that they are not questioned. At another level, then 'race' and 'racism' are aberrations from the norm, rather than integral to that norm. From a communicative perspective it can be argued that within this accommodationist model consensus, the basis for 'harmony', is not arrived at through de-racialising discursive communicative practices, but is managed and administered. Orthodox race relations then operates very much according to my notion of 'diskourse'. That is to say there is a set of non-dialogical language and theoretical reference points mal-structuring the communicative framework. Whilst the social constructions of this model are contributed to by the non accountability of elite academic institutions, the main impetus derives from the race specific actions of the state engaged in the overall strategy of managing the 'fear'. There are three main variants of this model – assimilationist, integrationist and diversity. I want to deal with the first two because the last one is very much a phenomenon of the nineties. The first two, unlike the last, are marked by notions of collective identity, even if the bases for these are ersatz constructions rather than inter-subjectively grounded solidaristic actions.

The post second world war evolution of the orthodox model of race relations was gradual, piecemeal, and only started gathering momentum in the sixties. Up to the late fifties government denial of a 'problem' with regard to race, as Furedi and Katznelson<sup>791</sup> separately argue, was very much the order of the day. This is not to deny Solomos's contention that race was very much the subject of discussion amongst Whitehall officials and politicians during this period and that both the Conservative and Labour governments of the respective days in the fifties instituted a number of covert administrative instruments designed to curb the inflow of Black immigrants.<sup>792</sup> What matters is that this was not a democratically open discussion, but one conducted in secrecy and under 'fearful' conditions. But then this was symptomatic of the resources officialdom had to draw on in responding to race which were largely framed by the colonial experience. The aftermath of the second world war, with Britain requiring labour from its colonies



coupled with the drive for independence in those very same colonies, created an official cross referenced departmental response to such issues in which problems were denied for fear of 'stirring up' trouble. But it was not just the state which drew on colonial learning processes for the populace at large had hundreds of years of unchallenged racist representations of Black people through which to mediate their social relations. It took thus the 1958 Notting Hill disturbances for the government to start moving out of its 'denial' mode and into the beginnings of planned action to manage relations between races. The 'disturbances' referred to above, plus other incidents of a similar nature, had two components: first a clear indication that Black people here in the UK were not going to tolerate racism; and secondly, a warning note that large parts of the white populace did not want Black people in this country. It is at this point race entered overtly into the legitimisation problems of the state and into the legitimisation calculations mass political parties had to make. The result of this was firstly that the major political parties developed a consensus on matters of race, and secondly that this resulted in such parties seeking legitimisation in a twofold strategy. Roy Jenkins, the sixties Labour government's Home Secretary, summarised the all party consensus to managing race in the UK, a now aphoristic status achieving saying which still underpins the UK government's approach to race, when he said; "Integration without control is impossible, but control without integration is indefensible."<sup>793</sup> The white populace's 'fears' were to be assuaged through the government action aimed at controlling the numbers of Black people entering and being allowed to stay in the country, expressed symbolically through a number of racially grounded immigration acts which began in the early sixties. Political accountability for this was directly structured through Parliament. Between the Notting Hill event in 1958 and the first major, post second world war, racially structured piece of immigration legislation in 1962, numerous open debates, in the sense that they were recorded for public communicative consumption, took place at party conferences and in parliament, about the need to restrict Black immigration.<sup>794</sup> That is to say that whatever the criticisms about the inadequacies of representative democracy the legitimisation test of the extent to which the government could be seen to be responding positively to the racist fears of white people, could be gauged to some degree via the ballot box. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act was symptomatic of the way in which race consciously entered the definition of who was allowed into the country, and thus into issues of nationality, without openly using race categories. Thus all Commonwealth passport holders were subject to immigration controls except those who were born in the UK, or held passports issued by the UK government. Solomos is right when he concludes that this particular piece of legislation was widely read as being applicable only to Black immigrants.<sup>795</sup> However, no such semblance of democratic accountability was afforded to meeting the legitimisation claims of Black people living in the UK. Instead, as Katznelson argues and shows,



the British state reached into the past and then prevailing pattern of governance of Black people as expressed through the UK state's colonial experience and introduced a series of structures and processes, with its own descriptive language, through which the government and through which it was expected Black people would, mediate their legitimation perspectives.<sup>796</sup> Between 1965 and 1976 three increasingly stronger pieces of race anti-discriminatory pieces of legislation were passed aimed at outlawing certain acts of racial discrimination. Given the 'control-integration' leitmotiv, it is not surprising that the government and its functions were omitted from the scope of the Acts. Whilst at one level, thus, these acts also satisfied the legitimation interests of the government internationally for they appeared to satisfy the expectations of the increasing level of race anti-discriminatory international protocols and legislation, at another level internally they offered the ostensible hope of redress to Black people who felt they had been racially wronged. The inadequacies of all three acts were, however, to become the focus of legitimation contestations between the claims for justice made by Black people and the legalistic anchoring of the 'control-integration' kernel. At another level it can be said that the development and implementation of the Acts failed to satisfy the principles of discursive communicative democracy for all of those affected were not party to the development of the legislative norms and final instruments. The 1976 race relations Act was very much the product of the white liberal wing of the legal profession and did not include in any substantive way the views and aspirations of the Black communities in the UK. It is not surprising, therefore, that Lustgarten's analysis of that Act includes the substantial observation that the chance to redress collective wrongs was missed, whether advertently or inadvertently.<sup>797</sup> In a nineties retrospective look back at the '76 Act, Anthony Lester, a barrister and prime architect of that Act, confirms that it was very much a product of the then Home Secretary's and his aims. His prefatory principles which he set out were that "the overwhelming majority of the coloured population is here to stay....and that the time has come for a determined effort by the government.....to ensure fair and equal treatment for all our people regardless of their race, colour or national origins."<sup>798</sup> That late seventies and asynchronous acknowledgement of Black people being here to stay has to contrasted with the everyday experiences and interpretations of Black people in the ongoing debate about who belongs and to which they were never formally invited to participate. Katznelson quotes a Black person's reactions in the late sixties to the debate going on around him, but not with him. Thus, "...in 1944 I was a serviceman in the British air force fighting for freedom and democracy. In 1947 I became a settler in Nottingham. In the 1958 riots I became a coloured man. In the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act I became a coloured immigrant. And in 1968 I am an unwanted coloured immigrant. You tell me what's going to happen to me in 1970."<sup>799</sup> In previous sections I had argued that controlling, defining and also unsettling space, time and place for black



people is one of the direct results of racism.. Attempting to write in remedies for this on the back of racist immigration controls actually undermines the potential for achieving the universal moral norms underpinning such remedial instruments. Hence Lester points to the improvements in the '76 Act over the '68 one, such as the inclusion of both direct and indirect discrimination, the intention to cover public institutions, including the Crown, giving individuals direct access to legal redress etc. Unfortunately he also points out the ways in which such intentions were frustrated. For example interpretations by the House of Lords effectively exempted the crown from the Act by making only individual acts, and not institutional ones, liable. Built into the Act itself under section 75(5) was the permission for the Crown to discriminate on the grounds of birth, nationality, descent and residence, whilst section 69(2) allowed ministers to issue certificates on the grounds of national security to block the access of individuals wanting to complain to employment tribunals. Additionally the fact that individuals making complaints of racial discrimination were not eligible for legal aid effectively meant that such individuals could not be adequately or effectively represented in court.<sup>800</sup> In other words the 1976 Act, in many circumstances, allows for the façade of making, and seeking redress, for and to, claims of racial justice without substantively meeting those claims, and thus contributes to the both satisfying the legitimisation responsibilities of government, and at the same time at the point of that façade cracking, a motivation crisis in respect of the government's right to govern. Within this context the main impetus for the development of the representational discourse of the orthodox race relations model grew. Katznelson derives his colonial analogy from the British model of indirect colonial rule involving the use of so-called indigenous and manufactured indigenous political structures through which the power of the colonial state was affected, pointing to the similarities between those and the structures and processes put into place in Britain post second world war to address 'race' problem. However, there were other aspects as well that seem to draw from the colonial well, for example the differentiation out of racial, cultural and religious aspects of the Black populations and affording of different priorities to these giving rise to the claim that these were part of a strategy of divide and rule. All of this is true to some extent; true in the sense that they attest to my arguments about the learning processes of domination. However the one aspect that marks this out as being 'colonial', and here I am in agreement with Katznelson, is the fact that these initiatives were removed from the direct, or other, democratic influence or control of Black people; they who were supposed to be the main beneficiaries of these actions. The way in which these structures and processes were established and the way in which they were expected to conduct there affairs amounted to a "quangoisation" of race. That is to say administration, not communicative discourse, was the order of the day. Katznelson makes use of the term 'racial buffering' to describe the



arrangement of institutional structures and processes which were, and still are expected, to interpolate between Black experiences and the political process.<sup>801</sup> Thus he notes that a “key feature of classic colonial patterns of social control – indirect rule through a broker, native leadership – has been replicated in the mother country....(where indirect rule)....refers in an omnibus way to a variety of colonial practices governing in different areas....(and in which)....native chiefs were an integral part of the colonial administration.”<sup>802</sup> In the sixties the government gave intention of formalising the institutionalisation of racial buffering in the 1965 White paper which set out the proposals to create a National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants supported by a network of local NCCIs. The core of principles underpinning the philosophy and operationalisation of this approach still inheres in those of the NCCI’s successor structures, the Race Relations Board and Commission and local community relation councils (CRCs), and, currently in the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) and local CRCs. These principles were, and are, that the NCCI, and its support structures at the local level, were not there to be in the role of spokesperson for Black people, or an institutional framework for pressure groups, but rather that of developing and managing a ‘consensus’ between ‘old’ and ‘new’ communities through a role that can be best described as that of being cultural intermediaries. The 1967 guidelines for the formation of local committees, as Katznelson points out, emphasised that this was not “a committee to serve the interests of one section of the community, but a committee to promote racial harmony...(being)...therefore beneficial to all.”<sup>803</sup> Representation was to be drawn from all local organisation sectors of the community, e.g. Rotary Club etc., as well as the ‘*visible* immigrant leadership’. For Katznelson, and I am in general agreement with his conclusion, “the significance of the critical structural decision to link the Third World population to the polity through buffer institutions, replicating key features of traditional colonial relationships....was ....the building of a political consensus aimed at depoliticising race.”<sup>804</sup> Whilst it appears that at the time of writing in the mid seventies Katznelson had a more orthodox notion of depoliticisation, that is linking it to formal participation, or lack of it, in the polity, his argument applies equally to the idea of depoliticisation as expressed in the nineties as that of “the modern orthodoxies of technocratic, managerial ‘consensus politics’”. But there is another aspect of this institutionalisation of ‘technocratic, managerial consensus’ on race that Katznelson does not adequately signify. This is that whilst he points out that the successor to the NCCI, the Community Relations Commission, established by section 25 of the 1968 Race Relations Act, was, unlike the NCCI, made a statutory body responsible to the Home Office, he does not properly highlight the role and context of that lead government department. The Home Office was always associated with the responsibilities for law and order and immigration in which the latter task was from the outset racialised through over signification of Jewish immigration in the nineteenth century,



thus effectively blurring the boundaries between law and order and immigration. In the thirties, as Jacobs points out, anti-fascist mobilisation in the East End, together with the obvious involvement of local Jewish communities therein, created in the minds of Home Office officials and politicians the association of anti-racist movements, even if such a term would not have been used then, with that of the problem of public order.<sup>805</sup> A nascent notion of 'community relations' as the legitimating seed bed for good community order and harmony, and thus an antidote to both extreme right wing political demands as well as radical opposition to those demands, began to germinate. From the sixties, onwards then, the formalisation of the management of race by the state, through the political shibboleth of no integration without control etc. – and woe betide any politician who goes against this particular grain – came to be both symbolised by that Department's historical and contemporary roles, and at the same time invited critique and opposition because of the inherent contradiction in trying to run those two together. At another level then, in terms of the subliminal blockages to non-distorted communication, it can be said that Black people's presence in this country straddled a blurred political line which was, and is, being defined and moved between grudging acceptance and being merged with notions of the enemy within. Overall, however, Jacobs assessment that the race relations initiatives of government were more concerned with the issue of social control and order rather than addressing that of racism, is correct. The question now is to what extent my, and Katznelson's, analysis of the state's approach to Black people in the country as being primarily colonial in character holds true for the late seventies. The answer to this will be explored in the next section which details the relationship between these institutionalised race structures and processes and the local governance polity, thereby beginning to sketch in as well the race and local governance prelude to what I have previously described as the positive racialisation of local governance.

### **10.7 Race, Local Governance and the Colonial in the Seventies**

In the previous sections I had argued that the nineties downgrading and de-prioritisation of race equality in local government, particularly those London ones which had been regarded as 'leading edge' in this area of responsibilities, could be likened to a process of re-colonisation. This argument is structured not only in relation to the evidence of de-democratisation and imposition of administrative rule in those areas where previously there had been actual, or the potential for, communicative discourse concerning issues of race, but also in relation to colouring Habermas' theory of lifeworld colonisation. The point about raising this now is that this is different to Katznelson's argument concerning the colonisation of Black people in the UK post second world war. I see this rather, and I think Katznelson argues the same, as the extension of the



colonial paradigm of rule internally to deal with the 'establishment's' racial fear of potential disruptions to public order, thereby threatening at both the primary and secondary levels the political and societal legitimating bases. Thus Katznelson, in considering the remedial alternatives, poses two possible ways forward in the seventies. The first envisages Black people being treated equally with white people and enjoying the same political rights without fear or actual practice of racism. The second draws on a notion of consociational democracy entailing a form of group representation in the political decision making structures. Leaving aside the unfortunate misappropriation and misuse of the consociational ideas by the eighties apartheid theoreticians in South Africa in an attempt to lend intellectual respectability to their then constitutional proposals, there are inklings in both Katznelson's suggestions of what I am arguing for. His first assumes the de-racialised society which I contend requires radical restructuring in the communicative relationships, including the political ones. The second marks out an overlap with the intellectual and political developments surrounding the movements concerned with Black representation in the Labour movement, both at the political and trade union levels. The latter, particularly those associated with certain trade unions, were quite influential in beginning to open up the communicative structures in local government in a way that helped the process of positive racialisation, and thus, in a way, running with the colonial metaphor, that of de-colonisation.

We can flesh out the 'colonial' paradigm, as the state sponsored and supported race related structures and institutions have come to be described, by reference to those structures and institutions formally incepted through the 1976 Race Relations Act. In the previous section I had attempted to define the colonial, in substantiation of the argument that the nineties are overseeing a period of re-colonisation, in relation to a number of non-discursive communicative features on the basis that the domination of the colonial regime is marked by the total absence of communicative discursive processes and mechanisms for the colonial 'subjects'. These features are the development and imposition of administrative systems as a substitute for political ones by, primarily, viewing race as a problem to be 'managed'. It can be seen that, whilst the actual physical distance between the 'colony' and the metropole has now been shortened, the political communicative distance is just as vast because 'race' is effectively removed from the political decision making bodies. The genesis of the 1976 Act bears testament to this. Whilst it can be argued that the pressure to bring in a more effective piece of anti-discriminatory legislation than that which existed in the 1968 Act brought into the public sphere the burgeoning Black political voice being expressed through their own organisations, e.g. the Indian Workers Association, or those which covered similar areas of concern, e.g. the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination, the actual conceptualisation and drafting of the Act remained a white liberal activity, ultimately being



negotiated through, and sanctioned by an all white parliament without any real communicative channels to the Black constituency. The main institutional structure established by the '76 Act was the Commission for Racial Equality, (CRE). Whilst this body has more powers than that of its direct organisational predecessors, the Community Relations Commission and Race Relations Board, and the NCCI, the principles underpinning the latter, as I argue above, are still enshrined in the CRE. Ultimately these come down to the 'moderate' management of race issues. The 'paternalism' identified by Rex in the sixties state sponsored race institutions, still existed in the thinking that lay behind the establishment of the institutional structures. The CRE was, and is headed by a Chair, appointed by the government and who, in turn, oversees the work of the Commission. In this the Chair is aided by a board of Commissioners, again, all government appointees. Little wonder then, that the first Black Chair of the CRE was only appointed in the nineties. At the local level the existence and continuing establishment of Community Relations Councils continued as part of the CRE's brief. CRCs were, in some ways, a mirror image on a smaller scale of the CRE. The manager of the CRC, the Community Relations Officer, sometimes prefaced with the title 'Principal', was, as is the staff of the CRE, a government appointee. The management committee of local CRCs are, on the whole, there at the behest of the CRO. Many CRCs also obtain up to half of their funding from the respective local authority. The relationship between the CRE and CRCs is, however, as the 1981 Home Affairs Committee Report, strongly implied, very centralist. As Jacobs observes, "ultimately the CRCs do have to respond to the general administrative and financial requirements of the CRE."<sup>806</sup> In support of this observation he relates the incident of how the CRE threatened to cut off the funds of the Wolverhampton CRC because that body's proposed appointee to a senior CRO post was regarded as too radical for the CRE. This however says more than just expecting CRCs to adhere to administrative guidelines because it also demonstrates the trope of race moderation which informs the race politics of the colonial. The same HAC Report highlights what it describes as "an atmosphere of backbiting and bickering" which pervades the industrial relations perspective to CRCs, and which, from an effectiveness and value for money view, undermines the achievement of race harmony.<sup>807</sup> But then this is not so surprising. CRCs' responsibilities range from policy development, through public education, community development to community service. Its accountability lines, however, are, in many cases, tri-partite because they track back to specific responsibilities to the CRE, and local government, and a more general, unspecified one to the community. None of these were, or are, democratic in the orthodox sense, or discursively communicative, in the sense that I think they should be. Jacobs points to Black groups formally associating with CRCs, even though they were ambivalent about their role, because he reasons that these groups saw the CRC as a route to local government resources. To some



extent this is true. However, as I shall show with reference to Lambeth and borough X, the affiliation of Black groups to CRCs was in many ways limited, a partiality which had much to do with the politicking of CROs and the CRCs committees as they tried to form affiliate shields in an attempt to ward off criticism from more radical elements in the Black community. They also legitimated claims made by CROs that they had a 'constituency' and thus could speak for the Black community. In some cases this partiality split along fractious ethnic lines as self appointed ethnic leaders spoke on behalf of their self claimed constituencies to lay claim to the CRCs resources, or those of the local council. But these fault lines were there from the outset of the state's attempts to create colonial buffering institutions. They hark back to the complaint from a NCCI development officer in the sixties that because of the tri-partite lines of fractured accountability, they "were caught in a bind" and thus had to be careful.<sup>808</sup> Another commentator noted that the organisation generated "an atmosphere of superficial liberalism and generalised good will...(but that)...its characteristic style is paralysis and non-statement." I would argue that this paralysis and internecine conflict inheres in the unstated politics of trying to manage a constructed, moderate consensus on race without the discursive involvement of Black people, because these problems, as they often do, turn on the types of purposive rational action given over to career decisions and/or personality clashes. More importantly it can be said that the focus of race equality, apart from being trapped in the orthodoxy of 'race relations', is displaced on to the administrative system instead of the political system and that those macro- and micro-level normative decisions pertaining to racial justice are considered primarily within a managerial context governed by means-end reversal. It is little wonder that the role and status of the CRE and CRCs were viewed with a great degree of scepticism, and even downright hostility, by some organisations and activists in the Black community. In terms of what I have described as the transformative perspective on race relations, commentators like Sivanandan, viewed the whole process as evidence of the way in which the state responded to capitalist economic interests which both required the adoption of a migrant system of labour together with the control and management of race domestically through the creation of a parastatal race bureaucracy. Whatever the doubts about the social labour based determinism of Sivanandan's argument, there is, contained within his critique, the kernel of a valid criticism, which is that these bureaucracies appeared incapable of changing, or influencing the overall plight of Black people.<sup>809</sup> By the mid seventies there was overwhelming evidence pointing to the general state of what has been termed 'racial disadvantage' experienced by Black people in the UK. This related to their differential life chances as expressed in their access to material and political resources. Across the whole range of citizen enhancing processes and resources Black people were worse off when compared with white people. Thus there were keenly felt and argued



issues around the failures of the educational, social and health, housing and criminal justice services, not to mention the visible threat to political participation posed by the rise of the extreme right. The empirical studies, which I'll only refer to generally and globally, speak for themselves. What is clear, however, is that the lead in opposing, fighting and proffering alternatives to these manifestations of racism, and their underlying philosophies, came from movements and activists thrown up by, and centred on, the Black communities. In these CRCs either lagged behind, or were very silent 'partners'. Within this context it can be more easily comprehended why, upon coming to power in 1979, the Thatcher government resisted calls from its own right wing to overhaul and/or close down the 'race relations' industry.

There is however another important aspect to this which is germane to this piece of research. Many of the services mentioned above were either part of the local authorities remit, or operationalised through local structures with functional and/or mutually influencing links to the apparatus of local governance. The CRE did then, and still does, claim part of its legitimacy to speak on issues of race, from the contact and liaisons local CRCs have with both the Black communities and local authorities. From the outset the race relations structures, starting with the local NCCIs were in a prime position to try and influence the local authorities, especially since part of their funding sources in many cases were direct from local government. It can be seen, however, from the studies done on the Nottingham race structures in the late sixties and from that done on the Wolverhampton ones, that the relationships established with local authorities were, for the most part, ineffectually facadic, characterised by the local authorities wanting to maintain such structures as no more than talking shops, and, in some cases, CROs legitimating that devaluing process through their own career and status needs.<sup>810</sup> Race was then on the local governance agenda long before the development of internal race structures and processes in the eighties both formally, through the establishment of relationships with local CRCs, and informally through the myriad racist decisions which excluded Black people from most aspects of the local authority. Apropos the latter Jacobs cites the example of the Housing Department in Wolverhampton in the seventies where formalised informal race monitoring of housing applications, via hand written coded additions, with the intention of excluding those applicants. It can be said that the relationship between local CRCs and the local authority was very much that of the external adviser, marginalised by the local authority, and used only as and when it suited that local authority's needs; above all hardly ever being able to influence substantially the internal workings of the authority. The extent to which this can be said to hold true can be considered with reference to the mid-seventies history of the CRC in Lambeth, not only because it will provide us with the background to the decision to develop internal race equality structures in Lambeth council in



the late seventies, this council being the main secondary source of information, but also because this process will in itself be a rough template against which to consider the initiation of race equality structures in the primary target borough. This makes sense as well in terms of the time chart of events because Lambeth established its race equality structures in 1979, and target borough X their own in 1984. It will be argued that the Lambeth structures and underwriting processes had a seminal influence on the Borough X's decision to establish similar ones.

Thus Lambeth's CRC was established in the late sixties under the legal and organisational auspices of the 1965 Race Relations Act and Race Relations Commission; later consolidated through the 1968 Race Relations Act. Its inception and early development criss-crossed the varying fortunes of Labour in the 1970 local elections, including the loss of Lambeth to the Conservatives at that time, and the subsequent re-assumption of power by the local Labour party in 1974. But this was a Labour Party which at this local level was changing from the old traditional one of the sixties. There was a larger influx, not only in terms of members, but also in terms of elected councillors, of both those who could be described as moderate 'modernisers' and more left wing radicals. The importance of this was that it was the beginning of the attempts by the political party and leadership to forge external links with local community organisations and 'representatives', especially those from the Black community, recognising that the old traditional, authoritarian, inward, incestuous form of politics that was old Labour, was no longer appropriate. The local CRC's role in this was afforded prominence both because it was the most conspicuous 'race' organisation in the borough and because it was seen, and used, as a 'respectable' cultural intermediary conduit to certain Black organisations and designated 'leaders' or 'representatives' from the community. Part of this reputation for 'respectability' was maintained in its early years by the over representation of white people on the executive committee, including council representatives. Indeed it was only in 1975 that the first Black Chair of that committee was elected. In some cases there was a political cross over with certain Black individuals who were themselves members of the Labour Party.<sup>811</sup> This is not so surprising. Other commentators have through the sixties, seventies and eighties analysed the extent to which, despite their record on race, the Labour Party has been, and is, seen as the 'only' political party for Black people, if only because at the end of the day they still aspire to the norms of social justice. This was the case in Lambeth and from the mid seventies onwards there was a steady increase in the membership of Black people in the local Labour party. Additionally 'race' could not be ignored by the politicians in Lambeth. The Black community represented over 20% of the population in Lambeth according to the 1971 census. The Lambeth CRC was seen, then, as a local 'race' organisation with which the Council could do business, and, in so doing be represented as 'doing' that



business on behalf of and with the Black community. The fact, however, is that “this ‘respectability’ did not necessarily mean the organisation was either functionally efficient or indeed credible in the eyes of the grassroots, the majority of local black people ..(since)...it was often contended by CCRL’s own members and officers that the organisation was little known and probably not much respected by many people.”<sup>812</sup> This lack of respect and acknowledgement from the ‘grassroots’ also stemmed from the CCRL’s role in another important aspect of the state’s attempt to run with a colonial paradigm in inner city areas with large Black populations. Since the late sixties and through into the seventies successive governments had, and have, attempted to influence the social control dimension to run down inner city areas through a number of inner city programmes all of which had a substantial grant dispensing element. The majority of these monies were channelled through local authorities. In the seventies Edwards and Batley’s important study of these programmes concluded that the key incentive for their development lay in the underlying fear governments had of the potential for racial unrest in the inner city areas.<sup>813</sup> Atkinson’s and Moon’s study of urban policy in the UK argue and attest “to the long term role race has played in shaping the conception and development of urban initiatives”, starting in the fifties.<sup>814</sup> The growth in Black population from about 500,000 in 1950 to just over a million in 1969 facilitated the development of an area based approach to urban policy by the government, as opposed to the immediate post second World War emphasis on a physical strategy, i.e. addressing in the most simplistic of terms the obvious physical manifestations of deprivation. In support of my argument regarding legitimisation strategies and tactics on the part of the major political parties, Atkinson and Moon summarise this the thinking behind this change in urban initiatives succinctly.

“Given the concentration of black and Asian people (*their terms*) in urban areas, some form of area-based urban initiatives would inevitably include many within its net while avoiding overt targeting. From this perspective the genesis of urban initiatives can be seen, at least partially, as a shrewd response to black and Asian needs and liberal opinion which, simultaneously, avoided alienating the white working class vote that was so essential to the Labour Party’s electoral fortunes.”<sup>815</sup>

In a previous chapter I had argued that the period of the nineties re-colonisation of the inner cities, marked particularly by the targeting and disestablishing of key race equality structures and processes in local authorities, is masked by a falsely constructed new universal need for efficiency, economy etc., and largely taking effect through the introduction of neo-managerialist programmes. This trope of ‘mal-targeting’ Black people through an ersatz universalism as justification takes its originating cue from the exculpation for colonialism and imperialism. This is evident in the structuring of Britain’s urban policy throughout the fifties, sixties, and



seventies wherein the universal 'urban' was a code for finding acceptable ways to manage the 'race problem'. This latter sentiment appeared to be a subsidiary element of the urban programmes where the combination of the local CRCs and local authorities, the former acting as the main, if not the only, scrutineer of 'acceptable' Black grant applications, ensured that funds went to 'deserving' Black organisations. At another level it expressed the views voiced by a prominent educationalist in one of the remaining British colonies in Africa in the late sixties that the best hope for independent African countries lay in the creation of a middle class through the proper targeting of resources, such as education.<sup>816</sup> Whether or not one accepts this tracking back of the urban programme rationale's anthropophagi, it is clear that the urban programmes of the late sixties to late seventies were born of a fear of US style racial violence in the inner city, and, given the ostensible universal character of the policy, born, as Young argues, "to ambiguity". This other strand to the attempt, by government, to manage the 'race problem', is put into perspective by Stewart's and Whiting's 1983 study of race and the urban programme.<sup>817</sup> They conclude that since Black people's major concerns are about racism and discrimination, an Urban Programme, understood as a source of funds for community activities, is "at worst a diversionary smoke screen to divert attention from the absence of a serious commitment to a multi-racial society."<sup>818</sup> What the latter quote attests to is the characteristic of trying to manage non-discursively within an underlying context of fear and denial which comes to determine the experience of Black people within such programmes. This is the attribute of marginality whereby race is manipulated consciously or unconsciously on to the backburner of priority social issues. There are two inter-related ways in which this can be seen to work in relation to the urban programme. The first is that because 'race', particularly the dimension of race equality cannot explicitly and communicatively discursively, be built into the considerations, for to do so would be to undermine the unspoken legitimisation compact with the white working class, there are no means to ensure that grant monies are equitably distributed to the Black community. The result, both in Lambeth, and, as shall be shown, in the target borough, is a grant funding profile heavily skewed in favour of white, often large traditional NGOs, with a spattering of Black groups. For example Ouseley, first Principal CRO with the Lambeth CRC, and then the council's first Principal Race Relations Adviser, noted that:

"By 1977 there was a developing awareness within parts of the black community that one or two of the black organisations had better access to local authority funds, mainly because the personalities involved were known to Council officials and key elected members, and were regarded as the unofficial or even official spokespersons or leaders for the black community. This consciousness also extended to include the local CRC which was understandably, if mistakenly, regarded by some as a quasi-governmental body. Holding a unique and favourable position in the eyes of the council....The twin combination of self-imposed black



leadership and a well resourced CRC were then increasingly being seen by some groups as constraining the development of a more natural black community response to issues directly concerning them...<sup>819</sup>

Then there is the second aspect of marginality, which again because of the dual, but contradictory, legitimisation interests securing the constructed consensus on race, ensures that the parameters of any overt recognition of race by the state is restrictedly defined and controlled. A case in point is that of the definition(s) and use of Section 11 monies. Section 11 of the 1966 Local Government Act enabled local authorities with significant numbers of Black children, especially Black Asian children whose first language was not English, to apply for up to 75% of the cost of funding for additional English teachers. As Atkinson and Moon summarise the intent of that part of the '66 Act, this was an attempt "to assist the assimilation of immigrants into the host population ...(and)...reflected the view that black and Asian children constituted a problem, and a concern that the white population should not feel threatened."<sup>820</sup> Marginality was re-enforced by the practice of many authorities in applying for blocks of Section 11 money and then using that in a non-race specific role to bolster the mainstream budget. Additionally, as I shall show later, as if to emphasise the transitory nature of such initiatives, the majority of race specific posts created in local authorities during the expansion of race equality programmes, were funded under the auspices of Section 11. One can see most clearly the way in which the dual, Janus faced nature of the race contract in the UK, reflected in the 1977 White paper issued by the Department of the Environment, sustains the distorting blockages to communicative clarity on responsibility for racial justice, thereby ensuring the process of marginalisation as a means of social control. In the prefatory comments to the White paper publication the then Environment Secretary, Peter Walker, had argued for the need to discover the "extent of multiple deprivation suffered by Britain's black and Asian populations."<sup>821</sup> Yet the actual white paper went on to state that, "the attack on the specific problem of race discrimination and the resultant disadvantages must be primarily through the new anti-discrimination legislation and the work of the Commission for Race Equality."<sup>822</sup> It is clear that at work here was, again, the hope that area based, 'universal' urban programmes would, in their broad shotgun effects, pick up on Black needs, whilst, in an ostensible play to the white legitimating constituencies, the public focussing on the CRE could be visibly seen to be consigning race to its 'rightful' ghetto. In both cases of marginality outlined above the scenarios illustrate the argument that the 'colonial' operates through suppressing the proper discursive resolution of race through a recursive process of marginalisation. The latter is often thinly disguised under an ostensible appeal both to generalities, whether this be "the civilising mission", or the area based approach to urban programmes, and to the view that these generalities are best achieved through administrative means.



There was a visible presence both metaphorically and in reality, in the latter case reinforced by the fact that the Town Hall was practically in the centre of that community's social focus, Brixton. The soon to be christened 'front-line- was less than five minutes walk away. This was the time, as well, of increased community mobilisation around issues of concern, especially to the Black community – the 'sus' campaigns, those around the treatment of Black children in the educational system, the coalitions against right wing extremists, the increased labour disputes, such as Grunwick, both against certain employers and the complicity of major trade unions. It was the burgeoning development, as well, of an incipient Black public sphere and supporting network exemplified by race or Black specific communication forms of media, such as 'Race Today' and, for the more torturously inclined Marxist intellectual, 'Black Liberator', with both of those publications' head quarters being sited in Brixton. Unfortunately the extent to which, by the late seventies, these influences, the orthodox race structures and developing social movement on race rights and justice, flowed past and failed to change the nature and instruments of local governance in Lambeth, can be gauged through a cursory race profile of the council. By the time of the 1978 local government elections affecting Lambeth there were no Black councillors. The proportion of Black people working for the council stood at under 5%. Local Black organisations and representatives had for some time been raising issues over what they regarded as the racist practices of two of the major service directorates, Housing and Social Services. The complaints about the Housing Directorate focussed not only on the differential access to council housing, compared with white people, experienced by Black people, but also the differential access to the good housing stock. There were certain run down council estates regarded as dumping grounds for Black people. With Social Services there was a strong view, soon to be confirmed by the Council's own research, that they displayed an over zealous policing and surveillant role in the lives of Black families resulting in inappropriate service interventions, reflected then in the disproportionate number of Black children legally taken into care. There were as well, growing anger over the way in which the urban programme was being managed through the conduit of the local council.<sup>823</sup> The question, in terms of my argument, was how to break out of the colonial stranglehold represented through the language of the orthodox race relations model and its organisational, structural and legal realities of race management and social control. The answer lay in the way in which the Black organisations and activists achieved a sufficient measure of solidaristic and collective action which enabled them to break away from the confines of state sponsored action and to place the issue of race, and more pertinently race equality, explicitly into the arena of local democracy and governance; moreover place it with a degree of accountability back to that community.



By 1978 the two major points of contention, that of the patronising inaction on the part of the council with regard to race equality and the perceived imposition of Black self-styled leaders, bolstered by council connivance in securing disproportionate funds for their respective organisations, was the prime impetus for a large number of grass roots organisations coming together. This was facilitated by the local CRC, primarily because the relatively new CRO, Ouseley, wanted to push the CRC into a new radical direction which would see it playing a local facilitative role in anti-racist initiatives and far less of that which the council had constructed and come to expect, i.e. as spokesperson for the Black community. Out of this series of meetings between organisations came a large, federated one comprised of both Afro-Caribbean and Asian constituents. Called the Consortium of Ethnic Minorities, its aims were primarily to secure the development and advancement of ethnic minority organisations and communities in Lambeth through helping them to secure the relevant resources, to ensure they are consulted by local and national governments on issues relevant to those local communities, and to secure change in the way in which the local council addressed the issue of race. Apropos the latter point the local CRC had previously put forward to the council's political leadership that it needed a new strategy to tackle racism within the council. The response had been to deny the existence of a problem, to re-affirm the council's good intentions on race, and to offer the CRC slightly more resources to tackle the issue of discrimination. This, quite rightly, was viewed as both offensive and patronising by the CRC. However, it was to be this confluence of mobilised Black opinion and influence and the changes from the left within the local Labour party which saw a commitment to introducing relevant race equality change within the council being written into the local Labour Party's manifesto for the 1978 local government elections. It would be realistic to say that this 'confluence' contained a number of values and motivations – a genuine desire on the part of both groups to secure the goal of race equality within the council; the more strategic one of securing more resources, primarily urban programme grant funds, on the part of black organisations; the equally strategic motivation of securing the Black vote, on the part of those left politicians then in the ascendancy. Nevertheless this array of forces was the prime impetus for the inception and development of race equality structures and processes within Lambeth Council post 1978.<sup>824</sup> What is important, and this is not a construction which has been put on it by any of the commentators on race and local governance in the UK, including Ouseley, is that not only did race move out of the shadows of government machinations into a more positive valorisation, but this goal of race equality as a positive, explicit one, was placed within the purviews of local democracy, thus offering the potential for a communicative discursive control and/or influence, fully inclusive of Black constituents, over race.



As a prefatory run in to the main work that derives from the target borough, I shall provide a brief outline of the race equality structures introduced into Lambeth Council. This will concentrate on the radical ambivalence at the core of these structures, and thus, in my view, the potential that existed to change fundamentally the power relationship between Black people and the institutions of local governance. It begins to pin-point as well my argument that this period, which I have identified as the positive racialisation of local governance, had within it the potential for the development of a de-colonising, fully inclusive relationship between Black people and local governance. At the time Lambeth Council was comprised of twelve Directorates, each covering a specific service area made up of related sub-service areas. In turn each was responsible to a service committee made up of councillors who, in theory at least, were responsible for the policy direction of that Directorate. However, the major committee was the Policy and Resources Committee with a remit for agreeing and overseeing the key policy and resource decisions and directions of the council. In terms of internal structures and processes, Lambeth was very much a large, hierarchical bureaucracy, but with a managerial and information infrastructure, because of the corporatist changes initiated in the early to mid seventies, which were more dynamic than many other neighbouring boroughs. That is to say that council policies were often underpinned by relatively efficient operational procedures and information systems. At the heart of this was the Directorate of Management Services which provided the intellectual, policy and procedure impetus resources for the human resource and organisational development direction of the council. Yet, this 'modern', 'progressive' stance on management still operated, as I have argued earlier, on assumptions that underpinned the orthodoxy of bureaucratic power relationships and those between elected members and officers. This allowed for a configuration of both formal decision making powers, as exemplified in senior management team arrangements, and informal ones which were equally, if not more, powerful, e.g. those between Chairs of committees, directors and senior union officials, often enacted in the local public houses and cafes surrounding the town hall. Within an arrangement like this it was extremely difficult for managers below the senior level to achieve, or initiate, any kind of radical change. Yet a race equality structure was created in the council in which the key personnel were graded at middle management level, with only the Principal post bordering on the senior management grade. Its relative success stemmed from the way in which these posts bypassed the bureaucracy in terms of formal, hierarchical accountability lines, and in essence, reported direct to elected members.

The structure, agreed by the Policy and Resources Committee in April 1978, an agreement bolstered by the weight of support from the Consortium of Ethnic Minorities, comprised a Race Relations Unit in the Chief Executive's



Directorate, and Race Relations Advisers in each of the Management Services, Social Services, Housing and Amenity Services Directorates.<sup>825</sup> Whilst in terms of the formal reporting line arrangement these posts reported to the Director, or Chief Executive in the case of the Principal Race Relations Adviser, those senior officers could only comment, but never amend, any advice or policy recommendations made by those advisers. That responsibility was to be the sole province of elected members. Additionally the Management Services Adviser, with the main remit for employment, also covered all the other Directorates, including, in terms of overall race policy on employment, those with their own advisers. The advisers were also functionally linked to the Principal Race Relations Adviser. It is true then that "the advisers were given an independent role with access to power", which also included the PRRA having "access to the Leader of the Council to generate speedy intervention on any issue of great concern."<sup>826</sup> At the formal political level the Community Affairs Committee, one with eponymous responsibilities covering areas such as grants to community groups, was given an additional set of references related specifically to race. This was to enable a formal co-ordinating role to be established on race matters at member decision making level. The role and responsibilities of the Race Relations Unit and Directorate advisers were, "to develop explicit race policies, to introduce measures to combat all forms of racial discrimination, to advise on equality programmes, to develop race awareness within the authority, to liaise with black community organisations, to spearhead the development of a race relations strategy for the authority, and to monitor the overall effectiveness of the race policies."<sup>827</sup> It is clear that for the period, 1978, this was an innovative structure, an innovation described mainly, even by its architect, Ouseley, as that which gave advisers 'access to power'. That, and the apparent confusion evident in the 'race relations' model written into the advisory function together with the 'race equality' function, underscores what I had earlier described as the "radical ambivalence" underlying the role of the structures. I want to concentrate on the radical potential written into these structures which in the early years were never fully appreciated. This is that aside from the obvious catalytic change role these structures had, there was also that of being a communicative conduit for Black opinion to influence both the political and administrative decision making mechanisms in a direct participative way. For the most part, however, up to 1982, the race structures operated in a rhetorical manner; rhetorical in the sense that I have argued in an earlier chapter in so far as claims were made which were still to be discursively communicatively redeemed because those undistorted communication forces were still in place. To some extent this position was successful in so far as visible race equality progress could be discerned, primarily in the employment field where the number of Black employees rose considerably. It would be true to say that the bulk of the work in those early days focussed on increasing the level of Black people in the organisation. However



rhetoical claims, if they are to retain the promise of communicative democracy, have to tread a fine balancing line between showing how that promise can be fulfilled, and lapsing into the politics of representation. In ensuring the former, the actual representation of formal, instrumentalised authority in the organisation has to be divested of real value by those occupying such positions through participative activities with those they claim as constituents, whilst at the same time also using those formal positions of power and symbolic status strategically in the service of such communicative aims. It is unfortunate, therefore, that positions of status and hierarchical pecking order, were afforded more importance by that first tranche of race advisers. All this served to do was to help shift the emphasis of the race equality structures from that of being catalytic to that of being marginalised. For example, other non race advisory section 11 funded staff, but who nevertheless had race specific responsibilities, were not brought into the co-ordinating, developmental and participative activities of the race advisers, which in the end served only to announce a hierarchical order of race advice and to provide an unnecessary communicative distance which was exploited by those seeking to disrupt the race equality initiatives. But there are other positive examples of what could have been achieved if a more collective, solidaristic approach had been adopted. Two will be briefly outlined.

The first relates to a research project undertaken by the Directorate of Social Services research section into the reasons for reception into, and treatment by, that directorate's child care services.<sup>828</sup> Built into this was a race monitoring question, which was the only ostensible race dimension to the project. However, it did enable the database to be differentiated on the grounds of race and so for identical sets of information to be compared. What emerged was that there were differences across the whole gamut of the projects span which could only be attributed to race. Whilst the recommendations arising from the report were accepted by the council, the detailed substantive report was suppressed by the relevant white manager on the grounds that it read as if it were written by someone totally alienated from the directorate. The term 'white manager' is relevant because the report was written by the first, and at that time, only Black research officer in the section. What is interesting, however, is the reaction of the race equality personnel. The race adviser in the Directorate at the time was viewed with some critical scepticism by both the small number of Black employees and certain Black organisations. This is not only because she was white. It had to do as well with her prominent membership of the local Labour party in Lambeth as well as the perception that she had not produced anything of substance since her appointment. The report on Black children in care came as something of a bombshell, and its suppression appeared to be more than just the prejudiced whim of one particular manager. It was notable, however, that the central Race Unit did very little to support the



publication of the report. Nevertheless, one of its agreed recommendations was that working party should be established comprised of relevant Black organisations and Social Services staff with the brief to produce a good practice guide on Black children in care. The thinking behind a good practice guide by the research officer concerned was that the care services for Black children had to be deconstructed and reconstructed with the participative involvement of the local community. Underlying this was a deeper, philosophical argument which owed a theoretical debt to the early works of Habermas. Further the written framework for this reconstruction, the guide, would have the status of a publicly owned and produced document against which the Directorate's race equality action in this particular field could be measured. In this respect the resultant service programme was some ten to fifteen years ahead of similar, now labelled 'best value', state sanctioned service initiatives in local government. What this illustrates, however, is my argument that race equality action at this level is very much, though often unacknowledged, pathfinder, cutting edge action which precipitates wider structural change affecting the rest of the community. The important aspect of this change, however, is the way in which it demonstrates the potential for bringing in the Black community to affect democratically the construction of services which have a substantive impact on their everyday lives. I use the term 'democratically' because the space provided by the working party and backed up by its terms of reference, which assured equal communicative status to all participants, enabled a communicatively deliberative consensus to be arrived at by all parties to a very detailed dissection and re-assembly of child care services over a space of time. Whilst the potential that existed in this specific configuration of local authority bureaucratic power, as invested in the participating personnel, and local Black community representation, illustrates the way in which Habermas' expressed hope and need for more communicative control and/or influence over bureaucracies, as exemplifying administrative systems, can be realised, there is obviously much more that could have been done to take these sorts of initiatives forward. The pity is that in the short history of the positive racialisation of Lambeth that this was the only de- and reconstruction of a service around a race equality axis which included the equal participation of the local Black community, to have been undertaken. Yet again, in illustrating that race is part of the unfulfilled completion project because it addresses the bases to overall societal inclusiveness, the core principles of the good practice guide covering areas like upholding the welfare of the Black child, active involvement of parents in all decisions, better structured and monitored placements, more attention to educational needs etc., which formed part of a submission to the relevant Home Affairs committee on children in care, can be found as universal principles in the 1989 Children Act.



The second example draws on the key features to the establishment and development of a Black Workers' Group in one of the main local government employees' trade unions' branch in Lambeth. The then National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO) branch in Lambeth reflected the changing political profile of local government through the seventies with a branch executive and officers comprised mainly of people on the political left, many of them Socialist Worker Party members. There were very few, if any Black shop stewards, and thus, because all shop stewards were de facto branch executive members, Black members of the executive. Yet, in keeping with the political complexion of the executive, there was broad support for issues of race equality, and for the council's developing foray into matters of race. Broad support, however, did not always turn into action which showed a full and proper understanding of racism and Black people's experiences therein. This is exemplified by an episode involving the branch's agreement to a proposal from what was then an equality sub-committee, to fund and sponsor a branch booklet on race equality which was to be distributed to all members. The booklet was produced in draft form within the stipulated time, but for some reason, languished for months with the branch officers responsible for publicity and publications. It took a motion of no confidence by the booklet's authors against those officers, put to one of the branch meetings, for the branch to rapidly expedite matters. This appeared to be symptomatic of the approach of the executive and officers where the residues of the seventies anti-nazi league and the SWP's incorporatist 'black-and-white-unite-and-fight' still lingered strongly. Action on race, thus, extended then as far as subsuming it under a broad equality sub-committee of the branch executive. However, it has to be acknowledged that at that time, within the overall context of the trade union movement and the more specific one of Lambeth, especially the craft and manual trade unions, this was deemed 'progressive'. Nevertheless many of the increasing numbers of Black employees were dissatisfied with what can be termed the 'class ceiling', i.e. Black needs and aspirations in relation to the trade union constantly hitting up and melting against a class conflationary barrier. One of the consequences of this was that there was soon an unofficial Black Workers' Group which met in their own time and, at that time, was still small in numbers. None of these was on the branch's equality sub-committee since membership of that was restricted to Branch Executive members. The circumstances surrounding the production of the booklet, however, provided an overlap of interests between one of the authors of the booklet, who is Black and could only be part of that equality sub-committee as an ex-officio member, and the Black Workers Group. This imbrication was the basis for a series of meetings whose aim was to secure a more structured and formal footing for the Black Workers' Group. The option agreed and put to a specially convened meeting between the group and branch officers was: for the group to be formally recognised by NALGO; for it to be open to all Black members;



where Black was being used in its widest, generic, signifying sense; for there to be a number of seats on the Branch Executive allocated to the group; and for the group to decide who and how those representatives would be elected. At that stage all that could be achieved was an informal agreement to the proposed constitution of the group since its formal ratification involved a branch rule change, and thus required a two thirds majority at a full branch meeting of all members. There are a number of cogent points which should be briefly elucidated at this stage. Firstly the group's decision to use an all inclusive notion of 'Black' moved the potential constituent basis out of the 'ethnic' ghetto of simply associating 'Black' with Afro-Caribbean or African where the latter terms are sub-coded via references to colonial anthropological measures, a process I had earlier referred to as the 'Golliwogging' of Africa. This accorded with the Race Unit's recommended race categories on monitoring, and agreed by the council, to use Black as the main signifying nomenclature for those of Afro-Caribbean, African or Asian descent on the basis that racism presents itself as injuriously colour coded, and not on the bases of culture or ethnic background. The difference, however, between the group and the council's use of 'Black' was that the group had a direct, democratic evaluation and control over its use, thus making it more contingent. Potentially this straddled a discursive line which could either open it up to a radical interpretation, or it could regress back into the ghetto. The second point is that the formal acceptance of the group would have to rely on winning the arguments at an open branch meeting. Whilst there would be support, even if some felt ambivalent, from most of the branch executive, the opinions and feelings of the wider membership could not be predicted. The fact that no Black shop stewards had yet been elected seemed to indicate, and was certainly felt by many Black members as being true, that the mostly white membership had trouble viewing Black members as being capable of holding union responsibilities. To counter this it was decided to try and get as many Black members as possible to attend that particular branch meeting. There were two reasons for this: to ensure the debate involved as many relevant Black people as possible, and, to ensure that there was a visible rhetorical Black presence in the hall as a counter to those who would want to introduce racial forces into the structure of discursive communication of that meeting. This bringing in of Black people to that meeting was achieved by the literal long march through the different sites of Lambeth local authority by the core members of the group armed with leaflets explaining why the group and meeting were important, and placing them on the desks of Black employees, sometimes engaging in argument and discussion with them. At the end of the day the arguments were won and the group formally established.

829

But there was more to the group than simply being a meeting facility for Black members of NALGO. It became a basis for solidaristic discussion



and action within the council and between Black members and the Black community outside. In so doing the group was clear that racism cuts across the systems, processes and structures which white people accept as structuring their everyday working lives. This dissolution of boundaries can be a potential for opening up the communicative discursive channels for Black people in a way that, in terms of the council's race structures, can support them, or even pre-empt them, and, in so doing, enhance the participative involvement of Black people in council decisions. For example the group, through community contacts, became aware that the council intended to evict forcibly a group of Black squatters from houses in Railton Road, then associated with the Brixton 'front-line'. It was clear that advice from their own in-house race structures was not going to be heeded. The group therefore pushed through a motion at one of the branch meetings to the effect that the branch should not only condemn this action, but also take out an advertisement in the local press outlining what the council intended to do and why it was wrong. The effect of this was immediate and important. It forced the political leadership of the council, mindful of what I regard as the race claims for political legitimation they had made, to call an urgent press conference to deny that they had intended to evict the people concerned, or would do so in the future.<sup>830</sup> The radical novelty of the group's action, that is establishing across previously accepted boundaries, a communicative link between local government employees and local community members in need to make the institution accountable, outside of the formal discursive restrictions associated with the organisational positioning of a bureaucratic employee vis-à-vis a member of the public, demonstrates how race dissolves communicative distorting forces as well as showing how substantive democratisation, as opposed to facadic, lies at the heart of resolving the 'race problem'. At the time of this episode, 1983, the first wave of Race Advisers had already moved on, two of the key ones to similar posts in the GLC. These, for various reasons, despite the radical potential of the structural position their posts were in, had operated very much within the orthodox parameters of local government employees. This was especially so in relation to elected members where Labour Party loyalty – all four advisers were Labour Party members in their respective constituencies – appeared to be an influential determinant of what was deemed acceptable behaviour. Appeals to a constituency relied mainly on the examples provided by the many individual cases of racial injustice uncovered through their work. The second wave, including the principal researcher, for the most part, had no such party political affiliations. There was also a quite active link with the Black Workers Group and outside community groups. The effect of this was to begin to recast the organisational dynamics of the Race Advisers' role in a way that emphasised the solidaristic communicative constituency base, as against the hierarchical organisational role. This recasting involved as well a fluidity of organisational boundaries so that presenting situations which presaged



blockage and communicative closure on race equality, could be re-approached via other organisational or intra- or inter-organisational routes, certainly those through which Black people could voice directly their claims for racial justice. For example management or member level stalling on any piece of key race equality initiative could be re-approached via the Black Workers Group and NALGO so that the trade union concerned would not only push for that particular initiative, but also could be seen to be leading on an important aspect of race which was supposedly a manifesto priority of the local Labour Party. There was another important aspect of this reconfiguring of the Advisers' role and that is it accelerated the deconstruction of orthodox management, certainly in relation to the managerial orthodoxy I have spelt out in an earlier chapter, and raised issues of critical alternatives, specifically in relation to race equality, and thus, in pathfinder terms, more generally in relation to the overall duties and responsibilities of the institutions of local governance vis-à-vis its citizens. This critical re-appraisal and re-alignment covered and highlighted the theoretical territory thrown up by writers like Alvesson and Wilmott in their attempts to derive a critical theory of management. The only difference being that these were real time, real practice alternatives, and not simply that of academic theorists.

There are obviously more details relating to the period of positive racialisation in Lambeth council. These will be referred to in my outline of the work done in the primary borough, X. This brief sketch, however, of the development and initial implementation of race equality structures and processes in Lambeth serves three purposes. First, it begins to demonstrate the social reality correlates which indicate the way in which the colonial in local governance can be de-colonised through opening up discursive communicative channels with and through the active participation of Black people, as a counter to the those social reality correlates of the shadowing technical learning processes for domination. To that extent it begins to demonstrate as well my theoretical and pragmatic contentions that local government can be conceived of in terms of an institutional mediation with communicative potential between lifeworld and system. Secondly it shows, as well, the potential that existed in this period for a radical rethink of local governance, certainly in terms of increasing the democratisation of local government, which appear to have been ignored by this nineties wholesale embrace of the market by the major political parties. Thirdly it provides both the empirical and meso-theoretical templates within which to examine the target borough in this research study.